Military Intervention

in the campaign “Non-Recognition and the Attempted Military Invasion: Moscow's Response to the Independence of the Chechen Republic (September-November 1991)”

On 7 November 1991 the RSFSR president Yeltsin signed decree No. 178, point 1: "To introduce, from 05:00 on 9 November 1991 until 05:00 on 9 December 1991, a state of emergency on the whole territory of the Chechen-Ingush Republic". By the same decree he imposed a curfew, banned rallies and strikes, ordered "the temporary seizure of firearms and cold weapons from citizens, enterprises and organisations", searches of vehicles and dwellings, and "the expulsion of violators of public order who are not residents of the given locality to their place of permanent residence or beyond the territory of the Chechen-Ingush Republic at their own expense", and instructed the minister of internal affairs and the chairman of the KGB (predecessor of today's FSB) of the RSFSR to submit "proposals on bringing in additional forces"[1]. On 8 November the parliament of the Chechen Republic, chaired by Khusein Akhmadov, demanded that Yeltsin "within 24 hours withdraw all armed formations from the territory of the sovereign Chechen Republic" and resolved "to inform the parliaments and peoples of the world of the armed interference of the leadership of Russia in the internal affairs of the sovereign Chechen Republic"[2]. The journalist Tsyganok, in the article "Ten Days That Cancelled the Peace", quotes the summary of the RSFSR ministry of internal affairs for the morning of 10 November: "To ensure the regime of the state of emergency, units of the MVD [ministry of internal affairs] of the RSFSR with a total strength of about 1.2 thousand men have been sent to the North Caucasus region"[3]. According to the chronicle of events, on 8-9 November "two military transport aircraft with special-forces detachments on board, but without weapons, landed at the Khankala military airfield near Grozny… the airfield is blockaded by Dzh. Dudaev's guardsmen, leaving the aircraft is impossible, so on the morning of 9 November the aircraft fly away"[4]. The National Guard of Chechnya and unarmed townspeople surrounded the building of the ministry of internal affairs in Grozny; on 9 November the first deputy minister of internal affairs of the RSFSR Komissarov reported to Moscow: "We are blockaded in the building of the MVD [ministry of internal affairs] of the ChIR [Chechen-Ingush Republic]. We are surrounded by a crowd of about 4,000 people, fuel tankers are standing opposite"[3]. On 9 November the Moscow leadership recorded that "the heads of the executive bodies (Barannikov [minister of internal affairs of the USSR], Bakatin [chairman of the KGB of the USSR], Komissarov [first deputy minister of internal affairs of the RSFSR]) in a difficult critical situation failed to carry out their direct official duties"[5]. The nominal head of the USSR, Gorbachev, refused the RSFSR the use of union troops, and on 10 November at 10:45 the internal troops (predecessors of today's Rosgvardiya) began their withdrawal from Grozny[3]. On 11 November the deputies in Moscow resolved "to recognise the approval of the Decree as impossible", established "a special regime of entry into and exit from the Chechen-Ingush Republic, excluding the import and export of weapons" and ordered "a parliamentary and an internal (through the MVD of the RSFSR and the KGB of the RSFSR) investigation to establish the persons responsible for taking insufficiently prepared political and military-technical decisions on the introduction of the state of emergency"[6].

References