A procedure is a historical example of a colonizer using a technique or sub-technique in the course of a specific campaign against a specific people. They are listed below and can be filtered by the peoples affected by Russian aggression.
The invasion by the regular Russian army and massive missile and air strikes on Ukrainian cities: "On 24 February 2022, the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, announced his decision to conduct a 'special military operation' in Ukraine to seek its 'demilitarization and denazification'. On the same day, Russian troops crossed various border points into Ukraine, including through Belarus, and launched attacks by land, air and sea"[1]. The UN Commission investigated the events of February-March 2022 in Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv and Sumy Provinces[1].
Deliberate mass killings of people without regard to their ethnic origin, solely on the basis of their Ukrainian citizenship and affiliation with the Ukrainian state[2].
Total information control and a ban on calling the invasion a war - officially it was declared a "special military operation" whose stated aims were "demilitarization and denazification"[1]. The informational cover for energy terror rested on the "response" narrative: "There is a lot of noise now about our strikes on the energy infrastructure of the neighboring country. Yes, we are doing this. But who started it?"[3].
Deliberate restoration of old Soviet or imperial names to captured cities and streets (in particular, the renaming of Bakhmut to Artemovsk) in order to erase Ukrainian national memory and visually integrate them into the space of the Russian Federation.
Coercing residents of the occupied territories into taking Russian passports: "the policy of mass conferral of Russian citizenship to residents of occupied areas of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions exacerbated the coercive environment there," and "those who refused Russian passports were denied access to public services, notably social security, healthcare, and education, and risked unemployment" and "faced a heightened risk of arbitrary detention when crossing checkpoints"[6].
Artificial alteration of the demographic composition of the population in the occupied territories (for example, in destroyed Mariupol) by incentivizing the relocation of citizens of the Russian Federation and their mass purchase of housing, against the backdrop of squeezing out the indigenous residents.
From April 2022 the Russian occupation administrations marked the seized territories with imperial signs - in stone and on paper. In Kherson oblast more than 110 Lenin monuments had been dismantled before the invasion, with practically none left; after the occupation the invaders erected ten new ones: the first in Henichesk in April 2022 - the first Lenin monument on Ukrainian territory since 2014 - and at the end of that same month a monument was returned to its pedestal by the city council in Nova Kakhovka[7]. In Mariupol on 5 May 2022 a monument to a woman with a red flag was unveiled, and the ceremony was published in his Telegram channel by Andrei Turchak, secretary of the general council of "United Russia"; the Square of the Warrior-Liberators, named in honor of those who freed the city from the Nazis, was given back its Soviet name of "Lenin Komsomol Square" by the occupiers[8]. In parallel the occupation administration papered the territory with banners: in Kherson and Nova Kakhovka hung Russian-language billboards reading "Russia is here forever!," "Kherson - forever with Russia," "Kherson is a Russian city," and for them they bought, for twenty cents on a stock-photo site, a picture by the Ukrainian photographer Anna Pasichnyk - her son Yaroslav with a friend in vyshyvankas in a rapeseed field near Kyiv - painting a Russian flag in behind the children's backs[9]. In Balakliia in Kharkiv oblast the occupiers pasted over a city banner: first they hung "Ukraine and Russia are 'one'" on top of it, then a poster with a tricolor reading "We are one people with Russia!". On 10 September 2022 Ukrainian soldiers tore the tricolor down - and beneath it emerged the lines of Shevchenko that had stood there through the entire occupation: "Fight - and you shall prevail! God is helping you! Truth is with you, glory is with you, and holy freedom!"[10]. The signs held only until de-occupation: on 11 November 2022, a "Russia is here forever" poster in liberated Bilozerka in the Kherson region was torn down by local residents - the video was published by the Telegram channel "Nikolaevsky Vanek"[11].
The publication of the manifesto "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians" (July 2021), constructing a pseudo-historical myth: "Russians and Ukrainians are one people, a single whole," while modern borders are declared the result of the fact that "the Bolsheviks' actions in severing from Russia its historical territories are not considered a criminal act"[12]. The same article describes how Lenin personally "persuaded" the leaders of the Donetsk-Kryvyi Rih republic "to act within Soviet Ukraine," and how the Central Committee resolved "to create at the congress 'one government for all of Ukraine'"[12]. On the eve of the invasion the thesis was taken to its limit: in his address of February 21, 2022 Putin declared that "modern Ukraine was entirely and wholly created by Russia, or, to be more precise, by Bolshevik, communist Russia," and called the country "Ukraine named after Vladimir Ilyich Lenin" - "He is its author and architect"[13].
The official denial of the Ukrainian nation's right to independent statehood: the article by the head of the Russian state declares outright that "Ukraine's genuine sovereignty is possible precisely in partnership with Russia," while "the wall that has arisen in recent years between Russia and Ukraine" is declared a split of "between parts of what is essentially one historical and spiritual space"[12].
An article by D. Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia's Security Council, in Kommersant (11 October 2021) marginalizing the Ukrainian leadership: "it is pointless for us to deal with vassals. One must do business with the suzerain"; "at the head of Ukraine stand weak people who strive only to line their own pockets," and negotiations with them are "absolutely pointless"[14]. In the same text the Ukrainian president was likened to a hypothetical Jew serving in the SS[14].
Total indoctrination of Russian society with the ideas of the philosopher I. Ilyin (so-called "white fascism") and the transformation of the "Russian World" concept into a state ideology (rashism) that justifies the metropole's cultural superiority and existential right to violence against its neighbors[2].
The seizure of Sloviansk by an armed group that had crossed the border, and the formation of the separatist "DNR"/"LNR": the detachment's commander openly admitted that "in practice it was our detachment that set in motion the flywheel of the war that is still going on," and that "it was I, after all, who pulled the trigger of the war"[15]. In parallel, "groups of armed men unlawfully carried out a well-organized and coordinated seizure of public buildings and police and security service offices"[16]. The "republic's" leadership was from the outset dispatched from Moscow: "Alexander Boroday - the first prime minister of the DNR, who in 2014 handed over his powers to Alexander Zakharchenko," a Muscovite raised "in an intelligentsia Moscow family"[17].
A massive campaign of fabricating fakes to dehumanize Ukrainians: on state television it was claimed that "Ukrainian armed forces herded city residents to the central square and publicly executed a small boy and his mother," yet "there is no evidence to support Pyshniak's claim," and the residents of Sloviansk who were interviewed did not confirm the story[18]. The same method produced the fabricated "death of a 10-year-old girl" in the Petrovskyi district of Donetsk (March 2015): BBC correspondents on the ground established that no such girl had ever existed[19]. In parallel ran an operation to conceal responsibility for the destruction of flight MH17: the Russian Ministry of Defense "made a series of self-contradictory claims blaming Ukraine, rather than Russia or Russian-led separatists, for the Boeing 777's shoot down," while a deputy defense minister publicly repeated "a fabricated claim that originated on Twitter of how a Spanish air traffic controller named Carlos saw two Ukrainian fighter jets near MH17"[20].
The use of a hacker group linked to the security services to compromise Ukrainian artillerymen's software: "the filename 'Попр-Д30.apk' was linked to a legitimate application which was initially developed domestically within Ukraine by an officer of the 55th Artillery Brigade named Yaroslav Sherstuk," and "in-depth reverse engineering revealed the APK contained an Android variant of X-Agent" - an implant whose exclusive operator is FANCY BEAR[21]. The same toolkit was used in cyberattacks on the Ukrainian power grid in the winters of 2015 and 2016[22][23].
The overt crossing of the state border by regular Russian troops in the summer and autumn of 2014 to save the separatists from defeat: the "DNR" commander admitted that the decisive role was played by Russian servicemen who came "on leave" - "it was mostly 'vacationers' who advanced on Mariupol. When they left, both the front line and the opportunities became precarious"[15]. The offensive resulted in heavy losses for the Ukrainian army near Ilovaisk and Debaltseve. The presence of regular troops continued into 2015: the GRU men captured near Shchastia were "soldiers of the 3rd Separate Guards Special Purpose Brigade of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, who arrived on the territory of Ukraine on March 26 and were quartered in Luhansk"[24].
Mass unlawful detentions and abductions of civilians in the occupied territories: "armed groups continued to commit abductions, to subject people to physical and psychological torture and ill-treatment," and "people were abducted for ransom, for forced labor, and for exchange for fighters captured by the Ukrainian authorities"[16].
The systematic use of torture and physical violence against civilians for a pro-Ukrainian stance: the UN recorded that "armed groups continued to commit abductions, to subject people to physical and psychological torture and ill-treatment, and to commit other grave human rights violations"[16]. Abducted Automaidan activists were held in a basement where they were "allegedly beaten several times, with their hands bound," and their hair was cut off in reprisal[25].
The physical elimination of legitimate representatives of local government who resisted the occupation: "the mutilated body of Volodomyr Rybak, a member of the 'Batkivshchyna' party and deputy of the Municipal Council of Horlivka (Donetsk region), was found near the village of Raihorodok," and "Rybak was abducted on April 17 by pro-Russians, following a pro-Ukrainian gathering in Horlivka. He was then tortured and murdered"[25].
Engagement in combat operations of Russian neo-Nazi groups (such as the "Rusich" sabotage and reconnaissance group under the command of A. Milchakov), whose ringleaders openly called for unmotivated sadistic violence against civilians ("Slaughter the homeless, the puppies, and the children!")[2].
An attempted armed seizure of power in the spring of 2014 by storming regional administrations: the UN recorded that already "in mid-April 2014" "groups of armed men unlawfully carried out a well-organized and coordinated seizure of public buildings and police and security service offices in towns and villages of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions," and "in order to retain control of the seized areas these groups erected barricades and checkpoints"[16]. In Kharkiv the coup was quickly suppressed.
The instigation of armed clashes in Odesa on May 2, 2014: the UN records the violence committed "in Odesa on 2 May 2014 during clashes between supporters of unity and supporters of the federalization of Ukraine, as a result of which 48 people died, mostly supporters of the country's federalization," and notes that "no one has yet been held to account"[16]. The culmination was the fire in the Trade Union Building where activists had taken refuge: the UN monitoring mission listed among the key uninvestigated questions "what caused the fire in the Trade Union building" and "who are the perpetrators of the killings"[26].
The exploitation of the Odesa tragedy to build a state propaganda myth and invert the roles: the actual picture, per the UN, is clashes "between supporters of unity and supporters of the federalization of Ukraine, as a result of which 48 people died," while the investigation remains incomplete and "no one has yet been held to account"[16]. The tragedy was used as moral justification for further aggression - by the same device as the "crucified boy" fake, for which "there is no evidence to support Pyshniak's claim"[18].
The use of regular troops without insignia to establish control over the peninsula. A year later V. Putin admitted it on his call-in show of 17 April 2014: "behind the backs of Crimea's self-defense forces, our servicemen, of course, stood. They acted very correctly, but… decisively and professionally"[27]. Ukrainian garrisons on the peninsula were blockaded and disarmed, as Putin himself admitted: "and the way the Ukrainian units were disarmed - all of this was done so swiftly that it seemed it had been prepared for an incredibly long time"[27].
The official denial of Russian troops' participation during the operation – and Putin's later admission (call-in show, 17 April 2014) that the denial was a lie: "behind the backs of Crimea's self-defense forces, our servicemen, of course, stood"[27]. In the same broadcast an interlocutor congratulated him on having "honestly said that the 'little green men' are our peaceful military"[27].
The installation of a controlled administration under military cover: the decisions of the Crimean parliament were taken in conditions where "behind the backs of Crimea's self-defense forces, our servicemen, of course, stood"[27]. The UN General Assembly declared the ensuing referendum void and confirmed that it "was not authorized by Ukraine"[28]. OHCHR recorded the "election" scene itself: overnight into 27 February "armed groups without insignia took over the buildings of the local government and parliament," and "on 27 February, members of the Parliament of Crimea, in the presence of gunmen, dismissed the local Government and elected Sergey Aksenov as the Head of Crimea"[29].
The manufacturing of an appearance of mass pro-Russian mobilization on the peninsula: behind the "self-defense forces," in whose name the operation was conducted, stood Russian troops, as Putin admitted on 17 April 2014: "behind the backs of Crimea's self-defense forces, our servicemen, of course, stood"[28]. Rally and "volunteer" crowds supplied the picture of a popular impulse whose legal significance the UN rejected[27].
The legal formalization of the territory's severance: the treaty on "accession" was signed on March 18, 2014, and the law ratifying it was "Adopted by the State Duma on March 20, 2014, approved by the Federation Council on March 21, 2014"[30].
The use of economic blackmail and promises of a loan together with a gas discount to coerce V. Yanukovych into derailing the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU: on December 17, 2013, a reduction of the gas price "to 268.5 dollars per thousand cubic meters" (instead of 410) was announced, along with the fact that "Ukraine, under the bilateral agreements, will receive 15 billion dollars from the Russian National Welfare Fund, selling Moscow its government securities for that amount." Putin stressed: "We consider this a temporary solution, bearing in mind that long-term, long-lasting agreements must and will be reached"[31].
An attempt to legalize the marginalization of the state language in the regions: the law "On the Principles of State Language Policy" (the Kivalov-Kolesnichenko law) allowed record-keeping to be transferred to "regional languages," effectively entrenching the dominance of Russian in the Russified regions[32].
An attempt to strike a deal with the US leader over Kyiv's head in order to block Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration under the threat of its dismemberment: Ukraine's accession to NATO would create "a field of conflict for you and us, long-term confrontation," while Moscow, relying on anti-NATO forces, "would be working on stripping NATO of the possibility of enlarging. Russia would be creating problems there all the time"[33]. As retold by Kommersant's source from the summit itself: "You understand, George, that Ukraine is not even a state! What is Ukraine? Part of its territory is Eastern Europe, and part - a considerable part - was gifted by us!" - with a transparent hint "that Russia could begin the severance of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine"[34].
The deliberate injection of false historical narratives into the international arena: Ukraine, according to the Russian leader, "is not a nation built in a natural manner" and "an artificial country created back in Soviet times," and its territories were supposedly gifts - "In the 1920s and 1930s Ukraine obtained territory from Russia -- that's the eastern part of the country. In 1956, the Crimean peninsula was transferred to Ukraine"[33]. From this the thesis of its possible disintegration was derived: "the country could just split apart"[33].
Direct energy blackmail and the cut-off of gas supplies at the height of winter: on January 1, 2006 - "at 10.00am Moscow time on January 1, 2006, Gazprom cut off gas supplies to Ukraine"[35]; on January 1, 2009 - "Russian exports to Ukraine were cut off on 1 January," after which exports to the EU were "drastically reduced on 6 January and cut completely from 7 January," and in the worst-affected Balkan countries a humanitarian emergency ensued, with "parts of the populations unable to heat their homes"[36].
The imposition of corrupt gas-supply schemes through intermediary companies: Moscow "used a series of intermediary trading companies (Itera from 1998, Eural Trans Gas from 2003, Rosukrenergo (RUE) from 2005) to transport, and sometimes to supply, the gas to Ukraine," a practice that "was long criticized in European government circles and by corporate governance bodies (where there was concern about their opacity)"[36]. RUE's co-owner Dmytro Firtash told the US ambassador in December 2008 outright that "He acknowledged ties to Russian organized crime figure Seymon Mogilevich, stating he needed Mogilevich's approval to get into business in the first place"[37].
An attempt to physically eliminate the leader of the democratic opposition V. Yushchenko at the height of the election campaign by dioxin poisoning: in late December 2004 "a patient presented with TCDD poisoning; the levels in his blood serum (108000 pg/g lipid weight) were more than 50 000-fold greater than those in the general population"[38]. The poisoning led to severe disfigurement of the candidate's face.
The conduct of an aggressive information campaign in favor of "their" candidate with the direct participation of the head of the Russian state: live on three Ukrainian television channels two weeks before the vote, praise was voiced for the candidate's government - "V. Yanukovych's government achieved more: they managed to fill this growth with good quality. That is, Ukraine's economy is developing in a diversified way"[39]. In parallel, opponents were demonized with accusations of nationalism and pro-fascist views.
The instigation of the threat of splitting the country in response to the protests: at the congress in Sievierodonetsk on November 28, 2004, Regions faction leader R. Bohatyriova gave a direct promise of a separatist referendum - "we will not go to it with you, we will hold a referendum on the creation of a South-Eastern state (ovation, applause)"[40]. The presence of Russian officials lent this Moscow's sanction: the mayor of Moscow Yu. Luzhkov reminded the hall from the rostrum that "our President of Russia Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin was the first to congratulate Viktor Fedorovych Yanukovych on his victory"[40].
An armed seizure of power: the GKChP statement of 18 August 1991 announced the transfer of the USSR president's powers: "In connection with the impossibility, for reasons of health, of Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev performing the duties of President of the USSR and the transfer… of the powers of the President of the USSR to Vice-President Gennady Ivanovich Yanayev… to form the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR"[41]. The putsch was timed to derail the treaty-based reconstitution of the Union: "The formation of the GKChP was preceded by the so-called Novo-Ogaryovo process - negotiations begun on April 23, 1991 by USSR President Gorbachev at his suburban residence of Novo-Ogaryovo with the leaders of the union republics on the signing of a new Union Treaty"[42] - the coup cut this process short.
The immediate elimination of the independent press: GKChP resolution No. 2 of 19 August 1991 ordered "to temporarily limit the list of published central, Moscow city, and oblast socio-political editions to the following newspapers: 'Trud,' 'Rabochaya tribuna,' 'Izvestia,' 'Pravda,' 'Krasnaya zvezda,' 'Sovetskaya Rossiya,' 'Moskovskaya pravda,' 'Leninskoye znamya,' 'Selskaya zhizn'"[43] – anything not on the list could not appear.
The union center deployed an international platform against Ukrainian sovereignty: Bush publicly called the striving for independence a "suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred"[44] – the speech went down in history as the "Chicken Kiev speech."
A referendum with a vague formulation to legitimize union control: the ballot of the 17 March 1991 referendum asked voters to endorse "the preservation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics"[45] – even though the content of the "renewed federation" was nowhere defined, while the result was then used as a mandate for a new union treaty.
The use of brute force by party activists against Rukh activists: when Rukh members attempted to install a cross on the grave of those executed near Bazar, "the activists were not allowed into the village" "with the help of KGB men and provocations about the Rukh members' 'Banderite' intentions"; some participants "were dragged out of the car, beaten, and the flags were torn to shreds," while the role of "protesting peasants" was played by men in disguise: "in reality these were communist party activists from nearby districts"[46]. The political prisoner Vasyl Ovsienko ended up in the hospital: "the communists thrashed me near Bazar on November 17"[47].
The forcible neutralization of movement activists at the hands of the security structures and party apparatus: the dispersal of commemorative actions with beatings ("dragged out of the car, beaten") with the participation of the KGB and the militia[46], the hospitalization of the beaten political prisoner Vasyl Ovsienko[47], and the death of Rukh member Yevhen Melenivsky - after a "conversation" at the regional MVD directorate he "died on his way home"[48], and later - the law enforcement bodies' demonstrative disinterest in solving crimes against Rukh functionaries: they "demonstratively displayed disinterest in solving the crime"[49].
The forced disappearance of a key functionary of the movement: "on the night of January 15–16, 1994, two armed unknown men burst into the NRU secretariat in Kyiv, took some documents, and searched for Boichyshyn" - Mykhailo Boichyshyn, head of the Rukh secretariat, was never seen again. The investigation was sabotaged: law enforcement "at first was in no hurry to accept the report of the politician's disappearance, and then demonstratively displayed disinterest in solving the crime," and "the investigators were interested not so much in the circumstances of the attack on the Secretariat and Boichyshyn's disappearance as in the party's financing"[49].
Deliberate concealment by the union leadership in Moscow of the scale of the Chornobyl NPP disaster from its own population and international organizations, depriving Ukrainians of information about the level of the radiation threat[50].
Creation of an artificial picture of radiological well-being and the criminal, forced marching of people into the May Day demonstrations in Kyiv under radioactive fallout to mask the catastrophe[50].
Administrative pressure on schools: pursuant to the resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers of 13 October 1978 No. 835, the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, by its resolution of 2 November 1978 No. 518, obliged the ministry of education of the Ukrainian SSR to introduce, from the 1980/81 school year, the study of the Russian language in the first grades of general-education schools with Ukrainian as the language of instruction[51].
The ideological exaltation of the metropole's language: the all-Union scientific-theoretical conference "The Russian Language — the Language of Friendship and Cooperation of the Peoples of the USSR" (Tashkent, 22–24 May 1979) adopted detailed recommendations on Russification - from organizing "the study of the Russian language in the senior groups of preschool institutions" to "the use of the Russian language in lessons in other school subjects" in the senior grades of national schools[52].
Financial privileges for teaching in the metropole's language: pursuant to the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers of 26 May 1983 No. 473 "On additional measures for improving the study of the Russian language in general-education schools and other educational institutions of the union republics," the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, by a resolution of 10 June 1983 - signed by Shcherbytsky and Liashko, stamped "Not for the press" - raised from 1984 by 15 percent the salary rates of teachers of Russian language and literature and allowed classes of more than 25 pupils to be split into subgroups for Russian lessons[52][53].
Mass arrests of members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group and the fabrication of criminal cases: Vasyl Stus was "arrested on January 12, 1972 together with other Ukrainian writer-human rights defenders: I. Svitlychny, Ye. Sverstiuk, Ihor and Iryna Kalynets," and after joining the Helsinki Group in October 1979 he was "arrested a second time on May 14, 1980" and sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment and 5 years of exile[54]. He "died in the punishment cell of special-regime camp VS-389/36" and was buried "in a nameless grave under No. 9 in the camp cemetery"[54].
Use of state healthcare institutions for the politically motivated diagnosing of dissenters (the diagnosis of "sluggish schizophrenia") and their indefinite confinement in psychiatric hospitals[55].
Administration of destructive pharmaceutical drugs (neuroleptics) as a means of physical and psychological pressure on healthy human rights defenders in closed institutions[55].
Targeted arrests of the new Ukrainian intelligentsia, dissidents, and protest participants (including after the premiere of "Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors") to suppress the nascent resistance[56].
Use of political trials, interrogations, and administrative pressure by the KGB on the signatories of the "Letter of 139" to create an atmosphere of fear in cultural circles: "Administrative repressions against the 'signatories' began, along with KGB pressure. Rumors spread across Kyiv and Ukraine about the existence of an underground terrorist Banderite organization run by Western intelligence services"[57].
The legislative transfer of schools through "freedom of choice": the union Law of December 24, 1958 left the language of instruction to the republics[58], and the Law of the Ukrainian SSR of April 17, 1959 wrote into Article 9: "Instruction in the schools of the Ukrainian SSR is conducted in the pupils' native language. It is for the parents to decide to which school, with which language of instruction, to send their children" - the study of a language not taught in a given school became optional[59].
The ideological course toward erasing nations: the Third Program of the CPSU, adopted by the 22nd Congress in October 1961, announced "a new stage in the development of national relations in the USSR, characterized by the further drawing together of nations and the achievement of their complete unity," and called "the effacement of national distinctions, especially of language distinctions," merely "a considerably longer process than the effacement of class boundaries"[60].
The material sign of the "merging of nations" was erected in Pereiaslav in the Kyiv region, the city of the Pereiaslav Rada: "on 8 October 1961, a majestic monument in honor of the 300th anniversary of the reunification of Ukraine with Russia was unveiled on B. Khmelnytsky Square"[61]. The authorities unveiled the sign themselves: according to the newsreel Radianska Ukraina No. 49, the opening rally was addressed by Petro Shelest, first secretary of the Kyiv obkom of the CPU, and Pankratov, a secretary of the Moscow obkom of the party - the metropole spoke at the unveiling in its own voice[62]. The composition consisted of two female figures representing Ukraine and Russia and three bas-reliefs with medallions: "a torch, 1654; a hammer and sickle in the rays of the sun, 1917; the Order of Victory, 1945"[63]. The sign's purpose is recorded in its own protection passport: "The monument is a symbol of the eternal, unbreakable friendship and the indestructible monolithic unity of the fraternal peoples - Ukrainian and Russian…"[64]. Four years after the unveiling, the sign was taken under state protection by the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR of 21 July 1965 No. 711 "On the approval of the list of monuments of art, history and archaeology of the Ukrainian SSR"[65][66]. The pedestal bore the inscription "Forever together - forever with the Russian people"; in early December 2021 it was removed by unknown persons[67], and the monument itself was dismantled on 7 July 2022 - by an order of the Ministry of Culture that struck the monument, protection No. 5894-Ko, off the register "due to the loss of the subject of protection"[68].
A state campaign to construct a historical myth: the "Theses on the 300th Anniversary of the Reunification of Ukraine with Russia," approved by the CPSU Central Committee, declared that "by this historic act was completed the long struggle of the freedom-loving Ukrainian people against foreign enslavers for reunification with the Russian people in a single Russian state"[69] – the annexation of 1654 was retroactively rewritten as the goal and outcome of a national struggle.
The imposition of a concept of unbreakable unity instead of recognizing a distinct nation: per the Theses, "by the act of reunification the Ukrainian people consolidated its close and unbreakable historical bond with the Russian people, in whom it found a great ally, a faithful friend and defender"[69]. The celebrations and the transfer of Crimea "taking into account the commonality of the economy, territorial proximity, and close economic and cultural ties"[70] served the same frame.
The redrawing of internal borders by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's resolution of 19 February 1954: "To approve the joint submission of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR on the transfer of the Crimean oblast from the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic"[70] – the decision was taken in Moscow, without any expression of will by the peninsula's inhabitants. Behind the "commonality of the economy" stood the desire to shift the peninsula, ruined by deportation and war, onto the books of the Ukrainian SSR: "Moscow admits ever more openly: the Crimean region is a problem territory that the union center does not know how to sustain"[71].
The jubilee was fixed with a material sign in Pereiaslav in the Kyiv region, on the very square where the rada had taken place in 1654. The sign went up in the course of the jubilee reconstruction of the town ordered by the republic's authorities: "in connection with the preparation for the celebration of the 300th anniversary of the reunification of Ukraine with Russia," the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR allocated 20 million rubles for the reconstruction of Pereiaslav-Khmelnytskyi, the reconstruction plan was developed under the direction of the architect Volodymyr Zabolotnyi, and in May 1954, "on the square where the historic Pereiaslav Rada took place (now Reunification Square), an obelisk with a memorial plaque was erected"[61]. On the plaque, beneath a relief of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, a text is cast: "On this square, on 8 (18) January 1654, the Pereiaslav Rada took place, which, expressing the will of the Ukrainian people, unanimously adopted the historic decision on the reunification of Ukraine with Russia"[72]. The sign did not merely mark the spot: it declared the decision unanimous and expressive of the people's will, fixing this version in bronze on the very square where it all happened.
Use of regular troops and tanks to suppress revolts of Ukrainian political prisoners in the concentration camp system. In Kengir, tanks crushed the unarmed: "About 200 Ukrainian women joined hands and marched against the tanks. But the tanks did not stop and one by one overcame the living phalanx. And the MVD men rushed to the barracks, shooting everyone they encountered"[73].
Total ideological control over art and the press, the banning of works and the vilification of writers for alleged "bourgeois nationalism." The campaign culminated in the verdict in the case of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee: "on July 18, 1952 the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court passed death sentences on 13 people, including 5 natives of Ukraine, well-known Jewish writers and poets"[75].
The staging of public political persecution (attacks on Rylsky, Sosiura, Yanovsky, the campaign against "cosmopolitans"), instilling an atmosphere of fear. Its outcome was the execution of the defendants in the JAC case: "on August 12, 1952 they were all executed"[75].
Fabricated repressions against figures of the Ukrainian and Jewish intelligentsia: in the case of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, "on July 18, 1952 the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court passed death sentences on 13 people, including 5 natives of Ukraine, the well-known Jewish writers and poets D. Bergelson, D. Hofshtein, L. Kvitko, P. Markish, I. Fefer. On August 12, 1952 they were all executed"[75].
Regular chekist-military operations by the NKVD and MGB to sweep western Ukrainian villages: the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR T. Strokach personally "directed and coordinated operational-chekist operations to liquidate the underground of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and units of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, and mass deportations of the population in Western Ukraine"[54]. Already "on April 5, 1944, on the basis of a directive of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR, a scheme of arrests and deportation of OUN–UPA members was worked out"[76].
Extrajudicial killings of civilians in the course of suppressing the insurgency: the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee itself admitted, in its resolution "On the Political and Economic Situation of the Western Oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR" of May 26, 1953: "From 1944 through 1952, up to 500 thousand people in the western oblasts of Ukraine were subjected to various kinds of repression, including over 134 thousand arrested, over 153 thousand killed, and over 203 thousand deported forever from the Ukrainian SSR"[77][78] – the authorities did not divide the killed into insurgents and civilians, and already on July 2, 1953, after Beria's arrest, the resolution itself was revoked as conducive to "the activization of bourgeois-nationalist elements"[77]. Terror was also waged by disguised MGB "special groups" acting under the guise of the UPA: the military prosecutor of the MVD troops of the Ukrainian district, Kosharsky, in his report to Khrushchev (February 15, 1949), cited "examples of beatings, rapes and robberies of the population" by agent-fighters and stated: "the actions of the so-called MGB special groups are of a pronounced bandit, anti-Soviet character and, of course, cannot be justified by any operational considerations"[79].
The creation of an atmosphere of total fear through the bloody provocations of NKVD special groups operating in the guise of the UPA: People's Commissar Strokach "initiated the formation of special groups of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR from former partisans for the struggle against the UPA" and "personally interrogated the captured leaders of the OUN networks of Western Ukraine"[54]. The terror was also demonstrative: "one of the forms of struggle was the policy of intimidating OUN and UPA members and the local population: open trials and executions, putting the bodies of the dead on public display, and destroying insurgent graves"[80].
The coordination of actions with the pro-Soviet government of Poland to destroy the Ukrainian underground: Operation "Vistula," "as a deportation action, was elaborated in detail and carried out by the Polish authorities," but its execution "was coordinated with the party-Soviet organs of power of the USSR" - the Soviet command transferred "from Lviv oblast one tank division and special NKVD units, and blocked the Ukrainian-Polish border with border troops"[81].
The forcible removal of insurgents' families to Siberia and the deportation of the Ukrainians of Zakerzonnia: the removal of "bandit accomplices" with their entire families began at once - already in the summer of 1944 "more than 17,000 people were carried off to Krasnoyarsk Krai"[76]; in all, in 1944–52, 203,662 people were removed to special settlements, among them "representatives of the families of members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and soldiers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and their sympathizers — 182,543 people"[76]. Operation "Vistula" was carried out in order to "deprive it of socio-economic and moral-psychological support from the local Ukrainian population," and ended in the scattering of the community: the authorities rid themselves of the Ukrainian population, "dispersing about 150 thousand people"[81].
Mass arrests of UPA fighters, OUN members, and those suspected of aiding them, followed by dispatch to the GULAG camps, upon which the regime placed "the isolation of 'unreliable elements'" as one of its key tasks[78]. During Operation "Vistula," for civilians suspected of assisting the underground there was provision for "the introduction of courts-martial and concentration camps, in particular at Jaworzno"[81]. By 1951 Ukrainians had become the second-largest nation of the GULAG: according to the agency's own statistics, the "National composition of GULAG prisoners (as of January 1, 1951)" counted 506,221 Ukrainians out of some 2.5 million prisoners - about 20%[82].
The use of captured resistance members and deportees as free labor: the tasks of the GULAG included "using them as cheap labor and transferring them, as needed, from place to place"[78]; deportees from Western Ukraine were sent to special settlements and hard labor - in the summer of 1944 alone "more than 17,000 people were carried off to Krasnoyarsk Krai"[76].
The USSR built its accusations of Chechen "banditry" on falsified statistics: an inspection by the central apparatus of the Soviet NKVD (predecessor of today's FSB) in the summer of 1943 showed that of 213 "bandits" reported killed, only 22 people had ever been on file; at the end of August 1943 the files listed 359 members of "bandit groups" for the entire Checheno-Ingushetia[83]. On 9 November 1943 Deputy People's Commissar (Minister) of Internal Affairs Kobulov submitted to People's Commissar (Minister) of Internal Affairs Beria a report "On the Situation in the Districts of the Checheno-Ingush ASSR" "with deliberately false figures alleging a mass presence of active bandits and deserters. 'Kobulov! A very good memorandum,' Beria noted on the report, and set in motion the preparation of Operation 'Chechevitsa'"[83]. Beria lied in his final report as well - he informed the leadership of the USSR that the deportation had passed "without serious instances of resistance or incidents"; historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "In his report to the country's leadership the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs lied outright: the deportation of the Chechens was accompanied by numerous incidents and mass killings of peaceful residents"[83]. The Chechen historian A. G. Avtorkhanov, writing about this in emigration in 1952, took the official version apart point by point. The motive announced by the decree of 25 June 1946 he quotes verbatim - "Many Chechens and Ingush, incited by German agents, voluntarily joined formations organized by the Germans and, together with the German armed forces, took up arms against the Red Army... Therefore the Checheno-Ingush Republic is to be liquidated and its population deported" - and calls it calculated "for the ignorance of the Soviet people and the unawareness of the West"[84]. Against this version he sets two facts: "during the Second World War not once did a German soldier set foot on the territory of the Checheno-Ingush Republic, save for the brief occupation of the border settlement of Malgobek, populated by Russians," and "the Chechens and Ingush were physically unable to join German formations, since there was no compulsory conscription in Checheno-Ingushetia"[84].
On 29 January 1944 People's Commissar (Minister) of Internal Affairs Beria approved the principal document of Operation "Chechevitsa" - the "Instruction on the Procedure for the Deportation of the Chechens and Ingush"[85]; on 31 January the State Defense Committee of the USSR issued two resolutions on the deportation and the destinations[83]. The first laid out the reception of the deported at the places of exile: the Soviet NKVD (predecessor of today's FSB) was instructed to send "in February-March of this year, for resettlement, up to 400 thousand people to the Kazakh SSR and up to 90 thousand people to the Kirghiz SSR," and in every destination district it was prescribed "to organize troikas consisting of the chairman of the district executive committee, the secretary of the district party committee and the head of the district branch [RO] of the NKVD"[86]. The second resolution prescribed that people be transported "at the tariff for the transportation of prisoners"[87]. On 7 February, at a meeting with Beria, "concrete tasks were set for organizing the deportation of 459,486 Chechens and Ingush - 97,635 families," and the date was fixed: 22-23 February[88]. The colonizer massed in the republic, write historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov, "up to 19 thousand officers of the NKVD and NKGB and 100 thousand combat-ready soldiers of the internal troops... over 15 thousand railway wagons and hundreds of locomotives, 6 thousand trucks"[83] - under a cover story: "rumors were spread about large-scale tactical exercises in the mountains of Chechnya and Ingushetia"[88]. On 23 February, the Soviet military holiday ("Red Army Day"), NKVD troops rounded up the men - historian Z. S. Isakieva writes: "Instead of the clubs, the men were driven (and marched) to assembly points under reinforced armed guard"[88]. The Chechen historian A. G. Avtorkhanov cites the testimony of a Russian student eyewitness, printed in the émigré journal Prometheus in 1949, about the evening of 23 February in the auls: "That evening the Red Army men lit fires on the aul squares and began singing and dancing. The aul residents, suspecting nothing, gathered at this festivity as spectators. When in this way most of the residents had assembled on the square, all the men were arrested. Some Chechens had weapons, and shooting broke out in many places... The men arrested on the squares were locked in barns, and a hunt began for those who had not been on the square. The whole action was carried out in two or three hours"[84]. "By 11 o'clock of the first day of the deportation more than 94 thousand people had been taken out of various settlements"[83], and by the morning of 24 February - more than 333 thousand. The NKVD hauled the people in 180 trains: following a "rationalization" proposal the agency packed the loading tighter - "densification of the loading of the special contingent" in its papers - from 24 to 45 people per wagon; historians write: "In reality up to 80 people were crammed into the freight 'teplushka' wagons"[83]. En route, according to the official figures of the Soviet NKVD, 1,361 people died[83]; the eyewitness Ametistov, later a judge of the Constitutional Court of Russia, recalled: "I saw them [the Chechens] brought in in wagons - and half were unloaded already as corpses. The living were thrown out into 40-degree frost"[83]. "The last train with deported Chechens and Ingush pulled up for unloading in the Kazakh steppe on 20 March 1944"[83]. A. G. Avtorkhanov recorded how it looked to the people: "On 23 February 1944... within literally 24 hours the entire population of the Checheno-Ingush Republic was placed under arrest, and its loading into prisoner trains began, for dispatch to an unknown destination," while the decree liquidating the republic "was published backdated" - two years and four months later[84].
During the deportation the punitive forces of the Soviet NKVD (predecessor of today's FSB) killed on the spot those Chechens who could not be brought to the trains - the gravely ill, the old, women with children: in the agency's papers they were listed as "untransportable." On 27 February 1944 in the aul of Khaibakh, Galanchozh district, the punitive forces, according to historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov, killed "over 700 people": Colonel Gvishiani, as the historians write, "ordered the 'untransportable' residents of Khaibakh and the surrounding hamlets locked... in the stable of the local collective farm named after L. P. Beria, after which the stable itself was piled round with hay and set on fire"[83]. An eyewitness - Dziyaudin Malsagov, Deputy People's Commissar (Minister) of Justice of the republic - testified: "When the stable was engulfed in flames, the huge, heavily reinforced gates collapsed under the press of people, and through the fire a crowd of maddened people surged out. Gvishiani commanded: 'Fire!' Automatic and machine-gun bursts rang out from dozens of barrels... No one broke through the fire and the gun cordon. No one was saved"[83]; Gvishiani received from People's Commissar (Minister) of Internal Affairs Beria, the historians write, "a personal commendation, a recommendation for a decoration and a promotion in rank"[83]. The punitive forces killed the "untransportable" throughout the mountain districts: "47 gravely ill people were put to death and buried in a single pit on the grounds of the Urus-Martan district hospital... several dozen old people, women and children were burned in Tsori, Targim and Guli. Many of those who fled that day from the villages into the mountains or forest were shot on the spot without warning"[83]; "in the Itum-Kale district... houses were packed with the sick and pelted with grenades and bottles of incendiary mixture"[83]. Historian Z. S. Isakieva writes: at the end of March 1944 NKVD troops "shot" the residents of mountainous Malkhista, whom they had failed to reach in February because of snowfall[88]. The Chekists recorded the shootings of the sick in their own correspondence: on 28 May 1944 the head of the Galanchozh operational sector Gransky reported to Deputy People's Commissar (Minister) of State Security Kobulov about the "unauthorized shootings of the elderly Chechen women, the sick and the crippled who remained after the resettlement" - in the Nachkhoevsky village soviet alone the "sick and crippled" shot numbered "up to 60 people"[89].
Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write about the days of the deportation of the Chechens: "over the two or three days that the deportation lasted, killing one or two people here and there, the punitive forces destroyed in total no less than a thousand people. And it was announced loudly and distinctly, in Russian: for attempted escape - execution, for failure to obey an order - execution, for expressing protest - execution"[83]. The Chechen historian Dalkhan Khozhaev writes that the threats "were announced in Russian, though many did not understand the language," and the toll of reprisals began within the first hours: "On the Chechen plain hundreds of people (men, women, children and the old) were shot within a few hours"; in the mountains, where people were driven to the roads on foot, "more often than on the plain, they shot down stragglers, the enfeebled, those who misunderstood an order, or simply - 'attempting to escape'"[90]. Historian Z. S. Isakieva writes about the columns from the mountain villages: "Those who could not walk were led out of the column and shot, without even permission to bury them"[88].
In April-May 1943 officers of the Soviet NKVD (predecessor of today's FSB), led by Kolesnikov, Deputy People's Commissar (Minister) of Internal Affairs of the republic, in the course of "anti-banditry operations" detained Chechens "suspected of ties with bandits" and shot them "unlawfully, without trial or investigation" - 25 people in two months, "citizens guilty of nothing whatsoever": in the village of Bachi-Yurt, on the orders of cavalry platoon commander Volosov, the convoy shot 17 of 19 detainees, among them a 15-year-old girl; in the village of Belty a convoy headed by Soviet militia section commander Dubasov shot four people "without any pretext whatsoever" and delivered their corpses to the district branch of the NKVD; at the Kuloi hamlet Meishvili, a battalion commander of the NKVD troops (predecessors of today's Rosgvardia), shot the brothers Baisar and Baim Bataev, Dzhamalani Pitalov and Mavla Chebiev[85]. The executioners wrote the shootings off as "attempted escape," and Kolesnikov issued "findings that the use of weapons had been proper"; all this was established by the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office following a letter from the Chechen Dokhtukaev, written from exile - the results were reported in 1957 to Bulganin, head of the government of the USSR, but no one was ever brought to court: the ten-year statute of limitations had expired[85].
During the deportation - Operation "Chechevitsa" - the troops of the Soviet NKVD (predecessors of today's Rosgvardia) burned the mountain auls of the Chechens as soon as they had driven the residents under convoy to the trains bound for Kazakhstan and Kirghizia (today's Kyrgyzstan) and had driven off their livestock. The Chechen historian A. G. Avtorkhanov cites the testimony of a Russian student of the Grozny Petroleum Institute who was sent to one of the auls on the day of the deportation: "In the mountain auls this action was carried out differently. All the livestock was evacuated from there, and then the auls were burned, to deprive the 'bandits' of a base for existence. For days on end one could watch auls burning in the mountains"[84].
The USSR lured out by deception the Chechens who were hiding in the mountains from the occupation regime, promising freedom - in the NKVD's (predecessor of today's FSB) papers this was called "legalization." Those who believed the promises were arrested or deported together with their compatriots to Kazakhstan and Kirghizia (today's Kyrgyzstan) in the course of the genocidal Operation "Chechevitsa." The report of Dementiev, head of the Grozny Oblast internal affairs directorate (1956), states: in September-October 1943 alone "30 bands were legalized, comprising 183 men, plus 60 lone bandits"[85]. Historian P. M. Polian writes: the NKVD files "listed 1,300 so-called legalized bandits, that is, men who had come forward, by mutual agreement, with a confession and been released from repression for it. All or nearly all of them were arrested shortly before the deportation or in its course"[85]. In the days of the deportation the troops announced clemency for those who had gone into the mountains - and deported those who came out. A Russian student eyewitness from Grozny, whose testimony was printed in the émigré journal Prometheus in 1949 and is cited by the Chechen historian A. G. Avtorkhanov, writes: "At the same time an amnesty [a promise not to punish] was announced for those who had gone into the mountains, if they came forward voluntarily. Some of them did in fact come forward, but were deported all the same…"[84]. In the summer of 1944 the colonizer repeated the deception: historian P. M. Polian writes that in June "tried and tested" religious authorities, deported in February, were brought from Kazakhstan to Grozny, and they induced hundreds of Chechens in hiding "toward legalization and, hence, deportation"[85].
The colonizer cut the Chechens off from medical care from the first day of the deportation: the Chechen historian Dalkhan Khozhaev writes that the troops, driving people out of their homes, "threw the sick off their hospital beds"[90]. Typhus broke out in the trains - the certificate of the Soviet NKVD (predecessor of today's FSB) of 7 April 1944 on those brought to Kirghizia states: "412 people died and 278 were hospitalized"[91]. With no quarantine and no medicine at the destinations the epidemic spread: by 1 April 1944 about 4,800 people had fallen ill in Kazakhstan, over 2,000 in Kirghizia[83]. The colonizer forbade local residents, on pain of arrest, to help the dying Chechens. The Chechen historian A. G. Avtorkhanov writes: "The local population was categorically forbidden to render help to the dying by giving food, water or medicine. Even a simple display of human sympathy for the perishing women and children was punished with arrests"[84].
The USSR, deporting the Chechens and Ingush from their native land, made no provision for food at the places of exile - and from famine and disease in exile almost a third of the deported died within four and a half years. The colonizer had taken the people's livestock and food back home: by the resolution of the State Defense Committee of the USSR of 31 January 1944 the people's commissariats (ministries) were obliged "to accept in the North Caucasus from the special settlers livestock and agricultural produce... issuing exchange receipts for what was accepted," while from the confiscated livestock 350 horses "fit for cavalry service" were handed over to the cavalry units of the Soviet militia[87]. Pchelkin, People's Commissar (Minister) of Internal Affairs of the Kirghiz SSR, reported to People's Commissar (Minister) of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria on 22 April 1944: the food the exiles had brought with them "is running out," "the established ration is critically insufficient," the collective farms are "in no position to help for lack of it, as a result of which in some districts there are instances... of the eating of roots and grasses"[85]. Historian P. M. Polian writes: for lack of food, shelter and fodder the exiles in Kirghizia "had to slaughter up to 90%" of the livestock issued "in compensation for that left behind in their former places of residence," while the funds allocated to them were handed out by local bosses to others - in the Kazalinsk district "one ton of bread was issued to the local party activists," and in the collective farms of the Bazar-Kurgan district "food was issued only to able-bodied special settlers, while those unfit for work were deprived of rations"[85]. In exile the Chechens and Ingush died by the tens of thousands: by the end of 1944 the number of exiles ("special settlers" in the colonizer's terms) had fallen by about 11.5 thousand in Kirghizia and by more than 46 thousand in Kazakhstan[83]. In 1945, among the North Caucasus exiles, 44,652 children died - 2,230 were born; no fewer than 80 thousand people were starving[83]; in the winter of 1948-1949 in the Kazakh SSR (today's Kazakhstan) up to 118 thousand were starving, and 418 people died of hunger[83]. By October 1948 about 146.9 thousand North Caucasus exiles had died in exile; historians put the direct losses of the Chechens and Ingush at 145.7 thousand people, and together with the unborn - at 300 thousand; the people recovered its pre-war numbers only by 1959[83].
The Soviet NKVD (predecessor of today's FSB) obliged the exiled Chechens and Ingush ("special settlers" in the colonizer's terms) over 12 years of age to report monthly to the special commandant's office - the agency's surveillance post at the place of exile; from age 16 the commandant's office opened personal files; the colonizer forbade them to join the Bolshevik party, its youth league (the "Komsomol") and the trade unions, and did not take them into the army[88]. From January 1945 the commandant could, without trial, arrest "offenders" for up to 5 days or fine them up to 100 rubles[83]. By the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of 26 November 1948 the deportation was declared eternal: the Chechens and Ingush were "exiled in perpetuity," with up to 20 years of hard labor for escape and up to 5 years of prison for aiding escapees[83].
The colonizer locked the exiled Chechens and Ingush into their places of settlement: the commandant's offices forbade absences without their permission, and the mutual surety of the "ten-yard groups" was in force - ten neighboring households answered for one another[83]. People fled anyway: from the spring of 1944 to the end of 1950 - over 20.6 thousand escapes, and the chekists caught nearly all the escapees[83]. In 1948 the colonizer forbade the exiles to live within 100 kilometers of the USSR border and forcibly resettled over 6 thousand people deeper into Kazakhstan[83].
The colonizer abolished the very republic of the Chechens and Ingush and carved up their land among its neighbors: on 7 March 1944 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued the decree "On the Liquidation of the Checheno-Ingush ASSR and the Administrative Organization of Its Territory"[88]: lowland Chechnya went into the newly created Grozny Okrug of Stavropol Krai - a month later the colonizer transformed it into Grozny Oblast[85]; the mountain part was divided between the Georgian SSR (today's Georgia) and the Dagestan ASSR (today's Dagestan within Russia), and the Ingush lands were handed to North Ossetia[83]. The abolition was given legal form by the law of 25 June 1946[88].
On 23 February 1944 the colonizer mobilized students and housewives not employed at factories in Grozny and from six in the morning drove them out to the Chechen auls, from which, half an hour after their arrival, the troops took away the arrested Chechens. The Chechen historian A. G. Avtorkhanov cites the testimony of one of the mobilized - a Russian student of the Grozny Petroleum Institute: "Thus we were, according to a carefully worked-out plan, distributed among the auls, 20-30 people per aul"[84]. The student writes about the work they were given in the auls: "The task of the students was to keep the farms in order until the arrival of the settlers from Kursk and Oryol oblasts. We were to gather the livestock, feed it, take in the grain, the implements, and so on"[84]. By mid-May 1944 settlers had arrived in Grozny Oblast numbering 40% of the deported Chechens, including 6,800 families from Stavropol Krai[83]. Into the districts handed to Dagestan the colonizer resettled 65 thousand people from 224 mountain villages of Dagestan[83]. The settlers died too: in the Aukh district in 1944-1947 about 2 thousand - nearly a third - of the resettled Laks, one of the mountain peoples of Dagestan, died of disease[83].
On the land emptied by the deportation of the Chechens the colonizer destroyed the urban markers of their history: it ransacked the republican local history museum and blew up the monument to the Chechen commander Aslanbek Sheripov[83].
The colonizer ravaged the shrines and graves of the deported Chechens. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "...on the orders of the party-soviet organs even mosques and cemeteries were plundered... The grave churts (stones) went into the foundations of factories and livestock farms; they were used to pave city streets and edge sidewalks"[83]. The colonizer destroyed the city mosque of Grozny[83].
Having deported the Chechen people in February 1944, the colonizer burned its books and manuscripts. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "On the squares and streets of Grozny bonfires of books blazed up. All literature and textbooks in Arabic, Chechen and Ingush were burned"[83]. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes about the clan chronicles - the tyaptars: "For three days and three nights a bonfire burned in the center of Grozny, in whose flames were destroyed nearly all the Chechen tyaptars, as well as all the manuscript and printed literature devoted to the history and culture of the Chechens"[92]. From the auls, writes D. A. Khozhaev, open trucks carried "ancient manuscripts, religious-philosophical treatises, Arabic-language books on mathematics, astronomy, medicine, historical hadiths, ancient legends of the Chechens and Ingush in Arabic and in Chechen (in Arabic script), secular belles-lettres. All these books and manuscripts were dumped in Grozny straight onto the snow by the public toilet in the square adjoining the Palace of Pioneers"[90].
The colonizer erased Chechen and Ingush names from the map. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "Streets, settlements, auls and districts were hastily renamed"[83]. Historian P. M. Polian writes of the Ingush lands handed to North Ossetia: "all the Ingush place names were repressed as well; they were replaced with Ossetian or Russian ones" - by the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR of 29 April 1944 the Psedakh district became Alansky, Nazran district - Kosta-Khetagurovsky, Achaluki district - Nartovsky, and by the decree of 30 August 1944 the colonizer renamed "all the districts and their centers" of Grozny Oblast[85]. The Chechen lands that had gone to Georgia the colonizer named the Akhalkhevi district[83].
Deporting the Chechen people in February 1944, the colonizer looted its emptied homes. The Chechen historian Dalkhan Khozhaev writes: "In the days of the deportation, parallel to the human stream, columns of military trucks moved toward Grozny in an unbroken flow, loaded with the valuables looted from the emptied homes of the Chechens and Ingush. The items the guards deemed most valuable - carpets, burkas, Caucasian mounted belts, weapons ornamented with gold and silver (daggers, shashkas, flintlock rifles made by Chechen masters of the last century), jewels - were carried in canvas-covered vans"[90]. Drozdov, head of a brigade of the People's Commissariat (Ministry) of State Control of the RSFSR, who inspected the districts handed to Dagestan in August 1944 on the instructions of the government of the RSFSR, reported "unrestrained theft and squandering of the property of the special settlers," begun "soon after the deportation": Yusupov, acting chairman of a district soviet, "fully outfitted himself at the expense of the property of the special settlers" - he was short four hand-operated and four treadle sewing machines, 26 rugs, 30 carpets and 6 bicycles; Khashaev, prosecutor of Dagestan, received a house, an orchard, a vegetable garden and an "ownerless" cow; people's judge Suleimanov formalized his haul with a receipt: "Goods received, money not paid, to which I hereby subscribe"[90]. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov sum up: "Implicated in the unrestrained theft of other people's goods was the entire party-economic and militia top brass of Grozny Oblast, Dagestan, Stavropol, North Ossetia and Georgia"; those caught were dismissed and tried, but "in the end the arrests had to be abandoned, since no one would have been left at liberty to govern"[83].
In early November 1941, waging a military operation against the "uprising" it had itself declared, the USSR bombed with combat aircraft mountain auls of Chechnya in which there was neither this invented "uprising" nor the real protest. The historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: for the suppression of the protest, "besides the operational groups and internal troops, three flights of combat aircraft were brought in," and "the operation proved poorly prepared in the military respect and was accompanied by heavy losses among the peaceful population. Bombs rained down on auls whose population did not even suspect any 'uprising'"[83]. The historian S. P. Arenin, who wrote from the documents of the NKVD Department for the Struggle against "Banditry" (a predecessor of today's FSB), writes of the operations of 28 October - 3 November 1941: they were carried out by "chekist-military groups, to which three flights of aircraft were attached"[93]. In the spring of 1942, according to memoirs, Soviet aircraft repeated the strikes on a larger scale - the Chechen historian A. G. Avtorkhanov, who wrote about these events in emigration, testifies: "in the spring of 1942 Soviet aviation twice subjected all of mountain Checheno-Ingushetia to bombing," and "in the auls of Shatoy, Itum-Kale and Galanchozh the inhabitants killed by aerial bombing and by the Bolsheviks' artillery shelling outnumbered those left alive"[84]. Avtorkhanov adds: "In those days, when Stalin was arranging this hell over his own people, not a single German had yet set foot in the Caucasus"[84]. The report of the 141st Regiment on the military operation of 30 October - 15 November 1941 counts only its own men and "bandits" - "killed: bandits — 36... Regiment losses: killed — 6, wounded — 7"[85]; there is not a line in it about killed or wounded villagers. On the Galanchozh district the testimonies and the documents diverge: the historians cite data gathered from those who were in the mountains - that "absolute calm was observed" there, "and the bombing of peaceful auls by Soviet aviation came as a shock even to the district leadership"[83], while Khalukhaev's report names the Galanchozh district among those engulfed by the uprising[85].
The USSR declared the economic protest of the Chechens an "uprising" organized by "fascist agents". The party organs of the Soviet colonial administration of Checheno-Ingushetia, "at the prompting of the NKVD-NKGB", gave the protest of late October 1941 a name the historians render as: "an open anti-Soviet 'kulak-bandit uprising'"; the events themselves, as the historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write, bore "features of social protest"[83]. This version became fixed in the documents: in the report of the commander of the 141st Regiment of the NKVD Internal Troops (predecessors of today's Rosgvardia), Lieutenant Colonel Khalukhaev, dated 26 June 1943, October 1941 is described thus: "an armed counter-revolutionary uprising was raised by German-fascist agents"[85]. The count kept by the secret services contradicted the picture they were imposing: over the whole of 1941 the NKVD organs eliminated 12 "bands" with a total strength of up to 100 men, recording four "bandit incidents" in which nine people died[83]. There is no uprising behind these figures: all the "bands" the NKVD counted and eliminated over the year held up to a hundred men for the whole of Chechnya, and nine people died in the clashes. The desertion the colonizer imputed to the Chechen people was the desertion of recruits, not of frontline soldiers - the certificate of Dementyev, head of the Grozny Region directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, dated 1956, states: during the first mobilization "450 men deserted en route to the dispatch point, 269 men evaded the call-up"[85], and the historians confirm: the detained deserters were "by no means from the front, but from units being formed in Grozny or passing through it"[83]. On frontline desertion Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "over the first six months of the war, 38 known cases of desertion from the front line"; at the same time, they write, in Checheno-Ingushetia "they began to count as 'deserters' also those who fled death in the 'labor army' or evaded mobilization into it," and they also write about the bookkeeping: "A man was counted as an 'evader', or even a deserter, if he failed to appear at the recruitment stations at first summons, even by reason of disability or of his own death"[83]. The historians note that the assessments rested "on the data of the central apparatus of the NKVD of the ChIASSR exclusively," and that "the only real thing here was the bombing of Chechen auls and hamlets by Soviet aviation. Everything else is open to question"[83]. The military commissariats carried out three call-ups: 29 August - 2 September 1941 (8 thousand men were subject to call-up), in October 1941 (4,733 men) and on 17-25 March 1942: "14,577 men were subject to call-up, of whom only 4,395 were called up"[85] - people evaded the call-up en masse. In April 1942 the USSR cancelled the call-up of Chechens and Ingush altogether - Dementyev's certificate states: "In connection with this, in April 1942 there followed an order of the NKO of the USSR cancelling the call-up of Chechens and Ingush into the army"[85] (the NKO - the USSR ministry of defense). The Chechen historian A. G. Avtorkhanov, writing in emigration, dates the release from service to February 1942 and renders the order's motivation in the words "the Chechens and Ingush, by religious conviction, refuse to eat pork"[84]. The historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write that it was the NKVD organs (a predecessor of today's FSB) that obtained the halt of the call-up in March 1942, and render the official motivation thus: "the halt of the call-up was motivated all but by care for the Chechens and Ingush, even by the impossibility of providing their nourishment with meat (the highlanders did not eat pork, and there was practically no mutton or beef laid in as canned food)"[83]. Two years later the USSR accused the people it had itself removed from the call-up of evading service and going over to the enemy; on this accusation the colonizer built the decree deporting the people from its own lands in 1944, known as Operation "Chechevitsa" ("Lentil") (campaign C1180) and later recognized as genocide of the Chechen people: by Russia in 1991[94], by the European Parliament in 2004[95] and by Ukraine in 2022[96].
In September 1941 the USSR created special departments for the struggle against "banditry" within the local NKVD organs (a predecessor of today's FSB), including in Chechnya, and permanent operational groups in the Shatoy, Galanchozh and Itum-Kale districts, whose task the historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov render in the words "to quickly suppress any manifestations of banditry"[83]. The first came the military operation of 30 October - 15 November 1941 across the districts of the declared "uprising": according to the report of the 141st Regiment of the NKVD Internal Troops (predecessors of today's Rosgvardia), 36 people recorded as "bandits" were killed and 251 detained - "insurgents — 127, bandits — 7, bandit-insurgents — 13, deserters — 104"[85]. On 5 December 1941, in the village of Gikhi in the Urus-Martan district, the regiment in a two-hour battle destroyed a group of ten people that the report calls the "cadre band" of Kaidov Azak: three were killed, seven detained[85]. In the same December, to support the operational groups, the USSR formed the 178th Motorized Rifle Battalion in Chechnya, expanded the following year into the 141st Regiment of NKVD troops (in the commander's report the regiment is called a rifle regiment, by the historians - a mountain-rifle one)[83]. The regiment's count for 1941, from 25 October to 1 January 1942: 59 people killed, 390 detained[85].
In 1941 the USSR forcibly herded up to 13 thousand Chechens deemed unfit for military service into the "labor army" - construction battalions sent to build defensive lines: the people were carried toward the front without weapons and without soldier status. The mobilization, as the historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write, was carried out by the local military commissariats "by practically forcible methods"[83]; the historian M. K. Osmayev writes: "People were seized right on the streets without being served call-up papers and without preliminary explanation of the purpose of the mobilization," and among the mobilized "there were not a few old and sick men"[97]. The historians write about the position of the mobilized: they "were on the footing of servicemen but were not counted as Red Army soldiers"[83]. The historians describe the outcome: "The mobilized masses were loaded into trains and in September 1941 found themselves in the frontline zone, where no one needed their labor. The army was retreating in haste. Over 10 thousand unfortunate citizens of Checheno-Ingushetia died of cold, hunger and bombing, owing to the criminal negligence of the military officialdom"[83]. M. K. Osmayev cites another version of the fate of the mobilized: before even reaching their destination, "they were scattered by German aviation," and, by different sources, from 1,200 to 2 thousand people made it to Rostov-on-Don, whom a special commission of the colonial administration of Checheno-Ingushetia took back to Grozny[97]. The survivors the colonizer declared "deserters of the labor front"; the historians write: "They were barely saved from execution by a government commission from Checheno-Ingushetia that traveled to Rostov-on-Don in response to complaints"[83].
The USSR put Chechen-Ingush volunteers into the line, but denied them weapons, supply and an army number - and on 3-4 August 1942 threw them, with sabers and miscellaneous rifles, against German tanks at Kotelnikovo. Chechens and Ingush went to fight without any imperial coercion: already in the first year of the war over 18 thousand were at the front, by the third year - 32 thousand, by other accounts up to 50 thousand[83]. After the USSR cancelled the call-up of Chechens and Ingush, Chechen-Ingush officers of the Soviet army obtained permission to recruit volunteers; their requests to arm the recruits properly, army-style, went unanswered. The Chechen historian A. G. Avtorkhanov, who wrote about these events in emigration, names them one by one: "On the initiative of the Chechen Soviet general Supyan Mollaev, the Ingush colonel Abadiev, Major Visantov, Captain Akhtaev and others, the Soviet government permitted the Chechen-Ingush republic to recruit volunteers"[84]. Two divisions gathered, an active one and a reserve one; after the evacuation of Kerch the active division went to the Southern Front. In Krasnodar the commander of the Southern Front, Marshal Budyonny, drew it up facing the division that had retreated from Kerch and addressed the retreaters, as Avtorkhanov renders it, with these words: "Look at them, the highlanders: their fathers and grandfathers, under the leadership of the great Shamil, fought bravely for 25 years and defended their independence against the whole of tsarist Russia. Take them as your example of how to defend the Motherland!"[84]. Neither of the two divisions was taken onto the supply rolls of the Soviet army or received an army number. Avtorkhanov writes: "They were uniformed by the Chechen-Ingush republic itself, and from there they received their provisions as well"[84]. Of the fighters' weapons and footwear he writes: "the entire armament of these divisions consisted of sabers alone and of chance rifles of the most varied systems"[84]; "Many of the fighters were barefoot, as their homemade highland chuviaki had long worn out"[84]. The officers asked Budyonny to take the divisions into the army and arm them army-style. Avtorkhanov continues: "Budyonny promised to think it over. While Budyonny was thinking, the Germans crossed the Don, and the Chechen-Ingush division, in the same condition, without any support, was thrown literally under the hurricane fire of German tanks racing toward Stalingrad. At Kotelnikovo, on 4 August 1942, German tanks rolled over the corpses of many fighters of this division. A small part was taken prisoner; another, led by the staff, managed to break out of the encirclement and retreated. But the rout of this division, together with the rout of whole corps and armies of the Southern Front, served as a bad attestation for the entire Chechen-Ingush people"[84]. The historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov describe the events differently: a single 114th Chechen-Ingush Cavalry Division was being recruited - volunteers came a thousand over the establishment of 4.5 thousand - Moscow disbanded it, and the 255th Chechen-Ingush Cavalry Regiment of Major Movlid Visaitov, created on its base, was thrown by the USSR toward Stalingrad[83].
The 1941 scorched-earth tactic under the directive of the USSR Sovnarkom and the Central Committee of 29 June 1941: "In the forced withdrawal of Red Army units, drive off the rolling railway stock, leave the enemy not a single locomotive, not a single railcar"[98]; the Dnipro hydroelectric station was "destroyed at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War… (see the Directive of the USSR Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the VKP(b) of June 29, 1941)"[78].
The total removal of industrial equipment and food supplies into the interior of the USSR: "550 industrial facilities were moved into the interior of the USSR (190 of all-Union and 360 of republican subordination)"; "From the Right Bank to the left bank of the Dnipro were ferried 4,498 tractors, 680 combines, 690 motor vehicles"[75].
The mass conscription by field draft offices of the population of just-liberated territories: "'Chornosvytnyky' or 'black infantry' – such was the unofficial name given to men and youths mobilized by field military commissariats, and in fact by the commanders of formations, units, and detachments in 1943–1944 after the Red Army's liberation of enemy-occupied territories"[99].
The use of untrained conscripts as expendable material: they were "thrown into combat often at once, without undergoing military training in reserve units, sometimes unarmed, not even changed into military uniform (hence the name)"[99]. The scale is visible from a single episode: "after the Red Army first took Kharkiv in the spring of 1943, about 15 thousand people aged 15 to 45 were mobilized into it and sent to the front without training," with "1 rifle per 5-10 men"[99].
The partition of Eastern Europe behind the backs of its peoples: the secret protocol established that "in the event of a territorial-political rearrangement of the areas belonging to the Polish state, the boundary of the spheres of interest of Germany and the USSR shall run approximately along the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula, and San"[100]. Half a century later the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR "recognizes the secret protocols as legally untenable and invalid from the moment of their signing"[101]. The invasion was covered by Molotov's note to the Polish ambassador Grzybowski (17 September 1939): "the Polish state and its government have in fact ceased to exist"[102].
The direct armed invasion of Polish territory by the Red Army on September 17, 1939 for the military occupation of the western Ukrainian lands; the seizure was consolidated by "the treaty of the USSR with Germany (September 28, 1939)," which "confirmed the incorporation of the western Ukrainian lands into the USSR"[103].
The staging of a no-alternative "People's Assembly" under the control of occupation troops to give the seizure legal form: "On October 27 in Lviv, the People's Assembly of Western Ukraine of 1939 adopted the Declaration on the reunification of Western Ukraine with the Ukrainian SSR, and on November 1 the Supreme Soviet of the USSR passed the law admitting Western Ukraine, as part of the Ukrainian SSR, into the USSR"[81].
The official annexation of the occupied lands: the western Ukrainian lands were incorporated into the USSR under the treaty with Germany of September 28, 1939[103], and "after the Red Army occupied Bessarabia and Northern Bukovyna at the end of June 1940, on August 2, 1940 the Supreme Soviet of the USSR annexed Northern Bukovyna and the Khotyn, Akkerman, and Izmail districts of Bessarabia to the Ukrainian SSR"[81].
Mass forced resettlement by quota: "under the resolutions of the Council of People's Commissars of December 5, 1939 and March 2, 1940, subject to administrative resettlement were the employees of the former state institutions, courts, police, army, merchants, Polish settlers, landowners, owners of plants and factories, and their families"; in total "up to 1,250,000 people were removed to remote regions of the USSR"[76]. The waves were separate: the osadniks were deported under the USSR Sovnarkom resolution of December 5, 1939, no. 2010-558ss - its text remains in the closed Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (fond 93), while the mechanics of the operation are known from the NKVD Instruction approved on December 29, 1939[104]; the families of officers, policemen and prison guards were deported under the resolution of March 2, 1940, no. 289-127ss[105].
The neutralization of the politically active stratum through mass arrests: immediately after the "People's Assembly" came "the arrests of leading figures of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, by lists prepared in advance, drawn up in the Soviet consulate"[106]; "in all, in 1939—1941 the NKVD organs arrested 21,982 Poles, 23,163 Ukrainians and 13,160 Jews"[106], and those arrested faced execution, prison or the GULAG camps: "in total, during 1939—1941, between 16 and 35 thousand OUN members were shot or imprisoned"[106].
The transfer of hundreds of thousands of people into special settlements and camps as a system of forced labor: in under two years "up to 1,250,000 people (about 10% of the population) were removed to remote regions of the USSR"[76] – the deportees were assigned to labor in remote regions with no right to leave.
The sign of the new order goes up within the very first weeks: Soviet troops took Lviv on 22 September 1939[107], and already in October, in the city center, on the islet in the middle of today's Svobody Avenue, rose the monument to the Stalin Constitution - a huge vertical composition of columns entwined with red banners, on a wooden frame, with five sculptural groups (a Red Army soldier, a worker, a mother with a child, a female student, and an old Hutsul with a boy) and inscriptions in Ukrainian, Polish and Yiddish symbolizing the "friendship of peoples" according to the articles of the Stalin constitution[108][109]. The sign has named authors: the sculptor Serhii Lytvynenko and the Kyiv artist Mykhailo Dmytrenko, who arrived in Lviv in 1939 in the "landing party" of Soviet artists whose task was the implantation of socialist realism; possibly the authors merely adapted to the site a design produced in Moscow, and it was executed by the sculptors Yevhen Dzyndra and Andrii Koverko[108]. The monument stood until 30 June 1941 and vanished with the arrival of the Germans[108].
The conduct of secret mass "national operations" of the NKVD for the physical annihilation of members of ethnic minorities[110]. The mechanism was set by the operational orders of people's commissar Yezhov: No. 00485 of 11 August 1937 opened the Polish operation - "to begin, from 20 August 1937, a broad operation aimed at the complete liquidation of the local organizations of the 'POW'" with completion "within a three-month term"[111], - and No. 00439 of 25 July 1937 the German one[112]; the Greek, Bulgarian and other operations followed their template[110]. The scale is recorded in the perpetrator's own accounting: according to the summary figures of the 1st Special Department of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR dated 30 August 1938, 94,659 people were arrested in the republic under orders Nos. 00485, 00593 and others (54,011 on the Polish line, 23,036 on the German, 5,642 on the Greek), of whom 61,683 had been convicted by 1 July 1938; in all, of the 197,945 people convicted by the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR over the reporting period, 122,274 were sentenced to be shot - nearly two out of every three[113]. Across all the "national lines" of the USSR, 335,513 people were convicted, and 73.66% of them were shot[114].
The forcible closure of all national councils, pedagogical institutes, theaters and cultural institutions of ethnic minorities in the Ukrainian SSR[115]: the national districts and village soviets were liquidated by the resolution of the Orgburo of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) of 24 January 1938[116], and the resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U of 10 April 1938 reorganized the national schools and colleges and turned the Odesa German Pedagogical Institute into an institute of foreign languages[117].
On 24 January 1938 the Orgburo of the Central Committee of the VKP(b), by its resolution "On the Liquidation of National Schools and National Sections in Schools," closed non-Russian schools throughout the Union, liquidating the national districts and village soviets on the same day[118][116]; on 13 March the resolution of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) and the USSR Council of People's Commissars No. 324 "On the Compulsory Study of the Russian Language in the Schools of the National Republics and Regions" made the metropole's language a compulsory subject in all schools of the republics[119]. Kyiv executed the decision on 10 April 1938: the Politburo of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U, "proceeding from the decision of the Central Committee of the VKP(b)," declared "the further existence of special national schools inexpedient and harmful" and resolved to reorganize the German, Polish, Czech, Swedish and other schools and technical colleges "into Soviet schools of the ordinary type," to liquidate national sections and classes at ordinary schools, colleges and universities, and, where there was nowhere to transfer the pupils, to transfer the institutions themselves to ordinary school curricula - "with instruction in Ukrainian or Russian"; the Odesa German Pedagogical Institute was turned into an institute of foreign languages, and all the work was ordered finished by 1 August 1938[117]. The Politburo wrote its justification into the resolution itself: "enemies of the people - Trotskyites, Bukharinites and bourgeois nationalists operating in the People's Commissariat of Education of the Ukrainian SSR - implanted special national German, Polish, Czech, Swedish, Greek and other schools, turning them into hotbeds of bourgeois-nationalist, anti-Soviet influence on children"[117]. The decision was given the form of a state act by the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR in its resolution of 29 June 1938 on the reorganization of special national schools, colleges and the Odesa German Pedagogical Institute: by 1 August 1938, 766 national primary, incomplete secondary and secondary schools were subject to reorganization into ordinary schools with (predominantly) Russian and Ukrainian as the language of instruction, and another 122 were merged with Russian and Ukrainian ones on the territorial principle - the count of the historian Liudmyla Yakubova[120].
The Chechen historian A. G. Avtorkhanov, who worked in Chechnya in those years and later wrote about it in emigration, writes: "At the beginning of October 1937, accompanied by a large Chekist staff, there arrived in Chechen-Ingushetia a candidate member of the Politburo, chairman of the Party Collegium of the KPK under the TsK and Yezhov's deputy – Shkiryatov"[84]. Shkiryatov convened an enlarged plenum of the oblast committee of the party in the Lenin House of Culture in Grozny - by the archival protocols the plenum ran on 8-10 October 1937, with 194 participants[121] - and summoned there also the senior officials of the city and the districts. Avtorkhanov continues: "Shkiryatov gave the order to arrest all Chechens and Ingush who were members of the Chechen-Ingush oblast committee"[84]. The Chekists arrested them right there, in the hall of the plenum. Avtorkhanov writes of what followed: "Then Shkiryatov's order was extended to all Chechen-Ingush officials, from the chairman of the republic's government down to the chairman of a village soviet"[84]. In October and November 1937 the NKVD (a predecessor of today's FSB) arrested Ali Gorchkhanov, chairman of the government of the republic; Abdul-Khalim Salamov, his deputy; Khasi Vakhayev, second secretary of the oblast committee; Magomed Mamakayev, head of the culture and propaganda department of the oblast committee; Khamid Okuyev, People's Commissar (minister) of education; Musa Khaniev, chairman of the Supreme Court; Khasan Mekhtiev, prosecutor of the republic; and Said Baduev, chairman of the Union of Soviet Writers. Avtorkhanov writes also of the lower floors: "Arrested were also the chairmen of the district executive committees (in the Chechen-Ingush republic there were up to 28 districts), almost all chairmen of village Soviets, of kolkhozes, and their party organizers"[84]. Of the 23 heads of the district NKVD departments only Goytiev was a Chechen, and the NKVD arrested him too. The NKVD arrested, and the party organs removed from office - historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "In all, in October 1937, 30 of the 76 members and candidate members of the Chechen-Ingush obkom were repressed, including all the Chechens and Ingush; 20 of the 28 secretaries of district party committees; 77 members of district committees and 192 senior officials of the rural districts of the republic"[83]; in 1938 the colonizer removed almost all heads of the district land departments, 19 chairmen of district executive committees and 22 secretaries of district committees[83].
From the summer of 1937 to November 1938 the NKVD (the political police, a predecessor of today's FSB) arrested people in the republic by the categories and numbers assigned in operational order No. 00447 of Yezhov, the People's Commissar (minister) of Internal Affairs of the USSR, of 30 July 1937. The Chechen historian A. G. Avtorkhanov, who worked in Chechnya in those years and later wrote about it in emigration, described the beginning of the operation: "On the night of 31 July to 1 August 1937, by lists drawn up beforehand by the NKVD, the so-called 'general operation for the removal of anti-Soviet elements' was carried out across all auls and districts"; the Chekists hauled the arrested to Grozny - to the central garage of "Grozneft", to the Stalin club, to the pre-trial detention house of the republic's militia[84]. Avtorkhanov names "up to 14 thousand people" arrested in the first wave; the published operational summary on the course of the operation gives, for mid-August, about 2.4 thousand arrested across the whole republic, divided in it by the assigned categories: 888 "kulaks" (peasants whom the colonizer deemed "well-off"), 831 "criminals", 682 of the "counter-revolutionary element"[121]. Gridasov, head of the Gudermes district department of the NKVD, answered an officer who asked how to arrest a man when there was no material on him: "Material will always be found, so long as he wears a Caucasian hat!"[84]. The arrests went on until November 1938: in the autumn of 1937 Moscow raised the number assigned to the republic to 3,200 people, and on 1 March 1938 assigned a new one - 10,108 people, of whom the troika convicted 6,767[121]. On 8 September 1937 the newspaper "Pravda" printed an article by its special correspondent Kuzovkin under the headline: "The Bourgeois-Nationalist Tangle in Chechen-Ingushetia"[121]. Avtorkhanov relates its content: the author of the article "proved that in Chechen-Ingushetia 'bourgeois nationalists' sit in the party leadership and at the head of the government, leading the Chechen-Ingush people down an anti-Soviet path", and the newspaper and the author called on a judge not named by name: "to untangle the bourgeois-nationalist tangle to the end"[84]. Avtorkhanov writes of what the investigators manufactured out of the arrested: "Over the course of three years the Chekist investigators created the case of a 'bourgeois-nationalist, counter-revolutionary-insurgent, Bukharinite-Trotskyite, terrorist-espionage, anti-Soviet, wrecking organization' – literally so ran the many-storeyed formula of the charge for the top layer of the arrested"[84]. Into this "top layer", which the Chekists named the "bourgeois-nationalist center of Chechnya and Ingushetia", the investigation wrote 137 former senior officials of the republic. The investigation entered among these 137 also Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, who was then studying in Moscow: it wrote people into the case regardless of where they were and what they did[83]. To each of them the investigation imputed Article 58 - treason against the Motherland, preparation of an armed uprising, wrecking, terrorist acts, diversion, anti-Soviet agitation, membership in an anti-Soviet organization, and sabotage. According to the charge, the "center" acted in alliance with identical "centers" of Dagestan, Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay, Adygea and Circassia and was preparing, as Avtorkhanov writes, "the proclamation of a 'North Caucasus federative republic' under the protectorate of Turkey and England", with the "Moscow inter-national center" holding the liaison between them all[84].
The colonizer repressed almost the entire Union of Writers of Chechen-Ingushetia. On 20 November 1937 the bureau of the oblast committee of the party (the "obkom VKP(b)") dissolved the board of the writers of the republic - the resolution's wording: "as having proved clogged with hostile bourgeois-nationalist elements /Arsanov, Mamakayev, Aiskhanov and others/"[121]. One of the convicted, Khalid Oshaev, wrote in 1961 to the Ossetian writer Khadzhi-Murat Muguev: "of the 12 members of the union of writers of Chechen-Ingushetia 9 people were arrested, 7 convicted, 4 shot. I myself, a member of the Union of Writers since 1934, spent 13 years in confinement, and for 2 years was held in solitary confinement"[122].
On 13 November 1937 the bureau of the oblast committee of the party (the "obkom VKP(b)") approved two lists not subject to disclosure: No. 25/97 - on the removal of literature published in the republic - and No. 31/107 - on the mandatory removal of books from libraries and the book trade; the ban covered the works of 29 authors, among whom the historian K. G. Dendiev names D. Madayev, Kh. Yandarov, N. Muzayev, D. Malsagov and Kh. Oshaev[121]. The first Chechen literary works had appeared in the early 1920s[83] - the colonizer was removing and banning a literature not yet twenty years old.
Torture of the arrested was officially sanctioned by the Central Committee of the Bolshevik party (the TsK VKP(b)). Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "...against all those arrested under political articles torture was widely applied, officially permitted as measures of 'physical influence'"; Stalin's letter, circulated to party organs in January 1939, said: "The TsK VKP(b) explains that the application of physical influence in the practice of the NKVD was permitted from 1937 with the sanction of the TsK VKP(b)"[83]. One of the executors in the republic was Porubay, named in a 1938 memorandum of the oblast committee of the party as deputy People's Commissar (minister) of Internal Affairs of the republic. After the change of course he was put on trial - the charge: he "applied perverted methods of conducting the investigation and coerced the arrested into giving knowingly false testimony", and on the cases he falsified the troika passed death sentences[121]. The Chechen historian A. G. Avtorkhanov, who worked in Chechnya in those years and later wrote about it in emigration, writes that the investigation of the case of the "bourgeois-nationalist center" lasted three years, and describes its methods: "The investigation was conducted with the application of the physical tortures usual for the whole USSR, with a certain supplement for the specific 'national character'"[84]. Avtorkhanov names those whom the Chekists tortured to death: "During this investigation there were tortured to death: the former chairman of the oblast executive committee D. Machukayev, the former head of the obkom culture-and-propaganda department M. Gisayev, the former secretary of the Ingush obkom VKP(b) Idris Zyazikov, and others"[84]. He writes also of those whom torture drove to suicide: "Unable to endure the regime of torture, the following committed suicide: the chairman of the planning commission of the republic M. Islamov, the secretary of a district party committee M. Bektemirov"[84]. Avtorkhanov writes of the result: "By way of this unheard-of inquisition, named the 'preliminary investigation', the Chekists forced up to 90 percent of the members of the 'bourgeois-nationalist center' to sign and even to compose 'sincere confessions' of crimes they had, of course, not committed"[84]. Abdul-Khalim Salamov, deputy chairman of the government of the republic, under torture signed "sincere handwritten testimony" about the delivery into the republic from England through Turkey of 50 mountain guns, 1,000 machine guns, 200 thousand rifles, 5 million cartridges, 10 thousand shells and grenades for an armed uprising; there too he wrote that England had promised to support that uprising from the air. He also named the exact place where the weapons were buried in the mountains; Avtorkhanov writes: "the Chekists dug up all the indicated mountain gorges. Naturally they found nothing, but the beatings continued, with demands to point out the true place where the weapons were buried"[84]. The defendants showed the tribunal the marks of torture; Avtorkhanov writes: "The defendants, pointing to the scars of inflicted wounds, to knocked-out teeth, to mutilated parts of the organism (one had even been castrated during interrogation), declared that they had signed their false testimony under the influence of these physical tortures and in the hope that the day of trial, or of death, would thus be brought nearer"[84].
An extrajudicial organ - the "troika" - passed sentences in Chechen-Ingushetia under operational order No. 00447 of Yezhov, the People's Commissar (minister) of Internal Affairs of the USSR, of 30 July 1937, and Yezhov confirmed the troika's composition in the text of the order: "I confirm the following personal composition of the republican, krai and oblast troikas: ... Chechen-Ingush ASSR: chairman - Dementyev; members Yegorov, Vakhayev"[123] - Dementyev, People's Commissar (minister) of Internal Affairs of the republic; Yegorov, first secretary of the oblast committee of the party; and Vakhayev, second secretary. The historian G. I. Kakagasanov describes the institution: "An extrajudicial organ created for carrying out punitive policy... Its composition included: the head of the OGPU, the secretary of the party organization, the prosecutor of the republic, krai or oblast"[124]. The troika's procedure and its regime of secrecy are prescribed in the text of the order: the troikas examine "the materials on each arrested person or group of arrested persons", and first-category sentences are carried out "with the obligatory full preservation in secrecy of the time and place of the carrying out of the sentence"[123]. The NKVD (the People's Commissariat (ministry) of Internal Affairs - successor of the OGPU and a predecessor of today's FSB) did not inform the families of the condemned of the execution; Kakagasanov writes: "More often this took place under the formula 'convicted without the right of correspondence', which meant 'execution by shooting'"[124]. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov describe also "conviction by albums" - sentencing in absentia on a brief docket, "without acquaintance with the criminal case itself"[83]: that procedure was set by the orders of the "national lines" of the terror, beginning with NKVD order No. 00485. The investigation of the case of the "bourgeois-nationalist center" lasted, by the count of the Chechen historian A. G. Avtorkhanov - a contemporary of the events who wrote in emigration - exactly three years[84]. The Chekists chose not to try 137 people in a single trial and split the "center" into three groups: into the first they gathered the Soviet-party leadership of the republic - Ali Gorchkhanov, Abdul-Khalim Salamov, Khasi Vakhayev, Khamid Okuyev and Tuchaev; into the second - non-party men whom the investigation called the cultural-ideological leadership - Khalid Yandarov, Akhmat Matsiev, Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, D. Malsagov, Magomed Mamakayev; into the third - a "terrorist group", into which "the Chekists gathered, by the logic of things, young people alone"[84]. The groups came before the military tribunal of the North Caucasus Military District; Avtorkhanov writes: "of the roughly 120 people who reached the trial alive, only one - the former mullah Akhmat Tuchaev - admitted his guilt. All the rest declared with one voice that all the crimes imputed to them were an invention, and their 'sincere confessions' false and fabricated from beginning to end", "The entire charge and the evidence in the case were built exclusively on this personal testimony extracted by torture", "There was no other material evidence or witness testimony to substantiate the charge" - and the tribunal passed its guilty verdict on the first group "solely on the basis of the testimony of one defendant – A. Tuchaev"[84]. The tribunal sentenced Abdul-Khalim Salamov, Ali Gorchkhanov and Tuchaev to be shot, the rest - to prison terms of 7 to 25 years[84]. From the death cell Tuchaev submitted a petition for clemency addressed to Kalinin, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and wrote in it: he had confessed to crimes he had not committed because only so had the NKVD promised to free his family and spare his life[84]. Moscow commuted the death sentences of all three and reduced the terms of the others; the "terrorist group" the same tribunal released in its entirety, the case of the "culture-ideologists" it "did not accept for proceedings at all", and those who sat without "cases" the Chekists put through the Special Board - the NKVD's own departmental "court", which passed sentences with no trial and no defendant present[84].
On the morning after the night arrests of 31 July 1937 the bureau of the oblast committee of the party resolved: to hold meetings in all kolkhozes "with an explanation of the political situation in the countryside", and by 5 August - district and Komsomol meetings "on the results of the operation"[121]. On 3 August 1937 the Central Committee of the Bolshevik party (the TsK VKP(b)), by telegram No. 1178, obliged the oblast committees of the party: to organize "in each oblast, by districts, 2-3 open show trials" of assigned "wreckers of agriculture" - "covering the course of the trials widely in the local press"[121]. The newspaper "Groznensky Rabochy" ["The Grozny Worker"] covered the open trials from August 1937 - on 20 August under the headline: "The Trial of the Former Managers of Chechingtorg"[121]. From 11 September 1937 the same newspaper printed denunciations in waves, day after day: 11 September: "Untangle the Bourgeois-Nationalist Tangle" - with a report on a meeting at which "of the 587 members and 132 candidate members of the party present at the meeting... 520 people spoke"; 15 September: "Enemies of the Chechen-Ingush People: Root Out and Smash to the End the Band of Bourgeois Nationalists"; 16 September: "Enemies of the People Have the Run of Chechingizdat: the Wolf Pack Is Headed by the Dyed-in-the-Wool Nationalist Arsanukayev"; 17 September: "Expose and Smash the Vile Band of Bourgeois Nationalists! - Such Is the Common Voice of the Party Organizations of Chechen-Ingushetia"; the newspaper denounced people by name - Gorchkhanov, Salamov, Mekhtiev, Vakhayev, Okuyev, Khaniev, Matsiev, Yandarov[121]. On 27 September the newspaper printed an announcement: "Wreckers of Grain: Toward the Coming Trials" - three days before the report on the trial itself; on 12 October, under the headline: "The Trial of the Wreckers from the Artemovsky Elevator" - the newspaper reported: "the workers and housewives who filled the hall met the verdict with stormy applause"; on 3 November, under the headline: "The Trial of the Wreckers of the Second Oil Refinery"[121]. In March 1938 the participants of a rally in the Oktyabrsky district of Grozny demanded of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR the shooting of "rabid fascist dogs"[121], "Groznensky Rabochy" on 11 March printed an open letter of the Pioneers of Grozny school No. 3 demanding "the physical annihilation of the bestial enemies of the people"[125], and of the trial of 16-26 March the historian K. G. Dendiev writes: the proceedings in the case of the "Bourgeois-nationalist Trotskyite-Bukharinite counter-revolutionary group of Abastov, Kebiev, Zarmayev and others" "were heard in open session, with the participation of a state prosecutor and an organ of the defense", and the indictment was printed by "Groznensky Rabochy"[121].
On 11 July 1937 the occupation authorities approved the number of people "subject to shooting" in Chechnya: 862 "kulaks" (peasants whom the colonizer deemed "well-off") and 555 "criminals" - 1,417 people in all[121]; operational order No. 00447 of Yezhov, the People's Commissar (minister) of Internal Affairs of the USSR, of 30 July records for the ChIASSR: 500 people - to be shot (the order's "first category")[123]. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write of the executed writers: "of the 12 members of the Chechen-Ingush Union of Writers 9 were arrested, 7 convicted, among them four - S. Baduev, A. Dudayev, Sh. Aiskhanov, S. Oziev - sentenced to be shot"[83]. The NKVD (a predecessor of today's FSB) arrested one of those four - the writer Abdi Dudayev - on 24 November 1937 "without the prosecutor's sanction", on the standard charge of "anti-Soviet agitation", and on 2 December, by decision of the "troika under the NKVD of the ChIASSR", the Chekists shot him - eight days from arrest to killing; the finding on his case of 13 May 1958 states: "The investigation of Dudayev's case was conducted in violation of the law; confrontations with witnesses were not held"[121]. Moscow personally confirmed the lists of detainees for shooting: Stalin, Molotov and Zhdanov signed the list of 7 December 1937, and on 28 December the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR passed 32 death sentences on it[121]; on 12 September 1938 the Politburo confirmed a new list of those subject to its court: of the 61 under investigation, 50 went under the case of the "bourgeois-nationalist center", and 55 of them stood "in the shooting article"[121]. On 29 June 1938 the Military Collegium sentenced a large group of the republic's technical intelligentsia to various terms, and 30 people to be shot - the Chekists shot them the same day[121]. The indictment in the case of Porubay - deputy People's Commissar (minister) of Internal Affairs of the republic, put on trial after the change of course - states: "Falsified the investigative cases of Khamzatkhanov, Aliev, Khasiev, Kadilov, Ukhuev, Mutushev; all these persons were sentenced by decision of the troika to VMN" - "VMN" meant execution by shooting[121]. The Chekists dumped the bodies of the killed into two trench-pits at the central cemetery of Grozny - the historian T. U. Elbuzdukayeva writes: there, "in October, November and December 1937", they dumped "the bodies of the shot"[121]. A. Bozhedomov opened the burial in the summer of 1990 - by excavations with the participation of members of the Chechen-Ingush "Memorial" and staff of the museum of local history[121].
Creation of an atmosphere of total paralyzing fear in society through the fabrication of cases (for example, the "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine") and the staging of public show trials[126].
Mass confiscation and destruction of literature declared "nationalist," and rigid control over the printed word and the arts[126].
The forced orthography reform of 1933, aimed at artificially bringing Ukrainian grammar and terminology closer to the Russian language[126].
Mass closure and destruction of churches, as well as repressions against clergy, aimed at the complete destruction of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC)[126].
Physical annihilation and isolation of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, writers, and scholars, as well as of the party opposition (national communists), in the course of targeted repressions. Fabrication of cases (including the "UNC" case) and driving representatives of the national elite to death, including the historian Mykhailo Hrushevsky, the writer Mykola Khvylovy, and People's Commissar Mykola Skrypnyk[126].
Institutional destruction of national historical scholarship, closure of research schools, and removal of the works of Ukrainian historians from scholarly circulation[126].
The construction of a new Soviet-imperial historical canon to supplant the Ukrainian past: "from the late 1930s a thesis took hold in the historical scholarship of the USSR," proclaimed in the works of B. Grekov, K. Huslystyi, and F. Yastrebov, "of Kyivan Rus as the 'common cradle' of the history of the Ukrainian, Russian, and Belarusian peoples," and "in 1939 B. Grekov advanced the proposition of the ethnic unity of the 'Rus people' in the era of Kyivan Rus"[78]. This scheme displaced M. Hrushevsky's conception and denied the independence of Ukraine's history.
Confiscation of absolutely all food, including the extraction of seed stocks, through the mechanism of crushing grain procurement quotas, which led to mass deadly famine[126].
The introduction of the "blackboard" regime - a total economic blockade of settlements. The resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR and the CC of the CP(b)U of December 6, 1932, signed by Chubar and Kosior, prescribed "the immediate cessation of the delivery of goods, the complete cessation of cooperative and state trade on site, and the removal of all available goods from the respective cooperative and state shops," as well as "a complete ban on kolkhoz trade both for kolkhozes and kolkhoz members and for individual farmers"[127].
Deliberately starving millions of Ukrainian peasants to death as a direct result of Moscow's state policy[126].
Systematic psychological suppression through public show trials of "saboteurs" and the introduction of the punitive law on the protection of socialist property (the "law of five ears of grain")[126].
Sealing off the starving region: peasants who tried to escape from the blockaded villages were intercepted on roads and at railway junctions. The directive sealed off precisely Ukraine and the Kuban: "all peasants who had managed to leave Ukraine and the North Caucasus were subject to return to their places of residence," while permits to leave were denied even "to the national districts of the krai, where there was no famine at all"[126]. Within 50 days "219.5 thousand peasants were detained, including 38 thousand in the Ukrainian SSR, 47 thousand in the North Caucasus, 44 thousand in the Central Black Earth region, 5 thousand in the Western oblast, 65 thousand on the railways"; of these, "186.5 thousand were sent home under convoy, almost 3 thousand were convicted, and all the rest awaited trial or were under investigation in filtration camps"[126]. The point of the operation lay not in sentences but in marching people back into the starving villages: the coded telegram "documentarily attests to his intention to organize absolute famine in the rural areas of Ukraine"[126].
Lethally dangerous exploitation of the labor of Ukrainian peasants, convicted en masse under the "law of five ears of grain" and exiled to corrective labor camps during the Holodomor[126].
Forcible seizure of land, livestock, and agricultural implements from peasants as part of forced collectivization under slogans of socialist modernization[126].
Mass dispossession and forced deportation of hundreds of thousands of resisting peasants (the so-called "kurkuls") to remote special settlements in Siberia and the North[126].
Mass deportation of hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian peasants ("kulaks") and their family members to Siberia and remote northern regions of the USSR[126].
Mass arrests of peasants during the dekulakization campaign: according to the 1930 directives, in addition to deportations, tens of thousands of people were sent directly to concentration camps for isolation[126].
Use of dekulakized peasants, sent into the emerging GULAG system, as forced unpaid labor for heavy state projects[126].
A "kulak" was what the colonizers called a peasant they deemed "well-off". In Chechnya officials entered a person into the "kulaks" without any trial, and the colonizer then stripped him of his rights. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "To limit the political influence of the kulaks such a measure was applied as deprivation (temporary or permanent) of voting rights. In 1926, 1.3% of the voters were thus barred from taking part in the elections, and in 1927 - already 4.5%"[83]. The report on the inspection of the party organization of the Chechen Autonomous Oblast, sent on 7-9 March 1931 to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee - the supreme organ of the occupation power of the RSFSR, states: "The lishentsy [people stripped of the vote] in the re-election campaign of 1928/29 numbered 11,279 people, on average 6.8% across the oblast; in some settlements of the okrugs the percentage reached 30, and in the Galanchozh okrug up to 40%"[85]. In January 1930 the leadership of the krai committee of the party (the "North Caucasus kraikom VKP(b)"), preparing a resolution on the expulsion of peasant families, wrote into the draft: "subject to expulsion are exclusively those deprived of voting rights, and also kulaks who by chance have not been deprived of voting rights"[128]. Officials drew up the lists of "kulaks" at random, and the party's own oversight admitted it. Larin, chairman of the North Caucasus krai control commission, reported in February 1930: in Avtury and Shali, "of the 18 households listed for individual taxation [a punitive higher tax], 4 households turned out to be not kulak at all: one poor-peasant and three middle-peasant"; in Kurchaloy 12 poor-peasant and 7 middle-peasant households were entered into the "kulak list", while 89 households that the colonizer himself counted as well-off in his own tax rolls did not make it into the "kulak list"[129]. Larin also named the purpose of the "grain assignments" - the quotas of grain the colonizer ordered the auls to hand over: "The aim was benign: to introduce stratification into the mountain auls by these assignments, but what came of it was exactly the opposite"[129]. Peasants entered as "kulaks" and middle peasants were put on trial by the colonizer for failure to deliver grain and pay taxes - and even the imperial courts found no guilt in those cases: by Larin's count, 40% ended in what amounted to acquittal. Up to November 1929 "265 cases against kulaks were heard, and 132 against middle peasants"; of the 265 cases against "kulaks", "30 were acquitted and 26 sentenced conditionally", another 58 people received forced labor, and such verdicts Larin also counted among the acquittals: "40% were acquitted"[129]. The empire vetted even its own village soviets - the organs it had planted in the auls in place of Chechen self-government - and expelled from them Chechens with the "wrong" past. Larin reported: "In 5 mountain okrugs, 215 persons of clearly alien element have been found in the composition of the village soviets. There are kulaks, and traders, and former elders, and former policemen, and former bandits, and clergy"; the resolution of the oblast party conference, which had proclaimed "the complete cleansing of the composition of the village soviets from alien and kulak elements", he corrected: "To put it mildly, that was said incautiously"[129]. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "If in 1928 62 kulaks were repressed across the whole of Chechnya, a year later the number of the repressed reached 356 people... As a result of these repressions, by the end of 1931 the number of kulak households in Chechnya had shrunk threefold compared to 1929"[83]. Belov, commander of the occupation troops of the North Caucasus Military District, who fought against the insurgent Chechens, in his report to the krai committee of the party named among the causes of the uprising "the incorrect disenfranchisement of middle peasants, and in a number of cases of poor peasants as well", which in the Itum-Kali okrug had become mass practice[85].
The colonizer outlawed the Chechen courts by legislative acts and installed its own judicial system. Until 1927 the sharia courts - courts of Islamic law - were the judicial system of the Chechen people and heard all its cases: criminal, land, labor and family. The occupation power at first recognized the Chechen court: in April 1921 the congress of Soviets of the Mountain Republic - the Soviet autonomy into which the empire had then included Chechnya - resolved to recognize the sharia court system. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov call this "a manifest (and temporary) concession to the Muslim clergy"[83]. Just a month later, in May 1921, the leadership of that same republic stripped the sharia courts of budget money and of the support of its organs[83]. But the courts went on working. In December 1925 the party leadership in Chechnya set out to discredit them, and, as historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write, that attempt "failed completely"[83]. And in 1927 "the sharia courts were curtailed in their rights by an act of will, at the direct demand of the procurator of the Supreme Court of the USSR... Criminal and land cases and labor disputes were removed from their competence, state financing was terminated, and Soviet organs were directly forbidden to apply to the sharia courts"[83]. In their place the colonizer installed its own organs: historian K. G. Dendiev writes that in the Chechen Autonomous Oblast "the all-Union judicial system is introduced, with the subsequent abolition of sharia legal proceedings"[121]. Despite this, the Chechens preferred to settle disputed cases in their own courts. Larin, chairman of the North Caucasus krai control commission, reported in February 1930 that in the Urus-Martan okrug "land disputes are resolved not in the judicial-land commissions" but before the aul elders, of whose influence he said: it is "still not undermined to any more or less significant degree"[129]. In December 1929 the insurgents in Benoy established their own organ of power and sent their demands to Moscow. The fourth point there read: "Abolish the 'people's' courts introduced by order from above, and restore the sharia organs of justice"; the fifth - "End the interference of regional leaders and figures of the central organs of power in the internal affairs of the 'Chechen Autonomous Oblast' and restore the powers of political decision of the Chechen Congress"[121].
The colonizer took from the Chechen clergy the donations of their congregations and closed their houses of worship. In the autumn of 1929 in Goity the colonizers were confiscating a mosque over an unfulfilled "grain assignment" - a quota of grain owed to the empire; Shita Istamulov, leader of the uprising in Shali, spoke of it: "Look what an outrage they are committing in Goity; they have announced: until you deliver the grain, we will take away the mosque for that time. What good is this, when the Chechen people is being robbed of its last faith..."[121]. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write that in 1929 in the Nadterechny district "an experiment begins in removing the mullahs from the distribution of the voluntary donations of Muslims for the benefit of the poor and the clergy - the zakat" - the empire handed the distribution over to its own peasant mutual-aid committees[83]. The colonizer destroyed the greater part of the mosques of Chechnya - the before-and-after count is given by historian K. G. Dendiev: before the Russian revolution Chechnya had "2,675 mosques, 60 thousand murids [disciples of sheikhs], members of various religious organizations, 38 sheikhs, 850 mullahs and 140 religious schools", - and the count of mid-1937: "401 mosques, not counting the kub ones [small neighborhood mosques]", at which "406 mullahs worked"[121]. Belov, commander of the occupation troops of the North Caucasus Military District, in the district command's report to the krai committee of the party (the "North Caucasus kraikom VKP(b)") on the results of the military operation of spring 1930, named the closing of mosques on the colonizers' orders among the causes for which the Chechen auls had risen in arms[85].
By prohibitive acts of 1925-1929 the Russian colonizer destroyed the children's schools of the Chechen people. The khyuzhar is the elementary school at the mosque: a mullah (clergyman) or a qadi (judge of Islamic law) taught children to read the Quran, to write in Arabic and to count; no permit was needed to open one, and the school lived on parents' money and believers' donations[130]. Such a school stood in nearly every settlement, and the people had no other. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "Literally at every mosque there operated schools teaching the Arabic language and script, as well as the basics of arithmetic"[83]; and of the first Soviet years: "while religious schools at the mosques existed in the overwhelming majority of settlements, the secular school had yet to be created anew, since the few 'highlander' schools that had existed in the Terek oblast before the revolution had closed"[83]. The ministries of internal affairs and of education of the RSFSR, by a secret instruction on the teaching of the Muslim creed of 21 August 1925, permitted the Muslim creed to be taught "only in mosques" and "exclusively to persons who have reached the age of 14", with a separate permit from the local imperial organ for each case and with particulars on every teacher - down to his social estate before the revolution; as for the teaching of general subjects under the guise of the creed, the ministries ordered it watched for and prevented[131]. For a school that took children and taught them writing and counting, this was a ban on working. The Chechens did not submit and went on building schools. Nagayev, chairman of the krai commission that inspected the Chechen oblast, in a secret memorandum to the presidium of the North Caucasus krai executive committee of 4 August 1928 cited the tally: on 1 January 1927 Chechnya had 138 Arabic schools with 2,068 pupils, on 1 January 1928 - 180 schools with three thousand pupils, against 105 Soviet schools; the growth of the Arabic schools Nagayev called "the most serious political question"[85]. The Chechens also thwarted closures by force - Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "attempts to close the schools at the mosques by force provoked protests of the population, often accompanied by a refusal to build Soviet schools, as happened in the auls of Gudermes and Achkhoy-Martan"[83]. The supreme organ of the occupation power and the government of the RSFSR, by the resolution "On religious associations" of 8 April 1929, forbade religious associations to hold children's gatherings, groups and circles "for the teaching of religion" and resolved: "The teaching of any religious creeds whatsoever in state, public and private educational and upbringing institutions is not permitted"[132]. Displacing the khyuzhar at once did not succeed: by May 1930, 168 religious schools were still operating in Chechnya and Ingushetia[83]. In the khyuzhar's place the USSR installed its own school and shifted it to the Russian language - Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "If in the 1928/29 school year 79.8% of all schoolchildren in Chechnya were taught in their native language, in 1930/31 it was already only half"[83]. Historian K. G. Dendiev places the closing of the religious schools in one row with the imposition of income tax on the mullahs, the abolition of the sharia courts and the handover of mosques "for economic needs"[121]; the colonizer also handed over the zakat - the Muslims' donations on which the school lived - from the mullahs to its own committees in 1929.
The USSR took livestock and land from the Chechen peasants. In one year of the forced merging of households into kolkhozes ("collectivization") Chechnya lost 184 thousand head of livestock. The report on the inspection of the party organization of the Chechen Autonomous Oblast, sent on 7-9 March 1931 to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) - the supreme organ of the occupation power of the RSFSR, carries a table of oblast statistics: total livestock in the oblast in 1929 - 993,200 head, in 1930 - 809,063. The report admits: "The growth of livestock numbers in all categories that had begun in 1929 found no continuation in 1930; on the contrary, a significant decline in numbers occurred, sparing only the horses"[85] - and the cause is named right there: the decline occurred "chiefly in the spring of 1930, when the kulaks, offering frenzied resistance to the growth of kolkhoz construction, predatorily destroyed the livestock"[85]. That is how the colonizers described the peasants' actions: people slaughtered their own livestock rather than hand it over to the kolkhozes. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov put the loss higher still: "Forced to join the kolkhoz, the peasants strove to shelter at least part of their household from socialization, and if that failed, simply rid themselves of it. Thus collectivization was accompanied by a sharp reduction of livestock numbers - in the single year 1930 they shrank in Chechnya by almost 300 thousand head"[83]. The Central Committee of the party (the "TsK VKP(b)") likewise admitted that the livestock was being taken by force: in the resolution "On the forced socialization of livestock" of 26 March 1932 it recorded that "in a number of districts a practice is observed of socializing the cows and small livestock of individual kolkhoz members by in fact coercive methods", and demanded that such attempts be "cut short"[133]. The colonizer took land from the Nokhchi as well. In the redistribution the Russians called "land settlement", write Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov, "in the Vedeno, Itum-Kali and Shatoy okrugs about 1.5 thousand hectares of land were seized from the kulaks and the mosques"[83]. The directive to "curtail" the Chechen peasants declared well-off when seizing land stands in the same VTsIK report[85].
The USSR ruined the Chechen peasants with taxes and forced deliveries of grain and meat. Officials taxed those entered as "kulaks" at a higher rate by a special list ("individual taxation"), and Larin, chairman of the North Caucasus krai control commission, held in February 1930 that too few households made the lists: in the Vedeno okrug, "of 8,513 households only 80 households were taxed on the individual basis"; in Tsentoroy "of 464 households, 406 are exempted from the unified agricultural tax", in Belgatoy 295 of 335, in Dargo 439 of 501. The tax struck at random, to the point of absurdity - of the village of Day Larin said: "a kulak in Day was assessed at 4 kopecks, while a Komsomol member there was assessed at 4 rubles 39 kopecks"[129]. The colonizer laid "grain assignments" - delivery quotas of grain - on the mountain auls, though there was hardly any grain there. Larin reported: the oblast committee of the party gave the Nozhay-Yurt okrug an assignment of 15,000 poods - about 240 tonnes of grain; further in Larin: "and on the spot they raise it to 25,000, and on the single aul of Benoy, where there are hardly 5 thousand poods to be had at all, fall 5 thousand poods"; for non-delivery the colonizers inventoried property for confiscation and imposed fines - in Shali, Larin reported, "a decision was passed to fine 60 households"[129]. In 1932, write historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov, on top of the confiscated livestock "a meat procurement plan was also handed down, which meant, in essence, the confiscation of a significant part of the livestock"[83]. The colonizer taxed the clergy as well: historian K. G. Dendiev places the imposition of income tax on the mullahs as the first step of their displacement from the life of Chechnya[121].
From 1930 to 1936 the USSR expelled peasant families from Chechnya by the orders and lists of the krai committee of the party (the "North Caucasus kraikom VKP(b)"), of the OGPU (the political police, a predecessor of today's FSB) and of the NKVD that replaced it. In January 1930 the leadership of the krai committee of the party, apportioning among the okrugs the expulsion of 20 thousand households of peasants declared well-off, assigned Chechnya 500 households; a household was expelled whole - the family with all its members[128]. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write of the same expulsions counting people, not households: "At the beginning of 1930, 1,500 peasants declared kulaks are expelled from Chechnya"[83]. Historian G. I. Kakagasanov gives, from published documents, the count for the first half of 1935 - 1,553 families were expelled from the national districts of the North Caucasus krai, and he specifies: "Of these, 473 families (2,112 people) were expelled from Chechnya" - four to five people per family[124]; for 1935 the count of Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov is briefer: "in 1935, 450 kulak families were expelled from Checheno-Ingushetia, another thousand families were expelled from Chechnya and Dagestan in 1936"[83]. On 22 May 1936 the head of the NKVD of the USSR Yagoda, by telegram No. 56379, ordered Dagin, head of the krai NKVD directorate: "to carry out the resettlement beyond the borders of the krai" of five hundred peasant households from the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Oblast and five hundred from Dagestan, finishing "no later than October 1936". In the telegram this thousand families is divided between the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (today's Uzbekistan) and the Kirghiz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (today's Kyrgyzstan). Yagoda also wrote the norms into the telegram: belongings per family - "of a total weight up to thirty poods per family" [about 490 kilograms], loading "from 32 to 35 people" per railcar; able-bodied men he permitted to be arrested "10 days before their dispatch" - "with the aim of preventing their flight"[134].
The Nokhchi rose in arms three times against the forced merging of households into kolkhozes ("collectivization"), and all three times the USSR sent troops against the auls. In December 1929 Shali, Goity and Benoy revolted. The Chechen historian A. G. Avtorkhanov, who worked in Chechnya in those years and later wrote about it in emigration, names the leaders of the uprising: in Shali it was headed by Shita Istamulov, in Goity - by Akhmat-Mullah and Kuriev, in Benoy - by Yaroch and Khodzhas. Shita Istamulov explained why he was taking up arms: "we cannot look on while the Chechens' grain is taken away, while they are ruined and their last property is taken. Fines, searches - if the authorities keep all this up, they will force me to come out with weapon in hand... If we keep looking on at this, they will take everything, down to your last trousers, and kill you naked. Better to die, at least you will know you will be buried in trousers"[121]. Avtorkhanov writes of the first days of the uprising: "The insurgents occupied all the village and district institutions, burned the state archives, arrested the district authorities, including the chiefs of the GPU [the political police, a predecessor of today's FSB], in Benoy they also seized the oil fields, and established a provisional people's power"[84]. The insurgents sent their demands to Moscow. As the first point they demanded "Stop the unlawful confiscation of peasant property", as the second - "End the trial-less arrests of peasants", as the third - "Recall the heads of the GPU from Chechnya, replacing them with a civil administration"; by two more points - to abolish the "people's" courts introduced by the Soviet power, with the return of sharia justice, and to restore the powers of the Chechen Congress. They agreed to lay down arms if these conditions were met[121]. The first attempts of the Soviet troops to seize the auls failed - Shali and Goity fought them off; the staff of the North Caucasus Military District admitted in its memorandum on the first operation of 30 March 1930 that "the successful armed resistance to the local authorities in the auls of Shali and Goity during the seizure of inventoried property served as the final push" toward calling in field units[85]. The OGPU recorded in its survey of the political condition of the USSR for December 1929: on 7 December "two teips [clans] of the aul of Goity, led by the son of Sheikh Khadzhiev, shut themselves in their quarters, posting an armed guard", and "on 8 December in the village of Shali, over the inventorying of the property of kulaks [peasants declared well-off], the militia was disarmed"; the OGPU calls Shita Istamulov "the former Minister of War of the government of Uzun-Haji" [the North Caucasus emirate of 1919-1920]; the arrest count in the same survey: "220 people arrested in Shali and 144 in Goity. The leaders of the Shali and Goity outbreaks Istamulov, Khadzhiev and Kuriev have gone into hiding"[135]. The Russian command moved against the peasants, disarmed four years earlier, a detachment formed in Grozny. At its head stood Burichenko, former head of the Vladikavkaz infantry school. After the first failures the command reinforced the detachment with battalions, an artillery divizion and a "detachment of airplanes". On 11 December the troops seized Shali, on the morning of 12 December - Goity, and from 20 to 27 December they attacked the mountain auls of Benoy, Tsentoroy and Zandak. The staff memorandum states: "in the operation as a whole there took part, together with the units of the VOGPU [OGPU troops], 1,904 fighters with 75 heavy and light machine guns"; artillery pieces and seven airplanes are named there as well; the outcome, in the same document: "Over the operation 450 bandits were seized. Up to 60 people killed and wounded"; the troops' losses - 43 men, of them 21 killed or dead of wounds[85]. On the end of the uprising the sources diverge: in the staff memorandum the seizure of Shali and Goity is dated 11 and 12 December 1929, while the historians place the fall of both centers in mid-January 1930; of the leaders' fate some sources write that they escaped, others - that the insurgent staff in Goity perished[84]. In the spring of 1930 the mountain okrugs rose again, and the Soviet troops again marched on the auls, now in greater force. The occupation command of the district admitted the scale of the outbreak in its report to the krai committee of the party (the "kraikom VKP(b)"): "In Chechnya, as in Karachay, we had not isolated bandit counter-revolutionary outbreaks, but a direct uprising of entire districts (Galanchozh), in which almost the whole population took part in the armed action"[85]. By the district staff's memorandum on the second operation in Chechnya, by 14 March rifle battalions with batteries, cavalry divizions and an aviation flight had been massed into Chechnya: "in all, 3,920 fighters with 16 [artillery] pieces were drawn into the operation"[85]. By the final report of Belov, commander of the occupation troops of the district, to the krai committee of the party, 1,500 units of weapons were seized across Chechnya, 122 people arrested, 19 insurgents killed[85]. Avtorkhanov describes the end of the march on Benoy: "At the end of March 1930 Belov, having received fresh units from Transcaucasia, unfolded a large mountain offensive with the task of taking the insurgents' last point - Benoy. After two months of heavy fighting and great losses, in April 1930, Belov entered Benoy, but found not a single inhabitant in the aul: all of them, including women and children, had evacuated further into the mountain wilds. The victor Belov sent envoys to the insurgents with an offer of honorable peace: to all who voluntarily returned to the aul with the surrender of weapons, an amnesty was declared. The insurgents replied that they would return to their auls only when Belov left with his troops"[84]. In March 1932 the Nozhay-Yurt district revolted; the uprising was led by Mutsu Shamilev (the Nokhchi know him as Motsu of Shuani), Ibragim Ninakhadzhiev, Usman Ushkhaev, Khusein Istamulov and Dada Kebetov; on 20 March, 300-400 insurgents attacked the oil extraction site on Mount Sterch-Kertch, another 700-800 dug in on the mountain ridge, covering the uprising's district from the direction of Khasav-Yurt, a town in neighboring Dagestan[83]. Kashirin, commander of the occupation troops of the district, in a memorandum of 31 March 1932 reported to the Minister of War of the USSR Voroshilov: "The band is headed by a certain 'imam' Mutsu from the aul of Shuani"[85]. For nine days the district remained in the insurgents' hands. Units of the 28th Mountain Rifle Division and the national cavalry regiment approached the district on 26-27 March, fighting began at midday on 28 March, and by 29 March the Soviet troops had seized the district. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "the number of killed reached 333, of wounded - 150. The units of the Red Army and the operational groups of the GPU lost in all 27 men killed and 30 wounded"[83].
Hostages figured as a separate accounting line in the final report on the punitive operation of 1930: Belov, commander of the occupation troops of the North Caucasus Military District, reported to the krai committee of the party (the "kraikom VKP(b)") verbatim: "Seized across Chechnya: of active counter-revolutionary and bandit element, 122 people, of them ringleaders - leaders of the movement - 9; ringleaders who appeared voluntarily - 7; hostages - 35. Rank-and-file participants who appeared voluntarily are not counted, they number hundreds"[85]. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov quote this line of the report: among those arrested in the course of the operation - "leaders of the insurgent movement - 9, hostages - 35"[83]. The Chechen historian A. G. Avtorkhanov, who worked in Chechnya in those years and later wrote about it in emigration, described why the Chekists took hostages and what awaited them: "To the old tsarist system of taking 'amanats' (hostages) to force 'bandits' to surrender the Chekists resorted constantly, and on a wider scale", but "in the history of Soviet Checheno-Ingushetia there was not a single case of the 'amanats' being released when the 'bandit' appeared"; of the fate of both Avtorkhanov writes: the man who appeared voluntarily, "contrary to the solemn promise to spare his life, - was shot, while the 'amanats' were exiled to Siberia, including women and children"[84].
The USSR arrested, exiled, disenfranchised and hounded the authorities of the Chechen people - the sheikhs, the mullahs, the revered elders. The national commission of the North Caucasus krai committee of the party resolved on 28 June 1927: "The sheikhs in most cases are themselves kulaks and traders... they not only economically enserf the poor and middle peasants but, using the religious prejudices of the masses, exercise their political influence as a kulak stratum over a significant part of the toiling masses"[136] - thus the party designated the people's spiritual mentors "kulaks", class enemies. In the summer of 1927 the USSR broke off relations with Great Britain and expected war - and the OGPU (the political police, a predecessor of today's FSB) arrested sixteen religious authorities across Chechnya. Yevdokimov, the OGPU plenipotentiary in the North Caucasus, in his secret report for 1927 tied the arrests to the war scare: "The days of military danger of the summer period unusually inspired the Chechen musduh [Muslim clergy] in the sense of bold and open agitation for aid to external forces, for the preparation of an uprising", - and explained the operation thus: "The c/r [counter-revolutionary] propaganda of the clergy, which was shaping a panicky-defeatist mood in the Chechen peasantry, obliged our organ to be forestalled into a mass operation against the most active religious top layer. Rarely subjected to repressions and confident in the strength of his influence over the broad public - the Chechen mullah found himself caught unawares. The removal of 16 reactionary representatives of the Chechen religious world therefore made an enormous impression on him and for a time paralyzed his activity"[137]; "removal" was what the empire called a person's arrest. Yevdokimov measured success by the disintegration of the spiritual stratum: "a whole series of mullahs began to renounce their rank (up to 30 cases), and a number of religious authorities, compromised by a/s [anti-Soviet] sabotage in the past, to hide from the authorities"[137]. The Chechens answered with intercession, and the report admits: "the campaign for organizing public petitions on behalf of the arrested had significant success"[137]. Among those under arrest was Sheikh Gaysumov of Shali - one of the most revered men of Chechnya; Yevdokimov wrote: "The exception was the sect of Sheikh Gaysumov, whose activists, in connection with the latter's arrest, acted very energetically in the field of mobilizing public sympathy"[137]. The assembly of the village of Shali - 800 people - vouched for the arrested man: "to confirm that citizen Gopsumov Sungant [thus is Gaysumov recorded in the document], aged 107, has been an honored elder in the present village and has never been noted in anything discreditable, either criminal or political"[85]; Nagayev, inspector of the North Caucasus krai executive committee, filed this assembly into his report as evidence - "in the person of these 'assemblies', led by the kulaks and the clergy, the outlines of a real organization opposing our party are beginning to crystallize"[85]. The empire entered the intercession for an old man into its own file of incriminating material. In the autumn of 1927 the Prague journal "Volnye Gortsy" ["The Free Highlanders"] printed a letter from the Caucasus about the same wave: "The Bolsheviks, striking the pose of saviors of our national freedom, are in fact little by little killing all the living forces in the country, tearing from our ranks the most capable - our intellectual forces"; "Such an explosion of new terror took place here after the Anglo-Soviet rupture. Numerous arrests of the intelligentsia, the clergy and even whole families took place in almost every locality on the highlanders' territory. The GPU is working flat out"[138]. The OGPU in the same report named the next target as well: "the national-democratic movement appears to us as that new kind of highlander c/r [counter-revolution] with which we shall have to contend in the coming years and months"[137]. The empire struck at the authorities' rights as well: at the elections of 1928/29 in the Chechen Autonomous Oblast it disenfranchised 11,279 people, and in the breakdown of the lishentsy stand the lines: "Servants of religious cult, 1,569" and "Members of lishentsy families, 5,658"[85]. By 1930 the colonizer had counted the whole stratum head by head - the report on the inspection of the oblast party organization, sent in March 1931 to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee - the supreme organ of the occupation power of the RSFSR, states: "The strength of the mullahs in the Chechen aul is still enormous. On 1 May 1930 there were in Chechnya... communal mullahs - 450, kub mullahs - 800, sheikhs - 34... descendants of Muhammad and other religious authorities - 250, folk healers - 150"; the conclusion, in the same place: "In order to wage a struggle against such a huge army of mullahs, sheikhs and the like, it is necessary to have trained cadres"[85]. In the autumn of 1931, after the killing by the Chekists of Shita Istamulov - leader of the 1929 uprising in Shali, - the arrests of the authorities became mass; the Chechen historian A. G. Avtorkhanov, who worked in Chechnya in those years and later wrote about it in emigration, writes: the killing "was the beginning of a large GPU operation in Chechnya for the liquidation of 'kulak-counter-revolutionary elements and mullah-nationalist ideologues'"[84]. The Grozny and Rostov krai GPU, Avtorkhanov writes, set the arrest quotas, and the government of the USSR confirmed those quotas[84].
The USSR fought the auls that revolted in December 1929 not only with troops but with false promises; the Chechen historian A. G. Avtorkhanov, who worked in Chechnya in those years and wrote in emigration, described this mechanism. For the "peaceful liquidation" of the uprising a government delegation arrived from Moscow - it included Nikolayeva, member of the Central Committee of the union party (the "TsK VKP(b)"), and Ryskulov, deputy head of the government of the RSFSR, - and the "peace commission" of religious authorities it created declared to the insurgents in Shali: "responsibility for the events that have occurred lies exclusively with the local functionaries, who acted contrary to the directives of the party and the government", and in the name of the government delegation an address to the Chechen people was read out: "the internal Chechen affairs will henceforth be decided by the Chechen people itself"[84]. The insurgents, Avtorkhanov writes, "found these explanations satisfactory and agreed to return to their homes"; the GPU detachment (the political police, a predecessor of today's FSB) that arrived next spent three days arresting local Soviet functionaries - just as had been promised; Avtorkhanov continues: "and toward one o'clock in the morning of the fourth day they surrounded the house of the former leader of the insurgents, Shita Istamulov"[84]. The seizure failed - the Chechens fought Shita Istamulov free; Avtorkhanov writes: "To the ultimatum to surrender without a fight, however, Shita and his brother Hasan replied with fire. Part of Shita's house was engulfed in flames and Hasan gravely wounded when, toward dawn, help arrived: about a hundred armed Chechen horsemen surrounded the very part of the GPU troops that had invested Shita's house. After perhaps an hour of hand-to-hand fighting the GPU detachment, numbering up to 150 men, was almost entirely destroyed"[84]. Avtorkhanov continues: "Freed by his friends, Shita Istamulov called all Chechens to a 'holy war' for the restoration of the 'Imamate of Shamil' and the expulsion of the 'infidels' from the Caucasus. Following this call, Shali, Goity and Benoy rose again"[84]. The second deception was the amnesty; Avtorkhanov writes: "To all participants of the uprising, including the leaders of the uprising, an amnesty was declared in the name of the central government" - Shita Istamulov returned to Shali and "on instructions from above" was even appointed chairman of the Shali rural consumers' society (a cooperative for manufactured goods)[84]. Avtorkhanov describes the denouement thus: in the autumn of 1931 Shita Istamulov "was summoned to Baklanov, head of the district GPU, to be handed the official act of amnesty from Moscow. Handing him the act with one hand, Baklanov with the other, from under the counter, emptied an entire Mauser clip into him. The gravely wounded Istamulov managed to stab the treacherous Baklanov to death with his dagger. The outside guard finished Istamulov off"[84].
The OGPU (the political police, a predecessor of today's FSB) fabricated the "Chechen nationalist center" - an underground organization that did not exist - and convicted thousands of Chechens in the case. Thus the empire "explained" the uprisings against the forced merging of households into kolkhozes ("collectivization"): it was not hunger and devastation that raised the people, but a secret conspiracy. The Chechen historian A. G. Avtorkhanov, who worked in Chechnya in those years and later wrote about it in emigration, described the mechanism of the fabrication: "The logic of the Chekists suggested that the culprits and organizers of all the anti-Soviet uprisings should be sought in some single 'nationalist center', into which, undoubtedly, by the same logic, representatives of the internal and foreign Chechen emigration must belong"[84]. The work, by his words, was taken up by the krai organ of the OGPU under Kursky and Fedotov and the Chechen oblast department of the OGPU under Kraft: "They created this 'counter-revolutionary nationalist center' so skillfully and plausibly that even many of the Chechens believed in its existence"[84]. The "evidence" was letters in the name of the Chechen émigré, oil industrialist Tapa Chermoev - with calls to prepare an uprising; they came to Chechen public figures in Grozny from Istanbul, Paris and London through intermediaries whom the OGPU had obliged to hand the letters over to it. Avtorkhanov concludes: "the version of Chermoev's letters was a lie, and the letters themselves - forgeries of the OGPU. But it was precisely these letters that served as 'material evidence' against the 'nationalist center'"[84]. In the autumn of 1932 the OGPU arrested the entire "group" of the addressees, followed by mass arrests across the Gudermes and Nozhay-Yurt districts - the very one that had revolted against the kolkhozes in March 1932; Avtorkhanov writes: "In all, up to 3 thousand people were arrested in the case of the 'Chechen nationalist center'. The arrested were charged with creating a 'counter-revolutionary nationalist center of Chechnya for the preparation and carrying out of an armed uprising'"[84]. There was no trial - Avtorkhanov writes: "Almost all the arrested were convicted through the collegium of the GPU. Of the members of the 'center', Abdulkadirov, Shamilev, Kurbanov, Motsa-Hadji Sotaev and Beymurzaev were shot. Others received 10 years each. How many of the rank and file were shot is impossible to establish"[84]. With the fabricated case the empire justified itself publicly as well: Yevdokimov, secretary of the krai committee of the party, at the krai party conference of 1934 cited "the letters of the millionaire Chermoev" as proof of the preparation of an uprising with the money and weapons of the Western powers[84]. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov confirm the scale: repression "in connection with the case of the so-called 'Chechen nationalist center'" befell, "by some data, up to 3 thousand people"[83].
The OGPU (the political police, a predecessor of today's FSB) passed sentences on arrested Chechens by "troikas" - commissions of three: without trial, without defense counsel, up to execution by shooting. In Chechnya the extrajudicial procedure had operated since the 1920s: Kraft served as deputy head of the Chechen oblast department of the GPU - the oblast link of the political police - and worked with troikas as early as 1924: on 20 August the leadership of the Chechen oblast executive committee, on his report, resolved "to deem necessary the extension of the term of functioning of the troika for extrajudicial hearing by two months"[121]. On 2 February 1930 deputy chairman of the OGPU Yagoda signed order No. 44/21 "On measures for the liquidation of the kulaks as a class" - "kulaks" was what the colonizers called peasants they themselves declared well-off[128]. Under this order the OGPU created troikas: cases in them were examined without trial, and the panel was made up of representatives of the krai committee of the party, of the procuracy, and Chekists[121]. The troikas received the cases of the "first category" - the peasants whom the supreme organ of the occupation power (the "Politburo of the TsK VKP(b)"), by its secret resolution of 30 January 1930, had consigned to concentration camps, up to execution by shooting[128]. In the autumn of 1931, after the killing by the Chekists of Shita Istamulov - leader of the 1929 uprising in Shali, - the GPU carried out a wave of mass arrests across Chechnya. The Chechen historian A. G. Avtorkhanov, who worked in Chechnya in those years and later wrote about it in emigration, writes of the trial of the arrested: "The arrested were convicted by an extraordinary 'troika' of the GPU specially created for the purpose, chaired by its chief G. Kraft", and "few of them ever returned to freedom"[84]. The count of the arrested diverges among the sources: the historians give up to 35 thousand, while by the OGPU's own memorandum of 31 July 1931, 20,230 people passed through the extrajudicial troikas of the whole North Caucasus krai in 1930[128]. The troika worked after the March 1932 uprising in the Nozhay-Yurt district of Chechnya as well: Yevdokimov, head of the OGPU for the North Caucasus krai, at a secret conference of the secretaries of the national oblast committees of the party in Rostov on 15 December 1932, reported the tally of the Chekists' "work" on the results of the uprising: "...745, of them 386 screened out, 359 brought before the troika, 100 people sentenced to 10 down to 3 years, 188 conditionally, 166 released"[121].
The USSR shot arrested Chechens - including captured leaders of the uprisings. In March 1932 the Nozhay-Yurt district of Chechnya revolted against the forced merging of households into kolkhozes ("collectivization"); historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "The five captured leaders of the uprising were soon shot"[83]. Next the Chekists came for the clergy - Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov continue: "Arrests befell some well-known Chechen sheikhs, and Kana-Sheikh Khantiev was shot in April 1933"[83]. Kana-Sheikh Khantiev was a spiritual mentor of Muslims (a sheikh) from the village of Lakha-Nevre, today's Nadterechnoye; researcher A. Dukhaev, quoted by historian K. G. Dendiev, writes of him: "He was arrested for the last time on 17 March 1933, at the age of 85... and on 9 April of the same year sentenced to the supreme measure of punishment. The sentence was carried out on 10 May 1933. In 1990 Kana-Sheikh Khantiev was rehabilitated"[121]. The sources diverge on the date of the execution: April or 10 May 1933. The count of those shot is not limited to the top: the Chechen historian A. G. Avtorkhanov, who worked in Chechnya in those years and later wrote about it in emigration, writes that in the case of the "Chechen nationalist center", fabricated by the OGPU (the political police, a predecessor of today's FSB), rank-and-file people were shot as well - how many, it is impossible to establish[84].
On 31 July 1925 the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR explained the operation being prepared by the properties of an entire people - the order says: "The Chechen oblast is a hotbed of criminal banditry spreading to the districts neighboring Chechnya... In their mass the Chechens are inclined to banditry as the main source of easy gain, which is furthered by the presence of a large quantity of weapons. Mountain Chechnya is a refuge for the most hardened enemies of Soviet power"[139]. The label from the order passed into the operation's working nomenclature: the instruction of 4 August 1925, approved by Uborevich, commander of the North Caucasus Military District, Volodin, member of the district's Revolutionary Military Council, and Yevdokimov, plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU (the political police, a predecessor of today's FSB) for the krai, puts people in one row with rifles and "removes" them with a single verb - point 8 of the instruction reads: "If the conditions of the surrender of weapons are fulfilled, no house-to-house search is conducted, and only the bandit and vicious element is removed"[140]. Thus criminality was declared a property of the people, and its men - an "element" subject to removal.
On 31 July 1925 the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, in the order justifying the operation to disarm Chechnya, declared the Chechens incapable of proper farming: "The rich lands granted to the Chechens on the plain after the revolution are not used by them in full; they run their agriculture in backward forms, are not industrious"[139]. The accusation stands in a military order as one of the grounds for sending in troops: the lands were "granted" to the people by the authorities themselves, their way of farming was declared backward by the same authorities, and the conclusion drawn from this assessment was a military operation. Historian T. U. Elbuzdukayeva, who publishes the order, also cites its continuation: "political indications" had ripened - the population's weariness of war and the demand to fight "banditry"[139] - that is, even by the document's own logic the war was to be waged not on economic backwardness, yet it is backwardness that is set down as a justification.
The documents of its staff described a military operation with artillery shelling as the bringing of peace: the "Main Tasks of the Special Operational Groups of the OGPU in the Operation in the Chechen Autonomous Oblast", approved by Yevdokimov, plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU (the political police, a predecessor of today's FSB) for the krai, Uborevich, commander of the North Caucasus Military District, and Volodin, member of the district's Revolutionary Military Council, open with the words that the mass operation "in its final result must bring general pacification to Chechnya and create the appropriate conditions for the peaceful Soviet-economic construction of the oblast"[140]. The same frame was prescribed to be spoken aloud in every aul: under the disarmament instruction of 4 August 1925 the representatives of the authorities, having entered a village surrounded by troops, announced to the assembly the purpose of their coming - "the removal of weapons with a view to the Chechen authorities securing a normal working life for the toiling population", and the artillery shelling was given a name within this frame: "warning fire as a measure of influence"[140]. The organizer of the operation, Mikoyan, secretary of the North Caucasus krai committee of the party, brought this picture to its final formula in his memoirs: "It was a brilliant operation without any bloodshed"[141] - in the same chapter he himself describes the Chechen old men taken hostage by the Chekists and the shelling of a Chechen village by the troops of the USSR.
On 25 August 1925 the USSR sent troops into the Chechen Autonomous Oblast to take away the weapons of its inhabitants; the operation was conducted by the army and the OGPU (the political police, a predecessor of today's FSB) under the overall command of Uborevich, commander of the North Caucasus Military District, and Yevdokimov, plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU for the krai[139]. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write of the forces gathered against the Chechen villages: "In all, about seven thousand Red Army men with 240 machine guns and 24 [artillery] guns were brought in to take part in it. In addition, two aviation detachments and an armored train were at the disposal of the operation's commander. Tactically the troops, as well as the operational groups of the GPU, were divided into seven groupings"[83]. Historian T. U. Elbuzdukayeva gives, from the military documents, a different count: 6183 Red Army men with 137 heavy and 102 light machine guns, 14 mountain and 10 light [artillery] guns, and beyond that 341 OGPU officers assembled from across the whole North Caucasus[139]. Mikoyan, secretary of the North Caucasus krai committee of the party and one of the operation's organizers, recalled that "It was agreed to send two divisions into Chechnya 'for exercises'. The exercises were to include contact with the population, amateur performance evenings, concerts, closeness with the local youth, which was to strengthen still further the trust in Soviet power"[141]; the same legend was scattered from the air - the account of a surviving companion of imam Nazhmuddin Gotsinsky, printed in 1936 in the Warsaw journal Severny Kavkaz, says: "To calm the population, proclamations were scattered from aeroplanes, in which it was written that ordinary maneuvers were taking place and the inhabitants were asked not to worry and to stay in their homes"[142]. The head of Chechnya itself - Eldarkhanov, chairman of the Chechen TsIK (the highest organ of power of the autonomous oblast) - was not informed of the preparations: "The center and the organs of the OGPU did not consider it necessary to inform even the chairman of the Chechen TsIK, T. Eldarkhanov, of the action being prepared. The concentration of troops in Grozny was explained by forthcoming maneuvers"[139]. At the same time the disarmament instruction of 4 August 1925 wrote the Chechen TsIK into every step of the execution: its representatives enter the surrounded aul together with the command and convene the assembly, sit on the weapons-reception commissions, are obliged to provide profiles of the districts, and after "all the enumerated measures of influence" receive the authority to dissolve village executive committees and install revkoms[140]. Even before the troops went in, the OGPU had described every village: historian E. F. Zhupikova relates - "The organs of the OGPU gathered information about the most influential mullahs and sheikhs, about the honored elders, about the guides without whom it was impossible to penetrate into the mountains"[143]; for every settlement a questionnaire was drawn up with the number of inhabitants and households, the composition of the population by taips (clans) and the quantity of weapons planned for removal[140].
Over the three weeks of the operation, from 25 August to 12 September 1925, the troops of the USSR took from the inhabitants of Chechnya 25299 rifles, 4319 revolvers and pistols, a machine gun and about 80 thousand cartridges[83]; the OGPU (the political police, a predecessor of today's FSB) reported to Stalin in rounded numbers: "In Chechnya during the operation 24000 rifles, 4000 revolvers, about 70000 cartridges, 2 machine guns were removed"[144], while Mikoyan, secretary of the North Caucasus krai committee of the party and one of the operation's organizers, counted in his memoirs "more than 30 thousand rifles, more than 10 machine guns"[141]. By the assessment of historian E. F. Zhupikova, what was removed amounted to "approximately 75% of what the population had before the start of the operation and approximately half of the weapons removed in all the highland oblasts"[143]. Under the disarmament instruction of 4 August 1925 the inhabitants were announced "the exact figure of the firearms and ammunition subject to removal", taken from the OGPU questionnaires, and given no more than two hours to surrender them[140]; Mikoyan describes the same quota with the words "they would present each village with the demand to surrender all weapons in the quantity known from agent intelligence"[141]. The taking of weapons began even before the troops went in, with the inhabitants divided up by lists: from those entered in the lists of the "vicious element" and their relatives "the local revkoms took the weapons away, while registering those of the remaining inhabitants"[143]. The inhabitants themselves asked to give up their weapons without shelling: in early September 1925 the delegates of the Goity society Eski Karlagov, Khatu Dobriyev and Dzhabi Otgayev appealed to the district's Revolutionary Military Council with a request: "Now, at the disarmament, which we consider right, we ask that this be taken into account and petition that an exception be made by allowing the voluntary surrender of weapons without the taking of repressive measures"; the answer came by telegram, "most urgent", over the signatures of Uborevich, commander of the North Caucasus Military District, Volodin, member of the district's Revolutionary Military Council, and Yevdokimov, plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU for the krai: "The Red Army knows well the revolutionary services of the village of Goity. The surrender of weapons must be carried out voluntarily on 9 September with delivery of the weapons to Grozny. The weapons necessary for self-defense will be left to the aul of Goity"[145].
The targets of the artillery and aviation were often not military objectives but inhabited settlements as such: the instruction of 4 August 1925, approved by Uborevich, commander of the North Caucasus Military District, Volodin, member of the district's Revolutionary Military Council, and Yevdokimov, plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU (the political police, a predecessor of today's FSB) for the krai, prescribed - "If the population of the aul does not fulfil the demand to surrender weapons in the established time in full, or fulfils it partially, the detachment command, by way of threat, opens artillery fire (or, in the absence of artillery, machine-gun fire) for 10 minutes with high bursts and half-strikes", and added: "depending on the situation the warning fire, as a measure of influence, may be opened several times as well"[140]; the document names no military objective and no target inside the village at all. Of the 242 disarmed settlements 101 came under rifle, machine-gun and artillery fire, 16 under strikes from the air[83]; by the count of historian E. F. Zhupikova, "104 one-pud bombs [about 1.7 tonnes] were dropped on the 16 auls where the leaders of the insurgents were hiding"[143]. A one-pud aerial bomb is about 16 kilograms, the weight of a round of a modern 120 mm mortar; on average six to seven such bombs fell per aul. The aviation was directed by Petrozhitsky, chief of the district's air force, and historian T. U. Elbuzdukayeva lists the targets by name: "In the course of the operation the aircraft of the 3rd, and from 6 September also of the 5th aviation detachments delivered air strikes on the auls of Zumsoy, Dai, Tagir Khoy, Akki Bougi, Oshni, Khimoy, Nizheloy, Ragekhoy, Urus-Martan and Nozhay-Yurt"[139]. What the "warning fire" looked like in a single aul can be seen from the dispatch on Achkhoy-Martan of 25 August 1925: "15 shrapnel rounds were fired at the aul, first four with a high burst, then to strike. After two Chechen women had been wounded, the inhabitants began to hand over their weapons"[146]. Historian A. Yu. Lashkov writes of the strike on the aul of Dai: "Initially, because of heavy fog, the neighboring settlement of Chubakhkimeroy was mistakenly subjected to the air strike"[147].
Through the resisting villages the troops moved in raids with house-to-house searches and arrests. The instruction on mass searches, issued for the operation by the staff of the OGPU (the political police, a predecessor of today's FSB), ordered houses to be cordoned off and everyone found in them to be detained and searched, and speaks of arrests in points 7 and 8: "All who counteract in one measure or another the successful conduct of the mass operation are brought to account and arrested", "Malicious concealers of weapons are arrested"; of what was taken during a search the same document says: "During searches and arrests only all correspondence is taken, including correspondence in the Arabic language, as well as all weapons found during the search"[140]. The information department of the OGPU, in its "Survey of the Political Condition of the USSR for September 1925" stamped "Top Secret", summed up the operation with the words "On our side losses are 20 men"[144], and reported nothing about the killed and wounded in the shelled and bombed auls. The count of losses for the operation as a whole is given by historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov from a journal publication of 1995: six killed civilians, 30 wounded, a further 12 killed assigned to the "bandits", with the troops' own losses at five killed and nine wounded[83].
Disarming Chechnya, the troops of the USSR destroyed the villages that had not met the ultimatum, up to complete demolition: the aul of Khakmedy - more than 300 households - was destroyed entirely, in the aul of Dai 20 houses were destroyed, Urus-Martan stood for three days under artillery fire and air strikes. A surviving companion of imam Nazhmuddin Gotsinsky - the spiritual head of the resistance in Dagestan and Chechnya, whom the troops pursued into the mountains - related in 1936 in the Warsaw journal Severny Kavkaz: "Then the fire was transferred to the nearest auls, of which the aul of Khakmedy (more than 300 households) was completely destroyed"[142]. The aul of Dai, the center of resistance of the fifth combat sector, historian A. Yu. Lashkov describes from the documents of the military archive: "From the shelling and bombings the aul of Dai suffered substantially: 20 houses turned out destroyed, there were a small number of human casualties"[147]. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "...the aul of Urus-Martan was subjected to artillery shelling and air strikes for three days, the aul of Dai was bombed three times, for two days artillery shelled the auls of the Zumsoy society"[83].
Even before the operation the village assemblies together with the revkoms (unelected committees installed in place of elected Soviets - campaign C1176) drew up lists of the "vicious element" - inhabitants noted in robberies; historian E. F. Zhupikova writes: "They and their relatives bore material responsibility for all cases of theft on the territory of Chechnya"[143] - the relatives paid for others' thefts by the fact of kinship and an entry in the list. One could leave the list only by an oath with an obligation to inform: "If the 'vicious element' took an oath that for a year he would not rob and would inform on thieves, he was struck from the list"[143]. When the troops reached the mountains, the destroyed was counted by the same category: as the result of the bombing of 16 auls "119 houses of the 'vicious element' were blown up"[143]; historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov confirm the number - "119 houses were blown up"[83]: a house was blown up because its owner was entered in the list.
To get at imam Nazhmuddin Gotsinsky, who was sheltering in the mountains of Chechnya, the OGPU (the political police, a predecessor of today's FSB) took old men from the villages and held them hostage under the threat of destroying the villages with artillery. Mikoyan, secretary of the North Caucasus krai committee of the party and one of the operation's organizers, described it himself: "to catch him, the Chekists invited to their quarters old men from the villages where he might be hiding and, declaring them hostages, warned them that if they did not say where Gotsinsky was, they would destroy the villages with artillery, and would arrest them and put them on trial. For a whole day they tried to persuade the old men, but all was without result. Then an aeroplane was sent to that district. They were terribly afraid of the aeroplane. Only after several shells had been fired at the village so that, without destruction of the houses, the inhabitants should feel its power, did the old men say in which gorge Gotsinsky was hiding"[141]. The word "hostages" is also in the documents of the operation itself: on 4 September 1925 Mironov, head of the Chechen oblast department of the OGPU, reported: "I report: the population is giving up Nazhmudin. I am now conducting negotiations with the representatives. The matter is being conducted through the hostages I have released... Let aeroplanes appear at 15 hours, but not strike. For effect let some 6-7 of them come"[145]. For the Sharoy district the count of hostages is known from the documents of the military archive: historian A. Yu. Lashkov writes that "the command of the military grouping demanded of the population of the Sharoy district the surrender of the well-known bandit Gotsinsky. In doing so, 40 men from among the honored elders were taken hostage. However, the demand to surrender Gotsinsky was not satisfied within the appointed time, and therefore the troops resorted to intensified repressions. In two days 22 puds of bombs [about 360 kilograms - like 22 rounds of a modern 120 mm mortar] were dropped on the district"[147]. The surviving companion of Gotsinsky names a different number and adds what is not in the Soviet papers: from the destroyed aul of Khakmedy "105 hostages were taken", and the hostages were threatened with shooting - his account says: "the Bolsheviks wrote of the shooting of the hostages in the event of resistance in their proclamations"[142]. The word "hostages" is not in the disarmament instruction of 4 August 1925, approved by the operation's commanders, - it allows only arrests of "influential persons of the aul" as an extreme measure: the hostage-taking was done over and above what was written, and its traces remained in the dispatches of the executors and the memoirs of an organizer.
On 8 September 1925 Soviet aviation dropped eight one-pud bombs - 16 kilograms each, like a round of a modern 120 mm mortar - on Nozhay-Yurt, to force the village to hand over Gibertiev, the former head of the district militia[148]. Urus-Martan was coerced in the same way: historian A. Yu. Lashkov writes that after artillery fire and bomb strikes "the leadership of Urus-Martan yielded and handed over the bandits on 9 September"[147]. Of the representatives of the local authorities the instruction on mass searches, issued for the operation by the staff of the OGPU (the political police, a predecessor of today's FSB), says: they are brought into the removal as those "obliged to point out the dwellings of persons subject to removal, as well as those persons (relatives and others) with whom the person subject to removal may be hiding"[140] - the community itself was made the executor of the removal. The price of this demand is named by historian E. F. Zhupikova: "By force of the highland custom of hospitality, the population of Chechnya, even if it was hostile to the leaders of the insurgents and the chiefs of the bandits, could not hand them over to the authorities. Breaking the custom would have disgraced the highlander for many generations and would have threatened his clan with blood vengeance from the man he had handed over"[143].
In the two months of the operation of 1925 the USSR arrested and shot the leaders of the resistance of Chechnya and Dagestan. Imam Nazhmuddin Gotsinsky, the spiritual head of the resistance in Dagestan and Chechnya, was arrested by the OGPU (the political police, a predecessor of today's FSB) on 5 September 1925. His hiding place was given up by the old men held hostage in the Sharoy district under the threat of the shelling of their villages. On the same day Uborevich, commander of the North Caucasus Military District, Yevdokimov, plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU for the krai, and Volodin, member of the district's Revolutionary Military Council, reported to Moscow: "The operation in the Sharoy district has ended successfully. After 5 days of repressions and agent work, today at 14 hours a report was received through the aircraft that Gotsinsky has been taken"[147]; he was arrested by an operational group of the GPU under the command of M. Ushaev[83]. Historian T. U. Elbuzdukayeva writes: "N. Gotsinsky was urgently taken to Rostov-on-Don, where on 15 October 1925 he was sentenced to be shot"[139]. Arrests are provided for by the disarmament instruction of 4 August 1925 as well - it allows "the conduct of arrests of influential persons of the aul, reactionarily disposed", with the proviso to resort to this measure "as an extreme one, with the observance of maximum tact"[140]. Under shelling even the innocent surrendered: historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write that in Urus-Martan, "after the artillery and aviation shelling of the settlement, the sheikhs Solsa-Haji Yandarov and Bilu-Haji Gaytayev surrendered to the authorities - soon, incidentally, released owing to their complete innocence"[83].
The instruction on mass searches, issued for the operation by the staff of the OGPU (the political police, a predecessor of today's FSB), establishes that until the end of the investigation the arrested are concentrated at the staffs of the OGPU district groups, and of what follows point 19 says: "The procedure for conducting the investigation and the further routing of the arrested is provided for in the regulations on the troikas for the extrajudicial examination of cases"[140]. The "Main Tasks of the Special Operational Groups of the OGPU", approved by Yevdokimov, plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU for the krai, Uborevich, commander of the North Caucasus Military District, and Volodin, member of the district's Revolutionary Military Council, include the same procedure directly in the list of tasks: "The removal of the counter-revolutionary, bandit and other criminal anti-Soviet element... the registration of the same, the conduct of the investigation and the extrajudicial examination of their cases and their transportation to the place of destination"[140]. Through this procedure passed 183 of the more than three hundred arrested in the course of the operation - the investigation of their cases ended in extrajudicial shooting[83]. The OGPU had received the right of extrajudicial reprisal a year earlier - by a secret resolution of the Presidium of the TsIK of 9 May 1924 (campaign C1176); the operation's instruction applied it to the arrested.
The USSR shot nearly all those arrested in the course of the operation of 1925 - people already in the hands of the troops and the OGPU (the political police, a predecessor of today's FSB). Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "The total number of arrested exceeded 300. Of the total number of arrested, 105 were shot on the spot; against 183 an investigation was opened, which also ended in extrajudicial shooting; 21 were exiled"[83]. Even the OGPU's own count found few "active" ones among them: the survey submitted to Stalin names 50 "active bandits and prominent counter-revolutionary figures", while "In all, 400 bandits and elements abetting them have been arrested"[144] - those shot were mostly not leaders but rank-and-file detainees whose guilt was established by no court. So was killed the operation's chief prisoner as well: imam Nazhmuddin Gotsinsky - the spiritual head of the resistance in Dagestan and Chechnya, detained on 5 September 1925 and sentenced in Rostov-on-Don - was shot, in the words of a highlander emigre writing in the Paris journal Prométhée in 1930, "Il fut fusillé sans jugement dans les souterrains du Guépéou de Rostov" - without trial, in the cellars of the GPU in Rostov[149].
Use of the Treaty on the Creation of the USSR (December 1922) to formally declare a union of equal republics, masking the final centralization of power in Moscow[150].
Stripping the Ukrainian SSR of control over foreign policy, the army, foreign trade, transport, and communications through the 1924 Constitution of the USSR, transferring them to the jurisdiction of the all-union people's commissariats[126].
The targeted physical annihilation of the national cultural elite. The official turn was sealed by the resolution of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) and the Council of People's Commissars "On Grain Procurements in Ukraine, the North Caucasus, and the Western Region" of 14 December 1932, signed by Stalin and Molotov: Ukrainization was declared to have been carried out "mechanically," which, in the resolution's own words, "made it easier for bourgeois-nationalist elements, Petliurites and the like to create their legal covers, their counter-revolutionary cells and organizations"[151]. The term "Executed Renaissance" denotes precisely "the repressive policy of communist Moscow aimed at the physical destruction of the Ukrainian intellectual elite of the 1920s–30s (more broadly – of the entire nationally conscious Ukrainian intelligentsia) and the tabooing of its creative achievements"[54].
The compulsory introduction of the metropole's language into schools: the resolution of the USSR Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the VKP(b) of 13 March 1938 No. 324 "On the Compulsory Study of the Russian Language in the Schools of the National Republics and Regions" ordered "to introduce the teaching of the Russian language as a subject of study in the schools of the national republics and regions from September 1, 1938" - from the 2nd grade in all non-Russian primary schools and from the 3rd grade in incomplete secondary and secondary schools[119].
Soviet Russia placed an unelected extraordinary body over Chechnya: on 3 April 1920 a congress in Grozny "proclaimed the transfer of all power to the Chechen Revolutionary Committee of five members"[83]. When at the elections to the Soviets in July 1920 "the overwhelming majority of seats in the Soviets went to... representatives of the so-called 'kulak-mullah and nationalist elements'", the elected Soviets were dissolved - historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov record: "within a short span the peasant Soviets were dissolved twice (in August 1921 and in July 1922) and the power of the revkom was restored again"[83]. In the autumn of 1920 "the Aldy congress was dispersed, and several Grozny party workers... arrested" on the orders of Ordzhonikidze, head of the Caucasus Bureau of the Communist Party's Central Committee[83]. The Mountain ASSR, which had given legal form to the highlanders' autonomy, "did not last long and in 1924, having fulfilled its tasks as conceived by the party leadership, ceased to exist"[83].
Soviet Russia disarmed Chechen villages by military operations through all five years of the campaign. Historian E. F. Zhupikova writes: the Caucasus Labor Army "conducted" disarmament operations "...in 1920; in March-August 1921 the Chechen auls of Gordali, Tsentoroy, Belgatoy, Dargo, Benoy, Vedeno, Groznensky and Shali, which had taken part in the mutiny of N. Gotsinsky, were disarmed"[152]. In May 1922 the troops sent into Chechnya were headed by Gikalo - secretary of the Mountain oblast committee (obkom) of the party[153], who in the war with Denikin had commanded insurgent detachments in the mountains of Chechnya[152]: "The villages of Makhkety, Goity and Katyr-Yurt were subjected to disarmament, with combat aviation used against the latter. Besides the seizure of a significant quantity of weapons, up to 30 'bandits' were captured and shot, and their property was confiscated by the authorities"[83]. The year 1924 "ended in the Chechen Autonomous Oblast with a large military operation to seize weapons, in the course of which almost 3 thousand rifles and about 400 revolvers and pistols were collected"[83].
Soviet Russia carried out executions for show: "During the Chechen congress in Grozny, by verdict of the local Cheka, 7 Chechens were demonstratively shot. The execution made such '...a devastating impression on the masses of Chechens who had not yet had time to disperse after the congress' that the command of the Caucasus Labor Army demanded that henceforth death sentences on Chechens be carried out as far away from Chechnya as possible"[83].
Over Sheikh Ali Mitaev, a member of the Chechen revkom, the GPU set "thorough surveillance", and in the spring of 1924 it "took the decision 'on the removal' of A. Mitaev from Chechnya. The official agreements with him were treacherously broken; he was suddenly arrested, taken to Rostov-on-Don and, after a brief investigation, shot"[83]; historian E. F. Zhupikova dates the arrest to 19 April 1924 and cites the GPU's formula of accusation - "for his connection with counter-revolutionary organizations"[152]. The historians call the character of the reprisal and its perpetrators by their proper names: "The murder of A. Mitaev by the Chekists," write Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov[83].
In 1923-1924 the Chechen revkom made hostage-taking an official practice of the fight against "banditry": "Measures were taken to register all criminals present in Chechnya, and the practice was introduced of taking hostages from among the close relatives of bandits in hiding"[83].
Soviet Russia gave the sharia courts official status and took it away within a month: the constituent congress of Soviets of the Mountain Republic in April 1921 resolved to introduce a sharia court system (sharia - Islamic law) - historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov call this "a clear (and temporary) concession to the Muslim clergy of Chechnya and Ingushetia": "Already in May 1921 the TsIK of the GASSR by its resolution deprived the sharia courts of financing from the state budget and of the support of state bodies"[83].
In 1920 the Red Army looted the Chechen villages where it was stationed: the units quartered in Chechnya, historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write, "received almost no property or food allowance", which pushed them into "self-supply" - "...the Red Army not only ran riot, but took away grain, cattle and so forth, terrorizing the population with senseless killings"[83]. In the summer of 1920, in Tsentoroy, the Chechens routed a unit of the Caucasus Labor Army "engaged in outright plunder"[83]. The property of the killed was taken too: during the disarmament of May 1922 "up to 30 'bandits' were captured and shot, and their property was confiscated by the authorities"[83].
On 9 May 1924 the Soviet Union, by a secret resolution of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee (TsIK), gave the OGPU "the right of extrajudicial reprisal against bandits and their accomplices, namely: expulsion from the given locality, confinement in a concentration camp for a term of up to 3 years, and the application of the supreme measure of punishment - shooting", and prescribed that the republics declare localities "unfavorable in respect of banditry", where the GPU organs "are entitled to decide at their own discretion any case of banditry"[154]. The Chechen authorities already in that same May telegraphed the center: "Sanction the creation of a tribunal or a political troika"[139]. The troikas that went to work, "composed of an official of the procuracy, the GPU and the first party leader, — as a rule, passed sentences in absentia — on the basis of the submitted documents, often without even questioning the accused. Of any participation of a defense in the proceedings there could be no talk"[83].
The special department of the Caucasus Labor Army carried out mass shootings uncontrolled even by its own command: army commissar Vrachev complained that of them "...almost nothing is known not only to the Revolutionary Tribunal or the Political Department of the army, but to me or the army commander either"[83]. During the disarmament of May 1922 people were first captured and then shot: "up to 30 'bandits' were captured and shot, and their property was confiscated by the authorities"[83].
On December 12, 1919, the command of the Soviet Southern Front issued secret directive No. 188. The document was signed by front commander Yegorov, the future head of the USSR Stalin, and chief of staff Petin. The directive gave the invaders' army its task: «to capture the city of Kyiv in the shortest possible time»[155]. On December 16, 1919, the army of Soviet Russia (RSFSR) took Kyiv for the third time since the start of the communist revolution[155][126].
The Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) is the Ukrainian state proclaimed in 1917. By December 1919 its army - eight to ten thousand soldiers, many of them sick with typhus - was pinned near Starokostiantyniv in Volhynia: the Volunteer Army of Denikin to the south and east, the Polish army to the west, the troops of Soviet Russia to the north. Contemporaries called this position the «triangle of death»[79]. At a meeting in Nova Chortoryia on December 4-6, 1919, the head of the UNR Directory Symon Petliura and the army command decided to dissolve the regular front. The UNR Army under the command of Mykhailo Omelianovych-Pavlenko set out on a raid through the rear of the Soviet and White forces: in 180 days, from December 6, 1919 to May 6, 1920, some ten thousand soldiers marched two and a half thousand kilometres across Ukraine. This raid is known as the First Winter Campaign[79].
That same winter Soviet troops occupied most of Ukraine. The dates of the cities' capture, according to the front reports: December 11, 1919 - Poltava and Kharkiv, December 16 - Kupiansk, December 24 - Luhansk, January 5, 1920 - Mariupol, February 7 - Odesa[155]. On the Right Bank the Russian occupier reached the Polish front line: Kamianets-Podilskyi, Proskuriv and Starokostiantyniv were held by the Poles[79].
The UNR leadership signed an alliance with Poland and secured the support of its army in the fight against the Russian occupiers. In the spring of 1920 the armies of Poland and the UNR moved to liberate Kyiv. On May 6, 1920, Yegorov, commander of the Southwestern Front of the Soviet army, telegraphed in secret order No. 304: «Kyiv must fall to the enemy only at the cost of the heaviest losses on his part»[156]. The armies of the UNR and Poland retook Kyiv: on May 7 Polish reconnaissance units rode to the centre of the city by tram, and on May 8 ten regiments of the 3rd Polish Army entered the capital[157].
The occupier gathered its forces and on June 6 broke through the Polish front south of Kyiv, at Samhorodok. On June 10 the Polish troops, having blown up the Chain and Rusanivskyi bridges, withdrew from Kyiv[157]. On June 12, 1920, Yegorov reported: «Units of the 58th Division have taken Pechersk and are entering Kyiv». The orders to cut the Kyiv - Korosten railway, issued the day before, were signed by Yegorov and Stalin[156].
On October 18, 1920, an armistice took effect on the Polish-Soviet front, and the UNR Army was left to face the invader alone[157]. By November 10 it held the front with 8,968 bayonets and 3,250 sabres, with 95 guns and 687 machine guns. Against it the Soviet command moved the 12th and 14th armies, the Bashkir cavalry brigade and Kotovsky's cavalry brigade: 24,000 bayonets, 4,000 sabres, 120 guns and five armoured trains[158]. The occupation troops attacked first and thwarted the offensive being prepared in Podillia, in today's Vinnytsia and Khmelnytskyi oblasts. In eleven days of fighting the UNR Army lost about 13 thousand soldiers, almost all of its artillery and four armoured trains[157].
On November 21, 1920, about 12 thousand UNR soldiers, together with the staff of Symon Petliura and the ministries, crossed the Zbruch River, along which ran the border with the lands ceded to Poland under the Treaty of Warsaw[157]. Mykhailo Andrusiak, a participant in the retreat, recalled: «Sadly, with bowed heads, the Cossacks laid down their arms after crossing the bridge and marched on to the West»[159].
In the autumn of 1921 the soldiers of the UNR army made a last attempt to raise a general uprising against the Soviet occupiers. This raid is known as the Second Winter Campaign, and its course is known from the report of the chief of the Field Insurgent Staff, Colonel Yurii Otmarshtein, submitted to Symon Petliura. At 2 a.m. on November 4, 1921, the detachment crossed the Polish-Ukrainian border near the village of Borove: 155 officers and officials, 645 Cossacks, 32 horses, with about 56 percent of the men armed with rifles[160]. On November 7 the detachment under the overall command of Yurii Tiutiunnyk liberated the Korosten railway junction in battle and freed 600 political prisoners from the jail, but withdrew that same morning: an armoured train of the Soviet occupiers was approaching the town with guns the detachment had nothing to counter, and ammunition had to be spared. Seven officers and twelve Cossacks died in the battle[160].
The detachment could go no further. Half of the infantry marched without boots and with frostbitten feet, the wagon train carried up to 80 wounded, and ammunition was replenished only with what was taken from killed and captured Russians. The staff decided to turn back, towards Poland[160]. The troops of the Russian invader blockaded the area of the UNR raid and on November 17 encircled the detachment near the village of Mali Mynky in the north of Zhytomyr Oblast. Over 400 soldiers died in the battle, 537 were taken prisoner, and more than a hundred broke out of the encirclement and crossed the Polish border on November 20[81][78]. The prisoners were taken to the village of Bazar, where 359 of them were shot[161]. The armed struggle of the regular UNR Army ended there[150].
In the autumn of 1921 the soldiers of the Army of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR), who had retreated across the Zbruch River in November 1920, formed detachments and returned to Ukraine to raise an uprising against Soviet rule. This raid is known as the Second Winter Campaign[78]. On November 17, 1921, occupation troops under the command of Kotovsky encircled the UNR detachment near the village of Mali Mynky in the north of Zhytomyr Oblast[78].
The captured Ukrainians were taken to the neighbouring village of Bazar and locked in the church. A visiting commission of the Cheka - the secret police of Soviet Russia, predecessor of today's FSB - arrived from Kyiv to judge them; the Communists called it the «Extraordinary Five». Its resolution, signed in Bazar on November 22, 1921, was entered into the collection of orders to the troops of the Kyiv Military District as No. 2578 of November 26, 1921[161].
The Russian commission described the battle as follows: «Over 400 men were cut down in the battle and 537 captured, including the wounded… In all, 443 men appeared before the extraordinary commission (the Five); the rest died of their wounds before the commission arrived or were in grave condition and left until recovery»[161].
The commission recorded the motive for the execution in the same document: «Guided by the dictates of revolutionary conscience… and in order to prevent similar crimes… and to show the entire capitalist world and its hirelings that the power of the Soviets mercilessly punishes anyone who attempts to disrupt its peaceful work, the Extraordinary Five resolves: 1. The persons listed in the annex hereto, numbering 359, as malicious, active bandits - TO BE SHOT»[161].
The fate of the remaining Ukrainian prisoners the commission set out in the same document: forty-one men of the senior command and civil administration it ordered sent for further interrogation by the investigative organs, and forty-two former Red Army soldiers, captured a year earlier, to the special department of the Kyiv Military District for screening[161].
The resolution was signed by commission chairman Garkavy, members Livshits, Ivanov, Kotovsky and Frinovsky, and secretary Litvinov. Kotovsky, who put his signature under the death sentence, commanded the very troops that had encircled the detachment at Mali Mynky. The order for the district was signed by district commander Yakir, member of the district Revolutionary Military Council Zatonsky, and district chief of staff Pauka[161].
The Soviet command offered the prisoners a transfer into the Red Army; not one agreed[150][81]. The colonizers carried out the execution in front of people herded to watch: the day before, they forced local peasants to dig a long ditch in a ravine near Bazar, and brought in the residents of the surrounding villages to the execution site[161]. Before the ditch one of the commissars asked once more who wished to join the Red Army. From the ranks came the answer: «We will not serve you!.. Shoot!.. The people will not forgive you for this!»[161]. The condemned embraced and sang «Shche ne vmerla Ukraina» - the song that seventy years later, after Ukraine declared independence in 1991, became the national anthem of Ukraine and remains so to this day[162]. To the sound of the anthem, Soviet troops shot all 359 Ukrainian prisoners near the village of Bazar[161][150]. The testimonies were gathered by a courier of the Ukrainian underground who visited Mali Mynky and Bazar immediately after the execution[161].
The exact day of the execution differs between sources, ranging from November 21 to 23[161][81][78].
The list of all 359 executed men, name by name, was published by Sotnyk O. Shpilinskyi in Kalisz in 1932; the list was later reprinted together with the text of the resolution[161].
Historian Larysa Yakubova writes: «This execution became a tragic symbol of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917—1921. The armed struggle of the regular UNR Army came to an end»[150].
In November 1921 Russian occupation troops under the command of Kotovsky encircled, near the village of Mali Mynky in the north of Zhytomyr Oblast, a detachment of soldiers of the army of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) who had returned from across the Zbruch to raise an uprising against Soviet rule - this raid is known as the Second Winter Campaign[78]. The captured Ukrainians were taken to the neighbouring village of Bazar, and a visiting Russian commission (the «Extraordinary Five») sentenced 359 men to death[161].
The colonizers staged a public execution for intimidation. The day before the shooting they forced the peasants of the village of Bazar to dig a long ditch in a ravine, and brought the residents of the surrounding villages to the execution site[161]. The purpose is recorded in the testimonies gathered by a courier of the Ukrainian underground who visited the site immediately after the execution: the people were herded there «to deter the population from attempts to resist Soviet rule»[161]. A detachment of the invader's army surrounded the 359 captured Ukrainians in a tight ring and shot them before the eyes of their assembled compatriots[161].
The calculation of intimidation is recorded in the sentence itself: the commission resolved to shoot the prisoners in order «to show the entire capitalist world and its hirelings that the power of the Soviets mercilessly punishes anyone who attempts to disrupt its peaceful work»[161].
Use of the "union treaty" format of June 1, 1919, and December 28, 1920, not to create an equal federation but as an instrument for legalizing direct, rigid rule from Moscow[126].
Transfer of control over the military affairs, finances, communications, and transport routes of the Ukrainian republic into the hands of the central bodies of the RSFSR[126].
De facto liquidation of the Ukrainian army (the disbandment of the Ukrainian Front) and the transformation of the government of the Ukrainian SSR into a nominal appendage of the Russian administrative machine[126].
The signing of the Treaty of Riga in March 1921: a backroom division of spheres of influence and Ukrainian territories with Poland behind the back of the Ukrainian people, legalized through the formal participation of the puppet Ukrainian SSR[150].
Moscow's seizure of direct control over the punitive apparatus through the decision to liquidate the independent All-Ukrainian Cheka (VUChK) in August 1919 and the appointment of its own special commissar, Ya. Peters[126].
Coercion of legal Ukrainian parties into self-dissolution (in particular, the Borotbists in the spring of 1920) and their absorption by the CP(b)U through political blackmail and the bribery of their leaders with official posts[126].
At the end of February 1919 four regiments of the Volunteer Army - the division of General Shatilov - attacked the village of Goity with artillery, for its refusal to hand over the Red Army men sheltering there; detachments from the surrounding villages came to its aid, and the Denikinites retreated toward Grozny[83]. On 23 March the army struck from Grozny at Gudermes[83]. From 27 to 30 March battles raged for Alkhan-Yurt: "The shelling of the village was conducted by 24 guns and an armored train that had taken position near the Ermolovskaya stanitsa... the village was captured"; more than 400 of its defenders died[83]. For failure to fulfill the demand to return captured Cossacks the army stormed Tsatsan-Yurt - historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "On 9 April 1919 the White troops attacked and by nightfall captured the village of Tsatsan-Yurt. In the course of the fierce battle more than 500 people died on the Chechen side, including over 400 Tsatsan-Yurt villagers proper"[83]. In October the command threw against Chechnya a force of 15 thousand soldiers and officers taken off the advance on Moscow: "On 5 October stubborn three-day battles began for Chechen-Aul, after which the villages situated near the railway were subjected to a new devastation"[83].
In its March offensive along the railway the Volunteer Army destroyed villages to the ground: "for several days stubborn battles went on, in the course of which the villages of Berdykel and Ustar-Gordoy ended up completely destroyed, and a number of other villages were captured"[83]. The year's count is kept by the Soviet survey cited by historian E. F. Zhupikova: 21 destroyed auls (27 in another publication of the same source) with 15 thousand dead[152]. The Chechen historian A. G. Avtorkhanov, who wrote of these events in emigration, gives both the motive and a list by name: the highlanders' desire "to arrange their state life at their own discretion" Denikin construed as "national Bolshevism", "hence the policy of burning auls and the extermination of the unsubmissive highlanders", and "to break the resistance of the Chechens and the Ingush, Denikin burned to the ground dozens of the largest centers of Chechnya-Ingushetia - Ekazhevo, Dolakovo, Alkhan-Yurt, Chechen-Aul, Ustar-Gardoy, Gudermes, Gerzel-Aul, Stary-Yurt and others" (Ekazhevo and Dolakovo are Ingush villages)[84].
After capturing Alkhan-Yurt at the end of March 1919 the Volunteer Army for a month did not let the residents bury their dead - historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "As a punishment for the stubborn resistance, the White command for the course of a month did not permit the bodies of the village's fallen defenders to be committed to the earth"[83].
The Volunteer Army answered the uprising in Grozny in December 1919 with mass executions: after the suppression of the rising on the night of 23 December the insurgent leader Gikalo reported: "Right now there are nightmarish reprisals in Grozny: 79 people have been hanged and a mass of people shot"[83].
On 19 February 1919 General Lyakhov, at a congress of Chechnya's representatives in Aldy, announced the demands of the Volunteer Army, including mobilization: "These demands were put forward in the form of an ultimatum and were not subject to discussion," write historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov, and the congress left the ultimatum without an answer[83]. In April 1919 the command put forward a new ultimatum: "the complete submission of the Chechens to the appointed ruler of Chechnya, the handing over of all Red Army men, Bolsheviks and abreks, as well as of all the valuables carried off into Chechnya by the Red Army... the return of the pilfered materials from the railway and the organization of deliveries of provisions and fodder for the army"; for failure to fulfill a separate demand - to immediately return a group of Cossacks captured in the vicinity of the village - the army took Tsatsan-Yurt by storm[83].
In February 1919 the Volunteer Army demanded, through the Mountain government, the handing over of all Red Army men sheltering in Chechnya: "About 700 people were indeed prepared for handover, but this action met the resolute resistance of the Goity Soviet and the open discontent of the people," write historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov (the Goity Soviet - the soviet of the village of Goity); General Shatilov reported: "...unrest is taking place among the Chechens, as part of them do not want the Bolsheviks handed over"[83]. The demand to hand over "all Red Army men, Bolsheviks and abreks" entered the April ultimatum as well[83].
In February 1919 the Volunteer Army announced at the congress in Aldy a mobilization of the highlanders - at the villages' own expense: "the villages were obliged to equip and maintain the mobilized at their own cost"[83]. General Aliev, the appointed ruler of Chechnya, carried out the mobilization: "The 200-300 horsemen assembled in this way (together with Kabardians and Ingush) took part in the suppression of peasant unrest in the Stavropol region"[83]. Historian E. F. Zhupikova conveys the conclusion of the researcher P. Aptekar on the causes of the Chechens' uprising against Denikin: "the forcible mobilizations and requisitions of provisions for Denikin's army"[152].
In 1919 General Denikin refused to recognize the Mountain government and dissolved it[152]; General Lyakhov, appointed ruler of the Terek oblast, agreed to regard the republic's parliament as no more than "a consultative organ attached to his person"[83]. As ruler of Chechnya the Volunteer Army appointed a general from among the Chechens - historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "As Ruler of Chechnya on behalf of the Volunteer Army was appointed a well-known military man - General Eriskhan (Iriskhan) Aliev, a Chechen by origin"[83]. On 29 March 1919 Denikin convened a conference in Grozny - as the same historians write, one "called upon to put an end to the bloodshed and to confirm E. Aliev as ruler of Chechnya" - attended by representatives of 42 villages, mostly supporters of the Atagi Soviet (the Chechen National Council, which sat in Starye Atagi), entrepreneurs and part of the clergy[83].
A full-scale offensive by the Ukrainian Front of the Red Army in early 1919 to recapture Ukrainian cities after the withdrawal of Austro-German troops[126].⏎In the summer of 1919 Ukraine was also under attack by the White army - the Armed Forces of South Russia led by General Denikin[163]. The advance of Denikin's White army on Kyiv ran under the slogan of restoring a "united and indivisible Russia"[126]. On August 30, 1919, Kyiv, abandoned by the Reds almost without a fight, was taken by the combined Ukrainian forces - the 1st and 3rd corps of the Ukrainian Galician Army (UHA) and the Zaporizhzhia Group of the army of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) under the overall command of the Galician general Kravs; for 4 p.m. the next day, Sunday, August 31, Kravs scheduled a ceremonial parade of the Ukrainian troops on Khreshchatyk with the participation of Symon Petliura, head of the UNR Directory[150]. The day after the Ukrainian armies entered the capital, Kyiv was also occupied by Denikin's troops under General Bredov, who forced the Ukrainian units out[150]. The events of August 31, 1919 became known as the "Kyiv catastrophe"[150][126]. A catastrophe this day was for the Ukrainian armies and for the statehood of the UNR: they lost the capital, taken the day before, within a single day; the armed clash on Duma Square left dead and wounded, and several hundred men were taken prisoner[150]. Historians of the Institute of History of Ukraine of the National Academy of Sciences conclude: "the initially successful operation of the Ukrainian forces turned into a painful defeat". Of the consequences they write: the catastrophe "had a demoralizing effect on the Ukrainian army and deepened the divergence in the strategic aims" of the two Ukrainian political leaderships - that of Dnieper Ukraine and that of Galicia[150].⏎The course of the day is known from the diary of the Supreme Command - the staff of the Ukrainian Galician Army. The staff described the morning of August 31 thus: at 8 o'clock Denikin's units entered the city, "it seems - across the middle unoccupied bridge and also across the railway bridge, over which several armored trains crossed", and positioned themselves in the southeastern suburbs[164]. The senior Galician commander, Otaman Vimetal, agreed with Denikin's commanders on a provisional demarcation line, but between 4 and 5 p.m. Denikin's general Stackelberg, with a delegation of officers and a detachment of 100-200 men, approached the City Duma, already held by the Galicians; Kravs demanded that they be withdrawn behind the agreed line[164]. The staff recorded the denouement thus: the assembled crowd, "knowing of the presence of Denikin's troops in Kyiv, demanded that the Russian flag be hung on the Duma in addition to the Ukrainian one we had already planted there", and Kravs, "in order to calm the crowd, in which there were many former Russian officers", permitted it with the justification "as a banner of the common struggle of both armies against the Bolsheviks"[164]. Units of the Zaporizhzhia Group passing by the Duma "tore down the Russian flag"; shooting broke out - Denikin's detachments attacked the Galician units scattered across the city, and of the fire from roofs and balconies the diary entry reads: "the civilian population also fired at our units"[164]. The day's toll in the diary: "10 Cossacks killed", the disarmed staff of the III Galician Corps and eleven of its companies, the guns of the Zaporizhzhia Group abandoned in the city; Kravs estimated Denikin's forces at "at least two divisions"[164]. There was no battle for the city: after the shooting at the Duma "great panic" set in - several units were disarmed, the rest fought their way out of the city; the staff summed up: "a unified resistance was impossible because of the panic mentioned"[164]. Kravs set out to negotiate with Bredov and already on his way met "strong columns of volunteers [soldiers of Denikin's Volunteer Army]" marching on the city[164].⏎Kyiv remained with Denikin's forces. On the night of September 1 Kravs signed with Bredov an agreement on the withdrawal of the Galician units; by September 2 the group's troops were already assembling on the Ihnativka - Vasylkiv line[164]. The withdrawal was the command's decision: the riflemen of the group, according to the entry for September 1, "deeply dispirited by the recent events, demand a new offensive on Kyiv"[164].⏎In the fall of 1919 the Red Army went over to a counteroffensive, now against Denikin's forces[126].
Mezhlauk, deputy war minister of the Soviet colonial administration of Ukraine (the UkrSSR), telegraphed Lenin on 5 April 1919: Ukraine must not be looked upon "as a promised land" of inexhaustible reserves - its resources had to be counted among the all-Russian ones as soon as possible and used under a single plan[165]. In the second half of April 1919 Lenin, head of the RSFSR government, proposed that the Petrograd organizations ship workers to Ukraine to replenish stocks of food and fuel: "Continue the mobilization of workers in Piter, extending it to Ukraine and the Don... I advise sending these workers en masse to Ukraine, the Don, the East for 3 months. It is foolish to starve and perish in Piter when bread and coal can be won back"[166]. By a decree of 12 April 1919 this administration obliged every village to hand over to the state the amount of grain assigned to it[54]. The grain was taken from Ukrainians by the administration's food ministry: it sent armed workers' detachments into the villages, and alongside them the grain was seized by detachments of the Bolsheviks' secret police - the extraordinary commissions (Cheka) - and by units of the Russian army[54]. These detachments confiscated peasants' property and implements, took hostages, and made a whole village answer for a single inhabitant. Detachments of the same ministry and of the Cheka intercepted, on roads and at railway stations, Ukrainians carrying grain for barter or sale outside the state monopoly: the food was seized, and carrying grain was punished up to and including execution[54]. Refusing to hand over property cost lives: in June 1919 agents of the Kherson district extraordinary commission detained Nykyfor Potachenko, a 24-year-old peasant of the village of Roksandrivka in Kherson district, "for unwillingness to provide horses"; by the commission's resolution he was shot on the night of 15 June (a local history publication gives 15 July) in the basement of the Tyulpanov house - twice he climbed out of the filled-in grave alive, and only the third execution killed him[167].
On 14 June 1919 Lenin telegraphed Kyiv at three addresses at once - Rakovsky, head of the colonial administration, Shlikhter, its food minister, and Podvoisky, its war minister - shifting the supply of the Russian fronts onto Ukrainian grain: "In view of the utter impossibility of provisioning the Western and Northern fronts from the exhausted stocks of the Centre, the whole weight of this state task naturally passes to the delegation of Tsekomprodarm, led by Orlov and working under Trotsky's order for the entire Russian army as a whole"; in the same telegram he demanded that the administration's war ministry assist this delegation "so that it can immediately move food freight to the armies of the West and North"[168]. A week later, on 21 June, Lenin sent Rakovsky a telegram marked "out of all turn" and "with verification of the exact time of delivery," setting a deadline: "The Western army absolutely needs three trainloads of bread within the coming days. I urgently request the most energetic measures to meet this need. The extremity is utmost"[169].
On 1 June 1919 the central Soviet authority of Russia (the VTsIK) resolved to carry out "a close unification of 1) the military organization and military command, 2) the councils of the national economy, 3) railway administration and management, 4) finances and 5) the commissariats of labour" of Russia, Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus and Crimea - "so that the direction of the said branches of national life be concentrated in the hands of single collegiums." The resolution was signed by Kalinin, chairman of the VTsIK, and by secretary Serebryakov, while preserving the formula of independence word for word: the unification was carried out "standing fully on the ground of recognition of the independence, freedom and self-determination of the toiling masses of Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus and Crimea"[170]. Ukraine's economy, railways, finances and labour passed under Moscow's management; independence remained a word on paper.
The food ministry was not on that list: Lenin, head of the RSFSR government, subordinated it separately and in secret. On 12 June 1919 he sent a note to Kyiv: the food ministry of the colonial administration of Ukraine (the UkrSSR) was passing under the all-Russian one in both money and management - without any announcement; at the bottom of the note stood the instruction to encipher the underlined part and transmit it immediately, and on 14 June the question was put before the plenum of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik party[171].
In captured Kyiv the occupiers shot hundreds of people over 1919: they killed at night, printed the names of the dead daily in a newspaper, and in the last week of August proclaimed a "week of red terror." An eyewitness - Kateryna Koval-Medzvedska, a Kyivan who lived seven months in the city under Moscow's occupation, from February to August 1919 - recorded that on 24 August 1919 "a 'week of red terror' was officially proclaimed - blood flowed in rivers. Peters, Voroshilov and Latsis, all-powerful that day, took no account of government members Rakovsky, Manuilsky and others who signed orders for releases from the Cheka, but ordered those people shot 'in the order of red terror.'" The shooting was done at night: "From 2 to 4 o'clock the sinister night silence of the unhappy, tormented city was broken by single shots and the piercing sounds of a car siren. People living near one of the 17 chekas scattered across the city understood that our brothers were being shot, their cries and groans drowned out by the red executioners with the shrill piercing sounds of sirens"[172].
From 24 to 30 August inclusive the newspaper Izvestia - the organ of the Kyiv occupation authority - daily announced lists of dozens shot "in the order of red terror"; on 26 August "a list was announced of 167 persons shot 'in the order of red terror'" - among them people whose release order the eyewitness had read two days earlier in the chancellery of the central organ of the colonial administration (the VUTsIK). "And how many people perished without announcement, simply vanished without trace!"[172]. One of those newspaper lists survived in a reprint: Shumakher, acting head of the Whites' Information Section, reproduced in "Summary of Information on the Atrocities and Lawlessness of the Bolsheviks" No. 25 a list printed in the Kyiv Izvestia of people shot by the occupiers: a professor, a gymnasium teacher, merchants, house-owners, attorneys, former Kyiv governor Sukovkin, former vice-governor Neklyudov, 80-year-old Slynko[167]. The very form of the announcements came from Moscow: the RSFSR government's resolution "On Red Terror" of 5 September 1918, signed by justice minister Kursky and interior minister Petrovsky, required "publishing the names of all those shot, as well as the grounds for applying this measure to them" - the Kyiv lists with the formula "in the order of red terror" delivered names and grounds, exactly what the resolution demanded[173].
The head of the Soviet colonial administration of Ukraine, Rakovsky, wrote to Lenin on 9 August 1919 that the Kyiv secret police had been carried away with executions by hastily drawn-up lists and that more than 300 people had been shot in Kyiv in total[174], while Latsis, chairman of the Ukrainian secret police, gave his own statistics in his 1920 report book: "Shot by the Kyiv Extraordinary Commission jointly with the V.U.Ch.K. - 825" people in 1919 up to October[175].
Units of the Volunteer Army (the "Whites") captured the town of Fastiv in Kyiv province on 25 August 1919 (7 September by the modern calendar) - and on the same day began robbing the inhabitants of the town's Jewish quarters. Pakhomov, the Whites' temporary commandant, having received 25,000 roubles from a Jewish delegation, promised to take measures but refused to stop the violence at once, explaining why: "since the troops are greatly embittered against the Jews." The Whites' garrison was commanded by Belogortsev. The Whites killed on a schedule: "Towards evening all the Cossacks, regulars and partisans separately, were usually assembled for roll-call. After roll-call and prayer they scattered in groups across the town 'to work.'" Those fleeing were caught on the railway: "Many were taken off trains along the way and led into the forest to be shot"[176].
When a Russian delegation came to the commandant asking him to stop the pogrom, because the Russian population had begun to suffer from it too, he asked: "And who is doing the robbing?" - and, on hearing that the Russian population was also taking part, replied: "And later they will say it was the Cossacks who robbed"[176]. On 23 September 1919 Kundo, the Whites' commandant in Fastiv, issued order No. 2 declaring everything settled: "I add that measures for the protection of order in the townlet were taken long ago, all apprehensions are entirely groundless. Of all cases of robbery, violence and requisitions I request immediate notification to the commandant's office"[177].
Rabinovich, a commissioner of the Russian Red Cross, described the result of the three days thus: "The pogrom, like a tornado, destroyed, burned and scattered the greater half of the town... From the smouldering ruins of the fires bodies of those burned in the houses were still being recovered"[178]. By 30 September 1919, 600 killed, 100 burned and 315 wounded had been counted in Fastiv - out of eight thousand Jewish inhabitants of the town, and the figure was incomplete: "there are far more killed, since to this day bodies are being found in the woods"[176].
The resistance of the villages of captured Ukraine tied down troops for the whole of 1919. On 18 April 1919 Antonov-Ovseenko, commander of the RSFSR's Ukrainian Front, reported to Vatsetis, commander-in-chief of the RSFSR armed forces, that he would give no troops for the Southern Front: "Right now there is hard fighting at Shepetivka and Tiraspol and a hard struggle with kulak uprisings everywhere." Vatsetis wrote on the report: "Carry out the order and report back"[179]. Two weeks later, on 3 May 1919, Antonov-Ovseenko repeated his refusal and named the scale: "30 versts from Kyiv there is a kulak uprising, up to three thousand well-armed men with 8 guns." Vatsetis answered as before: "I repeat that the order must be carried out"[180].
For the command, the Ukrainian peasants who had risen against the seizures were not an adversary but a hindrance to supplying the front: it regarded the Ukrainian village as a rear area to be kept in order while the main forces carried out Moscow's tasks.
Naval artillery was turned on the risen villages too: on 2-5 May 1919 the armed steamers of the Dnipro river flotilla shelled Chornobyl, Pliuty and Trypillia, held by the insurgents - the vessels "Arnold," "Verny" and "Admiral" are named in the operational summary one by one[181].
On 25 May 1919, summing up for the armies of the front the fighting against the Ukrainian units of commander Hryhoriv, who had risen against the Soviet authority, Antonov-Ovseenko laid down the order of the mopping-up: those who surrendered were to be handed to the military tribunals of the Soviet authority, "ringleaders and chiefs" singled out separately, and the villages in the armies' areas of operation disarmed with the taking of hostages; the order was signed with him by commissar Savitsky and chief of staff Babin[182].
The refusal of the White commanders to recognize Ukrainian statehood. General Denikin, as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of South Russia, signed the programmatic address "To the Population of Little Russia" (August 1919), which declared the struggle for a Ukrainian state to be treason. Symon Petliura (head of the Directory of the Ukrainian People's Republic and chief otaman of its army) and his associates, the address ran, "having begun the dismemberment of Russia, continue even now their evil work of creating an independent 'Ukrainian State' and of fighting against the rebirth of a United Russia"[163]. Denikin wrote in the first person: "declaring Russian the state language throughout the whole expanse of Russia, I consider entirely inadmissible and prohibit the persecution of the Little Russian folk language"[163]. The promised "prohibition of persecution" did not recognize the language but assigned it the place of a vernacular. What remained for Ukrainian under the address were everyday life, private schools, and the first years of primary school - Denikin explained: "to ease the pupils' assimilation of the first rudiments of knowledge"; the "treasonous movement" for statehood he required to be "completely distinguished" from the permitted "love for the native region… and its local folk language"[163]. Denikin allowed the people's existence and denied it political subjecthood: the striving for an independent Ukrainian state was declared treason, the language was left a vernacular. On the night of September 1, 1919, after four hours of negotiations, the Galician general Kravs and Denikin's general Bredov (according to the diary of the Supreme Command of the Ukrainian Galician Army - the commander of the Guards corps) agreed: the Galician units would withdraw from the city that same day "at least beyond the line of the Kyiv railway stations", then to the line Ihnativka - Vasylkiv - Hermanivka, while the Galician army guarantees that it "will make no moves against the army of the volunteers [Denikin's Volunteer Army]"[164]. In the fourth point the Galician command renounced political subjecthood: "The commander of the Kyiv group of the Galician army declares that the Galician army operates independently of Petliura's army under separate Galician command, without any political aims, and solely with the purpose of fighting the Bolsheviks"[164]. A day earlier, on August 30, at negotiations with the command of Denikin's 2nd brigade, its representatives demanded that the territory southeast and east of the Koziatyn - Fastiv - Kyiv railway be treated as "the operational zone of Denikin's troops", and that the strip between the line Fastiv - Volodarka - Saskiv - Buky and the line Bila Tserkva - Tarashcha - Lysivka - Zvenyhorodka be declared neutral; the diary records: "We did not agree to this demand"[164].
On 3 August 1919 general Mai-Maevsky, head of the Whites' administration in Katerynoslav, Kharkiv, Kursk and Poltava provinces, issued in Kharkiv order No. 22, opening it thus: "I announce the basic provisions adopted by the Special Council on the question of 'Ukrainian schools.'" The first point was reversal: "All schools in which, before the appearance of the 'Ukrainian' authorities, instruction was conducted in Russian, and then, by order of the Ukrainian authority, the Little Russian language was made the language of instruction, must return again to instruction in Russian"[183].
The history and geography of Ukraine the order struck from the curricula: "The teaching of 'Ukrainian studies' (the history and geography of Ukraine) is abolished"[183].
Nine days later the commander-in-chief confirmed the same norm: in the address "To the Population of Little Russia" Denikin declared Russian the state language "over the whole expanse of Russia," leaving to Ukrainian the private schools and the first years of primary school - "to ease the pupils' assimilation of the first rudiments of knowledge"[163]. In Kyiv order No. 22 was applied in the autumn as well: a summary of the Soviet side on the situation in the city records that "in all schools the Russian language is being introduced as the state language"[184].
Denikin, commander-in-chief of the White army, vouched in his address "To the Population of Little Russia": "there will be no restrictions whatsoever in relation to the Little Russian language in print"[163]. The ban came three weeks after the capture of Kyiv and was built as a system of permits: by order of general Mai-Maevsky, head of the Whites' administration, "all Kyiv newspapers and other periodicals appear only with the permission of the Kyiv governor," every publication is presented to the prosecutor and the governor straight from the printing house, "strict preliminary military censorship" is in force, and any deviation is punished with a fine of 20,000 roubles and six months in prison[185][184].
To the Ukrainian press this system gave no permits. The Information Bureau of the UkrSSR Defence Council reported from captured Kyiv: the Whites' newspapers - Kievlyanin under the editorship of Shulgin, Ekho, Vechernyaya Gazeta "and a number of other sheets" - came out daily, but "not a single Ukrainian newspaper appears in Kyiv," and "in the streets of Kyiv Ukrainian speech is not heard at all"[186]. Historians of the Institute of History of Ukraine confirm the outcome: under the Whites Ukrainian newspapers were closed down and Ukrainian books were removed from the shops[78]. The promise not to touch the Ukrainian word lasted exactly until the Whites entered Kyiv.
On 10 September 1919 colonel Matveev, temporary head of the Whites' administration in the city of Mykolaiv, issued an ordinance: all unions and societies that had not submitted their charters or had not been confirmed by the circuit court were deemed closed[187]. The Ukrainian enlightenment societies, grown up over the years of the revolution without confirmation under the pre-revolutionary procedure, fell under this condition wholesale: no separate order was needed to close them - it was precisely thus, by a formally neutral condition, that the Whites closed the Ukrainian societies. Historians of the Institute of History of Ukraine confirm the outcome: Ukrainian institutions under the Whites were liquidated, and Russian ones were set up in their place[78].
On 28 November 1918 the Central Committee of the Bolshevik party (the CC RCP(b)) created in the Russian city of Kursk a puppet government for Ukraine, which named itself the "Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government of Ukraine" - political cover for the invasion by the troops of Soviet Russia into Ukraine. By a manifesto of 29 November it proclaimed the establishment of Soviet power in Ukraine, and on 29 January 1919 it was reorganized into the Council of People's Commissars of the UkrSSR on the Russian model[162]. By a decree of 3 December 1918 - a month before the capture of Kharkiv - this government set up its own secret police: the All-Ukrainian Extraordinary Commission[188].
In the summer of 1919 Moscow took even the punitive apparatus away from the front it had created. On 11 June 1919 Shishkov, deputy chairman of the Ukrainian secret police, telegraphed the CC RCP(b) that it had no organizational ties whatsoever with the Russian one and that all local commissions in Ukraine were subordinate only to the Ukrainian, not the Moscow one[189]. On 22 July 1919 Dzerzhinsky, head of the Russian secret police, wrote to Latsis, head of the Ukrainian one, that the Ukrainian commission's business was to carry out in Ukraine the policy of the party's Moscow centre: "in relation to us You have become a samostiynik, become one objectively," and its task was "to be the conductor of the policy of the CC RCP [the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party] in Ukraine"[190]. On 13 August 1919 the politburo of the CC RCP(b) resolved to dissolve the Ukrainian secret police, merging it with the Russian one, and charged Peters with the execution; on 14 August the politburo of the party's Ukrainian branch (the CC CP(b)U) submitted, and on 16 August Peters was appointed representative of the Russian commission attached to the colonial administration of Ukraine (the UkrSSR)[191].
Don Cossacks of the White army of General Denikin killed Ukrainian Galician riflemen taken prisoner - the command of the Galician Army lodged a formal protest with the Whites' command, and the Galician Army's own military court confirmed that the killings of prisoners were fact. On 25 October 1919 the Supreme Command - the staff of the Galician Army (UHA) - sent, as recorded in its war diary, a mission to the Whites' command - otaman Lysniak, sotnyks Levytsky and Kurytsia - "who were to lodge a formal protest against the killings of our prisoners by the Don Cossacks"[164]. In the delegation's written commission the task was recorded thus: "first, to protest against the killing of our prisoners by Denikin's troops, as took place in Haisyn, and second, to discuss the matter of an exchange of prisoners." Otaman Lysniak testified in court: "In Vinnytsia I received the commission to go to the Staff of the Volunteer Army [Denikin's, the 'Whites'], hand over the said protest and negotiate an exchange of prisoners"; the delegation was received by general Slashchov, who promised "to telephone Denikin"[164]. In November 1919, at the military trial of UHA commander general Tarnavsky, sotnyk Kurdiak asked "whether the killings by the Don Cossacks were fact or fiction"; Tarnavsky replied: "It is fact. Witness - otaman Bukshovany, and indeed the 5th Brigade"[164].
Retreating from Kharkiv in June 1919, the Bolsheviks' secret police killed its own prisoners and hostages - Ukrainians held in its jails without trial. By the count given in a summary of the Whites' Information Section, over the months of the Bolshevik occupation of Kharkiv more than 1,000 people were shot: 40-50 were killed daily, "and in the last days this figure rose sharply"; among the named dead were former governor Bantysh with his son, generals Nechaev and Kuskov, prince Putyatin[167]. Excavations after the Bolsheviks left yielded 239 bodies; forensic medical examination established facts of burial alive, of torment and of torture. In the concentration camp the secret police had set up on Chaikovska street, 33 bodies of executed hostages were dug up[167]. A witness from the camp hostile to the Whites - the left SR Karelin, held in the Kharkiv prison - confirmed both the routine and the last day: Saenko, commandant of the Kharkiv secret police, "usually shot all the condemned... with his own hand," and "on the last day of our stay in the Kharkiv prison... 120 people were shot in the back yard of our prison"[192]. There were no sentences: Kharkiv secret police investigators Portugeis and Feldman, by the documents studied by the historian Melgunov, "in 1919 shot people without any protocols at all" - by a pencilled resolution, "Baeva, as an incorrigible criminal, to be shot"[192]. Before leaving neighbouring Vovchansk the Bolsheviks shot 64 hostages, among them the headmistress of the girls' gymnasium[167]. In the settlement of Velykyi Burluk in the same Vovchansk district the Bolsheviks executed the entire family of prince Vadbolsky - nine people, among them two 80-year-old women and an English governess; the compilers of the summary recorded: "they were stripped naked, led behind the house church, candles were lit, they were ordered to kneel and pray, and then, to whistling and shouting, their ears were cut off, they were hacked with sabres and, as the victims lost consciousness, finished off with shots"[167].
The Bolsheviks' secret police tortured detained Ukrainians in the captured cities: interrogations with beatings and torture regardless of sex or age, closet-cells and cellars flooded with water, staged executions, staff executioners paid per person shot. In Kyiv this was put on record by the Red Cross: the report of the Central Committee of the Russian Red Cross Society on the activity of the Kyiv secret police, compiled from the observations of nursing sisters over February - August 1919 and signed by the committee's acting chairman, doctor Lodyzhensky, describes the interrogations: "As soon as a person fell into the power of the ChK [the secret police], he lost all human rights... From the very first interrogation the screaming began... cruel beatings began, accompanied by abuse. Neither age nor sex protected from them" - "the fourteen-year-old daughter of the actress E. K. Chaleeva was cruelly beaten before her mother's eyes, to extract more candid testimony from both daughter and mother"; an investigator beat 60-year-old Vorovskaya in the presence of her arrested daughter[193]. The arrested Ukrainians were kept in a windowless cellar flooded with water and in a wall closet in which, according to the report, "one could only sit hunched." Interrogation was conducted by staged executions: Ustinsky "was led to the place of execution in the basement, undressed, laid on the floor... The shot did ring out, but calculated so that the bullet flew close but past. So close that... all the skin on Ustinsky's hands was scorched. Such shooting was repeated many times. In the end Ustinsky was shot dead"; Solntsev was forced to attend executions and locked in the basement as "the last living man among the still-warm corpses" - at a night interrogation he went mad, which, at the investigators' demand, was certified by the psychiatrist Kirichevsky, himself a prisoner. One of the sisters summed up seven months of observation thus: "there were no torn-out fingernails, no epaulettes nailed to shoulders, no flayed skin, no people scalded with boiling water. But their whole life was one continuous torture"[193].
In Odesa an eyewitness who had been held under arrest in the Odesa secret police and published his memoirs there in 1919 under the pseudonym K. Alinin recorded, from the words of the staff executioner Abash, how one of the chiefs of that secret police conducted interrogation: he "'broke a person up by parts.' He would usually sit down before his victim and begin questioning him. - An officer? - he would squint... and, taking aim with his revolver, shoot through the martyr's hand. - A colonel, perhaps? - And the bullet would shatter the elbow"; for each person shot, by the same Abash's words, the secret police paid the executioner[194].
In Kharkiv Saenko, commandant of the Kharkiv secret police, tortured the interrogated himself: his "favourite method," by testimony collected by the Whites' investigative commission, was this: "he would plunge a dagger a centimetre into the body of the person under interrogation and then turn it in the wound," and the torture went on "in the office of the investigator of the 'special department,' before the eyes of Yakimovich, his assistants and investigator Lyubarsky." The same was independently confirmed by the left SR Karelin, held in the Kharkiv prison: "Usually Saenko shot all the condemned with his own hand... In our presence in the Kharkiv prison he shot a sick man on a stretcher"[192].
On 29 June 1919 the central organ of the colonial administration of Ukraine (the VUTsIK) resolved "to carry out a general mobilization of workers and peasants of call-up age, beginning at 19, and in the front-line zone at 18," and to draft the entire "non-labouring element" from 18 to 45 into the rear militia - captured Ukraine was to fight for its captor - and by the same resolution it declared: "All who resist the carrying out of the mobilization are to be deemed enemies of the people"; it was signed for the chairman of the organ by Polozov and by secretary Lapchinsky[195]. On 26 July 1919 Skrypnyk, plenipotentiary of the same administration's Defence Council, reporting on the Trypillia district, where the army had just crushed the risen peasants, wrote: "there now remains the mobilization of the entire population of this district" - the men of villages that had just risen were taken into the very army that had crushed them[196].
On 25 May 1919 Antonov-Ovseenko, commander of the RSFSR's Ukrainian Front, disarming the villages, ordered the armies: "beforehand, to take hostages from the kulak elements"[182]. On 29 June 1919 the central organ of the colonial administration of Ukraine (the VUTsIK) legalized "the taking of hostages" by its resolution on general mobilization[195], and on 11 December 1919 Trotsky, war minister of the RSFSR, included "the hostage system" in the list of means by which the armies "entering Ukraine" were obliged to disarm the population[197].
In Zhytomyr, during the nine days of Soviet rule in March 1919, hostages sat in the secret police "until payment of the contribution" - until the town paid the sum imposed on it; so recorded Livshits, commissioner of the Central Committee for Aid to Pogrom Victims, noting that a considerable part of those arrested "as hostages" were Jews[198]. So it was in Fastiv too: until the contribution imposed on the town was paid, Jews sat as hostages[176]. The occupation secret police in Kyiv held hostages as well: Rakovsky, head of the Soviet colonial administration of Ukraine, wrote to Lenin on 9 August 1919 that after the proclamation of "red terror" over the Hryhoriv uprising it had shot 30 hostages - former members of the monarchist organization "Union of the Russian People," which staged pogroms, and former tsarist officials; when it prepared to shoot 15 more and Rakovsky with Latsis, chairman of the Ukrainian secret police, checked their biographies, only two turned out to be dangerous enemies[174].
The removal of hostages from Kyiv during the evacuation at the end of August 1919 was described by the eyewitness Kateryna Koval-Medzvedska: "Doctors, engineers, topographers were put on record, and in the last days, under threat of execution, they were carried off by force to Moscow. Besides that, landowners and the bigger merchants were carried off by the hundreds as hostages"[172].
On 29 June 1919 the central organ of the colonial administration of Ukraine (the VUTsIK) resolved: "To take the most energetic measures to suppress kulak uprisings and the actions of bands, applying the imposition of contributions on rebellious localities and the taking of hostages"; the resolution was signed for the chairman of that organ by Polozov and by its secretary Lapchinsky[195]. Under this resolution it was not the one who rose who had to answer - in money and in hostages - but the whole locality at once.
By the end of the year Moscow fixed the practice for the entire army: on 11 December 1919 Trotsky, war minister of the RSFSR, and Kamenev, commander-in-chief of the RSFSR armed forces, signed secret order No. 579 - every army "undertakes, in its area of operations, to disarm the population with the help of all means at its disposal (agitation, agent intelligence, payment for surrendered weapons in money and in kind, house-to-house searches, fines in money and in kind, collective responsibility, the hostage system, the shooting of culprits, etc., etc.)," and the order, as stated in it, applies "first of all to the armies entering Ukraine"[197].
On 26 July 1919 Skrypnyk, plenipotentiary of the same administration's Defence Council, telegraphed from the area of Zeleny's uprising - in the same words as the orders: "The uprising of the peasants of the Trypillia district has been suppressed... there now remains... the exaction from it of all the expenses borne by the workers' and peasants' state for the suppression," specifying: "It is necessary to carry out the exaction in produce, the exaction from the peasants of the expenses caused by the uprising"[196]. In Mohyliv-Podilskyi, which Soviet troops captured on 5 April 1919 without a fight, the town was at once subjected to a forced payment - a telegram to the Bureau of the Ukrainian Press over the signature of Ivanitsky reported: "there is exemplary order in the town, with which even the bourgeoisie is content, despite the imposed contribution of one and a half million"[199]. The reports of the Special Investigative Commission attached to the Whites' command (the AFSR) record of Odesa: "400 people have been sent to forced labour for non-payment of contributions," and of Izium in Kharkiv province: "eyewitnesses told of the wholesale robbery of families whose relatives had gone over to the 'Kadets'"[167].
In Fastiv in Kyiv province the forced payment imposed on the town under the Soviet authority was paid by the Jewish community - Kh. Hofman, an officer of the Editorial Board, the body collecting testimony on the pogroms, recorded: "The entire imposed contribution was paid almost wholly by the Jews, notwithstanding that they are poorer and considerably fewer than the Christians. Many Jews were taken hostage, sat long in prison, many had to leave Fastiv altogether"[176].
On 26 May 1919, at the height of the uprising of Ukrainian peasants under Hryhoriv against the Soviet authority, Lenin, head of the RSFSR government, telegraphed to Kyiv to Rakovsky, head of the colonial administration of Ukraine (the UkrSSR), and to Kharkiv to Mezhlauk, its deputy war minister: "Decree and carry into effect the complete disarming of the population, shoot on the spot mercilessly for any concealed rifle. The whole crux of the moment: a quick victory in the Donbas, the collection of all rifles from the villages, the creation of a solid army"; he ordered the telegram read "to all prominent Bolsheviks"[200]. A day earlier Antonov-Ovseenko, commander of the RSFSR's Ukrainian Front, had ordered the armies "to disarm the local population" in their areas of operation[182].
In secret order No. 579 of 11 December 1919 Trotsky, war minister of the RSFSR, named the goal in a single clause - "the unconditional and universal disarming of the village population" of Ukraine was declared "the basic condition of success"[197].
On 26 July 1919 Skrypnyk, plenipotentiary of the same administration's Defence Council, telegraphed on the course of the disarmament from the Trypillia district: "The disarming of the population is carried out by searches; all those guilty of concealing weapons and war materiel are handed over to the field revtribunal [the Bolsheviks' military court]"[196].
In the village of Tiutkovychi in Rivne district on 6 July 1919 an assembly of village representatives, in the presence of Soviet military commissar Senichkin, resolved to surrender "rifles, machine guns, cartridges" and asked "to leave the population 15 rifles and cartridges for the defence of the population against bandits"; in the same protocol the assembly complained that Soviet soldiers were taking property arbitrarily, without a warrant[201].
On 18 November 1919 the Whites' city administration in Mykolaiv ordered preliminary censorship of printed publications[202]. So it was in Kyiv as well: an order of general Mai-Maevsky, head of the Whites' administration, subjected all publications to military censorship - publishing only with the governor's permission, with every issue presented to the prosecutor[185].
General Mai-Maevsky, head of the Whites' administration in Katerynoslav, Kharkiv, Kursk and Poltava provinces, by order No. 22 of 3 August 1919 returned the schools of Ukraine to compulsory instruction in Russian, leaving the native language the place of an elective: "The teaching of the Little Russian language and literature is permitted as non-compulsory subjects on general grounds" - Russian became the compulsory language of instruction, Ukrainian was studied only at will[183].
General Mai-Maevsky, head of the Whites' administration in Katerynoslav, Kharkiv, Kursk and Poltava provinces, by order No. 22 of 3 August 1919 cut the Ukrainian school off from state money: "The release of credits from the treasury for the maintenance of educational institutions with instruction in the Little Russian language is not permitted"; the zemstvos - the organs of local self-government - and the towns he forbade to open or support such schools, and those already open he allowed to exist only "on condition of their being taken over for maintenance by private persons and societies." To the teachers the order closed off state standing as well: "the right of state service" was granted only to the teachers of schools recognized as "strengthening the idea of a single Russian statehood"[183]. In Kyiv that same autumn, by a summary of the Soviet side, "the release of credit to schools for the teaching of the Ukrainian language is discontinued"[184].
Political and military support for local radicals (the Artem group) in proclaiming a republic not subordinate to Kyiv[126].
An attempt at the bureaucratic resubordination of territories — declaring the Donbas an autonomous part directly linked to Russia, bypassing any Ukrainian authorities[150].
In January 1918 the troops of Bolshevik Russia were advancing on Kyiv. At Kruty station the Ukrainian defense barred their way. From late December 1917 the yunkers - cadets of the 1st Kyiv Youth Military School named after Bohdan Khmelnytsky, four companies of 150 cadets each with 20 officers and 18 machine guns - under the command of Sotnyk Averkii Honcharenko held Bakhmach, a railway junction on the border of the UNR and the RSFSR[203]. On January 27 the first company of the student volunteer battalion under Sotnyk Omelchenko arrived from Kyiv to join them - 115-130 volunteers: students and senior-grade gymnasium pupils, teenagers, many of them 17 years old[203][204]. Together with the company the Ukrainian command also sent out a demolition team; the volunteers dug in on both sides of the railway line between the stations of Kruty and Plisky[205]. The battle began on the morning of January 29, 1918. Historians of the Institute of History of Ukraine of the National Academy of Sciences write: it took place "during the offensive on the city of Kyiv by the troops of Bolshevik Russia", with the positions attacked by the forces of "a 6-thousand-strong Bolshevik detachment of Petrograd and Moscow Red Guards" led by Yegorov[203]. The fighting lasted until evening, the defenders repelled several attacks; historians put the defenders' losses at "up to 300 killed, wounded, captured"[203]. Toward evening Sotnyk Averkii Honcharenko ordered a withdrawal to their echelon - the detachment's train waiting two kilometers away; during the retreat part of the student company was encircled, and one platoon lost its bearings at dusk and came out at the station already held by the Red Guards - 27 captured teenagers and students were shot[203]. The defenders delayed the Red Guards' advance on Kyiv: explaining the heavy losses and the delay, Muravyov claimed in his report that the Ukrainian forces had been commanded by "S. Petliura himself" - as the compilers of the collection of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory note[205].
The Red Guards shot the prisoners taken at Kruty (a station in the Chernihiv region) with the authorization of Yegorov, commander of the First Revolutionary Army. Lapidus, commissar of the 1st Moscow Red Guard detachment, who was with the prisoners at the station and the day before, together with Zombart, commander of the armored train, had talked the Red Guards out of an immediate reprisal, recounted in his testimony to the investigation in the case of commander-in-chief Muravyov: "The next day, as we were pulling out of Kruty station, the train stopped on the way at Yegorov's order; all the detainees were led out of the carriage, and 300 paces from the train they were shot with explosive bullets. I went up to the dead, then went up to Yegorov and asked why they had been shot. Yegorov, puffing on a cigarette and smiling, replied that he had given the Red Guards permission because they insisted on it"[204]. Moiseyev, a member of the committee of the First Revolutionary Army, described in his testimony who was shot: "At Kruty station about 20 haidamakas were taken prisoner, among them many gymnasium pupils of about 17. They were taken beyond the station and shot in the most shameless manner. There was an outrageous case when one youth ran away from that place, but he was chased down, brought back to the same spot wearing only his underwear and shot" - and specified: "this was done from the train commanded by Yegorov"[204]. Babenko, commander of the Moscow detachment, captured the prisoners, and Muravyov had appointed Yegorov commander of the First Army - both links are recorded in the investigation materials[204]. The investigation clarified the number of those shot: Tsvanger, secretary of the army committee, corrected her testimony, naming 24 people instead of the earlier 150, and a member of the investigative commission certified the correction[205]. The sources differ in describing the manner of the killing: Sotnyk Averkii Honcharenko, who commanded the Ukrainian detachment at Kruty, wrote in his memoirs that the prisoners were not shot but bayoneted, whereas the documents of the Soviet investigation record shooting with explosive bullets[205].
The holding of an alternative congress in Kharkiv and the creation of a Moscow-controlled "People's Secretariat" to imitate an internal struggle: it was created "as an alternative to the Ukrainian Central Rada and the General Secretariat of the Ukrainian Central Rada" and "acted in close contact with and under the direct leadership of the highest state and party institutions of Soviet Russia"[206]. The congress declared Ukraine part of Russia. In the resolution on the self-determination of Ukraine, adopted in Kharkiv on 12 (25) December 1917, the congress recognized "the Ukrainian Republic as a federative part of the Russian Republic" and declared "a resolute struggle against the policy of the Central Rada, ruinous for the worker-peasant masses, exposing its bourgeois, counter-revolutionary character"[207]. The congress derived its mandate from the decisions of Petrograd: in the words of the resolution, "the principle of the right of nations to self-determination, proclaimed by the February Revolution, could be brought to life only thanks to the October Revolution, which led to the creation of the Workers' and Peasants' Government — the Council of People's Commissars"[207]. The secretariat's own power came down to another state's decrees: it "announced the overthrow of the UCR and the recognition of only its own decrees as valid. It introduced the decrees of the Council of People's Commissars of Russia in Ukraine"[206][150]. Moscow kept its man inside the government as well: Serhii Bakynskyi, people's secretary for inter-national affairs, was simultaneously "the representative of the CPC of Russia"[206]. Historian Stanislav Kulchytsky describes the direct oversight: "since a Ukrainian party center did not exist, Lenin placed a temporary extraordinary commissar over the Kharkiv government" - Georgii Ordzhonikidze, an official of the central party apparatus[208]. The journal of the Istpart of the CP(b)U "Letopis revoliutsii" wrote in 1924: "The All-Ukrainian government was a center without a periphery, a staff without an army, when it had neither territory, nor a population subordinate to it, nor an armed force"[126].
The Bolsheviks' provocation of an uprising of the Arsenal plant workers in Kyiv itself at the very moment of the Red troops' offensive: it was "an armed action organized by the Kyiv committee of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party (Bolsheviks) against the Ukrainian Central Rada," and "it was planned for the moment of the approach of Soviet troops to Kyiv in the course of Soviet Russia's war against the UNR of 1917–18"[209].
The direct deployment of Red troops, heavy fighting for the stations, and the storming of Kyiv. The march on Kyiv was led by Muravyov: he "headed the march of Soviet troops on Kyiv in January 1918"[206]. Overall command was exercised by Antonov-Ovseenko: "in December 1917 - March 1918 - commissar for combating counter-revolution in the South, he led the Soviet troops in the struggle against otaman A. Kaledin and the Ukrainian Central Rada"[81].
The Muravyov massacre of February 1918 after the capture of Kyiv by the Red troops: the EIU characterizes Muravyov as "the initiator of mass executions in the city," and later he was himself arrested on the charge of "'condoning mass executions and lootings that led to the fall of Soviet power in Ukraine'"[206]. Hrushevsky on the campaign's commander: "the chief commandant, the former gendarme Muravyov, who in February had boasted of executions of Ukrainians and the ruin of their property"[210].
The staging of a sham "all-Ukrainian" congress to give the seizure of power the appearance of popular will. The real All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in Kyiv on 17-19 December 1917 did not go the Bolsheviks' way: by the time resolutions were adopted it numbered more than 2,500 delegates, "the Bolsheviks were represented by a mere 150 delegates", and the congress backed the Central Rada[81]. The losers did not accept the outcome. Volodymyr Zatonsky - one of them, later a member of the Kharkiv government - recalled: "having gathered illegally in the trade-union building, the delegates of the congress, all of them Bolsheviks except two or three Left SRs, resolved to declare themselves the plenipotentiary Congress of Soviets of the Country, to elect a Central Executive Committee and a government of Soviet Ukraine and, having moved to Kharkiv, to enter into open struggle against the Central Rada"[211]. The new "congress" convened in a city already occupied by Russian troops: "the day before the congress of soviets opened, the Central Rada's garrison in Kharkiv had been disarmed by the troops of V. Antonov-Ovseenko, whom the Council of People's Commissars had instructed to take Ukraine by force of arms", writes historian Stanislav Kulchytsky[208]. He describes the merger thus: with the regional congress of soviets of the Donets and Kryvyi Rih basins, the newcomers "proclaimed their congress the All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets"[208]; historian Vladyslav Verstiuk writes that "an alternative congress of Soviets was hastily staged", at which "200 delegates represented 89 soviets and military-revolutionary committees", while "soviets alone in Ukraine at that moment numbered over 300"[212]. The majority of Ukraine's population stayed outside the hall - delegates from the peasants, notes historian Larysa Yakubova, "were almost absent", and the qualifier "with the participation of peasant deputies" was later scrubbed from the congress's name by Soviet historiography[150]. The assembly declared itself the All-Ukrainian Congress and proclaimed the creation of a Soviet - "supposedly truly popular" - UNR[150].
Use by the Council of People's Commissars of local Bolshevik cells as a legal political force that was to speak on behalf of the Ukrainian proletariat against the Central Rada[150].
Deliberate transfer of loyal delegates and political agitators to the All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in Kyiv in order to hijack the agenda from within[126].
An attempt to convert an electoral minority into a procedural majority at the congress. Actual support was negligible: in the Constituent Assembly elections "across the country as a whole the Bolsheviks gathered less than 24% of the votes, and in the Ukrainian gubernias only 10%"[126]. Hence the wager on capturing representative bodies: the Central Committee of the RSDLP(b) declared outright that "the transfer of government from the hands of one soviet party into the hands of another party is secured without any revolution, by a simple decision of the Soviets, by a simple re-election of deputies to the Soviets," while the All-Russian Central Executive Committee's decree of 4 December 1917 "On the right of recall of delegates" provided the mechanism for such a replacement[126][213].
With the start of the world war in 1914 the Russian Empire carried off to the front from Chechnya those it considered dangerous. The Chechen writer Kh. D. Oshaev, a native of the Vozdvizhenskaya settlement and a witness of the events, wrote: "As after 1905, the viceroyalty in the Caucasus decided, during the war, to remove from Chechnya all the unreliable element that had no employment for its hands and that could bring the tsarist administration much trouble 'in life's hard minute'. Those hiding from the authorities who expressed the wish to go to war were amnestied"[214]. For this the empire in 1914 created the Caucasus Native Cavalry Division, nicknamed the "Savage Division", - six national regiments of highlanders, four mounted sotnias each: the Chechen, Dagestani, Ingush, Kabardian, Tatar and Circassian[83]. The same goal was later named by General Denikin, who in the Civil War headed the Volunteer Army that occupied Chechnya in 1919 (campaign C1174): "It was all but the striving to remove the most restless elements from the territory of the Caucasus that was the sole reason for this formation"[83]. Those who remained the empire kept under reinforced garrisons - Kh. D. Oshaev wrote: "During the war the garrisons of the fortifications of Vedeno, Shatoy and Vozdvizhenskaya were enlarged; hundreds of cartloads of provisions, weapons and munitions filled the depots of these fortifications in the very first days of the war"[214]. In August 1916 the soldiers of the Ossetian foot divizion (a battalion-sized unit) training at the Vozdvizhenskaya fortress refused to carry out orders and dragged out their dispatch to the front; the military command transferred an infantry battalion from Grozny, and on 26 August it fired on the protest - historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "16 were killed and over 30 soldiers of the divizion wounded"; some of those who fled took shelter in Chechen auls and homes[83][215]. For instigation the imperial administration arrested two residents of Starye Atagi - Murda Khamidov and Dzhabrail Tolgaev; the same historians write: "Both were sentenced to death and escaped it only thanks to the February Revolution of 1917"[83].
In May 1916 the Russian Empire mobilized into the army the striking workers of the Grozny oil fields - those who held a deferral from military service and took part in the strike. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "an order was issued on the immediate mobilization of all Grozny workers holding a deferral from military service and taking part in the strike"[83]. The strike began with a wage dispute: on 12 May the workers handed the Council of the Congress of Terek Oil Industrialists written demands for a wage rise of 50% on average, on 21 May at two in the afternoon the oil fields stopped at the alarm whistles of the plants, and on 31 May, the same historians write, "the workers everywhere began to return to work"[83]. Those already recruited did not want to fight either: of the one and a half thousand men of the fourth draft of the "Savage Division" training in the reserve regiment, only 553 reached the combat units - the rest the military command returned to the Caucasus "in view of their 'unreliability'"[83].
From the formation of the Chechen regiment in 1914 the Russian Empire laid its upkeep on the Chechen communities themselves: the full equipment of each horseman cost 300 rubles, and it was paid not by the treasury but by the village communities that had recommended the man into the regiment. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "the upkeep of the national regiments lay as a heavy burden on the peasant-highlanders"[83]. State funds did not suffice for the rest either: the new horses assembled to replenish the division in the autumn of 1916 were, as the same historians write, "very poor", and the division's command sought the allocation of funds to buy horses[83].
On 13 August 1914 the Russian Empire placed the Terek oblast under the regime of "extraordinary security" - an imperial regime that handed the residents over to the extrajudicial powers of the administration - and then the oblast administration issued an order "on the protection of tranquility at the enterprises", under which the fate of "violators of tranquility" was decided by military courts[83]. How this worked can be seen from the strike of May 1916 at the Grozny oil fields: the administration brought armed Cossacks onto the fields, they arrested 13 workers, and, as historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov remark, "all those arrested turned out to be Muslims"[83]. The police arrested nine more workers on the first day of the strike - for sounding the alarm whistles of the plants[83].
The forced conscription of millions into the imperial army: "During the war years, 3.5 million Ukrainians were mobilized into the ranks of the Russian army (by other data – 4.5 million out of a total of 15.5 million)"[79].
The purge of Ukrainian institutions and the persecution of the movement's leaders. Hrushevsky was "arrested by the gendarmerie in Kyiv on December 11, 1914, and accused of Austrophilia and involvement in creating the Legion of Ukrainian Sich Riflemen. He was sent into exile to Simbirsk"[78], then transferred to Kazan with a teaching ban and stripped of his professorship.
The mass deportation of the civilian population of occupied Galicia: "The Greek Catholic clergy suffered particular persecution. On September 18, 1914, Metropolitan A. Sheptytsky was arrested and taken away to Russia. In all, thousands of Galicians were removed as hostages (through Kyiv alone about 12 thousand passed)"[79].
The ban on attending cultural events: the district curator "issued an instruction in which he declared students' attendance of Ukrainian theatrical performances as inadmissible as spending time in billiard halls or beer houses"[216].
The erasure of the memory of national heroes: "In January 1914, minister of internal affairs Nikolai Maklakov signed a circular by which he forbade throughout all governorates of the empire 'public celebrations of the Little Russian writer Taras Shevchenko'"[217].
The purge of the information space: Nicholas II's personal decree of 20 July 1914 on military censorship gave the command the right "to forbid for a set term, by their own authority and within the locality subordinate to them, any assemblies whatsoever, and to suspend periodical publications, as well as the transmission of postal items and telegrams"[218]. On this basis the military administration of the Kyiv military district that very day closed the only Ukrainian daily newspaper, "Rada," and confiscated at the printing house the print runs of "Svitlo" and of the "Literary-Scientific Herald," and on 9 January 1915 all Ukrainian periodicals were shut down[219].
The Russian Empire erected in Kyiv the largest monument to Alexander II in the entire empire. The gratitude on the pedestal was voiced not by Ukraine and not by Kyiv but by the "Southwestern Krai" - the empire's official name for the Ukrainian lands west of the Dnipro[220]. The monument, by the Italian sculptor Ximenes, was unveiled on 30 August 1911 on Tsarskaya Square, between the entrance to the Merchants' Garden and the building of the Merchants' Assembly; the unveiling was timed to the fiftieth anniversary of the abolition of serfdom and held in the presence of emperor Nicholas II, the Bulgarian tsar Ferdinand and prime minister Stolypin, who two days later, on the evening of 1 September, was mortally wounded in the Kyiv theater[221]. The money for the monument was raised by an all-Russian subscription, 200 thousand rubles[222]. The central pedestal bore the coat of arms of the empire, the double-headed eagle, and the inscription "To the Tsar-Liberator, the grateful Southwestern Krai. The year 1911"; on the lower pedestal was a bas-relief of peasants giving thanks for the abolition of serfdom[222]. The krai comprised the Kyiv, Volyn and Podillia governorates[220], which after the suppression of the Polish uprising of 1830-1831 were merged into the Kyiv governorate-general (1832-1914), whose task, according to the Encyclopedia of the History of Ukraine, "consisted in the liquidation of the political, socio-ethnic and cultural distinctions of the krai and the intensification of the russification of its elite - the szlachta"[103]. The monument joined a row: the Kyiv Nicholas I (1896), Alexander III (1909), Alexander II (1911), Stolypin (1912) - the historian Ihor Hyrych calls this the pre-revolutionary monument boom and adds that the erection of the monument to princess Olha and the planned subsequent monuments were handled by the Kyiv section of the Imperial Russian Military-Historical Society, nine-tenths of which consisted of officers of the Kyiv military district, and its secretary, colonel Steletsky, in a memorandum to the governor-general of 7 April 1910, laid out the queue of future sculptures - from Olha and Oleh to Nestor the chronicler[223]. Hyrych sums up the outcome of those same years thus: in that time the Ukrainians put forward one monument, to Shevchenko, and were not allowed to erect it, while their opponents managed to put up "at least half a dozen monuments asserting Russianness and negating the Ukrainian national idea"[223].
In 1911 the Russian Empire erected a monument to princess Olha in Kyiv - on a site the city had allotted two years earlier for a monument to Shevchenko. In May 1909, the Kyiv city duma allotted the square on Mykhailivska Square for a monument to Taras Shevchenko[224]. Zilov, the trustee of the Kyiv educational district, wrote confidentially to governor-general Trepov that Shevchenko should not be placed opposite a "Russian governmental institution" and that "it would be necessary to erect a monument to one of the figures of Russian history"[224]. Out of this letter grew the program of the "historical path": on 7 April 1910, colonel Steletsky, secretary of the Kyiv section of the Imperial Russian Military-Historical Society, submitted a memorandum with a queue of eight monuments - princess Olha, Oleh, Yaroslav, Volodymyr, Volodymyr Monomakh, Sviatoslav, "prehistoric Kyiv" and Nestor the chronicler[224]. On 15 March 1911, the duma, with 68 of 72 councilors present, gave the society the site between St. Sophia Cathedral and St. Michael's Monastery - 46 votes against 22 - and at the same session overturned its own decision of 1909, moving the site of the future Shevchenko monument to the Karavaivska intersection: 41 against 24[224]. At first the duma rejected the concrete design as insufficiently "artistically monumental," and a month later permitted only a temporary model to be put up[224] - that is, they agreed to place a makeshift on the seized site, so long as it was occupied. The monument was unveiled on 4 September 1911: princess Olha in the center, to the left the apostle Andrew pointing at the Kyiv hills, to the right the seated Cyril and Methodius[225][226]. The model was sculpted by Ivan Kavaleridze and Petro Snitkin, the architect was Valerian Rykov, and the project was led by the sculptor Fedir Balavensky[227]; the historian Ihor Hyrych notes the paradox - the author of the imperial monument turned out to be "one of the 'Ukrainomaniacs' - a future outstanding sculptor and film director, and then a beginning artist, Ivan Kavaleridze"[223]. Cast on the pedestal was: "A Gift of the Sovereign Emperor to the City of Kyiv. In the Year of Our Lord 1911" - the tsar's cabinet did indeed give ten thousand rubles for the monument, and the Kyiv merchant Mohylevsky contributed another thousand[225][224]. Below, on the pedestal of the princess herself, stood: "She was the first from Rus to enter the Kingdom of Heaven; her the sons of Rus praise as their initiator"[225] - the baptism of Rus was being written into the imperial genealogy right on the stone. In 1919 the statue was thrown off its pedestal and buried, split in two, beneath the monument itself; in March 1923 the remaining figures were removed, and in March 1926 the communal department of Kyiv ordered the concrete cleared away for good[225][224]. In 1996 the statue was dug out from under the flowerbed and the monument was recreated from the old sketches, this time in marble[227].
The direct closure of legal educational societies: of the roughly forty "Prosvitas" of Russian-ruled Ukraine, those in the Poltava and Kharkiv regions were banned from their very founding, and in 1908–1910, under Stolypin, virtually all the rest were liquidated, except the branches of the Katerynoslav governorate[219]. The crackdown received its doctrinal grounding: Stolypin declared in an address to the Senate that the revival of Ukrainian cultural life was undesirable, for "the three principal branches of Eastern Slavdom, both by origin and by language, cannot but constitute one whole"[219].
Stolypin's circular to the governors (20 January 1910) — a complete ban on self-organization: "when considering petitions for the registration of any alien societies whatsoever… one must… refuse without fail the registration of their charters"[228].
The official classing of the indigenous population as aliens: Stolypin prescribed to the governors to refuse the registration of "any alien societies whatsoever, including Ukrainian and Jewish ones, regardless of the aims they pursue"[228].
The economic squeezing of peasants onto the imperial frontier under the guise of free choice: "during 1906–12 about 1 million people left Ukraine for Asiatic Russia. The largest number of resettlers came from Left-Bank Ukraine, whose peasantry suffered from land scarcity"[54]; land and credit were unobtainable at home, while "Low land prices beyond the Urals and encouraging government credits… attracted the poor peasantry and prompted it to migrate"[54] – state coercion was disguised as voluntary resettlement.
The forcible suppression of protests and repressive measures against national self-organization of the same period: Stolypin's "instruction to the governors… demanding a halt to the registration of 'alien,' including Ukrainian, national cultural-educational societies"[54].
On 10 October 1905, at the Grozny market, the troops of the Russian Empire fired not at the pogromists but at the Chechens whom armed reservists were attacking: historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write that the soldiers of the Shirvansky regiment, led by Colonel Popov, used their weapons, "...shooting the hiding Chechens, hunting them down in attics and cellars, while the reservists and hooligans smashed and looted shops before the eyes of the authorities"; by the historians' count, 27 Chechens were harmed in the pogrom, of whom 17 were killed[83].
A military directive of the Russian Empire of late 1907 prescribed to the commander of the brigade stationed in the Grozny and Vedeno okrugs, in the event of an uprising, "...to act with full energy, scattering the bands to the point of total annihilation, and likewise wiping off the face of the earth the villages that sheltered them, bearing in mind that such a method will be not only more effective but also more humane"[83]. The prescription was carried out. In August 1908 the village of Tsatsan-Yurt was subjected to an "execution" with mass searches, and its residents had a "contribution" for undelivered weapons exacted from them - 7 thousand rubles[83]. In 1911, in the Vedeno and Grozny okrugs, all hamlets built "without permission" were demolished, and 100 thousand rubles were exacted from the Chechen population of both okrugs in favor of those who had suffered "...during the attack of Zelimkhan's band"[83]. People from the abrek's circle were killed and hanged: Salambek Gorovodzhiev was hanged; in March 1911 Ayub Tomayev was killed in Starye Atagi[83]. Speech was persecuted in the same manner: "Any propaganda undermining the authority of the government and the local authorities was prohibited in the strictest way", and the offender faced up to three years of prison or a fine of up to 3 thousand rubles[83].
At the end of 1906 a punitive detachment of the Russian Empire, with artillery and Cossacks, was restoring imperial power in the Vedeno okrug: "the villages of Nizhaloy, Nokhch-Keloy, Khoy and Makazhoy, whose residents stubbornly refused to submit, were subjected to artillery bombardment"; it was noted that as a result of the punitive expedition "...the greater part of the population of the Vedeno okrug, seized by panic, fled to the mountains, where it suffers hunger and cold"; several hundred people were arrested, most of them convicted and exiled[83]. In August 1908 the village of Tsatsan-Yurt was subjected to an "execution" with mass searches[83].
Following the Chervlyonnaya conferences of 1905-1906 the Russian Empire established a mechanism of circular monetary responsibility: fines on the guilty, "and in the event of their financial insolvency - the penal sanctions passed to the village community to which the guilty party belonged"[83]. Starye Atagi was fined twice for sheltering its fellow villager, an abrek - 3, then 6 thousand rubles; the same village was ordered, within three days, to hand over "100 rifles, two thousand cartridges and 500 daggers", to give up the abreks Tomayev and Khorsiev who were sheltering in the village, and "to collect funds for equipping the village police station with telephone communication"[83]. Tsatsan-Yurt in 1908 paid a "contribution" for undelivered weapons - 7 thousand rubles[83]. In 1911, by order of the Viceroy, "100 thousand rubles were exacted" from the entire Chechen population of the Grozny and Vedeno okrugs in compensation to those who had suffered "...during the attack of Zelimkhan's band"[83].
In 1911 the Russian Empire appointed "government elders" in the zone of Zelimkhan's operations and put troops on the residents' own upkeep: "Military teams were sent to be quartered in the villages of Kharachoy, Dyshne-Vedeno, Mekhkety, Zavirkhi, Khattuni, Eshelkhotoy, Elistandzhi, Tauzen, Isti-Su, Mayrtup, Khoy, Ikharoy, Rigakhoy, Makazhoy, Avtury and the Varanda hamlets"[83]. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write of this practice: "the sending of military units into Chechen villages was widely practiced, and their upkeep lay as a heavy burden on the local residents"[83].
In 1911 the Russian Empire demolished the Chechen hamlets of two okrugs: "A forcible demolition was begun of all the hamlets built 'without permission' (and there were no others here) in the Vedeno and Grozny okrugs"[83]; Chechen hamlets "were repeatedly demolished, including under the pretext of 'punishment' for sheltering abreks"[83].
In 1906 the head of the Vedeno okrug, Lieutenant colonel Dobrovolsky, as historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write, "found nothing smarter than to give the command to seize the women relatives of the abrek Zelimkhan in Kharachoy"[83]. "In the autumn of 1910 Zelimkhan's family was seized and exiled", and in November 1911 "24 relatives of Zelimkhan were exiled together with their families, after they failed to comply with the demand to hand over or kill Zelimkhan" - by the authorities' report, these people had also "...agitated among the rest of the population of Khorochoy that this should not be done"[83].
By 1913 the Russian Empire had arrested and exiled from the Terek oblast thousands of people "on the charge of sheltering the abrek"[83]. "In the course of suppressing the actions in the mountainous part of Chechnya, hundreds of peasants were exiled from the Vedeno okrug alone. As a result a great number of families lost their main breadwinners and found themselves on the brink of destitution" - part of his takings Zelimkhan spent on supporting the families of the exiled[83].
On 24 October 1905 the Russian Empire imposed martial law "in the Grozny, Vedeno and Khasav-Yurt okrugs of the Terek oblast, that is, in the whole of Chechnya", and on 23 December extended it to the entire oblast[83]. The weapons ban "applied exclusively to the highlanders and the out-of-town settlers and did not extend to the Cossacks. Moreover... the Viceroy of the Caucasus ordered that 10 thousand single-shot Berdan rifles and a million cartridges be distributed to the Cossacks of the Terek oblast free of charge"[83]. On 22 June 1909 martial law was lifted - but "in the Terek oblast a 'state of reinforced protection' was introduced at the same time", whose ordinances "effectively reduced to 'nought' the democratic rights and freedoms 'granted' by the imperial decree of 17 October 1905"[83].
In January 1908 the head of the Terek oblast, by a secret circular, ordered "to establish secret surveillance over the activity of the Muslim clergy, '...and likewise over the appearance of emissaries from Turkey'"[83]. In 1911 "the Russian authorities took an unprecedented step - in 1911 eight sheikhs at once, of both the Qadiri and the Naqshbandi tariqats, were exiled from the Terek oblast by administrative order (a sheikh is a spiritual mentor; a tariqat is a religious brotherhood of disciples around such a mentor)... Zelimkhan's chief protector - Bamatgiri-Haji Mitayev, as well as the Ingush sheikh Batal-Haji Belkhoroyev, died in exile"[83].
From 10 January 1906 the Russian Empire introduced field courts-martial in the Terek oblast - to them were handed over "...persons who have committed murder, brigandage, robbery and attack on a sentry or military guard, as well as armed resistance to the authorities and attack on the ranks of the troops and the police and on all officials in general..."; during the work of these courts, until 19 April 1907, 195 people in the Caucasus were sentenced to death and another 47 condemned to katorga[83].
State support for reactionary organizations: "The organization received financial support from the state and was patronized by Russian emperor Nicholas II. In 1907 there existed about 800 local branches of the 'Union'"[54].
Mass Jewish pogroms with the connivance and complicity of the police: in October 1905 "over 600 pogroms and over 800 killed were registered"[79]. In Odesa, "Low-ranking policemen and soldiers failed to interfere with the pogromists and in many instances participated in the looting and killing"[229], and the commander of the district's troops told policemen: "all of us sympathize in our souls with the pogrom"[229].
The intimidation of the population and suppression of the liberation movement by radical monarchist organizations whose program rested on the principles of "the unity and indivisibility of the Russian Empire, the preservation of autocracy… great-power chauvinism, antisemitism, militant Orthodoxy"[54]. The outcome was "the mass Jewish pogroms provoked by the 'Union,' particularly in Ukraine, in the 'Pale of Settlement'"[54].
The denial to Ukrainians of the status of a separate people at the level of official doctrine. The linguist Sergei Bulich, in the article "Little Russian dialect" of the Brockhaus and Efron Encyclopedic Dictionary (1896), formulated: "The relation of the L[ittle] Russian dialect to the Russian language may be likened to the relation between the Slovak dialect and the Czech language… but not to the relation between the Polish, Czech, Serbian and similar languages, on the one hand, and Russian, on the other"[230] - by this classification Ukrainian was a dialect within the Russian language. This doctrine was applied to the entire empire by the Central Statistical Committee, which conducted the census of 1897: in the tables of the consolidated volume, "Little Russian" ran as a subdivision of a single "Russian language", and its speakers were counted into the overall total of "Russians"[231]. This wrote 22,380,551 people into the "Russians" - speakers of the empire's second language after Great Russian (55,667,469)[231]. Nearly one in four of them - 5,374,863 people - lived outside the nine Ukrainian governorates: in Voronezh governorate 915,883 people named Ukrainian as their native language, in the Don Host region (now mostly Rostov oblast of Russia) - 719,655, in Kursk governorate - 527,778, in Bessarabia (now Moldova and the south of Odesa oblast) - 379,698, in Grodno governorate (now western Belarus) - 362,526, in Stavropol governorate - 319,817, in Lublin and Siedlce governorates (the Kholm region and Podlachia, now eastern Poland) - 304,261, in Siberia - 223,274, of them 54,422 in the Amur and Primorye regions, in Akmolinsk region (now northern Kazakhstan) - 51,103[231]. In the Kuban region (now mostly Krasnodar krai of Russia) Ukrainian was the most widespread native language: 908,818 people declared "Little Russian" (Ukrainian) as their native language against 816,734 with "Great Russian" (Russian), out of a regional population of 1,918,881[231]. The census methodology also undercounted Ukrainians, notes the collective monograph of the Institute of History of Ukraine of the National Academy of Sciences: "The census of 1897 recorded not nationality but the respondents' native tongue, and since many Ukrainians named Russian as such, there were in fact more ethnic Ukrainians than indicated in the census"[114].
The ban on the language in public speech: at the archaeological congress in Kyiv in 1899 the authorities forbade scholars from Austrian-ruled Ukraine to read papers in Ukrainian - they demonstratively withdrew from the sessions[219]. At the unveiling of the Kotliarevsky monument in Poltava on 30-31 August 1903, the Galicians were allowed to speak Ukrainian, but when local Ukrainians began reading a greeting address, the mayor cut the reading short, citing an order of the ministry of internal affairs; only in 1906 did the Senate revoke the ban, even reprimanding the minister for "the impropriety of his actions"[219]. In 1904-1905 the commissions of the Kyiv and Kharkiv universities and the Academy of Sciences, consulted by the Committee of Ministers, spoke out for lifting the bans on the Ukrainian word, yet the decrees of 1876 and 1881 were never formally revoked[219].
Total censorship of translations and book imports: in 1892 the Main Administration for Press Affairs directed the censorship committee to suppress translations into Ukrainian, "reducing the number of such talentless works for purely state purposes"[232]; "The ban on importing Ukrainian books from abroad was confirmed in the harshest form in 1894"[52].
The destruction of the basis for teaching children in their native language: "By a special circular of the Main Administration for Press Affairs in 1895, the printing of any books or collections in the Ukrainian language for children's reading was forbidden, 'even if in the substance of their content they appeared well-intentioned.'" The censor's resolution on a children's collection: "Obviously written for children, but they must learn in Russian. — Forbid"[52].
The Ukrainian regions became the empire's main raw-materials donor: "In 1910 coal extraction amounted to 1 billion poods, and in 1913 – 1.5 billion poods. Over this time the Donbas's share in the empire's coal industry grew from 67% to 74%… Before World War I, Ukrainian metallurgy produced 2/3 of the pig iron smelted in the empire"[75].
The mass importation of labor from the Russian governorates, altering the demographic balance: "in 1892, 80 percent of the workforce at the mines and plants of Yuzivka, one of Ukraine's industrial towns, had arrived from the Moscow region"[233]. "Among the workers and miners of the Donbas, ethnic Russians from Central Russia predominated… The rural population of the Donbas was mostly ethnically Ukrainian"[42].
The use of cheap labor at the mines and plants under conditions of harsh exploitation: "Initially the majority of miners were seasonal workers"[42] – without rights, without settlement, worked to exhaustion.
On the pedestal of the Khmelnytsky monument (1888) the empire cast a programmatic statement about the past: on the front side stood the phrase "We will to be under the tsar of the east, the Orthodox one," attributed to the Pereiaslav Rada, and on the right - the imperial formula "To Bohdan Khmelnytsky – one and indivisible Russia"[234]. Brought together, they presented the events of 1654 as a voluntary and final choice in favor of a single Russian state, and the entire history of the Hetmanate as the road to that choice.
On 11 July 1888 the Russian Empire unveiled the Bohdan Khmelnytsky monument on Sophia Square in Kyiv - a sign of "unity" with Moscow: on the left side of the pedestal stood the dates "1654-1888," counting the city's history from the Pereiaslav Rada[234]. The committee for its construction was headed by Mikhail Yuzefovich[234] - an official of the Kyiv educational district and author of the memorandum that formed the basis of the Ems ukase of 1876[235]. The conference convened over that memorandum, sitting with Yuzefovich's participation, resolved "not to permit the import into the empire, without special authorization of the Main Administration for Press Affairs, of any books or brochures whatsoever published abroad in the Little Russian dialect," and "to forbid the printing and publishing in the empire of original works and translations in that dialect, with the sole exceptions of: a) historical documents and monuments and b) works of belles-lettres" - the latter permitted only in Russian orthography and from a manuscript reviewed by the censorship[236]. Under the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR of 7 May 1919 on removing from squares and streets the monuments erected to tsars and tsarist minions, two of the three inscriptions were knocked off the pedestal; the remaining one was ordered removed by Hrynko, chairman of the Kyiv gubernia executive committee - academician Yefremov recorded this in his diary on 6 February 1925 - and in the end the side plaques were replaced with blank ones, while "Bohdan Khmelnytskyi 1888" was carved on the front stone[234].
In May 1877 the detachment of Colonel Batyanov suppressed the uprising in borderland Salatavia: historian A. I. Ismailova writes - "The suppression of the uprising, which went on through the entire second half of May, was carried out with extreme cruelty. The auls of Almak, Dylym and Burtunay with their hamlets were destroyed"[237]. On 12 July 1877, "significant detachments of troops were moved against the Bass auls. But the inhabitants, with their families and all their movable property, hid in the forests. The punitive expedition destroyed the auls, and the crops it ravaged and trampled down"[237]. On 16 July Colonel Nakashidze entered Cheberloy in two columns: historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write - he "destroyed 5 villages, including the auls of Makazhoy and Sadoy, arrested up to a thousand people and seized a large number of livestock"[83]. On 14 August the troops took the aul of Dyshni-Vedeno at the walls of the Vedeno fortress - the insurgents, according to historian A. I. Ismailova, defended every saklia (a highlander's house) "despite the murderous artillery fire"[237].
In the instructions of Svistunov, head of the Terek oblast, to General Smekalov one demand was invariably repeated: "advance at least little by little, mercilessly destroying everything and everyone before you... Our forces will keep arriving; just mow down everything without pity, beat and hang without mercy" - the instructions are quoted by historian A. I. Ismailova from the imperial publication "Materials for the Description of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78"[237]. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov record: at the final stage the punitive forces "acted in full accordance" with this order[83].
The order of Colonel Lokhvitsky of 17 July 1877 for the Cheberloy uchastok (administrative section) prescribed: "to raze to the ground the villages of Nizheloy, Rigakhoy and Nuy-Khoy"[237]; historian A. I. Ismailova sums up: "The auls and crops of the Cheberloy uchastok were destroyed wholesale; the same fate befell many auls of the Shatoy and Evdokimovsky uchastoks. The inhabitants hid in the forests"[237]. In October 1877, on the way back from the Simsir hamlets, historian D. A. Khozhaev records: "the Russians burned and destroyed Zandak and, for the second time, the village of Benoy - everything, down to the last house, including the mosques, they leveled to the ground"[92].
Svistunov, head of the Terek oblast, wrote to Smekalov on 18 August 1877: "As for Benoy and Zandak, they must be deported to Siberia to a man, or, if these scoundrels refuse, all of them must be killed off in winter like cockroaches and destroyed by famine"[237]; the same directive of Svistunov is quoted by historian D. A. Khozhaev[92]. In the imperial publication of the correspondence (letter to Smekalov of 18 August 1877, No. 226) the formula reads: "to freeze them all out in winter, like cockroaches, and destroy them by famine"[238]. The food base was being destroyed from the very first days: on 13 April 1877, merely for letting the detachment of Alibek-Haji, leader of the uprising, pass through the village, "the hayfields and maize fields of the inhabitants [of Benoy] were completely burned by the tsarist troops"[239]. Colonel Batyanov, according to historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova, "widely applied the destruction of stores of grain and hay," believing that this made many "come to their senses"[239]. In Cheberloy the troops stood for about 20 days - "All this time they were ruining the fields of the Cheberloy villages. Their inhabitants meanwhile were in such a state as if the greatest of floods had struck them"[83].
Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write about the teams of "hunters": "the militiamen had orders to kill not only abreks in hiding, but any inhabitant heading from his village into the forest. As a reward for every person killed or caught in the forest the authorities paid 25 rubles" (abrek - the empire's label for a highlander it had outlawed)[83]; separate sums were set for the leaders - "for Alibek-Haji - several thousand rubles"[83]. Captives were to be killed if an attempt was made to free them - and this was carried out: "during an attack by the insurgents on the detachment escorting 135 arrested inhabitants of the village of Mekhkety to the Vedeno fortress, the soldiers killed up to 20 Mekhkety villagers"[83].
Svistunov, head of the Terek oblast, ordered the head of the Argun okrug on 20 August 1877: "In the event not only of any aul receiving the mutineers, but of the slightest disorder in it or disobedience to the authorities, you will send the amanats of that aul to Grozny, and I will have them shot" (amanat - a person the empire took from a community as a hostage)[237]. Colonel Batyanov, according to historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova, declared that he considered it "a useful measure to shoot five of the amanats of every aul that had broken away"[239].
Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes about the surrender of Alibek-Haji and his naibs (naib - a district governor appointed by the authorities) in November 1877: "The head of the Terek oblast, General Prince Loris-Melikov, deceived them, giving his word of honor that all who turned themselves in would be pardoned"[92]. Alibek-Haji's secretary Goytukin Rasu, an eyewitness, recorded the mechanism of the deception: Alibek was told "that if he came to the authorities in peace, he would keep his freedom. Trusting their words... he presented himself to the commandant of the Vedeno fortress. The commandant at once ordered him seized and, having shackled his legs and arms in irons, sent him to the town jail"[92]. Those who surrendered were tried by a field court-martial and executed.
The field court-martial sat in Grozny on 4-6 March 1878: "Of the 17 persons tried, 11 were sentenced to death, among them Alibek-Haji, Uma Duev, one of his sons, and Dada Zalmaev"[83]; historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova counts 18 tried and 13 sentenced to death, the rest - to 20 years of katorga (penal labor)[239]. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes: "On 9 March 1878, at 6 o'clock in the morning, in the town of Grozny, on the fairground square, they were hanged and buried in a common pit" - and gives the list of the eleven by name[92]; Akhmadov and Khasmagomadov add: the execution took place "amid dead silence and the evident sympathy of the assembled townspeople for those being executed"[83]. A participant in the suppression who was present at the execution admitted: "I was struck by the calm with which these people died"[239]. The bodies, buried by the authorities in a common pit, were secretly reburied by Chechens at night according to Muslim rites - historian D. A. Khozhaev relays the tradition of a cemetery near Samashki, historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova - of the Tyrtov grove near Grozny[92][239].
"Already in August 1877 the first 150 inhabitants of the villages of Zandak and Dattykh were deported; small parties of exiles were being sent off throughout the autumn"[83]. "In the spring of the following year, 1878, another 110 families were deported from the Terek oblast, and 660 families from Dagestan. Most of the deportees died within the first months of exile. It is also known that over 500 Chechens were sentenced to lifelong katorga labor"[83]. Historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova gives the count for a single governorate: "of the 1625 highlanders deported in 1878 to the Novgorod governorate, 429 died within the first months (118 of them men, the rest - women) and 74 were declared hopelessly ill"[239]. The conditions were described by journalist Yu. Poluyansky, who visited the exiles: "In Cherepovets the highlanders are housed in a half-ruined, long-uninhabited hovel... Of the fifty people, up to thirty have already died, mostly children, of consumption and typhoid fever... For subsistence the adults are allotted 6 kopecks a day, the children 3 kopecks"[239]. Within Chechnya, mountain villages were being driven down onto the plain: "From the locality indicated, the villages of Mekhkety, Khatuni and Tauzen have been deported almost to a man"[83]; the plan for the wholesale deportation of the Salatavians, "up to 3000 souls," to the northern governorates was cut down to 200 people only for lack of escort troops[237].
The order of Colonel Lokhvitsky of 17 July 1877 for the Cheberloy uchastok obliged the punished themselves to cut a road for the troops into their own mountains: "the entire uchastok is to be obliged right now, within the very shortest time, to make a wide forest clearing (proseka) from the Bosoevskaya mountain to the Sharo-Argun river over a stretch of upwards of 6 versts" (a verst is slightly over a kilometer)[237].
Following the suppression of the 1877 uprising the empire took away the land of the mountain communities: historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova records - "Thousands of inhabitants of mountain villages were resettled onto the plain; their lands were confiscated"[239].
The starshina (headman) of Shali, Borshchik Khambulatov, who organized the repulse of the insurgents in April 1877, "was granted the rank of ensign of the militia and an annual salary of 600 rubles, and received a lifelong pension - 100 rubles a year"[83]; historian A. I. Ismailova puts the pension at "about 400 r. a year"[237].
Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "On 3 October there came to General Smekalov... a certain inhabitant of Benoy named Biy-Sultan. In exchange for a full pardon and permission to gather the remains of his property, Biy-Sultan volunteered to serve as a guide to Alibek-Haji's last fortified point. Thanks to this unexpected help the Simsir hamlets were quickly captured"[83].
The viceroy in the Caucasus, Mikhail Romanov, expressed the wish to bring the Dagestani militia (militia - armed detachments of highlanders in the empire's service) into the military operations in Chechnya, and on the Dagestan side, near the village of Botlikh, a detachment of regular infantry and 12 sotnias of mounted and foot Dagestani militia was concentrated[83]. At the beginning of May a detachment under Colonel Nakashidze was assembled in neighboring Dagestan - two battalions of the Apsheronsky and Samursky regiments, 6 druzhinas and 3 sotnias of militia with guns[83]. The rout was completed in the same manner: the village of Sogratl in Dagestan, where the leaders of the uprising had taken refuge, was surrounded by Russian troops and the Dagestani militia[92]. Part of the suppression the empire shifted onto the colonized themselves, keeping for itself the role of arbiter and entrenching enmity between neighbors.
The troops that occupied Chechen territories during the suppression of the 1877 uprising plundered the population. During the destruction of the five villages of Cheberloy the detachment of Nakashidze "arrested up to a thousand people and seized a large number of livestock"[83], and historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova records the practice beyond the orders: "the soldiers looted with impunity in the occupied territories, and also ravaged crops, took horses away from the population, slaughtered livestock even without any need for it"[239].
The ideological justification of a war of conquest by religion and Pan-Slavism: per Dostoevsky, "by Russia's insistence and blood the Slavs have already been liberated… the Turkish empire no longer exists and… the Balkan peninsula is free and lives a new life"[240] – the war was given the status of a sacred mission of liberating co-religionists.
The mobilization of the inhabitants of the colonized Ukrainian governorates into the imperial army for the war in the Balkans – under the universal military conscription in force in the Ukrainian lands since the liquidation of the autonomy[54].
A total legislative ban on the language: "Not to permit the import into the empire… of any books whatsoever published abroad in the Little Russian dialect"; "To forbid likewise any stage performances, texts to musical scores, and public readings in the same dialect"[241].
A concession that was in fact a choice between two alien orthographies: the 1881 revision allowed dictionaries to be printed, but "on condition of their being printed in conformity with all-Russian orthography, or with the orthography used in Little Russia no later than the 18th century"[236]. That is, either the metropole's orthography or an archaic one was admissible - contemporary Ukrainian orthography was not allowed in any form. The same document permitted stage texts to musical scores to be printed only "on condition of generally accepted Russian orthography," and made Ukrainian-language performances dependent on administrative permission: "dramatic plays, scenes and couplets in the Little Russian dialect... may be performed on stage, each time, however, with the special permission of the governors-general, and in localities not subordinate to governors-general - with the permission of the governors"[236].
The censor's refusal to consider national manuscripts: "On a Ukrainian grammar prepared in Russian, the censor wrote the resolution: 'It would be naive to hope for permission to print the grammar of a language that must not exist'"[52].
The ideological justification of the censorship refusal – the language was declared nonexistent by definition: the censor's resolution about "the grammar of a language that must not exist"[52].
The theater was banned not as repertoire but as an institution: the third point of the 1881 revision prescribed "to completely forbid the establishment of a specifically Little Russian theater and the formation of troupes for performing plays and scenes exclusively in the Little Russian dialect"[236]. Individual plays remained permissible - with administrative permission for each staging. The ban struck not at the text but at the very possibility of a permanent company existing: performing occasionally was allowed, being a Ukrainian theater was not. The report with this point was submitted by the minister of internal affairs Ignatiev; the emperor's assent followed on 8 October 1881[236].
The systematic imposition of the metropole's logic of superiority. Researchers reconstruct Katkov's logic thus: "a nation must be a tribe capable of creating a state; only a state nation can establish order in a given territory; tribes incapable of creating a state have to submit to the state nation"[242]. Katkov himself wrote: "In the recognition of a nation the question of power, of government, of the state is decided"[242]. Hrushevsky records both the thesis and its reach: Valuev invoked an imaginary "majority of Little Russians" who allegedly "know neither a Ukrainian nationality nor language, only one Russian people and tongue," while the ideology's mouthpieces carried it to the formula "there are no Ruthenians — there is only one 'Russian people' from the Carpathians to Kamchatka"[210].
The use of Ukrainians within the imperial army in large-scale wars of conquest in the Caucasus and Central Asia – recruit conscription had extended to the Ukrainian governorates since the liquidation of the autonomy[54].
The use of the regular army to suppress the January Uprising: Muravyov and Berg, appointed by the emperor, "resorted to brutal repressions and terror with the aim of suppressing the uprising"; "hundreds of Poles were executed, thousands exiled to Siberia or given over to the army"[79].
The purge of civic communities in the wake of the uprising's suppression: "the suppression of the Polish uprising of 1863–1864, which had a corresponding impact on the Ukrainophile movement, interpreted by the tsarist administration as an Austrian intrigue, led to the self-dissolution of the hromadas and the fading of public activity"[114].
The liquidation of education in the native language: in 1859–1862 the intelligentsia and students founded 111 Sunday schools in Ukraine to teach adults literacy, with instruction conducted in Ukrainian; in 1862 the authorities closed these schools "for the alleged presence of revolutionary propaganda"[206].
The closure of the national press: the Ukrainian socio-political and literary journal "Osnova" (St. Petersburg, January 1861 - October 1862) came to an end: the plans to reorganize the publication were thwarted by the minister of internal affairs Valuev, who refused to sanction its publication under a renewed program[206].
Valuev's secret circular to the censorship committees (18 July 1863), which halted printing in the native language: "the clearance of books in the Little Russian language, whether of religious content, educational, or generally intended for the people's elementary reading, is to be suspended"[243].
The official refusal to recognize the language and identity – the formula of Valuev's circular (1863): "there was not, is not, and cannot be any distinct Little Russian language, and their dialect, used by the common folk, is the same Russian language, only spoiled by Poland's influence upon it"[243].
The introduction of bonuses for the policy of denationalization: by decrees of the tsarist administration of 1869 and 1886, officials "in the ten South-Western governorates - persons of Russian origin, excluding, however, local natives" - were assigned bonuses for successes in the Russification of Ukraine[244] - part of the authorities' systematic plans to strengthen the "Russian assimilatory potential" of the Western krai after the Polish uprising of 1863, which included material benefits for Russian officials and teachers[245].
In early June 1860, troops, Cossacks, and militia were sent into Benoy, where the deported families had returned without permission, led by Baysangur of Benoy, head of that society under Imam Shamil (the leader of the highlanders’ resistance to the Russian conquest)[83]. On 28 September 1860 the troops took Benoy by storm: the historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write - "the desperate resistance... was quickly suppressed by artillery fire"; the historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova dates the taking of the aul to 26 September and adds: "The retaliatory repressions were directed at the entire population of the insurgent districts"[83][239]. In December 1860 - January 1861 General Kundukhov's operation swept through Ichkeria - ten infantry battalions, four hundred Cossacks, and seven hundred Chechen militia: "'flying' detachments were widely used to pursue the insurgents, while the main mass of the troops was engaged in 'combing' the terrain"[83]. From spring until late autumn 1861, according to the historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova, "on the territory of Chechnya, from the Assa river to the aul of Gekhi, a military-punitive expedition operated... evicting the Chechens by force of arms into the foothills and onto the plain"[239]. In autumn 1861 three detachments forced the last leaders of the uprising to surrender - an imperial report of 22 December 1861 sums it up: "The persistent actions of our troops in the severe winter of last year... compelled the Ichkerians to declare unconditional submission"[246].
In June 1860 the troops devastated the aul of Dzhumsoy, abandoned by its inhabitants: according to a July 1860 report from the commander of the troops of the Terek oblast to the Viceroy, it was "devastated to the ground, and part of the crops annihilated"[246]. The outcome of Kundukhov's operation in the winter of 1860-1861 is summed up in his own report, quoted by the historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova: "All the buildings, in the auls as well as in the khutors, have been burned to the ground... the hay not only in the auls but even on the very summits of the mountains has been annihilated by fire, at which the inhabitants themselves marveled, seeing that in inaccessible thickets and on the heights the hay was burning"; General Bazhenov reported on 29 November 1860: "Today I have finished with the Termoy people. All the auls are destroyed. In Ezi you cannot even recognize the place, so thoroughly has it been taken apart"[239]. In all, according to the historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov, "15 villages and a multitude of mountain khutors were left destroyed"[83]; the historian D. A. Khozhayev writes: "about 15 auls implicated in it [the uprising] were destroyed... Benoy was burned once again"[92].
The historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov reckon: "more than 1200 inhabitants of Benoy, Engenoy, Dattykh, Gendargen and other villages of Ichkeria were forcibly resettled"[83]; the historian D. A. Khozhayev details the mechanism of dispersal: the inhabitants of Benoy "on 29 January 1861, numbering 1218 people, were deported and dispersed, 5—10 households at a time, among the lowland villages of Chechnya assigned to them"[92]. Deportations went on in winter as well: the historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova writes - "Especially hard for the Chechens was the resettlement undertaken in December 1860, during severe frosts. 120 highlander families, having no way to shelter in the forest in winter, were resettled onto the plain within 2 days, their dwellings devastated by the troops. Over the winter of 1861, 1500 mountain Chechens were deported to the Chechen plain"[239]. The Akki mountain society was deported in its entirety in July 1860: according to an imperial report, "The mutinous Akkins were dispersed among the Galash people and other neighboring tribes; their dwellings were destroyed"[246].
A report of 6 August 1860 from the commander of the Caucasus Army to the Minister of War records, concerning the deported Akkins: "the land they occupied has been declared state property, and thus the matter of the Akkins has been settled conclusively"[246]. The historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov confirm: the inhabitants of the Akki society "were dispersed over the course of July among the Galash and other neighboring societies. The land of the Akki society was thereby declared 'state property'"[83].
Baysangur of Benoy was taken prisoner by the troops on 17 February 1861: General Kempfert reported to the Minister of War on 28 February - "...Despite desperate resistance, [we] took prisoner Baysungur and four of his companions... the families of Baysungur and Sultan-Murad were also seized — 14 people in all"[92]. In March 1861 a field court-martial in Khasav-Yurt sentenced him to hanging; the historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova relays the Chechen oral tradition about the execution: none of those standing by the gallows agreed to act as executioner, and "only after the officers in charge of the execution offered a monetary reward to a volunteer executioner did one of the Dagestanis standing in the crowd take this role upon himself"[239]; Baysangur's family and sons were exiled to Siberia[92]. The leaders of the uprising who surrendered - Atabi-Mullah Atayev, naib of Lesser Chechnya, whom the imperial papers call Atabai (14 November 1861), and Uma Duyev (14 December 1861) - Emperor Alexander II ordered exiled to the inner provinces - separately: "Uma... is to be sent to reside in provinces distant from the Caucasus... but on the condition that he not be in the same town as Atabai"[246]. Sheikh Kunta-Haji, a Muslim preacher who taught that God should be remembered aloud, in chorus, with singing and circling in a ring (such remembrance is called zikr - hence the imperial nickname of his followers, the zikrists), who had been under permanent police surveillance since the beginning of 1862, was arrested on 3 January 1864 in Serzhen-Yurt by order of the Viceroy. His followers had a single demand: "The main demand of the zikrists, as before, was the immediate release of those arrested and an end to new arrests. In that case the Kunta-Haji followers promised to obey the authorities once more"[83]. The head of the Chechen district, General Tumanov, rejected the demands and pressed for the surrender of those who had escaped arrest; on 18 January 1864, near Shali, the matter ended in a shooting. Those who came had left their firearms behind deliberately - the decision to go with blades alone is attributed to Machik-Mullah, who announced that Kunta-Haji, having appeared to him, would fill the soldiers' rifles with water[83]. The historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "the Kunta-Haji followers advanced on the dense squares of regular troops with nothing but shashkas and daggers in their hands. Tumanov allowed them to attack, and then gave the order to open rifle and artillery fire"; they put the dead at "over 150"[83]. The historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova gives the count at the site of the slaughter: "164 dead remained at the site of the clash. Among those bayoneted there proved to be 5 women's bodies"; the detachment's losses - 8 dead and 33 wounded[239]. Eighteen people were exiled in this case - the sheikh himself, indefinitely, to Ustyuzhna in Novgorod province; his brother Movsar - to the Vyborg fortress; the vekils, the sheikh's trusted men, - to Smolensk province; nine rank-and-file zikrists - to fortress labor with subsequent settlement in Siberia[83][239]. In the archival register of persons under surveillance in Novgorod province for 1865 the sheikh is entered in a single line: "Chechen Shikh-Kunty. Age 35. Exiled for spreading the fantastical teaching of 'zikr'... Receives 1 rub. 80 kop. a month"[239]. Having lived in exile a little over two years, Kunta-Haji died of starvation[83].
After the shooting near Shali the empire demanded that the Chechen societies hand over the survivors. On 26 January 1864 Loris-Melikov, head of the Terek oblast, assembled the naibs and "honorable" residents in the Groznaya fortress: the historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova writes - he "announced to the assembled Chechens that they were obliged to hand over all the zikrists [followers of Sheikh Kunta-Haji]. A final deadline was set - 1 February, after which the head of the oblast threatened to commence military operations. He also forbade the performance of zikrist rites"[239]. The historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov quote the demand verbatim: "...to assist in restoring the order disrupted by the zikrists...", and record the ban on the "loud" zikr, compliance with which was to be watched over by the clergy and the village elders[83].
In devastated Dzhumsoy in June 1860 the troops spared those who handed over hostages: "left untouched were those houses and plowlands whose owners appeared at their places and handed over amanats" (an amanat is a person whom the empire took from a community as a hostage, to keep it in obedience by the threat of reprisal against the one taken)[246]. After the Shali shooting, according to the historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova, "The families of the zikrists who had not been caught were taken into custody and deported to Yekaterinograd. Because of this, one zikrist gave himself up so that his family would be released" - Yekaterinograd here is not the Kuban Yekaterinodar but the stanitsa of Yekaterinogradskaya on the Terek, now in Kabardino-Balkaria; the auls of Chechnya "were bound by mutual responsibility", with lists of those answerable to the government[239].
In Kundukhov's operation in the winter of 1860-1861 marched the "7 hundreds of Chechen militia" of Colonel Chermoyev[83]; Atabi-Mullah Atayev, naib of Lesser Chechnya (Atabai in the imperial documents), surrendered in November 1861, according to a document, "to the commander of the Chechen irregular cavalry divizion, Vagap Aduyev" - Aduyev, who served the empire holding its rank[83]. Against Sheikh Kunta-Haji the authorities mobilized loyal clergy: the historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write - "measures were taken to induce the most prominent representatives of the Chechen Muslim clergy to come out openly against Kunta-Haji and the teaching he preached"[83].
According to the summary by historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov, of the 643 thousand desiatinas (a desiatina is a little over a hectare) of lowland and piedmont Chechnya, Chechen villages were left 347 thousand, Cossack stanitsas were handed 222 thousand - a third, officers as private owners got 28 thousand, fortifications 17 thousand, and the treasury about 30 thousand desiatinas of "reserve" land[83]. The same partition was described by the office itself: the Terek land-survey administration, counting only the lowland part of Greater and Lesser Chechnya (a narrower scope than the lowland and piedmont Chechnya of the historians' summary), summed up: "The entire lowland part of Greater and Lesser Chechnya, with the adjoining Lesser-Chechen forest, comprises an area of 271086 desiatinas. Of it, at various times, 650 desiatinas went to 6 Cossack stanitsas, 1560 desiatinas of forest to the Terek Cossack Host, 8645 desiatinas were granted into private ownership for the services of individual persons, 8266 desiatinas were given to towns and settlements, 234970 desiatinas were allotted to 43 Chechen auls, and 16965 desiatinas were held by the forestry department. Thus, there is no free land left…"[239]. The forests were confiscated wholesale: "in Chechnya and Ingushetia tsarism appropriated forests with a total area of 225.5 thousand desiatinas (they became 'state' forests) and handed another 33.5 thousand desiatinas along the Sunzha and its tributaries to the Cossack host. The forests were placed under armed guard, and the unfortunate peasants caught felling wood were pursued with heavy penalties"[83]. From the mountain auls, according to historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova, "50989 desiatinas of pasture were confiscated to the treasury", and the same pastures were then handed back to the communities "on terms of quitrent use"[239]. What people had cleared with their own hands was taken too: in 1874 in the Vedeno okrug the owners of 250 desiatinas of plots cleared from under forest were told to swear on the Quran that the clearing had been done with the permission of the communities - "in the whole okrug only Sh. Dolatmurzayev, a resident of the village of Belgatoy, was able to swear... all the other plots, whose owners to their honor did not risk giving a false oath, were declared communal"[83]; after the uprising of 1877 the residents of Dyshni-Vedeno had 74 certificates for cleared plots taken away "as punishment, for support of the insurgents"[239]. In 1888 the Chechen communities petitioned the emperor: building materials and firewood they were "forced to buy from private owners or from the treasury, whereas formerly they had used them free of charge"[239]. In 1891 the Vladikavkaz Railway Company received a concession for a branch line from Beslan station through Grozny to Petrovsk[247]. On 15 June 1891 Alexander III, by a personal decree to the Minister of Ways of Communication, ordered the expropriation of land for the route: "Having authorized the construction of the Petrovsk railway, in place of its previously indicated direction from Vladikavkaz to Petrovsk, along the direction from Beslan station... to Petrovsk, we command: 1) that the proper arrangements be made for the expropriation... of the lands necessary for this purpose"[248]. The trackbed, the station and the entire railway infrastructure landed on lands that by then were registered to the Terek Cossack Host and the Groznenskaya stanitsa - the very lowland land that had been taken from Chechen auls and handed to the host: historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write that "the railway trackbed (and, accordingly, the station and all the railway facilities) passed over lands belonging to the Terek Cossack Host", and "the Grozny city railway station was built on the land of the Groznenskaya stanitsa"[83]. The bargaining over the price went on between the railway, the town and the Cossacks: the town authorities demanded "60 rubles for every square sazhen of town land expropriated for the construction of the station, the locomotive depot with workshops, the goods station and the access tracks", while the Cossacks of the Groznenskaya stanitsa offered the builders their plot free of charge - counting on oil-refining and other enterprises rising around the station[83]. The money for the expropriation went to the holders of what had been seized; the Chechen communities had no part in that settlement.
The Kakhanovskaya stanitsa "was founded in 1860 on the site of the village of Umakhan-Yurt in the bend of the lower Sunzha" and found itself almost encircled by 14 Chechen villages, which took in the evicted people of Umakhan-Yurt[239]. Six stanitsas of the Kizlyar otdel "were situated on the lands of the expelled Chechen population", and the Baryatinskaya stanitsa, planted right up against the large village of Stary Yurt, took away part of the Stary Yurt residents' lands[239]. In all, on the Sunzha Line, by the count of historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova, "the highlanders lost 262946 desiatinas of lowland land"[239].
The allotment norm was written out by estate and origin: "Cossacks are allotted 30 desiatinas (a desiatina is a little over a hectare) per soul, while natives get no more than 2-5 desiatinas"[239]; the gap was also entrenched by the general rules of allotment: by the count of the newspaper Kazachy Vestnik for 1884, on which historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova relies, Russian residents of the Caucasus krai received "24–30 desiatinas of land allotment per soul, whereas natives got 12–18 desiatinas per dym, which on average numbered 5 men" (a dym is a hearth, a household)[239]. In 1886 in the Grozny okrug "an average Chechen family with many children... had 11 desiatinas of land, while the average Cossack family owned more than 92 desiatinas"[83]. By Order No. 418 of the viceroy of 1863, "the right to buy land plots from the local population was received by Russian officers and officials of the oblast administration"[239] - an ordinary Chechen could not be a buyer of that same category of land; the rules of 1 March 1902 instituted the buying-up of privately owned lands "for the needs of the Caucasus Cossack hosts, at the expense of their capital funds"[239].
Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov give a summary based on the materials of the Caucasus Military District (RGVIA, f. 1300, op. 7, d. 3) and the work of A. I. Khasbulatov: "According to the data of 1877, in Mountain Chechnya, including Ichkeria, with a population of almost 100 thousand people, there was on average 0.3 desiatinas (a desiatina is a little over a hectare) of arable land per capita... such fantastic landlessness as in Mountain Chechnya was known to no other region of the Russian Empire"[83]. In 1901 on the Chechen plain "a family (usually quite numerous) had from 7 to 14 desiatinas"[239]. The count by family budget was kept by the oblast statistics service itself: "A Cossack family had a gross income of 918 rubles from its land allotment... and was left with a surplus of 140 rubles. The richest Chechen family on the plain, according to the Terek Oblast Statistical Committee (1903), received an income of 262 rubles from its land allotment while spending 414 rubles on its upkeep; the deficit came to 152 rubles"[239].
In 1895 the Cossacks leased out 420 thousand desiatinas (a desiatina is a little over a hectare) of "yurt" (stanitsa allotment) lands, the official rent for which came to over 140 thousand rubles a year; on top of that, "reserve" lands went out on lease - up to 65 thousand desiatinas annually[83]. By 1913 the stanitsas were leasing out 424 thousand desiatinas of host lands and collecting 806.5 thousand rubles in rent, and the main tenants were Chechens - up to 77 percent of peasant households[83]. Leasing became so widespread that the administration of the Terek oblast grew alarmed: historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write that the authorities "seriously feared that, by renting the same plots for many years, the highlanders might in the end lay claim to them", and, besides, sought to attach to the oblast as many "out-of-town" peasants as possible, "and therefore at the end of the 19th century an ordinance came out forbidding Cossacks to lease their land directly to the highlanders"[83]. The use of land taken from the Chechens was made conditional on the authorities' permission, and that permission was revoked as soon as use threatened to turn into right.
The ban on leasing land directly to the highlanders, introduced at the end of the 19th century, produced middlemen: "The result of this decision was the appearance of a large number of intermediaries through whom the land still reached the highlanders, but at a higher price"[83]. Who profited from it is named by historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova: "Speculative leasing became widespread; it was practiced by officials of the government and administration and by officers, who rented large areas at 10-15 kopecks per desiatina and sublet them to the highland population at a price several times the original"[239]. The difference in price was pocketed by officials and officers of the very administration that had taken the land away.
"In 1867 alone, 8674 desiatinas (a desiatina is a little over a hectare) were transferred into private ownership across Chechnya for various kinds of 'services'" - according to historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova, 57 Chechens received it, and she names the viceroy in the Caucasus, Baryatinsky, as the initiator of the handouts[239]; the largest allotments went to the Chechen ruling families - the Taymazovs (6550 desiatinas), the Bekovich-Cherkasskys (over 6350), the Turlovs, the Eldarovs; land was also handed out to Russian officers - "Colonel Ippolitov received more than 1 thousand desiatinas of land in the Argun okrug"[83]. The hierarchy of the handouts followed estate lines: to the largest highland owners - "from 1 to 5 thousand desiatinas, depending 'on the degree of significance and the services rendered by each to the government'", to persons of the second category (the highland notability, the first being Russian nobles) - up to 1 thousand[239]. Land also paid the lower administration: "village elders received five shares each of arable and hay lands"[83], aul secretaries - up to 75 desiatinas[249].
On 1 April 1858 the "Regulation on the Administration of the Caucasus Army" created a special section for the mountain peoples at the Main Staff - historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova calls this "the first legislative confirmation of the system of 'military-popular administration' that had in fact taken shape as the land was being conquered"[249]. In 1859, "in connection with the reform of the local administration and the entry into force of the Regulation on the Main Directorate of the Viceroy of the Caucasus", State Control was "deprived of the ability to monitor the activities of the local authorities": within the viceroy's Main Directorate a special control department was set up, answerable not to the central agency but to the head of the Main Directorate himself[249]. On 16 January 1860 Emperor Alexander II approved the regulation by which the Left Wing of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on Nokhchi land) was renamed the Terek oblast[249]. On 24 May 1860 Baryatinsky, viceroy in the Caucasus, ordered the creation at the Main Staff of the Caucasus Army of a "Chancellery for the Administration of the Caucasus Highlanders" - later it was called the "Caucasus Mountain Administration", then the "Caucasus Military-Popular Administration"[249]. On 25 December 1860 the "provisional staffing tables of the military-popular administration of the Terek oblast" were approved: the oblast was divided into six okrugs (districts) - Kabardian, Vladikavkaz, Chechen, Kumyk, Ichkerian and Argun[249].
Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "in 1867 Major General Prince Tumanov was appointed head of the Middle military otdel, while of the eight heads of the mountain okrugs six were colonels and two were majors"[83]. The head of the Terek oblast united civil, military and Cossack authority in one pair of hands and, in the words of the same historians, could against the highlanders "at his own will use... arms and raise against them the troops and Cossacks subordinate to him, hand highlanders over to a military court and administratively expel 'undesirable elements' from the oblast"[83]. From September 1866 the viceroy received the right to replace highlanders in the posts of pristavs (superintendents appointed by the empire) with incomer officers - historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova records the result: for a long time highlanders could rise no higher in the administrative system of the Terek oblast than the office of village elder[249]. The elders themselves were hand-picked by the authorities and sworn to "unquestioning execution... of all instructions and demands of the administration"; the population was left no choice - "The local authorities did not consider it possible to grant even the right to elect aul elders, since they 'found no sufficient guarantees that this would not entail serious inconveniences in the matter of governing the highlanders'"[249]. The court system was crowned by the same officers: in 1862 an oblast Main People's Court was created, all of whose members were appointed by the head of the oblast, and in 1870 - okrug "Mountain verbal courts" chaired by officers of the administration; historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov conclude: "Thus the court system created for the highlanders of the Terek oblast was not merely not removed from the control of the military authorities but, on the contrary, directly subordinated to them"[83]. The 1895 regulation on village communities handed the right of assembly to a limited number of "elected representatives", and the okrug head could strip an "elected representative" of his office and dissolve the entire village assembly[83].
The oblast was recut in 1862, 1869, 1888 and 1899[249]. From 1 May 1888 the Vedeno and Argun okrugs were merged into the Grozny okrug - under the formula quoted by historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova, "to shield the Cossacks from the 'corrupting' influence of the highlanders"[249]. The Chechen villages on the right bank of the Terek, which were slated for transfer to the Kizlyar and Pyatigorsk otdels (Cossack divisions), were set apart as a special uchastok (sub-district) and temporarily left under the head of the Grozny okrug; the mountain okrugs were divided into uchastoks, while the Cossack otdels were divided by the pattern of manning military units, into sotnias (Cossack hundreds) and regiments[249]. From 1 January 1899 the oblast was recut once more: four otdels - Pyatigorsk, Mozdok, Kizlyar, Sunzha - and four okrugs: Vladikavkaz, Khasav-Yurt, Nalchik, Grozny[249].
The Groznaya fortress, founded by General Yermolov on the Sunzha on 10 June 1818[239], became the town of Grozny in 1870[83]. On 21 March 1888, by decree of Emperor Alexander III, the names of peoples were erased from the names of the okrugs of the Terek oblast: the Chechen okrug was renamed the Grozny okrug, the Ingush - the Nazran, the Kabardian - the Nalchik, the Kumyk - the Khasav-Yurt, the Military-Ossetian - the Vladikavkaz[249]. Okrugs named after the peoples living in them received the names of imperial fortresses and slobodas - the map of governance ceased to call the peoples by name.
From 1882 "especially important" cases in which the accused were highlanders were transferred to the field court-martial; in 1893, with the emperor's permission, a significant share of highlanders' criminal cases was withdrawn from the general civil courts - into whose jurisdiction these cases passed, the source does not specify[249]. Punishment could also be imposed without any court: the head of the oblast jailed highlanders for up to one month at his personal discretion, and imposed penalties on aul communities for harbouring[249]; on 19 November 1893 the rules of administrative deportation to Eastern Siberia on accusation or suspicion of stealing horses and livestock were extended to the Terek oblast[249], and according to historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov the decision on administrative exile for a term of up to five years was taken by the commander of the Caucasus Army, and the place of exile was Chechen Island in the Caspian[83]. The 1894 "Temporary Regulation on Measures to Restrain the Native Population of the Terek Oblast from 'Predation'" - its draft was submitted for approval by the head of the Terek oblast, general Kakhanov - according to historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova, wrote the collective liability of the village community for committed crimes into law[249]; historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov record the mechanics: mountain villages paid for stolen livestock "if the tracks of the stolen livestock turned out to be lost near the given village", while "the possibility that the thieves might not be highlanders at all was completely ignored"[83]. Indigenous inhabitants were barred from holding the posts of pristav and okrug head and from serving as justices of the peace[249]; the 1888 regulation on the administration of the Terek and Kuban oblasts established, in the words of historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova, "a narrowly caste-based military-Cossack administration, without the participation not only of representatives of the mountain peoples but of the non-Cossack element as well... the highlanders were placed outside the operation of the general laws"[249]. In the 1890s the administration, by a separate order, forbade Cossacks to keep kunachestvo with highlanders (kunachestvo - sworn brotherhood, an institution of friendship between households)[249]. Service was segregated too: the "political unreliability" of the Caucasus Muslims led the authorities to give up forming line units from them, and from 1886, by order of the Minister of War, recruits from the Terek oblast were assigned only to troops stationed in the Caucasus[249]. Zemstvos were never introduced in the oblast at all; the proposal on zemstvo institutions in the Terek oblast, submitted to the State Duma in 1914, was not adopted before the revolution[249].
The 1894 "Regulation on Residence Permits" enshrined estate inequality: nobles, officials and merchants received passport books of unlimited duration, while highlanders ascribed to village communities received five-year books or short-term passports and bilets (written passes) for absence[249]. Historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova states the regime's effect from the oblast's records: "Terek highlanders, should they appear beyond the Kuban or in other parts of the Russian Empire without passports, were considered vagrants and malefactors and were punished as such"; she also writes: "The passport system served the administration of the Terek oblast as a favourite means of constraining even persons well known to it"[249]. Inside the oblast a regime of absences operated: leave of up to a month was granted by the village elder, for a longer term - by the okrug head; unauthorized absence was punished by fine, arrest or public works, and a highlander could not move from one community to another without the consent of two village communities - the one he was leaving and the one he was joining[83].
As early as 1880, by decree of the viceroy, all highlanders were expelled from the Shatoy sloboda - "owing to the decrease of Russians in the sloboda" - with a ban on settling there henceforth[249]. On 14 May 1893 the eviction of highlanders from the towns and slobodas of the oblast began; the bans were lifted piecemeal over decades: for Grozny - on 18 March 1901, for the Vozdvizhenskaya sloboda - on 27 February 1906, for Vedeno and Shatoy - only on 10 May 1916[249]. The head of the oblast justified the repeal not by the rights of the evicted - he petitioned for the repeal of the law of 14 May 1893 as one "serving as a brake on the Russification of the tribes"[249]. By order of 26 August 1898 the head of the garrison of the Shatoy fortification banned entry into the fortification without a bilet - the population of three uchastoks was left without access to the post and telegraph office, the savings bank and the pharmacy[249].
On 17 August 1884 the "Binding Decree on the Sale, Storage and Carrying of Combat Firearms in the Caucasus Krai" was approved: combat rifles - only under police permits, and the sale and purchase of army-pattern weapons were banned[249]. On 1 July 1899 the decree was tightened: previous permits were annulled, annual renewal was required, and weapons without a permit were confiscated and sold for the benefit of the treasury[249]. In 1892, by order of the head of the Terek oblast, all weapons with which highlanders appeared in Russian settlements were confiscated, including weapons brought for sale; from 1893 the authorities were allowed to search homes for weapons[249]. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov record the contrast: highlander militiamen in imperial service carried weapons at all times, "unlike ordinary highlanders, who could not appear armed outside their villages"[83].
Historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova writes: from the 1860s the administrative apparatus in Chechnya and Ingushetia "was maintained chiefly on funds collected from the people"[249]. The empire did not trust the highlanders with military service - and taxed them in money instead: by the laws of 2 and 9 June 1887 a monetary levy in place of military service was introduced for the Muslims of the Terek oblast, its size "did not exceed 22 kopecks per 'dym'"[249] ("dym" - a separate household, homestead)[249]; historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov confirm: "in 1887 the Russian government introduced a special monetary levy for them"[83]. From then on the levies only grew: "From 1887 to 1905 the sum of taxes rose from 228.1 to 678.8 thousand rubles, that is, it nearly tripled over these years", while the podymnaya tax - the tax on each household - "in the Terek oblast reached in the 1890s up to 70 kopecks per desiatina, while at that time in the interior provinces of the country it was no more than 17 kopecks, or four times less"[249]. On top of the levy, village communities bore obligations in kind: maintaining the elder and the village board, the roads, ditches and watch posts[83].
Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: fine moneys were spent on maintaining exiles and secret agents, and at times covered officials' embezzlement - in 1893 the head of the Nadterechny uchastok, lieutenant Tomashevsky, embezzled over 300 rubles collected from Chechen villages[83]. The nature of the power was admitted from within by colonel Belik, appointed in 1860 the first head of the Chechen okrug; he later wrote: in Chechnya "there reigns for the most part not law but arbitrary rule, often founded on the dishonesty of the chief, and thereby we only sow in the people distrust of ourselves, even hatred"[83].
On 15 March 1873 the coat of arms of the Terek oblast was approved: "In a black shield, a silver wavy bend to the right. An Imperial standard on a golden staff. The shield is crowned with the ancient Tsar's Crown and surrounded by golden oak leaves joined by the Alexander ribbon"[249]. Historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova reads the meaning of the sign thus: the silver bend is the Terek, which had long been a border, and now "both its banks were united by the Imperial standard, and the Terek became fully Russian - such is the basic meaning of this coat of arms"[249]. The draft coat of arms of the city of Grozny was made by B. V. Köhne, an official of the Heraldry Office: on an azure shield a silver mountain between two golden sea lilies, and in the dexter canton - the arms of the Terek oblast[249], so that the city's emblem carried the imperial symbol of the oblast. The land was marked with the figure of the conqueror as well. The first monument to Yermolov in Grozny was "the carefully preserved dugout in which he lived during the founding of the Groznaya fortress"[249], and later a bronze bust of the general was set up by the dugout. What this sign meant, Ibragimova puts thus: the bust recalled the most tragic years of the conquest of the Caucasus and was a symbol of the dramatic fate of the mountain peoples, and the monument to the general who "with barbaric cruelty exterminated whole peoples in the name of the conquest of the Caucasus" became for Chechens "a kind of 'eyesore'"[249]. The sign outlived the empire: under Soviet rule the monument "was blown up by night with enviable regularity and just as regularly restored by night"[249].
At the start of the twentieth century the Terek authorities began to bring in military detachments and Cossack units for mass searches of highland auls - formally to confiscate weapons and to "detain fugitives"[83]. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write what this turned into: sweeping searches of mountain villages "were as a rule accompanied by looting and other unlawful acts by soldiers and Cossacks, which was encouraged in every way by the Terek authorities, who constantly sought a pretext for applying harsher measures against the highlanders"[83]. How literally this encouragement worked is visible in November 1902: during a search staged by Cossacks at the bazaar of the village of Shaami-Yurt mass disturbances broke out, the ataman of the Samashkinskaya stanitsa, Gridnev, forbade his men to use firearms, and the clash ended without bloodshed - after which the head of the Terek oblast removed Gridnev from his post and expressed displeasure to the Cossacks who had taken part in the disturbances for their "passivity"[83]. The sanction came from the very top: when the head of the Terek oblast reported that the clashes between Chechens and Cossacks were bringing material damage and human casualties and that these groups of the population should be kept apart, Nicholas II replied that "it is precisely this neighbourhood that keeps up in the Cossacks their old ancestral daring, and therefore there is no need whatever to take measures to soften the situation"[239]. Bloodshed in Chechen villages was for the authorities not an incidental cost but the working condition of the land.
The military teams and Cossack units brought in at the beginning of the 20th century for sweeping searches of the mountain auls robbed the residents with the authorities' encouragement: historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write that the searches "were as a rule accompanied by robberies and other unlawful actions of soldiers and Cossacks, which was encouraged in every way by the Terek command"[83].
In the summer of 1865 a fifth of the Chechen people left Chechnya - and almost half of those who left perished. The first families set out from Vladikavkaz on 28 May 1865; the last crossed the border on 10 September[239]; the historian D. A. Khozhayev draws up the tally: "23,057 people (5 thousand families) of Chechens, Karabulaks and Ingush leave their native land for Turkey"[92]; historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov reckon "up to 23 thousand Chechens," of whom more than 4.5 thousand families were inhabitants of Lesser Chechnya and the Ichkerinsky okrug, and in all in the 1860s "up to 20% of the total number of Chechens" were expelled[83]. The dying began at once: the historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova writes - "In the course of the resettlement about 40,000 highlanders of the Terek oblast perished, which was slightly less than half of all those who had left"; according to the dispatches of the Russian consul, in Trebizond in 1864 some 180-250 people were dying each day, in Samsun - 200[239]. The lands allotted for settlement "were unfit for agriculture – stony and barren"[239]; the colony of Ras al-Ayn, where mainly Chechens had been settled, shrank by 1878 from 4-5 thousand families to 500[239]. The muhajirs themselves - as those who left were called, from the Arabic "muhajir," a migrant - wrote to the head of the Terek oblast: "We have learned that Mussa deceived us... A third of us have already perished as it is" (Mussa is General Kundukhov; they called him by his first name)[239].
The head of the Terek oblast, General Loris-Melikov, set out the plan: "...the Chechen population had to be herded into one place... This population, cut off on one side from the mountains by the new stanitsas... would no longer dare to threaten us with an uprising and would not escape the most vigilant surveillance"[83]. The land of those who left was taken by the treasury: "many auls emptied completely; the untended lands became overgrown with weeds. These lands were confiscated for the benefit of the treasury"[239], and it was allotted "to Russian officers, the local nobility and, chiefly, to the Cossack hosts"[239]. The replacement proceeded stanitsa by stanitsa: in 1861-1865 alone, 81 Cossack stanitsas were founded on the emptied lands of the North Caucasus[250]. In Chechnya this can be seen step by step: in 1868 the resettlement of the Chechens was directly subordinated to the stationing of the Sunzha Cossack regiments - there was an option of leaving the inhabitants on the right bank of the Sunzha, "but the Cossack host laid claim to these lands, so the Chechens were moved to the left bank of the Terek and the Sunzha, and their lands were taken by the 1st and 2nd Sunzha regiments"[239]. From 1863 to 1885, 112 settlements were founded in the Terek oblast, mostly of Russian settlers, while the Terek Cossack Host occupied a third of the oblast's area while making up a fifth of its inhabitants[239]. The difference shows in the allotments: a Cossack family received on average from 57 to 90 desiatinas (a desiatina is slightly more than a hectare)[249], whereas in the Chechen auls a family had "0.5 – 10 desiatinas... that is, no more than 2 desiatinas per head"[250].
Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "The principal means of driving out the highlanders became depriving them of their main source of existence – the land. The transfer of vast lands on the plains to Cossack stanitsas left thousands of highlanders without means of subsistence"[83]. Imperial statistics recorded the result: "each family in the auls has 0.5 – 10 desiatinas... With such crowding not only the development of farms, but even the existence of the people cannot be considered secured" (a desiatina is slightly more than a hectare)[250]. Meanwhile the operation's own executors were reporting the opposite. The head of the Argun okrug, Major A. Ippolitov, wrote to the head of the Terek oblast, General Loris-Melikov: "I can positively tell Your Excellency that the people are not even thinking of voluntary resettlement to Turkey; at a general assembly they declared to me that they would go only when the whole of Chechnya leaves to the last man, or when they are ordered to go"[239]. Colonel Bellik on 25 March 1865 reported to the same Loris-Melikov the words of a Chechen: "we will not go to Turkey and will not let those go who are preparing to; in Turkey death awaits us, and it awaits us here too, but here it is more pleasant, because here is our homeland and here lie our fathers, slain by the Russians"[239].
The Viceroy of the Caucasus and commander-in-chief of the Caucasus Army Baryatinsky - on the Chechens who wished to leave: "...it is perhaps no bad thing that all this rabble, which is only a burden to us, will leave. Do not stop them, let them go to Mecca or wherever they wish. And I will take care to present this matter to the Sovereign in the proper light..." - to the emperor the matter was presented as "a voluntary movement of the Chechens themselves"[83]. The head of the Kuban oblast, General Yevdokimov, who carried out the expulsion of the highlanders of the Western Caucasus, formulated the principle: "Philanthropy first of all to our own; as for the highlanders, I consider myself entitled to grant them only what remains for their share after the last of Russian interests has been satisfied"[83]. The optic in which such decisions were taken was also articulated by imperial scholarship: Berzhe, who headed the Caucasus Archaeographic Commission for 22 years and compiled the first ten volumes of the "Acts"[251], grounded distrust of the highlanders in their nature: "The eight-hundred-thousand-strong highland population of the Terek and Dagestan oblasts forms here an almost solid mass... Permeated by Muslim fanaticism, inflamed by the long war, it continues to hate us as still-recent sworn enemies, as infidels, and will preserve this feeling as long as we remain giaours in its eyes"[250]. This is not an order but the voice of the epoch - the language in which the expulsion looked natural.
The head of the Terek oblast, General Loris-Melikov, stressed in a special dispatch to the Main Staff of the Caucasus Army: "For the success of the affair it is necessary that the highlanders not only not know of our desire to assist the resettlement, but the local authorities must, on the contrary, as it were dissuade them from this intention"[83]; its execution was entrusted to the head of the Middle Military Division, Tumanov, and he reported on it to Loris-Melikov himself: "The first and indispensable condition for arousing in the Chechens the desire to resettle to Turkey I consider to be not revealing that this desire comes from the government... consequently, all this must remain in the deepest secrecy; on our skill it will depend to complete the great [work] without bloodshed or particular disorders…"[239]. In Chechnya "forged proclamations were circulated, purporting to come from the Turkish government, in which the migrants were promised a cordial welcome and good material provision"[83] - Loris-Melikov himself asked in writing to be sent samples of Turkish proclamations "for circulation among the population"[239]. Agents frightened the people with the future: they "spread provocative rumours that not a single Chechen would receive a scrap of land, that all the young men would be given up as soldiers, that the Muslim religion would sooner be banned and everyone would become Christians"[239].
General Kundukhov, until then himself head of the Chechen okrug, received from the Viceroy "a most delicate assignment – to conduct unofficial negotiations with the Turkish government on carrying out a mass resettlement of the Chechens" and a written instruction "to proceed to arouse among the Chechen population a striving to leave for Turkey"[83]. For the agitation he received 5 thousand rubles from the treasury[83]; the historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova writes of 10 thousand "for the 'discreet remuneration' of three or four persons most popular among the population, that is, for bribing influential figures"[239]; Kundukhov personally was paid 45 thousand rubles "ostensibly for property left behind in Russia," with the treasury's total expenses exceeding 130 thousand[83]. Kundukhov himself described in his memoirs the recruitment of the Chechen leadership in February 1865: having invited the naib (an administrator of a district installed by the authorities) of Lesser Chechnya Sadulla Osmanov (in other sources - Saadula Osmayev) and the elder of the Karabulak society Tsugov, he achieved that "They all agreed to resettle without the slightest objection... and swore to prepare for resettlement"[92]. Osmanov was no outside appointee: in the consolidated list of the Imamate's naibs he stands as "Saadulla Osmanov of Nikhaloy (naib of Lesser Chechnya)"[83] - a man who had fought alongside Shamil, and who for an imperial salary and land drove his own people to Turkey. The price of the purchase is visible on him too: he governed his naibstvo for eight years, received 550 desiatinas of land for his service, swore on the Quran to assist the resettlement "to the end" and undertook to lead the second wave of those departing - going ahead of the first was a condition of payment of the reward[239]. He worked in such a way that even the head of the Terek oblast, General Loris-Melikov, admitted the naib was "overdoing it," spreading distorted rumours, and wanted to rid himself as soon as possible of the too-hotheaded agitator[239].
The empire's answer to the pleas of those who returned was fixed in a formula "at the very highest level": "Of any return migration of the highlanders there can be no talk"[83]. Under the rules approved in June 1861 by the chief of the Main Staff of the Caucasus Army, General Kartsov, highlanders who had entered Turkish subjecthood or overstayed their passports were "resolutely forbidden" to return[239]. By November 1865, 2,600 people had gathered at the border, ready to accept Orthodoxy for the sake of returning - "However, the Russian leadership even on such terms was in no hurry to let them through the border... they no longer had anywhere to return to; their ancestral lands had been either confiscated or sold"[239]. Those who tried to return secretly were caught for years: in 1867, 162 people were detained; in 1868 - 663; in 1869 - 369; in 1870 - 1,263; "Over ten years, from 1862 to 1872, 5,964 highlanders (mostly Chechens) managed to return to the Terek oblast, of whom 2,315 the authorities forcibly expelled to Turkey once again"[83]. Even those permitted were not allowed home: the returning Karabulaks (a Vainakh society kindred to the Chechens) "were not admitted to their native lands, but settled as a single aul, Sagopshi, on the lands of the Chechen village of Psedakh"[83].
The proseka - a wide swath cut through the forest to deprive the defenders of cover and send troops along it - was the load-bearing instrument of the conquest of 1857-1859: the forest that protected Chechen societies was felled systematically. The "Journal of Military Operations of the Chechen Detachment" from 15 January 1857 records the daily routine: "on the 21st all the troops... were engaged in the annihilation of auls, orchards and forest"; "on the 22nd the same occupations. The auls have been finally destroyed, the orchards felled, and the Geldygen clearing laid out 750 sazhens wide" - about one and a half kilometers (a sazhen is just over two meters)[246]. The purpose of the clearings was reported by General Yevdokimov, who commanded the Chechen Detachment, to Minister of War Sukhozanet in a report of 25 March 1857: the clearing "took away from the unsubmissive their broad fields, the places of their crops", and confronted the population with a choice - "to seek salvation either by flight into the mountains or by coming out to us onto the glades"[246]. On 19 March 1857 General Nikolai seized the Goytemir Gates - the passage into Aukh and Ichkeria (Chechen regions in the northeast and southeast): the report explains the task - "To destroy this nest of brigands and open the approaches into Aukh and Ichkeria, it was necessary to take possession of the Goytemir-Kapu tract and build a clearing there"[246]; historian D. A. Khozhayev confirms from the regimental history: "on 19 March 1857 these fortifications were captured by the tsarist troops and destroyed"[92]. In February 1859 the forest was already being felled at the walls of Vedeno - the capital of the Imamate, Shamil's state: "on 8 February 1859, despite the resistance of the Chechens and Dagestanis, the numerous tsarist troops, having cleared of forest the whole space between the villages of Tevzan and Elistanzhi, came out to the fortification of Vedeno"[92].
General Yevdokimov, who commanded the troops of the left wing of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on Nokhchi land), recorded in the journal of military operations of the winter of 1857 that he sent General Mishchenko down the Khizy-Shavdon, "instructing him... to annihilate auls, so as to take away from the Chechens the very thought of the possibility of remaining at the site of their former dwelling"[246]. The execution is recorded there as well: "Major-general Mishchenko burned all the auls and hamlets in the area assigned to him; a multitude of those who had submitted came out to him... up to 400 households, under the cover of part of the troops... sent to Umakhan-yurt"[246]. To the report on this campaign Emperor Alexander II replied with approval "for the completely successful conclusion of the 1st period of the winter campaign"[246]. In November 1857 the same journal summed up the expedition against Salatavia, bordering on Chechnya: "Salatavia has been devastated and burned, so that its inhabitants will now have to settle at the sites of the former Salatavian auls along the Sulak"[246]. Having taken Vedeno, the capital of the Imamate - Shamil's state - the empire destroyed the fortress: "Occupied on 1 April 1859 by the tsarist troops, the Vedeno fortress was completely destroyed within five days"[92].
Historian N. I. Pokrovsky writes of Lesser Chechnya (the lowland-piedmont western part of Chechnya): its inhabitants "as early as the beginning of the fifties had been driven by Russian troops into the mountain wilds and doomed to starvation" (campaign C1166)[252]. The clearings continued the same work: "The clearing of the Gekhi proseka gives Yevdokimov the opportunity to lay waste the fields of those of the Lesser Chechnya people who had not yet brought submission, hiding in the mountains"[252]. The choice the policy left open is formulated in the report of General Yevdokimov, who commanded the Chechen Detachment, of 25 March 1857: flight into the mountains - or coming out "to us onto the glades"[246]; famine in the mountains made the first path lethal.
Historian N. I. Pokrovsky writes: "Throughout January 1857 the Chechen and Kumyk detachments are cutting clearings", and "On 10 November a new expedition into Aukh began. The Aukhovites could not hold out and surrendered, 'brought submission'"[252]. In 1858 General Yevdokimov's troops entered the Argun gorge: "The tsarist troops are advancing along the Argun valley. In January the Chechen detachment occupied the exit from the Argun gorge onto the plain... only in July 1858 did Yevdokimov move further... on 4 July he crossed Mesken-Duk and penetrated into the Shatoy society"[252]. The course of the summer expedition can be seen from the journal of General Yevdokimov himself, submitted to Minister of War Sukhozanet with a report of 11 August 1858, No. 237: on 4 August imam Shamil approached the Argun "with all his cavalry from the Nazran expedition" and took position with two guns beyond the Verdy-akhk ravine; "having satisfied himself of our intention to remain on the right bank of the Chanty-Argun, he ordered the camp to be struck", after which the imperial "2 light guns and 2 half-pud mortars opened, at my order, fire on the highlanders". That same day Yevdokimov "inspected the site on which the main fortification was to be erected, and at once ordered that its laying-out begin"[246]. In February 1859 the troops approached Vedeno, the capital of the Imamate and residence of imam Shamil (leader of the resistance of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest) - the fortress fell on 1 April 1859[252].
On 7 December 1857, according to the journal of General Yevdokimov, who commanded the Chechen Detachment, "deputies appeared from the entire population of the Khulkhulau valley with an offer to bring submission and to resettle within our bounds" - the entry is cited by historian N. I. Pokrovsky[252]. "In April 1858 the Goyta people surrender, followed by the Gekhi people. By mid-April the Russian command can definitively declare the conquest of Lesser Chechnya completed"[252]. "In August 1858 the Shatoy people laid down their arms"[92] - the same journal of Yevdokimov dates this to 7 August and explains the cause: "As soon as the Shatoy people saw that the Tavlintsy were abandoning them and that we intended to entrench ourselves firmly in the territory we had occupied, they at once sent deputies to me with an offer of submission and a request for permission to settle at the sites of their former auls"[246]; "on 5 April the Cheberloy people expelled the naib and submitted", while "on 12 April the Aukh Chechens acknowledged their powerlessness before the Russian army"[92]. Capitulation was also formalized by paper bearing promises: in January 1859, during the advance on Vedeno, a proclamation by commander-in-chief Baryatinsky to the Chechen people was circulated - the full text is given by historian D. A. Khozhayev: "the Russian government grants you complete freedom to practice forever the faith of your fathers", "you will never be called up as soldiers and will not be turned into Cossacks", "you are granted an exemption for three years... upon expiry of this term you will have to contribute three rubles per household for the upkeep of your popular administrations", "the governors set over you will rule according to sharia and adat" (sharia - Islamic law; adat - customary law of the highlanders)[92].
Historian D. A. Khozhayev writes of the springs of 1859: "All the subdued highlanders were immediately, under convoy of the tsarist troops, resettled onto the plain for surveillance"[92]. To the plain, that is down to the lowland under surveillance, people were driven at once: in December 1857 up to 400 households that had come out of the auls being annihilated were sent under troop cover to Umakhan-yurt[246]. After the taking of Vedeno General Yevdokimov ordered his subordinate Nostitz "to proceed with the resettlement of the Chechens living between the Khulkhulau and the Gudermes": on 8 April 1859 "up to 300 families who lived in the nearest hamlets on the right bank of the Khulkhulau at once appeared in the camp with their belongings and livestock"[246]. Resistance to the resettlement is recorded by the imperial documents themselves: naib (district governor under the imam) Osman "several times attempted to pass by the detachment onto the plain and tried to obstruct the resettlement of the Chechens"[246]; separately, according to the journal of military operations of no later than 9 April 1859, "the Ichkerians, Aukhovites and Salatavians, having gathered in great numbers, wanted to obstruct the resettlement" of the inhabitants from the Aksai[253]. For the auls of the upper Fortanga and Assa, forced into capitulation in November 1858, the eviction was set with a deferral: "to remain in the places they occupy for another three months; with early spring they will move out onto the plain of Lesser Chechnya into the Galash society"[246]. Benoy held out longest: historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write that Yevdokimov "in the autumn of 1859 and at the beginning of 1860 set about the inhabitants of the mountain society of Benoy", part of whom "were dispersed among the surrounding auls and hamlets"[83].
General Yevdokimov recorded in the journal of military operations up to 22 June 1859 (report to Minister of War Sukhozanet, No. 544): for the refusal to hand over captives "I declared the Benoy people and their neighbors unsubmissive, deprived of the protection of Russian laws, and ordered the surrounding population to seize them as captives and to take away their livestock"[246]. Historian D. A. Khozhayev relays the same policy: "The temporary administration of the surrounding villages was directly instructed to cease all contacts with Benoy, to take the Benoy people captive and to destroy them"[92].
In November 1858 General Yevdokimov, by his own journal, "found it more advantageous to put the peaceful native population to use": naib (district governor under the imam) Saib-Dulla with more than two thousand armed Chechens forced into surrender the auls of the upper Fortanga and Assa, which "handed over to Saib-Dulla 27 Russian captives and amanats from the best families" (an amanat - a person the empire took from a community as a hostage)[246]. Former naibs of the Imamate the authorities preserved for future service: Colonel Belik, according to Yevdokimov's report of 8 September 1858 cited by historian N. I. Pokrovsky, "was instilling order and establishing the first principles of administration in the newly submitting societies; victims persecuted by the people sought refuge with him"[252]. On 4 July 1859, according to historian D. A. Khozhayev, Chechen elders came to Baryatinsky, commander-in-chief of the Caucasus Army: "a Chechen deputation of honored men, among whom were the former naibs Talkhig, Eski, Edil, Duba, Umalat, appeared at the Groznaya fortress before Prince Baryatinsky" - that is Talkhig Shalinsky, naib of Greater Chechnya and chief of the Imamate's artillery, and Duba Vashendaroyevsky, naib of Lesser Chechnya; the naibs who went over "received tsarist ranks, awards, and were appointed naibs of the same districts where they had once served Shamil"[92]. On 19 August 1859 commander-in-chief Baryatinsky gave "preliminary consent to the allotment of lands in Chechnya and on the Kumyk plain" to Sub-lieutenant Askhanov, Lieutenant colonel Chermoyev and Penzulayev[253]. Historian N. I. Pokrovsky summed up the outcome: "the heads of the tsarist administration in Chechnya and Dagestan after 1859 are persons well known to us as Shamil's naibs"[252].
The mass enrollment of peasants into the militia: "The trigger was the publication, during the Crimean War of 1853–1856, of Emperor Nicholas I's manifesto providing for the creation of a mobile state militia"[209] - the manifesto and levy decrees of 29 January 1855 (Nos. 28.991–28.993); the Kyiv governorate was not on the list of governorates called up, and the peasants took the empire-wide summons as addressed to themselves[254].
The armed suppression of the peasants' anti-serfdom movement (the "Kyiv Cossack movement"): "To suppress the 'Cossack movement' the government threw in regular troops and police. Bloody clashes occurred in several villages and towns"[209].
The period 1852-1856 passed in series of punitive sorties across Greater Chechnya (the lowland eastern part of Chechnya) and its fringes. On 4 January 1852 the detachment of Baryatinsky, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), assembled in the Vozdvizhenskaya fortress: imperial historian Volkonsky, a participant in the march, counts "over ten thousand bayonets, about one and a half thousand cavalry, 24 guns," and conveys the task thus - "to smash the enemy hordes, destroy all means of subsistence of the inhabitants and the enemy, and then act according to circumstances"[255]. Farther east the sorties continued until 1856: General Baklanov recorded in his memoirs a "hard fight at the annihilation of the auls Dengi-Yurt and Ali-Yurt" on 25 February 1853[256]. The award mechanics of the marches was exposed from inside by imperial officer Poltoratsky: the soldiers of the Kabardinsky regiment took the trenches abandoned by the Chechens on the Michik without losses, and they "were sent the same day to take the auls Gurdaloy and Asa-Yurt, where they managed to lose several killed and wounded, which was necessary, since the storming of the trenches had cost them not a single scratch"[257] - the auls were attacked for the sake of losses for an award recommendation.
In the pogrom of Chechnya of 1852 the victims among the inhabitants ran into the hundreds. On 18 January 1852 on the Goyta river operated the detachment of Baryatinsky, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi): imperial historian Volkonsky, a participant in the march, summed up the day - "on that day we... destroyed up to two thousand households"; the count in people he recorded thus: "Only ten prisoners were taken - and even those were barely torn by force from under the daggers of the Cossacks. Apart from the highlanders who fell in the battle proper, the number of victims who perished in the auls on the Goyta reaches two hundred people"[255]. On the raid against the aul Gurdali of 11 August 1852 the sources diverge: historian N. I. Pokrovsky conveys Baryatinsky's report of 21 August 1852 - he "slaughtered its entire population, except for 52 people taken prisoner"[252]; Volkonsky, who described the same day, asserts that the aul did not fall, the detachment withdrew with heavy losses, and regrets: "If we had really devastated and burned Gurdali, slaughtered its entire population... the affair would have come out both more substantial and more useful"[255] - Baryatinsky's report and Volkonsky's account describe one and the same day in mutually exclusive ways. The annihilation of people was also a declared plan: Vorontsov, viceroy and commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, in a letter to the Emperor of 1-20 March 1854, formulated the task of the past winter - "the final subjugation and annihilation of the remaining unpacified in the environs on the plain"[258] ("unpacified" in the imperial lexicon means those who had not submitted to the empire).
The auls of Greater Chechnya (the lowland eastern part of Chechnya) were burned out throughout the period. On 6 January 1852 Avtury was burned - imperial historian Volkonsky, a participant in the pogrom, wrote: "The aul Avtury had at that time up to nine hundred households and belonged to the number of the richest auls," and of the detachment's withdrawal: "all the auls and hamlets that lay on the path of our retreat blazed up like their metropole"[255]. On 27 March 1852, at the storming of the aul of naib Talgik (a naib is a deputy of Imam Shamil), "the aul itself was turned into a heap of ashes and ruins"[255]. In December 1852 the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus ordered Baryatinsky, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), to destroy Khan-Kala - Volkonsky conveys the order: "the commander-in-chief insistently ordered Prince Baryatinsky to take this aul and raze it from the face of the earth," and the execution: "The aul, numbering ninety-five houses, was given to the flames, and by the evening of that same day not one sound stone remained of it"[255]. The result of 1853 was summed up by Vorontsov, viceroy and commander-in-chief in the Caucasus: in a letter to the Emperor of 1-20 March 1854 he reported that Baryatinsky "took possession of the Michik, cut a clearing of enormous width through the Qachqalyq ridge down to the plains of Greater Chechnya and annihilated the greater part of the villages that still remained unsubdued along the Michik and other streams in the direction of Umakhan-yurt"[258]. In January 1854 the auls along the rivers Dzhalka and Khabi-Shovdan were devastated - the imperial chronicle of "outstanding events" counts the resettlement of "418 families of Chechens"[251].
Famine was the planned aim of the policy of 1852-1857 - the empire wrote about it in orders and reports. On 29 July 1852, near the aul Belgatoy, the column, by the record of imperial historian Volkonsky, "finding there the same stores of hay as the day before, annihilated them to the last stalk"[255]. Baryatinsky, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), in a letter to Vorontsov, viceroy in the Caucasus, of 16 August 1852, calculated the effect on the Dagestani cavalry of Imam Shamil, leader of the highlanders' resistance of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest: "in the coming winter expedition Shamil can have almost no Tavlin cavalry in Chechnya, because there will be nothing to feed it with"[252]. The doctrine was sealed by Vorontsov in an official letter (otnosheniye) to Minister of War Chernyshev of 28 August 1852: the Chechens, deprived of crops and hay, "must - either resettle into our bounds, or go into the very depth of the mountains"[258]. General Olshevsky summed up the practice in his notes: "The destruction of grain crops... compelled the Chechens to submit to us sooner than any other measures, resettling into our bounds"[252]. The result was recorded by historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov: "in 1856-1857 a famine set in in Chechnya such as the Chechens had almost never known"[83].
The famine strategy was supplemented by a trade blockade. Vorontsov, viceroy and commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, in a letter to Baryatinsky, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), of 21 March 1852, together with the threat "we will not allow them to sow or to mow," prescribed restricting the sale of salt to those who had not submitted to the empire; the letter is cited by historian N. I. Pokrovsky[252]. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov convey, after the chronicle of the Dagestani author Genichutlinsky, a blockade of salt, iron and coarse cotton cloth[83]. In the years of the Crimean War the empire did not loosen the blockade: the same historians write - "Up to 200 thousand soldiers and officers confidently blockade the areas of the highlanders' operations in the North Caucasus - even the heavy defeats in the Crimea did not make the Russian command loosen this blockade"[83].
The empire felled the Qachqalyq forest, the shield of eastern Chechnya, in a month and a half. General Baklanov, the executor, recorded in his memoirs: "On 5 January 1852 I concentrated... three battalions of infantry... set about felling the forest; within a month I reached the Michuk... having cleared by 16 February 1852 the forest 100 sazhens from the bank, and 300 sazhens along the river" (a sazhen is slightly more than two meters)[256]. The result was recorded by imperial historian Volkonsky: "the ancient, dense forest that had served the highlanders as their chief defense and protection fell forever, and the Qachqalyq ridge was laid bare"[255]. The calculation was set out in writing by Vorontsov, viceroy and commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, in a letter to the Emperor of 1-20 March 1854, as he was handing over affairs before his leave. The felling he described as a system of many years: "This important business, well begun by Gen. Freytag and then strongly advanced by the annual expeditions for the felling of forests by Generals Nesterov, Kozlovsky and Prince Baryatinsky"[258], and the result he reckoned thus: the Chechens, forced off the plain into the Black Mountains, would not be able to feed themselves there and "must in a short time come over to us, or declare submission where they are; then the weak population of the Ichkerians alone will not be able to hold out"[258].
Burning and famine drove Chechen families from their land under the empire's power - and the empire kept count of those carried off. On 23 March 1852 the column of General Baklanov carried off the inhabitants of two auls: imperial historian Volkonsky counts - "There were two hundred fifty-eight souls of both sexes and all ages: fifty-one families from Mazlagash and sixteen families from Gurdali"[255]; the mechanics of the choice he conveyed in the words of contemporaries about the naibs - deputies of Imam Shamil: "the naibs pluck them, we pluck them and will go on plucking... they resolved to choose the lesser of two evils, i.e. to resettle to us"[255]. After the destruction of Khan-Kala in December 1852, Baryatinsky, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), counted in a report of 10 February 1853: of roughly 500 inhabitants, 350 were brought to the Groznaya fortress, "the total loss of the inhabitants must be put at around 100 people" - the fate of that hundred, by the report's own admission, "is not known with exactness"[258]. In January 1854, after the devastation of the auls along the Dzhalka, "418 families of Chechens" were evicted[251], and the order of General Muravyov, commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, of 19 July 1855 counts the result: "more than 1 thousand Chechen families have resettled into our submissive auls"[251]. The plan for 1856 posed the choice bluntly: the Chechens were "to choose one of two things - to submit, or to move out farther into the interior of the Black Mountains"[251].
The empire starved the inhabitants of the Khankala gorge out by an openly formulated plan. Imperial historian Volkonsky recorded the design of the summer of 1852: Baryatinsky, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), "resolved... to smoke the inhabitants out of the gorge, precisely - to smoke them out, because it was necessary to annihilate with fire everything that gave them subsistence"; the calculation Volkonsky recorded thus - "And to seek food from us means to humble oneself, submit, and willy-nilly resettle"[255]. The same calculation stood behind the razing of Khan-Kala - the inhabitants were to be torn away from Imam Shamil, leader of the highlanders' resistance of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest: "the inhabitants, deprived of shelter and sustenance, instead of running over to Shamil, would seek refuge with us"[255]. During the siege of Khan-Kala the detachment cut the aul off from water as well: "the enemy was deprived of the possibility of covered access to the river, and he was left without water"[255].
The clearings took from the Chechens the land that fed them, and the empire entered this seizure on its books: the order of Vorontsov, viceroy in the Caucasus, for the Separate Caucasus Corps of 5 January 1853 counted the result of the Qachqalyq clearing: "The construction of this clearing took away from the unsubdued Chechens a significant quantity of land, which could feed up to 1,500 souls"[258].
The empire demonstratively rewarded defectors from the leadership of the resistance with ranks, money and land. Bata Shamurzayev, a naib of Shamil (deputy of the Imam, leader of the highlanders' resistance of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest), went over to the empire in the autumn of 1851 and received rewards. Baryatinsky, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), in a letter to Vorontsov, viceroy in the Caucasus, of 24 February 1852, requested - "what a great reward Bata deserves, and I ask you to pardon him, then for Avtur to return him his rank and a pension of 400 rubles a year; I also ask you for an officer's rank for his son... who has often served us as a guide"[252]. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "Bata Shamurzayev took an active part in the war against the Imam, was promoted to captain and awarded 500 desiatinas of land... as an example for other potential defectors"[83]. Through Bata, Vorontsov, viceroy in the Caucasus, conveyed ultimatums to the Chechens - in a letter to Baryatinsky of 21 March 1852: "I asked Bata to insistently repeat to the inhabitants of the northern part of Greater Chechnya that we will not allow them to sow or to mow, unless they declare submission"[252]. Imperial historian Volkonsky admitted the system of bribery plainly: the empire acted "through their own co-religionists and persons like Bati Shamurzov," and "not with words alone, but with something more enticing and substantial - especially in the times of Vorontsov and Baryatinsky"[255].
The bought-over naibs conducted reconnaissance for the empire and took part in planning the marches. Imperial historian Volkonsky writes of Bata Shamurzayev, a naib of Shamil (deputy of the Imam, leader of the highlanders' resistance of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest) who had gone over to the empire: Bata "had his agents everywhere, informing him of all Shamil's movements," and the winter expedition of 1852 "was undertaken and conducted by Prince Baryatinsky" on Bata's directions; "The chief of the detachment did not conceal that for the successful taking of the auls he owed much to Bata as well"[255]. Baryatinsky, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), in a letter to Vorontsov, viceroy in the Caucasus, of 4 June 1852 confirmed: "Bata has passed on to me much of interest concerning Shamil's secret intrigues among the Ossetians"[252]. In July 1856 Yusuf-Hadji Safarov, a former counselor of the Imamate, defected to the empire and offered his knowledge to Baryatinsky in writing: "I know much about Shamil and his troops... I hope to be useful to the Russian government and I guarantee to destroy everything I made at Shamil's, because the master of the house knows best what goes on in it"[83].
Even when receiving defectors from the top of the Imamate, the empire insured itself with hostages. When at the beginning of February 1854 Umayev, naib of Lesser Chechnya (a deputy of Imam Shamil, leader of the highlanders' resistance of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest), was coming over to the imperial side, the pristav (an imperial superintendent) demanded a guarantee - Lieutenant Colonel Predemirov, in a report to General Vrevsky of 6 February 1854: "fearing treason on his part and not wishing thereby to suffer a loss in men because of him, I demanded that he first give an amanat. On 3 February the son of Endirey was delivered as an amanat to the pristav" (an amanat is a person whom the empire took from a community as a hostage)[253]. The naib's child became the price of the father's right to surrender.
Over the captured part of Chechnya the empire built its own governing institutions. Historian N. I. Pokrovsky writes of the project of Baryatinsky, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi): "the statute on the governance of the Chechens worked out by Baryatinsky, partially reviving justice by the adats: tsarism feared the sharia court... This 'Statute' was confirmed by Nicholas I and put into effect" (adats are the customary law of the highlanders; sharia is the Islamic law on which the court of the Imamate was built)[252]. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov describe the implementation: "As early as 1852 in the Groznaya fortress the so-called 'Chechen People's Court' was instituted, headed by a Russian staff officer... as a counterweight to sharia, implanted in Chechnya by Imam Shamil, the Russian authorities strove to strengthen the influence of customary law - the adats"; the first chairman of the "Chechen" court was the Russian colonel Bartolomey, the interpreters - Bata Shamurzayev and Kasim Kurumov, and the execution of sentences was controlled by the "Administration of the Chechen People" with the right of coercion[83]. The court also worked out a written code of subordination - the "Rules for the Governance of Submissive Chechens": articles "providing punishment for disobedience to the authorities, for harboring abreks, for contact with 'unpacified' compatriots, the conditions of 'coming out with submission' from the territory of the Imamate" ("unpacified" in the imperial lexicon means those who had not submitted to the empire; abrek is the imperial label for a highlander outside the law); in 1854 the "Rules" were supplemented[83]. The result was recorded from inside by General Muravyov, commander-in-chief in the Caucasus - in February 1855 he wrote from the Groznaya fortress to General Yermolov, who had commanded in the Caucasus in the past: "Here five naibstvos have already been instituted, there is a pristav and a court established in imitation of your Kabardin court" (a naibstvo is an imperial administrative unit copied from the institution of the deputies of Imam Shamil, leader of the highlanders' resistance of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest; a pristav is an imperial superintendent)[251].
Cossack stanitsas continued to rise on the sites of Chechen auls: in 1856-1857 on the site of the village Churt-Togi the stanitsa Petropavlovskaya was planted - historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov give the pair in their general series: "the village of Churt-Togi - the stanitsa Petropavlovskaya (1856)"[83]. The method was confirmed in writing the same year by General Muravyov, commander-in-chief in the Caucasus: "to consolidate our dominion by stanitsas moved forward - is a method already tried with profit, and it should not be changed"[83].
At the destruction of the aul Khan-Kala, also known as Syurin-Kort, the troops of the march of Baryatinsky, who commanded on the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), entered the inhabitants and their cattle as their booty. Imperial historian Volkonsky drew up the account: "three hundred fifty Syurin-Kort people and more than three thousand head of horned cattle became our asset, our, so to speak, property"[255].
The strikes on Lesser Chechnya (the lowland-piedmont western part of Chechnya) in 1847-1851 were accompanied by the annihilation of unarmed inhabitants, documented by the perpetrators themselves. On 6 March 1847 a detachment, led by a bribed guide, burst at dawn into the sleeping hamlet of naib Duba (a deputy of Imam Shamil, leader of the highlanders' resistance to the Russian conquest); imperial officer Poltoratsky, a participant in the assault, wrote: "the majority, caught by surprise half-naked, old and young, women, children and nursing infants, drowned in their own blood from the sharply honed bayonets that pardoned no one, spared no one"[257]. On 15 June 1851 in the gorge of the Gekhi river, according to historian N. I. Pokrovsky, the detachment of General Sleptsov "annihilated a series of hamlets and auls. The inhabitants who had not managed to flee were slaughtered"[252]; Sleptsov's own report of 20 June 1851 puts it more mildly - "those who resolved to defend themselves were killed, or a very few were spared and taken prisoner"[258]. On 15 September 1851, at a crossing of the Sunzha river, the slaughter of those surrendering was admitted by the commander himself. Baryatinsky, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), described in a report to General Zavadovsky of 18 September 1851 how Chechens who had recognized the empire's power ("pacified") and Cossacks cut down the fleeing: "The pacified Chechens and our Cossacks, pursuing them along narrow paths, slashed without mercy. No one thought of defending himself... I myself and my officers tried to restrain the killings, but it was almost impossible"; he counts the dead at "more than 200 bodies"[258]. On 16 November 1851 General Kozlovsky reported, in a report of 21 November 1851, on the annihilation of the aul Dakhin-Irzau: "I resolved to annihilate this aul, which I carried out at dawn on 16 November with complete success" - more than 40 killed, more than 100 wounded[258].
Massacre as a means of intimidation was a conscious practice of the period - and the empire gave awards for it. Historian N. I. Pokrovsky writes of the strike on the hamlet of naib Duba (a deputy of Imam Shamil, leader of the highlanders' resistance to the Russian conquest): "the Russian command did not renounce separate short strikes aimed at terrifying the Chechens. The object of one such strike was the hamlet of naib Duba... What took place was an outright massacre"[252]. For this massacre the empire handed out awards: imperial officer Poltoratsky, a participant in the massacre, cites the order - "for the excellent courage and bravery shown in the action at the annihilation of the aul of Duba, such-and-such are promoted, and from ensign to second lieutenant - Poltoratsky," while Vorontsov, the viceroy in the Caucasus, sent the detachment "128 badges of the military order" for the soldiers[257]. An award for "the action at the annihilation of an aul" is official recognition of massacre as exemplary service.
The empire cut and widened forest clearings (prosekas) in the woods of Lesser Chechnya (the lowland-piedmont western part of Chechnya). Historian N. I. Pokrovsky writes of 1848: "In January - February R. K. Freytag was clearing and widening the Goyta and Gekhi clearings"[252]. Vorontsov, viceroy and commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, reported the purpose of the clearings to Minister of War Chernyshev in an official letter (otnosheniye) of 25 October 1847: "These clearings, together with those cut in the winter of 1845-1846, make it possible to penetrate Chechnya from several directions and punish hostile auls; constrained in their means of life, seeing their constant failures, the Chechens waver, and a large number of families are already resettling into our bounds"[253]. Emperor Nicholas I placed the resolution "Agreed" on the dispatch (6 November 1847; with one organizational reservation - on the impossibility of forming new line battalions)[253].
In the winter of 1847-1848 the empire built fortresses that locked in Lesser Chechnya (the lowland-piedmont western part of Chechnya). Imperial officer Poltoratsky, a participant in the winter expedition of 1847-1848, wrote: "By the building of the forward Sunzha Line, from Groznaya to Vladikavkaz, we greatly constricted Lesser Chechnya, but by now constructing fortresses on the Martan, the Valerik and the Assa we were finally carrying out her death sentence"[257]. Historian N. I. Pokrovsky records the continuation in 1848: "at the beginning of August the fortification of Urus-Martan was founded"[252]. The stanitsas settled Cossacks on the sites of burned auls; the fortresses kept troops on that same land.
The empire destroyed the auls and hamlets of Lesser Chechnya (the lowland-piedmont western part of Chechnya) blow after blow. In November-December 1847 Golen-Goyta and the aul of naib Saib-dula (a deputy of Imam Shamil, leader of the highlanders' resistance to the Russian conquest) were destroyed: imperial officer Poltoratsky, a participant in the winter expedition of 1847-1848, wrote of the burned highlander houses (saklias) - "the charred skeletons of saklias and, on the ground, blackened thick pools of blood and human corpses scattered everywhere recalled the rich aul of Golen-Goyta that had existed so recently," and of the aul of Saib-dula: the column "took the aul by storm, annihilated everything in it and burned it to the ground"[257]. On the night of 17 February 1850, under an order of the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus conveyed by the journal of military events of General Ilyinsky - "to annihilate there the dwellings of the harmful population stubborn in its insubmission" - the detachment of Colonel Sleptsov burned the hamlets of Muzuroyev and Nekhloyev and the aul Yasan-yurt: "Few of the inhabitants managed to save themselves... Having finished the annihilation of the hamlets and the aul in two hours' time, Colonel Sleptsov began his withdrawal"[258]. On 15 June 1851 "a series of hamlets and auls" of the Gekhi gorge was annihilated[252], and on 16 November 1851 - the aul Dakhin-Irzau: General Kozlovsky's report notes "the turning to ashes of the aul Dakhin-Irzau with enormous stores of grain and hay"[258].
Short surprise strikes were the working mode of the troops in Lesser Chechnya (the lowland-piedmont western part of Chechnya) in 1847-1851. The detachment against the hamlet of naib Duba (a deputy of Imam Shamil, leader of the highlanders' resistance to the Russian conquest) set out "on 5 March, at 10 o'clock at night" and struck at dawn[257]; the raid of 17 February 1850 took "two hours' time"[258]; in June, September and November 1851 the auls were struck by the detachments of Generals Sleptsov, Baryatinsky and Kozlovsky[258][252]. The frame of the practice was given by historian N. I. Pokrovsky: "separate short strikes aimed at terrifying the Chechens"[252].
The empire drove the population of the mountain gorges of Lesser Chechnya (the lowland-piedmont western part of Chechnya) down to its fortifications. General Sleptsov reported to General Ilyinsky on 4 October 1850: "In two days, from 30 September to 2 October, the auls Galgayevsky, Eyshkaloysky, Nachkhoysky and Terloyev, scattered in hamlets, emptied. More than 150 families settled the space around Zakan-yurt and Kazakh-kichu" - next to the imperial fortifications[258]. The report frames the resettlement as a request of the elders; the mechanism of coercion is named plainly by the same report - constraint by the future imperial settlements in the valley and the example of compatriots already resettled.
The squeezing of the Chechens out of the mountains was built on depriving them of the means of life - and the empire wrote about this openly. Vorontsov, viceroy and commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, reported to Minister of War Chernyshev in an official letter (otnosheniye) of 25 October 1847: "constrained in their means of life, seeing their constant failures, the Chechens waver, and a large number of families are already resettling into our bounds"[253]. General Sleptsov, in a report of 4 October 1850, built on this a calculation for the future: the mountain communities, "constrained by our future settlements in the valley, ... will inevitably follow the example of their compatriots" - that is, they too would come down to the fortifications[258].
The land of the evicted communities of Lesser Chechnya (the lowland-piedmont western part of Chechnya) passed to the empire. General Sleptsov, in a report to General Ilyinsky of 4 October 1850, summed up the displacement of the mountain auls: "the rich lands between the Sunzha and the Russian road have passed into the unaccountable possession of the government, so that the entire plain of Lesser Chechnya is now completely cleared of the hostile population"[258]. "Unaccountable possession" is the report's own formula: the land was taken without any registration of the former owners' rights.
The colonization of the Sunzha Line (the chain of Cossack stanitsas along the Sunzha river) left the Chechen people a small part of its own land. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov sum up: "after the creation of the Sunzha Cossack line and other numerous military fortifications, the greater part of the country's population found itself herded onto a space roughly 70 versts from west to east and 40 versts from south to north" (a verst is slightly more than a kilometer); per person there was less than 2 desiatinas of land (a desiatina is slightly more than a hectare) against a survival norm of 5[83]. Still earlier the empire took on the very order of settlement: "as early as the 1840s the Russian authorities strove to liquidate the numerous hamlets on the territory of lowland Chechnya, forcing their inhabitants to resettle into large villages with the aim of easing the collection of taxes and tributes and ensuring proper police control over the population"[83].
In 1847-1851 Cossack stanitsas rose, name by name, on the sites of the auls of Chechens and Karabulaks (a Vainakh community between Chechnya and Ingushetia). Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov give the series: "In 1847 on the site of the aul Gazhariyn-Yurt the stanitsa Nesterovskaya was erected. In 1847 on the site of the aul Ekha-Borze the stanitsa Assinovskaya was raised... the village of Mokhmad-Yurt - the stanitsa Magomed-Yurtovskaya (1847), present-day Voznesenovskaya; the village of Eldarkhan-Yurt - the stanitsa Karabulakskaya (1851); the village of Semashki - the stanitsa Samashkinskaya (1851); the village of Zaki-Yurt - the stanitsa Zakan-Yurtovskaya, later Romanovskaya (1851); the village of Alkhan-Kala - the stanitsa Alkhan-Yurtovskaya, later Yermolovskaya (1851)"[83]; of burned Akh-Borze they write plainly: "the burned Karabulak village of Akh-Borze is replaced in 1847 by the stanitsa Assinovskaya"[83]. The empire planned the continuation of colonization in writing: Vorontsov, viceroy in the Caucasus, in an official letter (otnosheniye) to Minister of War Chernyshev of 25 October 1847, reckoned that after the felling of the forests and "the removal from there of the hostile Chechen auls," "in 1849 it will be possible to lay the beginning of the settlement of the 2nd Sunzha regiment"[253]. Who the replacements were is visible from the empire's resettlement files. In 1847 families from the Don Cossack Host were moved to the Sunzha - according to the lists of the resettlement file, the first echelon set out on 23 May 1847 to settle the just-built stanitsas Magomet-Yurtovskaya and Assinskaya; the totals of the lists - 219 souls male and 221 female[259]. In 1850 the empire planted in the stanitsas of the regiment, including Assinskaya and Magomet-Yurtovskaya, the families of married soldiers of the regular regiments, including those "belonging to landlord ownership" - former serfs[259]. The first settler families lived, according to an imperial sketch, "in shanties covered with straw, or in dugouts"[260].
Those resettled down to the fortifications were held by hostages. General Sleptsov, in a report of 4 October 1850, stated that he was holding in the Cossack stanitsa Sunzhenskaya, planted on the site of the Chechen aul Dibir-Yurt, hostages (amanats) - people the empire took from the families of the resettled in order to hold their communities in obedience under the threat of reprisal against those taken: "The amanats, taken by me in assurance of the unconditional submission of the resettled, I keep in the stanitsa Sunzhenskaya"[258]. A hostage also secured the massacre of the hamlet of naib Duba (a deputy of Imam Shamil, leader of the highlanders' resistance to the Russian conquest) on 6 March 1847: imperial officer Poltoratsky wrote of the naib's two bribed nephews - "while one of the two was, as an amanat (hostage), held under arrest in the guardhouse at Vozdvizhenskoye, the other... was leading the enemy detachment into his own native nest"[257].
The massacre of the hamlet of naib Duba (a deputy of Imam Shamil, leader of the highlanders' resistance to the Russian conquest) on 6 March 1847 was prepared by a targeted bribe inside the naib's family. Imperial officer Poltoratsky, a participant in the assault, wrote of the detachment's guide: "This was naib Duba's own nephew, bribed together with his brother for a good cut out of the pocket of Meller" - Meller-Zakomelsky, who commanded the detachment[257]. Both brothers were bought: one led the troops against his native hamlet, the other sat as a hostage in Vozdvizhenskoye - a guarantee that the guide would not change his mind.
Every strike on the auls of Lesser Chechnya (the lowland-piedmont western part of Chechnya) ended with people being carried off. From the massacre of the hamlet of naib Duba (a deputy of Imam Shamil, leader of the highlanders' resistance to the Russian conquest) on 6 March 1847 the detachment, by the record of imperial officer Poltoratsky, "dragged along behind it 9 captives: three toothless old men and six women"[257]. In the raid of 17 February 1850, "54 souls of both sexes" were taken captive[258]; at the crossing of the Sunzha river on 15 September 1851 - 38 captives[258]; at the annihilation of Dakhin-Irzau on 16 November 1851, "24 souls were taken captive"[258]. The count in "souls of both sexes" in the reports is a count of civilians carried off, not fighters.
The empire conducted trade with the Chechens through controlled channels. The number of state barter yards (points of exchange of goods under the supervision of officials) in the second half of the 1840s "was increased to 11"[83]. In 1850 the empire expanded trade - under the same control: historian N. I. Pokrovsky writes - "In 1850 the commander-in-chief, wishing to bring the unsubdued highlanders closer to the Russians, permitted the opening of a fair near the Groznaya fortress... After an exchange of amanats on 15 May an armistice of three days was concluded... On our side the sale of weapons and iron was not permitted" (an amanat is a hostage whom the empire took from a community as a guarantee of its submission)[252]; historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write of "the first Grozny trade fair," to which the highlanders brought "various goods on 500 arbas" (an arba is a two-wheeled cart)[83]. The fair opened with an exchange of hostages; the sale of weapons and iron the empire did not permit.
The destruction of the first political organization of the Ukrainian intelligentsia following student Petrov's denunciation to the secret police: "In March 1847 the society was crushed by the gendarmes. The police managed to identify 12 members of the clandestine organization"[209].
Arrests, interrogations – the gendarmes "resorted to brutal pressure" and "applied refined methods of psychological processing"[209], and reprisal against the leaders: the sentences were set out in the report of the chief of gendarmes Orlov to the emperor of May 26, 1847, with Nicholas I's resolution "Execute"[261]. Shevchenko was sent into the army "with the institution over the poet of 'the strictest surveillance with a prohibition on writing and drawing'"[262][261]. Hrushevsky: the brotherhood "was seized while still in the midst of its very formation" after a student's denunciation; "The heaviest punishment fell on Shevchenko: he was given over to the soldiery and exiled to the trans-Caspian desert, forbidden to write and to paint," and "persecutions and prohibitions previously unheard of descended upon Ukrainian thought and the Ukrainian word… the very words Ukraine, Little Russia, Hetmanate were deemed criminal"[210]. The brotherhood's co-founder Mykola Hulak "was imprisoned in the Shlisselburg fortress (1847-50), then exiled to Perm under strict police surveillance (1850-59)"[78].
The Russian Empire took the oil wells near the Groznaya fortress away from the Chechens and on 16 February 1845 sealed the seizure by law: paragraph 154 of the "Regulations on the Caucasus Line Host", confirmed by Emperor Nicholas I, read: "as a mark of special favor…the host is granted the income most graciously bestowed upon it from the oil springs near the Groznaya fortress"[239]. Before the seizure the oil fed the Chechens themselves - historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova writes from the documents: in 1788 the Chechen ruler Kazbulat "traded and had a certain income from the oil wells located in his domains"; the Mozdok Cossacks recalled in a petition of 1811 how oil "was brought for sale... and sold at a free price"; "Later, the oil was taken away from the Chechens and became the property of the Caucasus Line regiment, which farmed it out"[239]. Over the 57 years of the tax-farming system, from 1833 to 1890, the host received 152,500 rubles in silver of net income[239][83].
By orders for the Terek oblast of 15 August 1890 and March 1897 the Russian Empire forbade the Chechen village communities "to enter into any agreements with mining industrialists" without the government's permission - "The guilty, in the person of village officials, were brought to account, and suits were brought in the courts to annul the concluded contracts"[239]. The ground of the ban is formulated by historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova: "The aul communities were deprived of the right to lease out oil-bearing plots - the land was granted to them not by right of property but only into use with the right of surface working; its subsoil was considered the property of the treasury"[239]. When the Ministry of Agriculture confirmed rules that allowed peasant communities to lease out their own land for the working of the subsoil, the head of the Terek oblast, General Kakhanov, in 1894 "categorically objected to the extension to the Chechen lands" of these rules - and demanded that, even if the communities' rights were recognized, the resolution on leasing the land be confirmed by the uchastok chief and a third of the income go "to pay the podymnaya tax of the communities concerned"[83]. For the Cossacks the opposite rule was in force: from 1891, when subsoil passed to the treasury, stanitsas were entitled to replacement land or compensation - "For the Chechen communities no reserve land allotments were provided by the state. Still less was there any question of material reward"[239].
The Terek Cossack Host of the Russian Empire leased out the seized Chechen lands to oil companies and lived on rent from another people's subsoil: in 1899 about 21.9 million of the 26.22 million puds of total output were extracted on the host's lands, and in that year alone the companies paid the host 631.8 thousand rubles[83]. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: the largest owner of the oil-bearing plots turned out to be the host itself; it did no extraction of its own, and the usual terms of a lease were 150 rubles a year per desiatina (a desiatina is a little over a hectare) plus "from 2 to 6 kopecks for every pud of oil extracted"[83]. Historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova records the dynamic: the host's capital grew from 400 thousand rubles in 1877 to 3 million in 1900 - "This was the result of receiving income from the oil-bearing lands"[239]. The scale was set by the field itself: on 27 August 1895 well No. 7 of Akhverdov's company gave "a gusher of incredible force, yielding up to 1 million puds a day... The roar and the smell of oil could be sensed 15 versts from the field"[263].
In 1841-1846 the empire held Chechnya, which had not submitted, under a trade blockade. On 7 May 1841 general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), sent to six sector commanders of the line an instruction "to take the strictest measures so that no gunpowder, sulphur, lead or any other supplies be passed to the unsubmissive highlanders, and on our side to keep unflagging and constant watch over the execution of this"[253]. The blockade's effect was admitted by the imperial memorandum "On the political condition of Chechnya" attached to the report of general Neidhardt, head of the empire's troops in the Caucasus, of 20 November 1843: the Chechens lack cloth, iron and salt, and "the cause of this must be sought in the cessation of trade ties with the Russians, and not in a shortage of means of subsistence"[253]. The historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write that the Chechen naibstvos (districts of the imamate governed by the imam's deputies, the naibs) became its economic base: the grain and other farm produce of Chechen peasants gave "the imamate the possibility of living for almost two decades under conditions of a complete economic blockade"[83].
The trade with Chechnya that remained permitted, the empire drove under its own control - into state barter yards (exchange points supervised by officials). Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "Free trade of Russians with the highlanders on the border line, including with the Chechens, was forbidden. All trade operations had to pass under the control of state officials, who saw to it that goods of military character did not reach the highlanders - 'beyond the border'. In addition, a number of restrictions were introduced on the sale of iron, salt, gold and other goods"[83]. The network of controlled points expanded: in the second half of the 1840s the number of barter yards was brought to 11; in 1846 barter points were opened in the Cossack stanitsas of Chervlennaya and Mozdokskaya; over 1846 the highlanders brought goods worth 231 thousand rubles to all the barter yards[83].
The empire demanded that Chechen communities hand over soldiers who had fled to them from the imperial army, and set salt as the price of that surrender. Minister of War Chernyshev, in an official service letter (otnoshenie) of 6 September 1842, conveyed to general Golovin, commander of the Separate Caucasus Corps (head of the imperial troops and administration in the Caucasus), the order of emperor Nicholas I: the local command was to ""demand the return of the servicemen who had hidden among the highlanders who had declared their submission to us"", and from the communities that had not submitted to obtain the surrender through need - ""to endeavour to induce the unsubmitted to hand over deserters in exchange for salt""[253]. The emperor expressly forbade ransoming the fugitives with money: the payment for the people handed over was access to the salt the empire kept under embargo.
Hostages were taken not as punishment for a rising but on suspicion - before an aul had done anything. On 9 January 1842 the commander of the Sunzha Line, in a report to general Olshevsky, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), described his order for the Kumyk plain (the lowland to the north-east of Chechnya): ""I instructed Colonel Freitag... if there is a suspicion that some village wants to flee, then at once to take from it a large number of amanats, so that the inhabitants themselves should feed them"" (an amanat is a person whom the empire took from a community as a hostage; the threat of reprisal against the one taken held the family and the whole aul in submission)[253]. The same report admits what the empire holds the people with: ""Winter and the amanats restrain them, at the present time, from fleeing to Chechnya""[253]. Hostages from Vainakh communities were also taken by the empire's civil administration in Georgia - on the mere news of a defection to the resistance. On 26 May 1841 the civil governor of Georgia-Imereti reported to Brayko, administrator of the civil department of the Transcaucasian region, that on news of the defection of the Kistins (a Vainakh community on the border with Georgia) to the side of Shamil (the imam, leader of the resistance of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest), provincial secretary Limmerman instructed the district assessors (officials of the district administration) ""to detain here, under a plausible pretext, all the Kistins who wintered in Tusheti and on the Alvani field"" (Tusheti and the Alvani field are a mountain region and a plain in north-eastern Georgia)[253]. Those detained were not the ones who had defected but those who had come for the winter; the pretext for the detention is called ""plausible"" by the document itself.
On 29 January 1841 general Golovin, commander of the Separate Caucasus Corps (head of the empire's troops and administration in the Caucasus), instructed general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), to organise the assassination of Akhverdy-Magoma, Shamil's naib in Lesser Chechnya (the deputy of the imam, leader of the resistance of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest): "it may be supposed that for good pay men will be found who will resolve on the destruction of Akhverdy-Magoma. There is no doubt that through the elimination of this enterprising associate of Shamil we would rid ourselves of one of his most dangerous instruments, and the pacification of Chechnya would then be a far less difficult matter"[253]. Golovin allotted a budget and an executor: Grabbe was granted "the right to employ at your discretion up to two thousand rubles in silver from the extraordinary sums", and "the execution of this affair is most fittingly to be laid upon maj.-gen. Olshevsky", commander of the left flank of the line[253]. The death of Akhverdy-Magoma is not connected with this order: in the summer of 1843 he died in a fight near the village of Shatili on the border with Georgia - historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "To the satisfaction of the Russian command, Akhverdy-Magoma perished in the summer of 1843 in a clash near the Khevsur village of Shatili"[83]. Participants of the resistance the empire handed over to military courts with expedited punishment. The commands of emperor Nicholas I of 29 December 1843 and 14 February 1844, conveyed to the troops on 24 May 1844, prescribed: "Officers from among the highlanders who took part in the revolt, as well as qadis and other chief instigators, are to be handed over to a military court under the field criminal code... The sentences of the court, upon final confirmation by me, are to be carried out without delay" (qadi - a Muslim judge)[253]. Under this norm it was not enemy soldiers who went before the field court-martial, but spiritual and communal leaders - "qadis and other chief instigators".
The empire kept secret agents inside the administration of the Imamate of Shamil (the imam, leader of the resistance of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest). Historian N. I. Pokrovsky writes from imperial military materials: "Akhverdy-Magoma replaced the chief of the guard posts between the Argun and the Sunzha, Mulla-Gazi, who had been a secret agent of the tsarist government" (Akhverdy-Magoma - the deputy of the imam in Lesser Chechnya; the Argun and the Sunzha - rivers in Chechnya)[252]. The second agent was an elder of the trans-Argun communities: general Zavadovsky, temporarily commanding the troops of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), in a report to general Neidhardt, head of the empire's troops in the Caucasus, of 24 February 1845, forwarded a dispatch from the left flank about information received "through a messenger who came to him from the trans-Argun elder, a man of weight among the people who is in secret communication with lt.-gen. Gaksfort": the agent reported that Shamil was convening a council of naibs (the imam's deputies) in Dargo, the imam's residence[252]. Defectors the empire formalised into agents and guides on the terms of a bargain. General Labyntsev, commander of the Sunzha Line, in a report to Vorontsov, viceroy in the Caucasus, in summer 1846 described the terms of the Chechen Topi: "Having promised, should this be carried into effect, not only to be a scout in the mountains and a guide for our troops, but, acting in our favour by his example and persuasion, to incline others to the offering of submission... I permitted the families of Topi... to settle among the resettlers located by the fortification"[253]. The agent was paid not in money but with his family's right to live by the fortification - under the control of the same empire.
The bribery of the highland elite the empire put on a programmatic footing. War minister Chernyshev, in a secret letter to general Golovin, commander of the Separate Caucasus Corps (head of the empire's troops and administration in the Caucasus), of 19 July 1842, proposed adopting the experience of British India: "The English knew how to establish their dominion in India by political means... Should not we too try this system?"[253]. Golovin, in a reply of 28 August 1842, drew up a list of candidates for buying over from the circle of Shamil (the imam, leader of the resistance of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest) and requested a fund: "By inclining to our side some of the above-mentioned persons, one would greatly weaken the union of muridism... I consider it necessary for the chief authority here to have at its disposal up to 15 thousand chervonets in ready money" (chervonets - a gold coin of the empire; muridism - in the imperial lexicon, the highlanders' resistance movement)[253]. On 1 February 1844 emperor Nicholas I approved the fund above the request: by an official service letter of Chernyshev to general Neidhardt, who had replaced Golovin at the head of the empire's troops in the Caucasus, "concerning your designs for secret dealings with the highlanders" it was commanded "instead of the 10 thousand chervonets you requested for this purpose, to assign to your charge 15 thousand chervonets"[253]. For the Dargo expedition of 1845 (the imperial army's march on Shamil's residence, the aul of Dargo) historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov record a separate fund: "for the bribery of influential persons from among the highlanders, 45 thousand rubles in silver were allocated"[83]. On the Sunzha Line under construction (the chain of imperial Cossack stanitsas and fortifications on the Sunzha river) the empire bought the loyalty of individual Chechen elders. Vorontsov, viceroy and commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, wrote in a report of summer 1846 about the elder of the aul of Natkhoy-Kezhu: "I turned my particular attention to attracting Aldumov to our side. For the losses borne by him and his 4 comrades... I would consider it just to assign a reward"[253].
At the beginning of 1844, after the defeats of the imperial army in 1843, general Neidhardt, head of the empire's troops in the Caucasus, issued a proclamation to the highlanders that inverted the picture of the war: the invader in it is not the imperial general who brought the troops, but Shamil (the imam, leader of the resistance of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest). The proclamation paints Shamil as a man "who preaches equality and the extermination of all hereditary authorities with the sole aim of seizing the inheritances of the khans and beks" and who "has filled your auls with hated murtazigats... has burdened you with heavy taxes..." (murtazigats - mounted warriors of the Imamate's standing army)[252]. The result of the proclamation historian N. I. Pokrovsky described briefly: "But the wails did not help" - by wails he means these imperial exhortations themselves[252].
Against the religious authority of the Imamate (the state of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya headed by imam Shamil, leader of the resistance to the Russian conquest) the empire fielded Islamic clerics loyal to itself. On 13 March 1845 Vorontsov, viceroy and commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, in a memorandum to emperor Nicholas I reported the dispatch of a Crimean Muslim judge (qadi) to Chechnya: "Qadi Esker Seid Halil Efendi came to me and declared his intention and wish personally to assist our righteous cause in the Caucasus mountains by admonishing the tribes in the name of the Mohammedan faith itself... I gave him for expenses... 400 rubles in silver in all and post-horses for four horses to the Groznaya fortress, charging this expense to the extraordinary sum"[253]. The empire paid for the service with a decoration as well: historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write - "In 1845 the Crimean Tatar qadi Qadiasker Seid-Halil Efendi was sent to the Groznaya fortress; his efforts were soon marked by a high decoration - the Order of St Anna, third class"[83].
Three times in 1842-1845 the empire threw large armies at Chechnya. On 30 May 1842 general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), led a ten-thousand-strong detachment from the Gerzel fortress into Ichkeria (mountainous south-eastern Chechnya) - towards Dargo, the residence of Shamil (the imam, leader of the resistance of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest); historian N. I. Pokrovsky: "In a six-day battle in the dense Ichkerian forests Grabbe suffered a decisive defeat"[252]; the historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov count: "The total losses in killed, wounded and missing came to 66 officers and over 1700 lower ranks"[83]. On 14 November 1843 emperor Nicholas I personally assigned new forces: "I am sending you for one year 2 divisions of 24 battalions... I give you such forces as the Caucasus has not seen even in a dream... You must penetrate into the mountains, rout Shamil wherever he stands against you, annihilate everything that resists you, but spare everything that submits without a fight" - and added, on bribery: "Scatter money, trying to attract to our side people who have influence over the tribes"[253]. In summer 1845 Vorontsov, viceroy and commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, on the direct order of Nicholas I led an army against Dargo: Pokrovsky counts the detachment at 9500 men, historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov - "an army of 21 thousand soldiers and officers with 42 artillery pieces"[252][83]. The march ended in catastrophe: "Of the 9500 men who made up Vorontsov's detachment, 3510 men were put out of action, among them 3 generals, 28 staff officers and 158 line officers"[252]. The fate of Dargo itself the sources convey differently: according to Pokrovsky, the troops found the aul "cleared and set alight by the murids themselves"; by the record of Gadzhi-Ali, Shamil's companion and chronicler, the Russians "after an insignificant skirmish took possession" of Dargo, and burned about 700 of their own tents as they left; historian D. A. Khozhayev writes that the village was burned by the tsarist troops themselves[252][264][92].
In 1841-1846 punitive marches of imperial troops against Chechnya went on yearly. In June 1841 general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), entered Aukh (the Chechen region in the north-east): historian N. I. Pokrovsky writes - "on 6 June he occupied Yaryksu, on the 7th - Kishen, which was being devastated for three days"[252]. At the end of September 1841 the detachments of Grabbe and lieutenant colonel Nesterov passed through the upper reaches of the Assa river - a march which, according to Pokrovsky, "was accompanied by annihilations of auls"[252]; from 15 to 30 October Grabbe's expedition passed through Greater and Lesser Chechnya (the lowland eastern and western parts of Chechnya). Pokrovsky states the goal of these marches: "to intimidate the Chechens by expeditions"[252]. In spring 1844 raids were ordered by general Neidhardt, head of the empire's troops in the Caucasus: to gather troops in the Groznaya fortress "for the conduct of brief and sudden raids into the nearest auls of Greater Chechnya" and to act "not only for menacing, but also for the punishment of unsubmissive auls" (instruction to the commander of the Nazran detachment of 5 April 1844)[253]. The sweeping of Lesser Chechnya (the lowland-piedmont western part of Chechnya) in December 1846 was carried out by a specially assigned column. The imperial officer Poltoratsky, a participant of the expedition, recorded the order of 14 December 1846: "for tomorrow... a column of three battalions [of the Jaeger Prince Vorontsov regiment], eight guns and a cavalry regiment under the command of colonel Meller-Zakomelsky was assigned to go and burn the enemy auls"[257]. The task "to go and burn" auls was set by order as a routine assignment for the next day.
General Neidhardt, head of the imperial troops in the Caucasus, in an instruction to the commander of the Nazran detachment of 5 April 1844 prescribed fear as the goal of the troops' actions: "by the simultaneous appearance and actions of detachments from different sides, along the whole extent of the theatres of revolt, to spread fear over the entire population, and, keeping the Chechens in their homes, to prevent them from giving help to the Lezgin tribes" (Lezgin tribes - in the imperial lexicon, the highlanders of Dagestan)[253]. The population's fear here is not a side effect of military operations but their declared goal, set for the troops by written order.
In the October 1841 expedition through Chechnya the troops of general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), tortured a captive to death. Historian N. I. Pokrovsky cites the episode from the manuscript of an eyewitness - officer Chaikovsky, "The Caucasus in 1841": a disarmed Chechen captive who refused to walk "was dragged for a whole march on a rope tied to a cannon. Mangled by being dragged along the stony road, he died the next day"; a second captive was bayoneted[252].
In 1841-1846 expeditions wiped out Chechen settlements by the dozen. The Aukh village of Kishen the troops of general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), destroyed over three days: the imperial historian Yurov recorded - "by evening the village and its orchards existed no more; out of the heap of charred ruins rose only two mosques and two saklias... spared at the request of Dukai-qadi" (saklia - a highlander's house; qadi - a Muslim judge)[265]. In the march to the Assa river at the end of September 1841 the detachment, according to Yurov, "took by fighting and destroyed 8 auls" - among them Gapurgoy-Yurt, Adilgeri-Yurt, Sha-Yurt - and "the stores of maize and hay were burned"[265]. In the October expedition of 15-30 October 1841 Phan-Kichu, Shalazhi, Magoma-Irzau, Magoma-Yurt, Terga-Yurt, Shuaib-khutor and the auls near Goyta were burned; on 16 October Nurikoy-Yurt was destroyed - Yurov calls it "the most populous and richest Chechen aul"[265]. In December 1846 the troops burned out the Aldy hamlets and the auls of Lesser Chechnya (the lowland-piedmont western part of Chechnya). The imperial officer Poltoratsky, a participant of the expedition, recorded on 15 December 1846: "at the order of the column's commander all the saklias around us burst into flame" (saklia - a highlander's house)[257]. The result of the sweep he summed up thus: "The goal of the expedition in Lesser Chechnya was achieved in full... the plain of Lesser Chechnya in the triangle between the fortresses of Groznaya, Vozdvizhenskaya and Zakan-Yurt has been cleared completely of dwellings and forests"[257].
In the winter of 1845-1846 the empire moved from cutting individual clearings to the destruction of the Chechen forests - the living environment and protection of the Chechen communities. Historian N. I. Pokrovsky cites the imperial survey by captain Nikolai: "From the end of 1845 our winter marches in Lesser Chechnya began", - and describes the acts: "from 4 to 24 December 1845 the expeditionary detachment of general R. K. Freitag cut a great clearing through the Goyta forest, one of the densest in Lesser Chechnya. The clearing connected the river Goyta with Urus-Martan"; "In January 1846, from the 18th to the 29th, the joined detachments of R. K. Freitag and P. P. Nesterov were already cutting. This time the object of annihilation was the Gekhi forest, and the clearing established communication between the rivers Gekhinka and Valerik"[252]. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov record the escalation: "from the beginning of 1846 the troops passed from the cutting of individual clearings to the literal annihilation of the dense Chechen forests"[83]. The goal was formulated by Vorontsov, viceroy in the Caucasus: to destroy the influence of Shamil (the imam, leader of the resistance of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest) and to "tear the Chechens away from him", without whom he would mean nothing[252].
In 1841-1846 the empire built up the Chechen plains with a chain of fortifications. Historian N. I. Pokrovsky writes of 1841: "in summer and autumn the Russian command feverishly strengthens the Sunzha Line: in July - August they build the fortification of Zakan Yurt, and in August - October - the fortification of Kazakh Kichu"[252]; historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov record the function: "The construction of the two new fortifications - Kazakhkichu and Zakan-Yurt - made it possible to exclude entirely the movement of large Chechen detachments beyond the Sunzha and still further isolated the Terek country from the rest of Chechnya"[83]. In 1844 - "the construction of the Vozdvizhenskoye fortification in autumn 1844 on the site of the destroyed aul of Chakhkeri (Chakhkar-Atagi), at the mouth of the Argun gorge"[83]; Pokrovsky names its purpose: "Vozdvizhenskoye was now to become the base for frequent raids on Chechen auls, for winter fellings of the forest in lowland Chechnya"[252]. In 1846 the fort of Achkhoy was built on the Fortanga river. An imperial report named the function of Achkhoy: "The building of a fortification on the Fortanga, almost in the heart of Lesser Chechnya, amid its granary plains, cannot fail to have influence on its subjugation"[253]. The invasion of Aukh (the Chechen region in the north-east) in June 1841 the troops of general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), secured with a fortification on the seized land: on 16-17 June a temporary fortification was built at Aktash-Aukh. The fortification stood for one summer: historian N. I. Pokrovsky writes - "on 21 September the fortification was razed, the detachment withdrew"[252]. At this fortification the empire gathered the "loyal" Aukh families before their resettlement under the rule of the Kumyk lords.
After the inhabitants of twelve Terek-side villages (Chechen settlements of the left bank of the Terek) fled to the insurgents in June 1840, the empire gave their property to the Cossacks. The "Report of the chancellery for the administration of peaceable highlanders", drawn up not earlier than July 1841, lists the villages - Stary Naur, Novy Naur, Emingulovskaya, Murdarova, Boyan-Yurt, Kacherman-Yurt, Nagai Mirza-Yurt, Mizhi-Yurt, Kozhakhi, Kalauzova, Mamakai-Yurt and Guneshki - and records the regime: "the grain left standing in their fields the line Cossacks were permitted... to gather for their own benefit, the houses remaining in the localities to be dismantled and carried off to the stanitsas" (line Cossacks - the Cossack troops of the empire's border line)[253]. The same report records the division of spoils: 800 rams seized by lieutenant-colonel Bekovich-Cherkassky (of a Kabardian ruling family, in Russian service) while pursuing the fleeing inhabitants of Mizhi-Yurt and Kozhakhi "were ordered to be distributed as a reward to those inhabitants of the said two villages who remained devoted to us"[253]. The land taken from the expelled the empire handed over to the Cossack host. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov record: "to the Cossacks were given in Lesser Chechnya the 'ancestral' lands of the inhabitants of Karabulak and Galashki" (Lesser Chechnya - the lowland-piedmont western part of Chechnya; Galashki - a Vainakh community in the valley of the Assa)[83]. The word "ancestral" comes from the imperial papers themselves: what was being given away was not wasteland but land on which people had lived for generations.
After the devastation of Aukh (the Chechen region in the north-east) in summer 1841 the empire resettled the Aukh families loyal to it away from their land. The imperial historian Yurov recorded: "By 21 June 180 families had gathered in the villages of Aktash and Yurt-Aukh; as a pledge of submission they delivered their most honoured men as amanats and sent their herds to pasture in Salatau" (amanat - a person whom the empire took from a community as a hostage)[265]. When the troops withdrew in September the families were led away from their native land: historian N. I. Pokrovsky - "the Aukhovites loyal to tsarism were settled in Kumyk auls, where they quickly fell under the heavy hand of the Kumyk princes"[252]. The pressure on the families was two-sided: according to Yurov, the Aukhovites who had gone over to the empire were threatened with reprisal by the Imamate, "one thing remained to them - to hold fast to the Russians"[265] - a choice between two threats that ended in the loss of their home and subjection to alien lords. The creation of the Sunzha Line went through the expulsion of the people living on it. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: after the decision to create the line of Cossack stanitsas "the systematic expulsion of the Chechens began. In the end the largest community of Lesser Chechnya - Karabulak - was deprived of its lands entirely" (the Karabulaks - a Vainakh community between Chechnya and Ingushetia)[83]. The sweep of December 1846 squeezed the inhabitants off the plain physically: the imperial officer Poltoratsky, a participant of the expedition, recorded - "the country around the Aldy hamlets kept emptying: the auls were burned, and their inhabitants were pushed further into the forests"[257].
The Terek-side Chechens (inhabitants of the left bank of the Terek) who had fled to the insurgents the empire deprived forever of the right to return home. The "Report of the chancellery for the administration of peaceable highlanders" (not earlier than July 1841) records the directive: "to announce to the fugitive Chechens that they have forever lost the right to settle in the places they occupied before their flight"[253]; lieutenant-colonel Bekovich-Cherkassky (of a Kabardian ruling family, in Russian service, set over the Terek-side auls) "was instructed not to receive Chechens returning from flight without permission"[253]. By that time the houses of the twelve villages had been dismantled and carried off to the Cossack stanitsas - there was nowhere to return to, and returning was forbidden. The programme for the conquest of Chechnya approved by emperor Nicholas I in 1843 prescribed where and how the Chechens were permitted to live. War minister Chernyshev, in a report to the emperor of 16 November 1843, recorded the will of Nicholas I: to permit the Chechens to resettle on the right bank of the Sunzha near the imperial fortifications "not otherwise than in large auls, to adapt them somewhat independently for defence and for the more convenient keeping of the inhabitants in obedience, bearing in mind also in course of time to turn them into the Cossack estate. The left bank of the Sunzha and the expanse up to the Terek are designated for the establishment of Cossack stanitsas and their supply with land"[253]. The norm fixed a double dispossession: the Chechens were allowed to live by their own rivers only in large auls under the guns of the fortifications, while the left bank of the Sunzha up to the Terek was signed over to the Cossacks. The surviving inhabitants of Lesser Chechnya the empire resettled onto the plain under the guns of the fortifications being built. Vorontsov, viceroy and commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, in a report of summer 1846 recorded the course and the hitch of the policy: "The resettlement of the inhabitants of Lesser Chechnya onto the plain near the fortification under construction does not yet have proper success"[253]. By August 1846 resettlers were already living by fort Achkhoy - it was among them that the families of the Chechen Topi, who had promised to serve the empire as a secret scout in the mountains and a guide for its troops, were permitted to settle[253]. The choice of where to live was replaced by assignment: to live by the fortification, in view of the garrison.
In the place of the expelled Chechens and Karabulaks (a Vainakh community between Chechnya and Ingushetia) the empire settled Cossacks - stanitsas on the sites of auls. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov list them one by one: "in 1845, on the site of the Chechen (Karabulak) aul of Obarg-Yurt, the stanitsa of Troitskaya was established; in the same year, on the site of the Chechen aul of Dibir-Yurt, appears the stanitsa of Sunzhenskaya (Sleptsovskaya)"; "On the site of the aul of Enakhishka (Karabulak community)... the stanitsa of Mikhailovskaya (present-day Sernovodskaya) was founded"[83]. They also record: "In 1845-46 the Sunzha military line was formed, and in the stanitsas built on Karabulak lands the Cossacks of the 1st Sunzha regiment were settled"[83]. The mechanics of the replacement were formulated in retrospect by colonel De-Sazhe (1854), quoted by the same historians: "Every step of the advance cut off from the highlanders irrevocably a piece of their native land. Thus were Lesser Chechnya and Galashki subjugated. On all these places Cossacks have been settled, fortifications built with the regiments' headquarters..."[83].
In Chechen villages the empire quartered its troops. The "Journal of military events on the left flank of the Caucasus Line" for 23 May - 6 June 1846 records: after most inhabitants of the aul of Akbulat-Yurt on the Terek had fled, ""for the protection of the remaining inhabitants of Akbulat-Yurt and in order to use the direct communication with the Kumyk plain through this aul, maj.-gen. Kozlovsky stationed there one company of infantry with one gun and set up there a post of 25 mounted Kumyks"" (the Kumyks - a neighbouring Turkic people from whom the empire recruited mounted guards)[253]. A garrison in the aul is surveillance from within: the village's life went on under the daily watch of a company with a gun.
From the cut clearings and the new fortifications imperial detachments swooped on the Chechen auls, plundering and burning them. Historian N. I. Pokrovsky describes the practice of 1846: "Russian troops systematically fell the forests to run wide strategic roads... and the tsarist detachments from time to time swoop on the auls, plunder and burn them"[252]. The plunder here is not an excess but the regular mode of operations of the troops from the line.
Against Chechnya the empire mobilised the other peoples of the Caucasus it had conquered. In the army of Vorontsov, viceroy in the Caucasus, in the Dargo march of 1845 historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov count "1 thousand men of the Georgian militia, 16 sotnias of Cossacks and highland militia (Kabardian and Ossetian)" (militia - armed detachments of highlanders and Georgians in the empire's service)[83]. The colonised peoples the empire put into the ranks against their neighbours - so that Caucasians would fight Caucasians for the imperial conquest.
The liquidation of the independent spiritual structure on the Right Bank in 1839: "in connection with the tsarist regime's liquidation of the Union in this region (1839), the monastery was closed, and its buildings destroyed"[54].
The forced transfer of the Uniate faithful of the Right Bank into the empire's state church (the Holy Synod; the patriarchate in Russia was abolished until 1917) for the spiritual assimilation of the population: the Basilian monasteries – the mainstay of the Union – were liquidated throughout the empire by the mid-19th century[266].
In 1838-1840 the empire eliminated leaders of the Chechen resistance by contract killings and arrests. General Golovin, commander of the Separate Caucasus Corps (head of the empire's troops and administration in the Caucasus), by a secret instruction of 17 November 1838 ordered general Pullo, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), to arrange the assassination of Shamil (Shamil - the imam, leader of the resistance of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest): "Among the highlanders devoted to us there will doubtless be daring men who, for a good monetary reward, will undertake to deliver the head of the instigator. I charge you to try this measure, secretly offering to kill Shamil... promising a reward of up to 1,000 chervonets" (chervonets - a gold coin of the empire)[267]. In autumn 1839, after the rout of Akhulgo (Shamil's mountain stronghold in Dagestan), Ullu-bey of Erpeli - a highlander in the empire's service, installed as pristav (superintendent appointed by the empire) over the Koysubu community - twice sent poisoners to Shamil in the Chechen village of Vedeno: Shamil's chronicler Muhammad Tahir al-Qarakhi recorded that "Ullubiy sent Shamil's nephew Ibrahim, son of Bartikhan, with poison, together with two companions... while the latter was in the village of Vedeno of the Chechen vilayat" (vilayat - an administrative province of the Imamate)[268]. During the winter expeditions of December 1839 - January 1840 Pullo's troops took from the auls people whom the empire had outlawed: historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write - "In December 1839 major-general Pullo passed through 28 villages without a single shot, collected 4 thousand rubles in silver from the Chechens, confiscated 455 rifles and seized 97 abreks" (abrek - the empire's label for an outlawed highlander)[83]; in the January march along the Michik the troops took 30 more people[265].
The invasion of Ichkeria (mountainous south-eastern Chechnya) by imperial troops in May 1839 opened with a public threat of annihilation. General Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), in a proclamation "to the Ichkerian people" threatened: "Those auls which give refuge to Tashev-hadji will all be annihilated to their foundations, and your children will long remember how all instigators are punished" (Tashu-Hadji - a sheikh, in 1834-1836 the imam of Chechnya, spiritual and military leader of the Chechen resistance)[267].
During the May 1839 invasion of Ichkeria (mountainous south-eastern Chechnya) the imperial troops tortured their captives. The imperial officer Milyutin, a participant of the march, recorded that five Aukhovites (the Aukhovites - a Chechen community in the north-east, by the Kumyk border) captured with weapons after a fight were made to run the gauntlet on 15 May 1839 near the village of Yaryksu-Aukh (an execution-torture: a man was led between two ranks of soldiers, each of whom struck him with a shpitsruten rod): they "were subjected to cruel torture by being driven through the gauntlet. The soldiers vented their spite on these unfortunates; of the five only one remained alive"[269].
In 1839-1840 punitive marches of imperial troops swept across Chechnya in waves. In May 1839 general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), invaded Ichkeria (mountainous south-eastern Chechnya); he named the goal himself in a report to Minister of War Chernyshev of 10 May 1839: "to punish both this village [Benoy] and all other unsubmissive villages"[253]. The imperial officer Milyutin, a participant of the invasion, admitted the outcome: "The burning of several Aukh and Ichkerian villages only embittered the nearest highlanders still more, and the very end of our raid nonetheless looked as if they had driven out uninvited guests"[269]. In winter the troops of general Pullo, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line, twice marched through the auls that had submitted: on 18-30 December 1839 - 28 auls of Lesser Chechnya (the lowland-piedmont western part of Chechnya), from 26 January 1840 - the auls along the Michik river; historian Sh. A. Gapurov writes of these marches: "He exacted tribute from the destitute people wholesale, disarmed them, demanded the surrender of captives, forced them to fell timber"[270]. After the uprising the punitive actions continued: in late April 1840 the troops marched into Aukh (the Chechen region in the north-east) - the imperial historian Yurov recorded: "Having destroyed the orchards and given the saklias to the flames..." (saklia - a highlander's house)[265]; on 6-14 July the detachment of general Galafeyev, who had taken over the troops of the left flank after Pullo, marched across Lesser Chechnya - historian N. I. Pokrovsky: "From 6 to 14 July general Galafeyev passed through Lesser Chechnya with fire and sword"[252]; historian D. A. Khozhayev cites the imperial goal: to "punish exemplarily" the Chechens "who had joined Shamil" (Shamil - the imam, leader of the resistance of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest)[92]. The autumn marches were sanctioned by general Golovin, commander of the Separate Caucasus Corps, in an instruction to general Grabbe of 17 August 1840 "to employ the troops... for the strict punishment of the mutinous Chechens"[253]; Nicholas I approved the plan through Minister of War Chernyshev on 10 September 1840[271]. Galafeyev's detachment passed through Greater Chechnya (the lowland eastern part of Chechnya) from 26 September to 18 October; Grabbe's detachments - through Lesser Chechnya from 27 October to 5 November and through Greater Chechnya from 10 to 18 November[252]. Historian N. I. Pokrovsky conveys the calculation of the last expedition from Grabbe's dispatches: "He counted on the stunning impression of this expedition"[252].
The empire answered the Chechen uprising by sending in troops. General Pullo, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), reported on 9 March 1840 about marching out against the insurgents: "I set out yesterday for Khankala with 5 companies" (Khankala - a tract by the Groznaya fortress)[253]. The second deployment was a detachment on the Sunzha river: an imperial instruction of 25 March 1840 set it the task of "keeping the Karabulaks in submission" (the Karabulaks - a Vainakh community between Chechnya and Ingushetia; "submission" - the empire's formula of subordination)[253].
The winter expeditions of general Pullo, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), in December 1839 - February 1840 carried out the physical seizure of weapons from the inhabitants of Chechnya's auls. The system was conceived by Pullo himself: in his 1840 memorandum he wrote that it was then that "a beginning was laid to the system of disarming the highlanders, by levying one gun from every 10 saklias from all the auls"[253]. The imperial historian Yurov recorded of the December 1839 march: the inhabitants "unquestioningly paid the tribute or, instead of money, handed over weapons"[265]. Historian Sh. A. Gapurov gives the tally from the archives: 455 rifles for the December march through Lesser Chechnya and 545 for the January march along the Michik[270]; Pullo himself, in his memorandum of 1840, reported the seizure of "upwards of 1900 rifles"[253]. In June 1840 the seizure of weapons was fixed as a norm: point 9 of the "Conditions prescribed to submitting highlanders", issued by general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line, on 15 June 1840, prescribed "To hand over one good rifle from every 10 saklias, as a pledge of their submission" (saklia - a highlander's house)[253].
The winter expeditions of general Pullo, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), collected money from the Chechen auls under the name of tribute. The imperial historian Yurov tallied the December 1839 march: "In all, during this bloodless military promenade, 3779 rubles and 455 rifles were collected, and 97 abreks, 7 captives and two fugitives were handed over" (abrek - the empire's label for an outlawed highlander)[265], and the January 1840 march along the Michik river: the auls "obediently presented 2463 rubles, 545 rifles, cattle for the detachment's provisioning, and handed over 30 abreks"[265]. After the suppression of the uprising the levy was fixed as a fine: point 10 of the "Conditions prescribed to submitting highlanders", issued by general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line, on 15 June 1840, prescribed "As punishment for participation in Shamil's uprising, to pay a fine of two rams from every saklia" (saklia - a highlander's house; Shamil - the imam, leader of the resistance of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest)[253].
While suppressing the uprising of 1840, the imperial troops kept taking hostages (amanat - a person whom the empire took from a family or community as a hostage; the threat of reprisal against the taken kept the relatives and the whole aul in subjection). On 15 March 1840 general Pullo, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), took hostages in the aul of Aldy by the Groznaya fortress - captain Pushkin reported to Traskin, chief of staff of the troops of the Caucasus Line: "gen. Pullo... entered there himself and took five new amanats"[253]. The "Conditions prescribed to submitting highlanders", issued by general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line, on 15 June 1840, open with a demand for hostages: "Immediately hand over amanats from these auls. The commander of the troops reserves to himself to designate how many and from which families the said amanats must be handed over" - and close with a threat: "the amanats of unsubmissive auls are exiled to Siberia"[253].
In 1839-1840 the imperial troops burned dozens of Chechen settlements. In the May 1839 invasion of Ichkeria (mountainous south-eastern Chechnya) the imperial officer Milyutin, a participant of the march, recorded day by day: "The nearby aul of Balansu was found abandoned by its inhabitants and given to the flames", "All the auls lying on either side of the road (Nake-Yurt, Tsezyn-Irzau, Doba-Yurt) were found abandoned by their inhabitants and given to the flames", and of the rout on 12 May of Sayasan, the residence of sheikh Tashu-Hadji (in 1834-1836 the imam of Chechnya, leader of the Chechen resistance): "The fortification was devastated, and the village given to the flames"[269]. In the January 1840 march the troops of general Pullo, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), wiped out two auls: the imperial historian Yurov - "the auls of Kazbek-Yurt and Batash-Yurt, populated mostly by relatives and namesakes of Shuaib-Mulla, which met the detachment with weapons in hand. After a minor skirmish both villages were levelled to the ground"[265]; historian D. A. Khozhayev adds: "The Russians burned the Benoy hamlet of Gurzhiyn-mokhk and the neighbouring auls of Zandak-Ara and Genderghen, and retreated"[92]. In summer 1840 the detachment of general Galafeyev, who had taken over the troops of the left flank, burned the auls of Lesser Chechnya (the lowland-piedmont western part of Chechnya): historian D. A. Khozhayev lists the destroyed Bolshoy Chechen, Dudu-yurt, Akhshpatoy-Goyta, Chunguroy-yurt, Urus-Martan, Gurak-Roshni, Khazhi-Roshni, Taib and Achkhoy - the troops marched on, "leaving behind them destroyed and burned villages"[92]; the detachment's journal of military operations confirms the route and adds Peshkhoy-Roshni[271]. In autumn the same detachment burned Greater Chechnya (the lowland eastern part of Chechnya): the imperial survey of 27 October 1840 records - "on 3 and 4 October the troops... burned both villages" (Shali and Germenchuk), "on 7 October the detachment burned 5 hamlets attached to the aul of Shali", and of Said-Yurt, the hamlet of Ersenei and the village of Avtury on 10 October: "gave them to the flames and annihilated the houses and all the property of the inhabitants"[253]. Muhammad Tahir al-Qarakhi, Shamil's chronicler (Shamil - the imam, leader of the resistance of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest), recorded that the inhabitants of Shali and Germenchuk abandoned and burned their own villages on Shamil's order long before the troops came: "Shamil ordered them to burn those ancient, well-settled and beautiful villages. It was hard for the lower Chechens, but they did it nonetheless" - part of the imperial burnings went through villages already empty; of Said-Yurt he gives the mirror version of the fight: the murids (the imam's disciples and warriors) "fought them and slew a great number of them. The murids put the Russians to flight"[268]. In the November marches of general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line, Gekhi and the auls along the Sunzha were devastated - historian N. I. Pokrovsky: "On 27 October Grabbe marched into Lesser Chechnya, devastated Gekhi, on 4 November laid waste the auls situated along the Sunzha"[252]; the imperial historian Yurov recorded: "During the rearguard action general Galafeyev managed to take by fighting and annihilate to its foundations the village of Mirti-Irzau", then on 13 November Germenchuk with its hamlets was destroyed, on 15 November - Lachi-Yurt and Indi-Yurt, on 17 November the troops seized and burned Batash-Yurt, the home of Shuaib-Mulla (naib - the deputy of imam Shamil in Greater Chechnya)[265].
In spring 1840 the empire imposed a grain blockade on Chechnya amid famine that was already documented. On 14 March 1840 general Piryatinsky, commander of the centre of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), reported: "throughout Chechnya there is no grain at all, the people suffer great extremity from famine"[253]. Three weeks later, on 8 April 1840, general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line, by an instruction to general Galafeyev sanctioned the ban the latter had introduced: "Your directive concerning the prohibition of the sale of grain I fully approve, and I permit you to extend this prohibition to all those parts of the region entrusted to you where you deem it necessary"[253]. In summer the troops destroyed the harvest where it stood: the journal of military operations of general Galafeyev's detachment (6-17 July 1840) names the goal outright - "the punishment of the mutinous villages by annihilating them and destroying their means of existence, for now a certain shortage in the inhabitants' food supply can be foreseen"[271]. In autumn the stores were annihilated just before winter: the imperial survey of 27 October 1840 records that the troops marched, "having annihilated on their way a very considerable quantity of stores of food and hay"[253]. General Golovin, commander of the Separate Caucasus Corps (head of the empire's troops and administration in the Caucasus), admitted the calculation in a memorandum of 26 April 1841: "In vain did we expect that after the annihilation, in last year's expedition, of the highlanders' food stores, their villages and various property, famine, cold and extreme destitution would shake the fierce power of the instigator" ("instigator" - the empire's label for Shamil, leader of the highlanders' resistance)[252].
The empire registered the subordination of the Chechen communities as "submission" (the imperial formula of subjecthood). After the invasion of Ichkeria (mountainous south-eastern Chechnya) in May 1839 by general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), the imperial survey of 1840 recorded: "The Ichkerians, in consequence of gen. Grabbe's expedition against them in 1839, declared their submission, but such is hardly consolidated" - the doubt about the firmness of the "submission" belongs to the imperial document itself[253]. After the suppression of the uprising Grabbe on 14 June 1840 issued a proclamation to the insurgents: "Come to your senses and save yourselves now by sincere repentance and immediate submission. Otherwise our troops will pass everywhere...", and on 15 June - the twelve points of the "Conditions prescribed to submitting highlanders", whose second point is the oath: "To take an oath of submission to the Russian emperor, and to present the oath sheets through the elders to the Russian authorities" (elders - the heads of aul communities)[253].
Suppressing the uprising of 1840, the empire demanded of the Chechens a public renunciation of resistance. General Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), in an appeal to the insurgents of 14 June 1840 demanded repentance: "Come to your senses and save yourselves now by sincere repentance and immediate submission" ("submission" - the imperial formula of subordination)[253]. The next day, 15 June 1840, he issued the "Conditions prescribed to submitting highlanders", whose point 8 prescribed that the insurgent auls "renounce all participation in the pernicious teaching of Shamil" (Shamil - the imam, leader of the resistance of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest; "pernicious teaching" - the imperial label for muridism, the religious movement of the resistance)[253].
The uprising of 1840 swept away the power of imperial appointees over lowland Chechnya - before it, the auls that had submitted lived under superintendents-pristavs appointed by the empire. The "Conditions prescribed to submitting highlanders", issued by general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), on 15 June 1840, re-established this power as a norm and built it further. Point 3 prescribed: "To fulfil all demands and orders of the Russian pristav who will be appointed by the government" (pristav - a superintendent over the auls appointed by the empire); point 6 obliged every aul: "To elect from among themselves one qadi, who is obliged to fulfil all orders of the pristav" (qadi - a Muslim judge); point 7 - an elder in every aul (elder - the head of an aul community), "who is confirmed by the Russian authorities, watches over public tranquillity and carries out all orders of the authorities". A surrendering aul was accepted under the empire's power only together with this structure[253].
The "Conditions prescribed to submitting highlanders", issued by general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), on 15 June 1840, imposed labour duty on the Chechen auls. Point 4 prescribed: "in case of a detachment's movement to allot people for building roads and bridges, to keep at the pristav's disposal a sufficient number of people for carrying papers or orders from one aul to another, to give mounted men for escort duty" (pristav - a superintendent over the auls appointed by the empire)[253].
The "Conditions prescribed to submitting highlanders", issued by general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), on 15 June 1840, obliged the Chechen auls to hand over the working cattle and transport of their households for the empire's use: at the first demand of the pristav (a superintendent appointed by the empire) to provide arbas (two-wheeled carts) and donkeys. Point 4 prescribed: "At the pristav's demand to provide arbas or donkeys for hauling loads"[253].
The "Conditions prescribed to submitting highlanders", issued by general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), on 15 June 1840, forbade the Chechens to choose freely where to live. Point 5 prescribed: "Not to move from one aul to another for permanent residence without the permission of the local authorities"[253]. The right to live on their own land, where they had lived for generations, the empire turned into a permit issued by the authorities.
The "Conditions prescribed to submitting highlanders", issued by general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), on 15 June 1840, obliged the Chechen auls to refuse shelter to members of the resistance and to hand over people who had escaped the empire's power. Point 8 prescribed: "Not to give refuge in their auls to abreks, murids and unsubdued highlanders" (abrek - the imperial label for a highlander declared an outlaw; murids - the imam's disciples and warriors); point 11: "To hand over all Russian prisoners and runaways staying in the mountains" - by runaways the empire meant its own soldiers and serfs who had gone over to the highlanders[253]. Handovers went on even before the decree, under the pressure of the winter expeditions: the imperial historian Yurov recorded of the outcome of the December 1839 march of general Pullo, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line, through Lesser Chechnya (the lowland-piedmont western part of Chechnya): "97 abreks, 7 prisoners and two runaways were handed over", and of the January 1840 march along the Michik river - the auls "handed over 30 abreks"[265].
The empire seized the Chechens' property and land by decree. In April 1840 an imperial directive prescribed "to sequester the Aukh herds wherever they are found at pasture in the Kumyk domain" (the Aukhovites - a Chechen community in the north-east, by the Kumyk border)[253]. The land of the Chechens the empire handed out to loyalists: a contemporary's letter from Tiflis, cited by historian N. I. Pokrovsky, names among the causes of the 1840 uprising "the endowment of prince Bekovich-Cherkassky with lands owned by the Chechens" (Bekovich-Cherkassky - a Kabardian prince in Russian service)[252].
At the destruction of the aul of Mirti-Irzau on 4-5 November 1840 (an aul on the Sunzha where the inhabitants of Zakan-Yurt and Samashki had resettled) the troops under general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), led away Chechen families into captivity. The imperial historian Yurov recorded: "We took captive several families of the Terek-side Chechens, numbering 35 souls, and seized 150 head of horned cattle" (Terek-side - the Chechens of the left bank of the Terek)[265]. The captivity of families stands in the imperial account in one line with the driven-off cattle.
In the marches of 1839-1840 the troops fed themselves on cattle taken from the Chechens and carried off the goods of the auls they were devastating. Of the December 1839 march of the detachment of general Pullo, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), the imperial historian Yurov wrote: "on the march the men subsisted on ration cattle taken from the natives by way of fine"[265] - the army supplied itself with the population's property, framing the seizure as a fine. In the summer of 1840 the troops of general Galafeyev plundered the auls of Lesser Chechnya they were devastating: historian D. A. Khozhayev - "The detachment rode out onto the clearing with the goods looted in the devastated auls"[92]. In November, at the destruction of the aul of Mirti-Irzau, the imperial historian Yurov recorded: "150 head of horned cattle were seized"[265].
In September 1837, preparing Nicholas I's visit to the Caucasus, the empire tried to recruit Shamil (Shamil - imam, leader of the resistance of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest), offering him power and honors in exchange for subordination to the empire. General Adlerberg conveyed the emperor's will to general Rozen in a letter of 10 August 1837: to give "Shamil and his chief accomplices Tashav-Hadji, Kibit-Magomet and the Qarakh qadi Abdurrahman suggestions... to beg the mercy of appearing before the face of the Monarch Himself" in Tiflis[272]; Tashu-Hadji (sheikh, in 1834-1836 the imam of Chechnya, spiritual and military leader of the Chechen resistance) is named first on the list. Carrying this out, general Klugenau obtained a personal meeting with Shamil on 18 September 1837 at a spring near the aul of Karanay; as recorded by Shamil's chronicler Muhammad Tahir al-Qarakhi, the general "began to speak, asking Shamil to come for a meeting with the Russian Nicholas. He asserted that the emperor would exalt him, Shamil, show him honor, and make him the administrator of the affairs of all Dagestani Muslims. From the emperor, he said, there would be no treachery"[268]. In parallel, general Feze instructed Akhmed Khan of Mekhtuli "to persuade Shamil to arrive in Tiflis by the time of His Majesty's arrival there", as general Rozen reported to Chernyshev on 25 September 1837[273], and colonel Pullo demanded of Shamil by letter that he send "to the Groznaya fortress two deputies to be presented to the Sovereign"[272]. The bribe was delivered to its addressee and rejected: on 28 September 1837 Shamil replied to Klugenau by letter - "I have resolved not to go to Tiflis even if I am cut to pieces, because I have many times seen treachery from you"[272]; neither Shamil nor Tashu-Hadji went to Tiflis. The offer to Shamil of the post of "administrator of the affairs of all Dagestani Muslims" repeated the same policy line by which the empire, in those same years, was creating loyal religious institutions (campaign C1159).
In February-April 1837, continuing the January annihilation of Lesser Chechnya (campaign C1160), the command of the Russian Caucasus Corps conducted a series of expeditions under General Feze across eastern and central Chechnya: the February movement through Shali, Germenchuk and the Michik, the March march up the Dzhalka, and the April night raid on the Gertli settlement. Rozen set out the sanction in a dispatch to Minister of War Chernyshev: a campaign "beyond the Argun" - "for diminishing the Chechens' trust in the instigators and turning them away from the intention of joining Shamil" (Shamil - imam, leader of the Dagestani and Chechen highlanders' resistance to the Russian conquest)[273]. The Gertli raid was declared a punishment in Rozen's report to Chernyshev of 30 May 1837: "for the devastation or final annihilation of this brigand party... and for the punishment of its inhabitants"[273].
Feze's spring tour across Chechnya (February-April 1837) was built on demonstrative violence converted into submission. Rozen's report to Minister of War Chernyshev of 4 March 1837 records the result of the annihilation of the auls: "the Chechens, gripped by fear from the preceding actions... fell into great despondency"[273] - after which the oaths followed one after another. Feze himself reported the calculation to General Velyaminov on 15 March 1837: he acted "with the intention of making use, as far as possible, of the panic fear" that had gripped "the Tavlins and the Andians" after the battle at Avtury[253]; Rozen's report of 11 March uses the same word for the demand of submission from the Andians - "wishing to make use of the fear"[273]. Fear drove people off their land: after the March sweeps through the forests the inhabitants, according to the report of 12 April, "were compelled by these searches to withdraw into the distant mountains"[273].
In February-March 1837, Feze's troops, annihilating the auls of those who evaded, took oaths to the empire from the Chechen communities one after another - Rozen's reports to Minister of War Chernyshev count them by date: on 6 February Shali ("brought an oath of submission to our government and presented amanats as its pledge"), on 8 February Germenchuk ("the oath of subjecthood was renewed"), on 15 February Geldigen ("brought an oath of allegiance and handed over amanats chosen from the best families"), on 21 February six auls of the Michik, on 25 February the auls along the Yaman-su from Balan-su to Biletli and on the Aksai[273]. By 24 February, according to the report of 11 March, Feze "brought to submission the Chechens dwelling along the Michik river"; at the end of March, at the camp at Ustar-khan, the troops took an oath from the elders of the Goyta forest and the Martan gorge - they "brought an oath of allegiance to the Sovereign Emperor and presented amanats as security for their submission"[273]. An oath taken under the guns of troops that had just annihilated the neighboring auls fixed subordination as a legal fact (amanat - a person whom the empire took from a community as a guarantee of subordination).
Every oath of Feze's spring tour (February-April 1837) was paid for in people: the troops took amanats (amanat - a person whom the empire took from a community as a guarantee of subordination) from every community that submitted. Rozen's reports to Minister of War Chernyshev record the mechanism: Shali - "presented amanats as its pledge", Geldigen - "handed over amanats chosen from the best families", the Yaman-su and the Aksai - "with amanats as its security", the Goyta forest and the Martan gorge - "presented amanats as security for their submission"; the summary of 4 March 1837 counts: for 12-22 February "52 amanats were taken"[273]. In April, in the Gertli settlement, according to the report of 30 May, "Feze ordered the elder's family and 12 more souls to be taken into custody"[273].
Over Feze's spring tour across Chechnya (February-April 1837), the troops led away dozens of inhabitants into captivity, most of them unarmed. The summary in Rozen's report to Minister of War Chernyshev of 4 March 1837: for 12-22 February "52 souls of inhabitants who did not submit voluntarily were taken captive by our troops, including 8 armed men"[273] - that is, 44 of the 52 captives bore no arms. The report of 23 February on the burning of Seid-yurt and Avtur: "one Chechen and three women who had not managed to get away into the forest" were taken[273]. On the night of 22 March at Gurdali, according to the report of 12 April, Lieutenant Colonel Panteleyev "took captive 9 unsubmissive Chechens"; in the April raid on the Gertli settlement "18 more souls belonging to the families of the brigands were seized"[273].
Feze's spring tour (February-April 1837) destroyed the housing and winter livelihood of the Chechen communities. Rozen's report to Minister of War Chernyshev of 23 February 1837: on 5 February "our troops annihilated the auls of Akhoy-yurt and Lyumik-yurt lying on the way and the khutors of the hostile Chechens"; on 9 February Seid-yurt and Avtur were annihilated[273]. In the March march up the Dzhalka, according to the report of 12 April, "the four auls they had abandoned were occupied and annihilated without resistance. Then the troops penetrated into the thick of the forest and destroyed the kutans (winter shelters for livestock)"; on 26 March the troops were destroying kutans near Shali, and Birzul's column did the same along its own route[273].
Destroying the kutans (winter shelters for livestock) along the Dzhalka and near Shali in March 1837, Feze's troops deliberately burned food. Rozen's report to Minister of War Chernyshev of 12 April 1837 records: in the kutans they "burned a considerable quantity of the grain found in them"; near Shali the troops "seized the watchmen present at them and a multitude of food supplies"; and Birzul's column burned "several hundred chetverts of the grain found in them" (chetvert - an old grain measure of about 210 liters)[273]. Burning hundreds of chetverts of grain at the end of winter left the families who had fled to the forests and mountains without means to survive until the harvest.
Throughout Feze's spring tour (February-April 1837), the troops took the Chechens' livestock and property. According to Rozen's reports to Minister of War Chernyshev: on 5 February the livestock of mullah Udi's detachment was taken - "148 head of livestock of various kinds"; on 11 February "213 head of livestock of various kinds belonging to the unsubmissive Chechens were seized"; against those hiding in the forests "searches were made in various directions... and livestock of various kinds and property were seized from many of them"[273]. The April raid on the Gertli settlement, according to the report of 30 May, took "465 head of small livestock"[273].
Feze's spring tour (February-April 1837) cut military roads through the Chechen forests. According to Rozen's reports to Minister of War Chernyshev: in February a road was cut "in the forests through the Qachqalyq mountains along the Michik and between the auls of Kazbek and Aku-yurt"; the report of 12 April notes that the March march went "by the clearing cut by him in February of this year"; Feze himself moved at the end of February "working the pack trail into a road fit for the passage of all kinds of loads"[273]. Clearings and roads through the forests deprived the Chechen communities of their natural protection and opened the troops permanent access into the depth of the country.
The submission taken by Feze's troops in February 1837 immediately turned into labor duty. Rozen's report to Minister of War Chernyshev of 4 March 1837 records: on 21 February "the inhabitants of six neighboring auls declared their submission and sent out workers to cut, together with the Kumyks, a road in the forests through the Qachqalyq mountains along the Michik"[273] - communities just subordinated were set by the empire to cut the forest for a military road against themselves; the duty came as part of the package of submission, as the standard "Conditions Prescribed to Submitting Highlanders" would later codify it.
By the April 1837 raid on the Gertli settlement the troops of General Feze imposed a collective property levy on the whole village: according to Rozen's report to Minister of War Chernyshev of 30 May, on top of the livestock taken during the raid "a fine of 132 head of livestock was imposed on the settlement"[273] - the settlement paid as a whole, with no regard to the personal involvement of its residents.
On 23-29 January 1837, a detachment under General Feze - 4 battalions of the Kurinsky and 2 of the Apsheronsky regiments, 257 Cossacks, 3249 men in all with 12 guns - marched out of the Groznaya fortress into Lesser Chechnya. Rozen, in a report to Minister of War Chernyshev of 11 February 1837, named the purpose plainly: "to punish the Chechens of the western part of Chechnya who have evaded obedience"[273]. The campaign continued the winter punitive operations after the December extermination of Kishkeroy-Yurt (campaign C1158): within a week, according to the expedition journal appended to the same report, Shalazh-yurt and the dwellings on both banks of the Shalazha were destroyed, more than a thousand saklias (saklia - a highlander's house) were burned, and 92 captives were taken[273].
During the annihilation of Lesser Chechnya by Feze's expedition in January 1837, the troops killed inhabitants who offered no armed resistance. The expedition journal, presented by Rozen to Minister of War Chernyshev on 11 February 1837, records: Shalazh-yurt, surrounded on the night of 24 January, was taken "without a shot, laying 14 souls on the spot"[273] - killings in a village that put up no armed fight. On 25 January Feze, according to the same journal, dispatched columns "to discover and destroy the population in the dense forests up both banks of the Shalazha river" - an order for the destruction of the population in so many words[273]. At Urus-Martan, after the inhabitants had fled, the journal records, "23 enemy bodies remained on the spot"[273]. The total number of the killed is not summed up by episode in the journal; some of the fallen fought an armed defense - the technique is recorded on the basis of the killings in a village taken without a shot and of the order to destroy the population.
In the course of the annihilation of Lesser Chechnya by Feze's expedition in January 1837, the troops took hostages from auls faced with the choice between subjugation and the fate of their neighbors. According to the expedition journal presented by Rozen to Minister of War Chernyshev on 11 February 1837, on 26 January 6 amanats "from the families of the most honored elders" were taken in Achkhoy, and 4 in Phan-kichu (amanat - a person whom the empire took from a community as a guarantee of subjugation; the journal frames the seizure of people with the word "handed over")[273]. Hostages from the most influential families made every community answerable to the empire with the lives of its own people.
During the annihilation of Lesser Chechnya by Feze's expedition on 23-29 January 1837, the troops led 92 inhabitants away into captivity. The expedition journal, presented by Rozen to Minister of War Chernyshev on 11 February 1837, counts by episode: at the taking of Shalazh-yurt "67 souls were taken captive", at Urus-Martan "13 souls were captured", at Khankharik-Roshnya and Birzul the detachment "took 12 souls captive"[273].
Feze's expedition through Lesser Chechnya on 23-29 January 1837 destroyed housing and livelihood outright. The expedition journal, presented by Rozen to Minister of War Chernyshev on 11 February 1837, records: "Having burned Shalazh-yurt", the troops "destroyed the winter quarters... and the dwellings of the Chechens on both banks of the Shalazha", and "on the way back more than a thousand saklias were burned along the Martan and Tengin gorges" (saklia - a highlander's house)[273].
Completing the annihilation of Lesser Chechnya, Feze's troops destroyed the survivors' food as well: on 29 January 1837, according to the expedition journal appended to Rozen's report to Minister of War Chernyshev of 11 February 1837, "by noon the detachment completed the destruction of the dwellings and of the stores of grain and hay along the Martan gorge"[273]. The destruction of food and fodder in the middle of winter left the survivors without means to live through it.
In Feze's annihilating expedition through Lesser Chechnya in January 1837, the empire led highlanders against highlanders. The expedition journal, presented by Rozen to Minister of War Chernyshev on 11 February 1837, names the composition of Colonel Shiroky's column: "a hundred Cossacks and 800 horsemen of Ossetians and Ingush" (the Ossetian and Ingush militia - auxiliary units of highlanders in the empire's service)[273]. The use of neighboring peoples in a punitive campaign shifted part of the suppression onto the colonized themselves and entrenched enmity between them.
On 26 January 1837, on the fourth day of the annihilation of Lesser Chechnya by Feze's expedition - two days after the taking of neighboring Shalazh-yurt with 14 killed - the troops, entering the aul of Achkhoy, took from it an oath "of submission" and 6 amanats (amanat - a person whom the empire took from a community as a guarantee of subordination)[273]. The frame is spelled out by the expedition journal itself, presented by Rozen to Minister of War Chernyshev on 11 February 1837: "the troops are proceeding to them not to punish them, but properly to confirm them in submission"[273] - subordination secured under military pressure and framed by the empire as a voluntary act of those who had submitted.
In late December 1836, Colonel Pullo carried out a punitive raid on the Chechen village of Kishkeroy-Yurt (Keshkeroy) beyond the Gudermes river, to punish its inhabitants for harboring Tashu-Hadji, the leader of the Chechen resistance. In April 1836, Nicholas I had demanded that action against Tashu-Hadji be undertaken "not otherwise than with complete confidence of success"[273], and on 10 December 1836 Rozen reported to the Minister of War Chernyshev that he "had authorized Col. Pullo to act at once against the unsubmissive Chechen villages"[273]. Over the four days of the raid, the village was exterminated together with 76 inhabitants and defenders, and 40 people were led away into captivity[253].
On 28 December 1836, during the sudden encirclement of Kishkeroy-Yurt, Pullo's troops killed inhabitants who tried to escape, as well as families in their houses: "those seeking salvation in flight were caught or exterminated", "the inhabitants, having barricaded themselves in their houses with their families, were put to the bayonet", and two were smoked out "by straw thrown into the chimneys"[253]. Upon the occupation of the village, 76 bodies of the slain were found[253]. Some of the inhabitants mounted an armed defense, and among the 76 killed are those who fell bearing arms; the technique is recorded on the basis of the killing of those fleeing and of families trapped in their houses.
On 29-31 December 1836, Pullo's detachment completely destroyed Kishkeroy-Yurt: "the village of Kishkeroy, consisting of 63 households, with a considerable stock of grain and hay, was put to the torch", and on withdrawing on 31 December Pullo "marched out of Kishkeroy-Yurt, having set fire to the houses that remained undestroyed"[253].
In the course of the extermination of Kishkeroy-Yurt, Pullo's detachment deliberately destroyed the winter stores: the village was burned "with a considerable stock of grain and hay," and the following day part of the detachment "was occupied with the destruction of the hay stored in the surrounding area"[253]. The destruction of grain and fodder stores in the depth of winter left the surviving inhabitants without means to survive it.
In the course of the extermination of Kishkeroy-Yurt on 28-31 December 1836, Pullo's detachment led away 40 inhabitants into captivity: "40 souls of both sexes were taken captive"[253].
In the course of the extermination of Kishkeroy-Yurt on 28-31 December 1836, Pullo's detachment appropriated the inhabitants' property, including weapons taken from the bodies of the slain: "all the property of the inhabitants and the weapons taken from the slain fell to our troops"[253].
In 1836, the command of the Russian Caucasus Corps under General Rozen established under its own control the post of spiritual leader of all the Sunnis of the Caucasus, and appointed to it the hired Kazan efendi (Muslim theologian) Taj ad-Din Mustafin, maintained at the treasury's expense - an attempt to tie the Sunni clergy of the colonized peoples, including the Nokhchi, to a figure subordinate to the empire. The historian N. I. Pokrovsky wrote: "a broad project emerges for subordinating the entire mountain Sunni clergy to a special spiritual person"; the task set was "to turn the highlanders onto the true path, subordinate them to the Russian government, and destroy or hand over Shamil to us alive" (Shamil - imam, leader of the Dagestani and Chechen highlanders' resistance to the Russian conquest)[252]. Only the establishment of the post, the appointment, and the preacher's years-long payment took place; subordinating the clergy did not succeed: "The preacher did not dare to show himself in the mountains"[252]. The empire wound down the project only six years later: Golovin, who succeeded Rozen, agreed to release Mustafin based on a report by Minister of War Chernyshev of 13 November 1841 - "the teaching of Tajudin Effendi over the course of 6 years did not change the highlanders' attitude toward us in the slightest"[252].
In 1836, the command of the Russian Caucasus Corps sent the hired preacher Taj ad-Din Mustafin, paid by the treasury, to the Groznaya fortress to undermine the influence of Tashu-Hadji (sheikh, imam of Chechnya in 1834-1836, spiritual and military leader of the Chechen resistance) - a spiritual track running parallel to the punitive military actions against the villages that had harbored Tashu-Hadji (campaign C1158). The goal was stated in the source: "with the aim of undermining the spiritual influence" of Tashu-Hadji "and reducing the effectiveness of the preaching of ghazawat" (ghazawat - the highlanders' war for independence from the Russian conquest)[83]. The agent "had managed to make a trip to the lowland societies of Dagestan" when Tashu-Hadji, by letter, "under threat of death forbade him to appear on Chechen territory"[83]; the response is cited by the historian Pokrovsky: "I instruct you that you shall not travel about in these lands without our permission, and if you are not foolish, you should withdraw before harm is done to you"[252].
In 1836-1840 Pullo, commander of the Sunzha Line and then of the left flank of the Caucasus Line (a chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), made hostage-taking the load-bearing institution of the amanat-and-tribute system in the auls of Chechnya seized by the empire. An amanat is a person whom the empire took away from a family or community as a hostage; the threat of reprisal against the taken one held the relatives and the whole aul in subjection. In a memorandum of 1840 Pullo described the method: "I took amanats not indiscriminately, as was done before, but from the most respected or least reliable families, and by this means many auls plotting revolt were repeatedly kept in obedience" - and the scale of the institution: "up to 20 thousand rubles... were spent yearly on the upkeep of amanats"[253]. The taking of hostages went in waves as the troops advanced: the imperial historian Yurov recorded of December 1839 that under the pressure of the detachment even the villages that barred the entrance to the Argun gorge "humbled themselves, handed over amanats" - the troops took people as a "token of submission"[265]. Yurov described the conditions in which the hostages were kept: "prisoners and even amanats were treated inhumanly, kept in a damp pit, where they often fell ill"[265]. In the same memorandum Pullo demanded that hostageship be made perpetual: for the offenses of those under warranty, amanats "must without fail, according to their age, be transferred into cantonists or convict companies, replacing the departed with other amanats" - child hostages to be handed into the cantonists (a military estate into which the empire forcibly enrolled minors), adults into convict companies (forced labor under military escort); in the memorandum of 1840 this is recorded as a plan[253].
The empire placed appointed overseers - pristavs - over the seized auls of Chechnya. The empire's Minister of War Chernyshev, by an official communication of 15 January 1839, conveyed to general Golovin, commander of the Separate Caucasus Corps - the head of the empire's troops and administration in the Caucasus, the will of emperor Nicholas I: in the communities that submitted voluntarily, "the authority over them is to be entrusted to natives devoted to us, members of those same communities", while communities "that will be subjugated by force of arms" were "to be entrusted temporarily to the authority of Russian military officials"[267]. The pristavs in Chechnya were installed by Pullo, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line (a chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi): the imperial historian Yurov writes that Pullo "was ordered - for the installation of our pristavs, to uphold their prestige at the outset... to carry out in the winter of 1839-1840 a movement into Chechnya, to the Michik and to the Qachqalyq people", and the pristavs themselves "were chosen predominantly, if not exclusively, from among the militiamen" - from the highland militia, armed units of highlanders in the empire's service[265]. The historian D. A. Khozhaev writes: "Appointed on 30 November commander of the Separate Caucasus Corps... Golovin, on the tsar's instruction, begins to introduce Russian administration on the occupied territory"[92]. The regime of surveillance was described by general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line and Pullo's superior, in a report to Minister of War Chernyshev of 23 March 1840: "When our pristavs entered upon the administration of the tribes entrusted to them, their strict surveillance cut off the constant relations of the peaceful auls with the unsubdued"[267]. The implanting of puppet religious authorities proceeded under the same directive (campaign C1159).
The amanat-and-tribute system of Pullo, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line (a chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), imposed a tribute on the seized auls of Chechnya. Pullo in a memorandum of 1840: "As the highland communities were subjugated, each handed over amanats, paid a tribute of one silver ruble per saklia, handed over all Russian captives held by it" (saklia - a highlander's house: the tribute was levied on every house; amanats - hostages whom the empire took away from the auls to control them)[253]. The 1840 register of the highland peoples, published in the documentary collection «Движение горцев северо-восточного Кавказа в 20-50 гг. XIX века» together with Pullo's memorandum, calls the tribute a punishment outright: the Qachqalyq people, the Michik Chechens and the Aukhovites (Chechen communities of eastern Chechnya) "pay a tribute imposed on them as punishment for repeated revolts", and the Chechens living beyond the Sunzha river, "as punishment for revolt, have been burdened with a tribute"[253]. The money was squeezed out regularly: general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line and Pullo's superior, in a report to the empire's Minister of War Chernyshev of 23 March 1840, named the regular payment of tributes a sign of the "tranquility" that had set in - the report lists the "regular payment of tributes and duties" weeks before the uprising[267]. Muhammad Tahir al-Qarakhi, the chronicler of Shamil (Shamil - imam, leader of the resistance of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest), named this exaction - one ruble from every house and one gun from every ten houses - as the reason the Chechens called upon Shamil.
Part of the amanat-and-tribute system of Pullo, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line (a chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), was a regime of economic blockade of the auls of Chechnya that had not submitted. Pullo in a memorandum of 1840: the overseers appointed by the empire over the auls (the pristavs) and the troops "cut off the relations of the submitted with the unsubdued and forbade the former to sell bread to the nemirnye and to pasture their cattle on their fields" ("nemirnye" - in the imperial lexicon, auls that had not submitted to the empire)[253]. The permitted trade was driven under control: "In Kizlyar and at some other points trading fairs opened" - exchange took place only at points controlled by the empire[253]. The workings of the blockade were admitted by its own authors: general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line and Pullo's superior, in a report to the empire's Minister of War Chernyshev of 23 March 1840, wrote that the mountain auls "could no longer have tillage and pasture on the plain", which "further aggravated the distressed condition of the inhabitants of highland Chechnya"; some of the inhabitants thought of submitting "to avert famine", others resolved "to rid themselves of the Russian yoke"[267]. In a plan for the conquest of the highlanders of the left flank drawn up in 1840 (the "Proposition... for the subjugation of the tribes"), Grabbe formulated how the blockade worked: the pristavs' surveillance "threatened the unsubdued with famine. Shamil took advantage of this disposition of minds" (Shamil - imam, leader of the resistance of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest)[267].
The overseers appointed by the empire over the auls (the pristavs), within the amanat-and-tribute system of Pullo, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line (a chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), systematically robbed the inhabitants of the seized auls of Chechnya under the guise of collections. The imperial historian Yurov described the mechanism - the pristavs lived off exactions, since "not all pristavs received a salary": from the Chechens, "under the pretext of collecting tributes and fines, the best weapons were taken away, and other entirely harmless but valuable articles of everyday use; it happened that people innocent of anything were arrested at the prompting of simple and often ill-intentioned interpreters... and during expeditions forced collections were permitted"[265]. The empire knew and would not listen: the historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write from archival documents that two Chechen elders brought to the Kabardian prince Bekovich-Cherkassky, who served the empire and was influential on the Terek river, "a petition drawn up on behalf of many Chechens, in which they complain of the oppressions and injustices of major-general Pullo" - the prince refused to accept the petition[83]; according to Yurov, the Chechens "had prepared a petition against him, but did not dare to set it in motion for fear that this general would remain their superior as before"[265]. The empire's survey "The Region in Political and Military Respects", sent by the empire's Minister of War Chernyshev to general Neidhardt, who soon headed the empire's troops in the Caucasus, on 2 April 1842, summed it up: "taking advantage of the abuses, the exactions and the indignation arising from the confiscation of weapons, Shamil little by little stirred all Chechnya to revolt" (Shamil - imam, leader of the resistance of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest)[252].
The amanat-and-tribute system of Pullo, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line (a chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), included forced labor: the troops forced the inhabitants of the seized auls of Chechnya to fell their own forest by allotment. The imperial historian Yurov recorded of the December 1839 expedition that under the pressure of the detachment the inhabitants of the auls "felled forest by allotment at Gekhi, at the Valerik tract and between the villages of Shali and Malaya Ataga" (Gekhi, Valerik, Shali, Malaya Ataga - Chechen villages and tracts; "by allotment" - by a forced apportionment imposed by the troops alongside the tribute and the surrender of weapons)[265]. The forest the inhabitants were made to fell was the environment of life and the shelter of the Chechen communities.
Within the amanat-and-tribute system of Pullo, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line (a chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), the troops destroyed the Chechen forests - the environment of life and the protection of the Chechen communities. Pullo reported in a memorandum of 1840: "we cleared all the forests to the distance of a gunshot on both sides of the road, in the direction from the Groznaya fortress through Martan, Achkhoy and Kurchali to the Military-Georgian road, and in the other direction through Germenchuk, Geldygen and along the Michik into highland Chechnya, altogether over a stretch of 165 versts" (the listed names are Chechen villages and rivers from the Groznaya fortress to mountain Chechnya; a verst is slightly over a kilometer)[253]. The Chechen writer Abuzar Aydamirov records the continuation of the clearing (a strip cut through the forest for the passage of troops) from the Groznaya fortress toward the village of Shali in 1837[215].
The amanat-and-tribute system of Pullo, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line (a chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), was anchored by new fortifications on Chechen land. The Chechen writer Abuzar Aydamirov records the founding of the Umakhan-Yurt fortification on the Sunzha river in 1837[215]. The plan of general Golovin, commander of the Separate Caucasus Corps (the head of the empire's troops in the Caucasus), for 1840 prescribed "to erect a fortification at Cherkey and near old Aksai (at Gerzel-aul)" - Gerzel-aul stands on the border of Chechnya and the Kumyk plain; the construction went on all winter: the imperial historian Yurov writes that in March 1840 Pullo was personally "at Gerzel-aul to bring it into a better defensive condition", and the fortification "was finished after a fashion"[265].
The method of the amanat-and-tribute system of Pullo, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line (a chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), was deliberately induced fear. Pullo described it plainly in a memorandum of 1840: "by threatening all the unsubmissive communities with the annihilation of their property, I instilled in them such fear, brought them to such a state, that one after another they began to submit. From 1834 to 1840 the auls of the Michik people, the Aukhovites and the Salatavians that had broken away, of Greater and Lesser Chechnya, and the never-subjugated villages of the Ichkerians and the Gumbetovians recognized the authority of the Russian government" (the listed names are highland communities of Chechnya and neighboring Dagestan)[253]. Fear was not a side effect but a declared instrument: Pullo credits the submission of the communities as the direct result of threats of annihilation.
The amanat-and-tribute system of Pullo, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line (a chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), rested on punitive sorties of the troops against the seized auls of Chechnya. Pullo described the practice in a memorandum of 1840: "I would appear unexpectedly before the astonished population of the most remote auls and, according to the degree of the village's guilt, either annihilated it or contented myself with imposing a fine, taking amanats and arresting the most guilty persons" (a fine here is a monetary penalty; amanats - hostages whom the empire took away from the auls; the "annihilation" of a village in the imperial lexicon means the destruction of its buildings and property, not of its inhabitants); auls suspected of ties with the resistance "were immediately punished with fines, with the arrest of ill-intentioned people, and in extreme cases even with the annihilation of auls"[253]. Punishment is the administrative routine of the system: the destruction of a village stands in one row with fines and arrests as a grade of punishment.
The amanat-and-tribute system of Pullo, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line (a chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), created within Chechen society a privileged layer with power over its compatriots. The offices of the overseers appointed by the empire over the auls (the pristavs) were handed by the empire to Chechens themselves: the imperial historian Yurov writes that the pristavs "were chosen predominantly, if not exclusively, from among the militiamen" - from the highland militia, armed units of highlanders in the empire's service[265]. The historian N. I. Pokrovsky showed the mechanics of the split: the office of pristav was unpaid, so only "certain representatives of strong families" could take it, and they "took advantage of the opportunity to use their power for further accumulation"; "by creating in Chechnya a local administration, Chechen by nationality, tsarism hoped to create at the same time the Chechen 'aristocracy' it so needed"[252]. The empire gave part of the society power and privileges over the rest and bound this layer to itself, not to the people: the handing of offices to the "strong families" is documented; the calculation of growing a loyal "aristocracy" was formulated by the historian N. I. Pokrovsky.
The amanat-and-tribute system of Pullo, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line (a chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), included the systematic confiscation of weapons from the inhabitants of the seized auls of Chechnya. Pullo in a memorandum of 1840 called it a program of his own: "the power of the pristavs was consolidated, and at the same time a beginning was laid to the system of disarming the highlanders, by exacting from all auls one gun from every 10 saklias. In all, upward of 1900 guns were collected - a circumstance important both for the quantity of weapons collected and especially because for the first time the thought was instilled in the highlanders that the government has the right to deprive of weapons those who have used them for evil" (saklia - a highlander's house; pristav - a superintendent over the auls appointed by the empire; the figure of 1900 is Pullo's self-report; the historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov count about one and a half thousand from the archives)[253]. The historian D. A. Khozhaev writes: "The expeditions of general Pullo in December 1839 and January 1840 to uphold Russian administration, and the disarmament of the Chechen lowland auls that had begun, when Pullo demanded the surrender of one gun from every ten houses, aroused indignation in broad layers of the Chechen people"[92]. The historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov name disarmament the trigger of the uprising: "The fear that after the disarmament the authorities would introduce in Chechnya the all-Russian serfdom order, shameful for people of noble standing, which practically all Chechens considered themselves to be, made the highlanders take up arms"[83].
The amanat-and-tribute system of Pullo, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line (a chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), formalized the subordination of Chechen communities as "submission" with obligations to the empire. The 1840 register of the highland peoples, published in the documentary collection «Движение горцев северо-восточного Кавказа в 20-50 гг. XIX века», records the outcome for the Ako community (the Akintsy - a Chechen community in the upper reaches of the Gekhi river): "Declared submission in 1839, handed over amanats and pledged to pay a tribute of one silver ruble per house" (amanats - hostages whom the empire took away from the auls to control them)[253]. The formalization proceeded under the system of fear that Pullo described in a memorandum of 1840: "by threatening all the unsubmissive communities with the annihilation of their property, I instilled in them such fear... that one after another they began to submit"[253].
On 27 August 1836, Colonel Pullo accepted at the Groznaya fortress the forced "submission" of the aul of Zandak on the Yaman-su river, devastated by his detachment on 23 August 1836 (campaign C1156). The subordination was engineered by the devastation itself: in a report to General Petrov dated 27 August 1836, Pullo admitted: "Being certain that the inhabitants of Zandak, following the common custom of the Chechens, would ask for submission after punishment, and considering such submission useful for the government, I did not order the village burned"[253]. The same report recorded the state in which the village went to its subordination: the devastation "brought both the inhabitants of the village and all those living in its vicinity into fear and despondency"[253]. The elders sent "a plea to be accepted into submission to the Russian government", and subjecthood was formalized on terms dictated by the empire: loyalty, a complete break with Tashu-Hadji, the leader of the Chechen resistance, a ban on assemblies, the handover of Russian captives in exchange for the inhabitants of Zandak seized during the devastation, and the established tribute[253]. Rozen recorded the fact and the date of the formalization in a dispatch to the Minister of War: "On 27 August the Zandak elders appeared before the commander of the Sunzha Line declaring their submission, which was accepted from them in the established order"[273].
On 27 August 1836, Colonel Pullo imposed tribute on the aul of Zandak on the Yaman-su river, devastated by his detachment on 23 August 1836 (campaign C1156): payment of tribute became a condition for accepting the crushed village's "submission". In a report to General Petrov dated 27 August 1836, Pullo recorded the obligation accepted by the elders at the Groznaya fortress: "to pay, on a par with the Aukhovites and other submissive tribes, the established tribute"[253]. The tribute was not the village's counter-offer but the empire's standing norm for taxing the societies it deemed "submissive"; refusal would have meant the return of the "avenging arms of the Russians" - the village had just survived devastation, the captivity of its inhabitants, and the seizure of its livestock[253].
In 1836, corps commander Rosen sent covert topographers through Chechnya for the clandestine surveying of the land that had not submitted. In a report to the emperor, Rosen acknowledges: "in 1836, to survey the direct route leading from Kakheti to Chechnya, a topographer was sent who, having crossed the snow ridge, came out onto the Caucasian Line at the fortress of Groznaya, and from there, through Chechnya and the lands of the Kistins and the Didois, returned to Kakheti"; at the same time "I sent from Vladikavkaz Ensign Prince Utsmiev of the Life Guards Grenadier Regiment with a topographer, through Chechnya, to Andia"[273]. Rosen named the method outright: "covert surveys of the lands of the mountaineers hostile to us"[273].
In 1835–1836, Colonel Pullo, chief of the Sunzha fortified line, conducted systematic expeditions against Chechen villages that supported Imam Tashu-Hajji. The imperial review of military operations acknowledges: Tashu-Hajji’s attempts "were preempted in good time by the expeditions of the chief of the Sunzha line, Col. Pullo, which inflicted utter ruin on the residents"[273]. On August 23, 1836, Pullo led a detachment by a covert night march to the aul of Zandak on the Yaman-su River. Corps commander Rosen reported to the Minister of War on the objective: "in order to shake the influence of Tashev-Hajji and to quell the unrest among the Chechens and instill fear in them, I resolved to undertake movements to punish the residents of the village of Zandak"[273].
On August 23, 1836, the detachment of Colonel Pullo, chief of the Sunzha fortified line, ravaged the aul of Zandak on the Yaman-su River. Corps commander Rosen reported to the Minister of War on the destruction in the aul of the houses of murids and of "other principal adherents of Tashev-Hajji"[273]. The Chechen writer Abuzar Aydamirov, in his "Chronology of the History of Checheno-Ingushetia," recorded: "Punitive expedition of Colonel Pullo to the auls on the Yaman-Su River. Destruction of the aul of Zandak"[215].
On August 23, 1836, during the sudden seizure of the aul of Zandak, the detachment of Colonel Pullo, chief of the Sunzha fortified line, took captive residents who had not managed to escape through the ravines and the forest. Corps commander Rosen reported to the Minister of War: the infantry drove out the defenders, "having taken prisoner 31 souls of male and female sex"[273].
On August 23, 1836, during the destruction of the aul of Zandak, the detachment of Colonel Pullo, commander of the Sunzha fortified line, appropriated the property and livestock of the inhabitants. Corps commander Rosen reported to the Minister of War: "our troops received as booty the property of the inhabitants and 384 head of cattle"[273].
From August 22 to the end of September 1832, corps commander Rosen conducted a campaign through Chechnya and Ichkeria (the mountainous southeastern part of the Chechen land) in retribution against the people for the uprising, applying a uniform scheme: a village that failed to meet the conditions was exterminated. Rosen acknowledged the scheme in a report to Minister of War Chernyshev: the villages, "being unable to agree among themselves on the release of our prisoners, have been punished by the destruction of dwellings and plowed fields"[273]. Historian D. A. Khozhaev wrote: "In the summer and autumn of 1832, the troops of General Rosen swept through Chechnya, leaving death and destruction in their wake"[92].
On August 23, 1832, during the storming of Germenchuk, the troops of corps commander Rosen burned alive about 60 encircled defenders of the village, led by Mullah Abdurakhman, who had refused to surrender. Rosen reported to Minister of War Chernyshev: a group "numbering about 60 men ... led by ... Mullah Abdur-Rakhman, was cut off and surrounded by us in one large house"[273]. The imperial historian Volkonsky, writing on the basis of Rosen’s dispatches, acknowledges the method of the massacre: "Major General Volkhovsky ordered burning firewood and hay to be thrown into the chimneys. This had its effect... while the greater part, together with Mullah Abdurakhman, perished in the flames, continuing to chant verses of the Quran"[274]. The demonstrative burning of people alive served to terrorize all of Chechnya; Volkonsky acknowledges the calculation: the destruction of Germenchuk "was bound to have the most crushing effect on the Chechens"[274].
From August 22 to September 23, 1832, the troops of corps commander Rosen razed dozens of villages of Chechnya and Ichkeria: Belgatoy and Dzhan-yurt, the houses of the six-hundred-household Germenchuk, Shali (except for 11 households), Alkhan-yurt, Sala-yurt, Katar-yurt, Lyalsin-yurt, Nazari-yurt, Uzden-yurt, Uruzbey-yurt, Khyzin-Erzo-yurt, Anzeli-yurt, Chingaroy-yurt, Said-yurt, Anto-yurt, Askhor-yurt, Taba-yurt, Kudish-yurt, Mairtup, Shoni, Tsentoroy, the hamlet of Khamer, Ali-yurt, Bey-Bulat-yurt, Bachin-yurt, Khelboyn-yurt, Benoy, and others. Rosen reported to Minister of War Chernyshev on the dispatch of Colonel Shumsky, by whom "Alkhan-yurt, Sala-yurt, Katar-yurt, Lyalsin-yurt, Nazari-yurt, Uzden-yurt, Uruzbey-yurt and Khyzin-Erzo-yurt have been exterminated"[273], and summed up the result himself: "Of unsubmitted villages, 61 have been exterminated"[273]. Historian D. A. Khozhaev wrote: "The general’s troops burned Benoy and other Chechen villages"[92].
In August–September 1832, the troops of corps commander Rosen destroyed the crops and plowed fields of the villages being ravaged — the people’s food base on the eve of winter. Rosen acknowledged this in a report to Minister of War Chernyshev: the villages that had not submitted were "punished by the destruction of dwellings and plowed fields"[273]. The imperial historian Volkonsky wrote: on September 1, the residents of Avtury, for refusing to hand over prisoners, were "punished by the destruction of crops and dwellings"; on September 3, near Geldigen, the detachment "exterminated their plowed fields and houses"[274].
Following the campaign of August - September 1832, the troops of corps commander Rosen exacted tribute and fines in money and livestock from the Chechen villages: Rosen reported to Minister of War Chernyshev that in total over the campaign "tribute and fines in money and livestock have been paid... about 5 th. r. s. [five thousand rubles in silver]"[273].
In September 1832, corps commander Rosen imposed on the villages of Chechnya and Ichkeria an annual tribute from each household as a condition of being spared. The imperial historian Volkonsky wrote: "from the village of Metso-erzo-yurt, amanats (hostages) were taken along with a tribute of one ruble per hearth"; the villages of Eshta-kale and Eyni-kale undertook "to pay henceforth a tribute of 1 ruble per hearth"[274]. Rosen reported to Minister of War Chernyshev: the village of Gurdali "handed over an amanat and undertook to pay tribute"[273]. The tribute was exacted from a people whose villages and crops were in those very days being exterminated by the troops.
In August–September 1832, corps commander Rosen coerced the villages of Chechnya and Ichkeria into handing over amanats (hostages) under direct threat of extermination. Rosen reported to Minister of War Chernyshev regarding the village of Miskit: "when it was announced to them that in the event of the slightest resistance the entire village, the grain and the hay would be exterminated, they immediately presented amanats"[273]. Rosen summed up the result in the same report: subjugation through hostage-taking covered "more than 80 Chechen and Ichkerian villages"[273].
On September 9, 1832, during the seizure of the village of Tsentoroy in Ichkeria, the column of General Volkhovsky from the detachment of corps commander Rosen took captive a woman from among the residents who had not managed to flee. The imperial historian Volkonsky wrote: "one woman was taken prisoner"[274]. On September 15, near the village of Dungen-yurt, the cavalry of Major Boreysha took captive residents caught while attempting to leave their homes. Rosen reported to Minister of War Chernyshev: the cavalry "managed to take prisoner 4 persons and 1 woman"[273].
In the campaign of August - September 1832 the troops of corps commander Rosen appropriated the property and livestock of the residents of the villages being devastated. The imperial historian Volkonsky wrote: the property of 50 families who had taken refuge in the forest near Mairtup "fell as booty to the detachment", and near Tsentoroy "6 horses and 50 head of cattle were seized"[274]. Rosen reported to Minister of War Chernyshev that on September 15, near the village of Dungen-yurt, the cavalry "seized 140 sheep and 9 head of cattle"[273].
In the winter of 1831–1832, General Velyaminov, from his camp near the Groznaya fortress, dispatched troops against Chechen settlements in revenge for their support of the uprising: on December 23, 1831, Lieutenant Colonel Zass, commander of the Mozdok Cossack Regiment, devastated the hamlets on the right side of the Sunzha opposite the village of Chertugai, and in February 1832 Velyaminov "undertook an expedition to punish the Chechen villages lying up the Sunzha from the Groznaya fortress" — this is acknowledged by the imperial survey of military operations[273]. The imperial historian Volkonsky wrote of the purpose of the raids: "to harass the enemy and divert his attention from our borders"[274]. The historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov recorded: "Another large expedition was directed against the Chechen auls situated along the banks of the Sunzha"[83].
On December 23, 1831, during the devastation of the hamlets near the village of Chertugai, Cossacks of the detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Zass, commander of the Mozdok Cossack Regiment, took three women captive. The imperial historian Volkonsky wrote: Zass "delivered three captive women to the camp"[274].
On December 23, 1831, the detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Zass, commander of the Mozdok Cossack Regiment, dispatched by General Velyaminov, drove off the livestock of the inhabitants of the devastated hamlets near the village of Chertugai. The imperial historian Volkonsky wrote: Zass "delivered to the camp... up to 250 head of cattle"[274]. Driving off 250 head of livestock in the middle of winter deprived the inhabitants of the devastated hamlets of their basic means of subsistence.
On July 14, 1831, near the Tashkichu fortification, Beibulat Taimiev, leader of the Chechen resistance and head of the uprising of 1825–1826, was killed from ambush — eliminated after open repression had been deemed too dangerous by the command. The historian D. A. Khozhaev wrote: "The tsarist command intended several times to do away with Beibulat, but feared to repress him openly... Preparations for the murder of Beibulat began, and it was soon carried out"[92]. The killer — Prince Sali, who was in imperial service — went unpunished, although other cases of blood vengeance were harshly prosecuted; commander-in-chief Paskevich wrote back that Beibulat "was a traitor to the end, and therefore the killer should not be punished"[92].
The abolition of traditional local self-government: "The final liquidation of Magdeburg law… in the cities of Central and Left-Bank Ukraine – in 1831 (in Kyiv – 1834)"[103] – the cities were transferred to the empire-wide municipal order.
The displacement of the native language from the official sphere of the cities: with the liquidation of the remnants of Magdeburg self-government, the last institutional support for the local legal tradition disappeared – Ukrainian-language court proceedings had been curtailed as early as the extension of the all-Russian judicial system in the 1780s[103].
From December 18, 1830 to January 26, 1831, General Velyaminov conducted a sweeping march through lowland Chechnya as punishment of the people for supporting the resistance, systematically devastating villages from the Sunzha River to the Kachkalyk Ridge. The imperial historian Potto wrote of the method: Velyaminov "would usually mark out a point toward which he advanced unswervingly with his entire detachment, and then, upon reaching it, immediately set up camp and established a fortified wagenburg (a camp enclosed by wagons), from which the troops were dispatched in turn in small columns to exterminate the neighboring auls"[275]. Potto acknowledges the outcome of the campaign: "the whole of lowland Chechnya, traversed through and through as far as the Kochalyk Ridge, was put to fire and sword by Velyaminov"[275].
At dawn on December 19, 1830, Cossacks of General Velyaminov's detachment, having burst into the sleeping village of Dzulgai-Yurt, cut down the inhabitants caught unawares. The imperial historian Potto recorded: "thirty-nine people were taken prisoner, and about twelve were cut down. The rest, having taken cover in the forest, opened an exchange of fire"[275]. Those cut down were inhabitants overtaken during the sudden nighttime seizure of the village; armed resistance was mounted later only by those who managed to reach the forest.
In December 1830 – January 1831, General Velyaminov's troops razed and burned the villages of lowland Chechnya: Kiter-Yurt, Pkhan-Kichu, Edin-Yurt, Daut-Yurt, Engeli, Uzeken-Yurt, Besenber with its hamlets, Avtury, Geldigen, and Mairtup with the surrounding auls. The imperial historian Potto wrote: Kiter-Yurt "was immediately given over to the flames," "over the following two days the Butyrsky and Tarutinsky regiments burned the village of Pkhan-Kichu," "along the way they burned two more unsubmissive villages: Edin-Yurt and Daut-Yurt," the troops "managed to exterminate one more aul, Engeli," the regiments "burned the unsubmissive village of Uzeken-Yurt," "exterminated in the vicinity the aul of Besenber, with all the hamlets adjoining it," and on January 21, 1831, "the same fate befell Maiortup itself"[275]. The submission offered by the villages of Avtury, Geldigen, and Mairtup, together with the handing over of hostages, Velyaminov rejected, demanding the impossible — the surrender of all Russian captives and fugitives — in order to preserve a pretext for exterminating the villages: submission, as Potto admits, "was not at all part of Velyaminov's designs, as he understood the necessity of punishing these auls cruelly"[275].
At dawn on December 19, 1830, during the seizure of the village of Dzulgai-Yurt, Cossacks of General Velyaminov's detachment captured the family of a resistance leader — the Karabulak chieftain Astemir, who himself managed to escape into the forest. The imperial historian Potto wrote: "his family — a young son, a daughter, a grandson, and a cousin — fell into the hands of the Cossacks. Besides them, thirty-nine people were taken prisoner"[275].
In the autumn of 1830, General Velyaminov introduced collective property levies on Chechen villages that bore no responsibility for the actions of others: for the driving off by Chechens of ten head of cattle from the stanitsa of Chervlennaya, he "immediately ordered that ten head of cattle likewise be taken from the inhabitants of the two villages of Braguny and Novy-Yurt, past which the party had traveled, and returned to the Cossacks"; for the driving off of a herd of horses in the Nogai steppe, "Braguny once again paid with exactly the same number of head"; and Shakh-Girei, the owner of Novy-Yurt, was confined to a casemate — a prison cell of the Groznaya fortress — for the inaction of the village watch. This was recorded by the imperial historian Potto[275].
In December 1830 – January 1831, General Velyaminov's troops deliberately destroyed the winter stores of food and fodder of the villages being devastated. The imperial historian Potto wrote: during the burning of Edin-Yurt and Daut-Yurt, the troops "destroyed enormous stores of harvested hay"[275]; on January 17, 1831, Geldigen was put to the torch "with all its stores"[275]. The destruction of hay and grain stores in the depths of winter condemned the inhabitants, who had fled to the mountains and forests, to famine.
In January 1831, General Velyaminov's troops cut a clearing and cleared a road through the forest between the settlement of Aldy and the Groznaya fortress, depriving the inhabitants of forest cover for the sake of a military passage to the south. The imperial historian Potto wrote: Velyaminov "set about cutting a clearing and clearing a road between Aldy and Groznaya in order to prepare for himself a secure gateway to the south"[275]. On January 21, 1831, Mairtup was exterminated "with its luxuriant gardens and plantations" — orchards of many years' standing, the foundation of the village's way of life, were destroyed[275].
In December 1830, during the encirclement of the village of Daut-Martan, the troops of General Velyaminov appropriated the property of the fleeing inhabitants: the imperial historian Potto records that "the inhabitants managed to flee, but all their property became the booty of the detachment"[275].
The deployment of troops to forcibly suppress the liberation movement: the detachments created by the insurgents "were routed by the tsarist troops in April–May 1831"[79].
Reprisals against the insurgents to preserve imperial control: "The tsarist government resorted to brutal repressions against the participants of the uprising, abolished the constitution of the Kingdom of Poland and, simultaneously, most attributes of the Polish lands' autonomy… introduced martial law (which lasted a quarter of a century)"[79].
In 1830, during an ongoing earthquake, General Rozen 4th, who commanded the troops on the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the eastern section of the empire's fortified border along the Terek and Sunzha rivers), on the orders of commander-in-chief Paskevich sent proclamations out to the auls, instilling in the people an artificial picture of the world: the natural disaster was declared God's punishment for resisting the empire. The historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov wrote about how this lie sounded among the Nokhchi: "supporters of the Russian orientation claimed that the earthquake was caused by the wrath of Allah over the attempt at an armed uprising"[83]. The imperial historian Volkonsky acknowledges the source of the suggestion: the commander-in-chief "ordered General Rozen 4th to spread entirely opposite rumors among the people, namely, that the earthquake had been sent down by God upon the Mountain Peoples for their ill-intentioned acts against the Russian government"[274]. The imperial historian Potto recorded the act: Rozen "resorted to proclamations in which he sought to assure the people that the earthquake had been sent down upon them as punishment for their treason and their ill-intentioned acts against the Russian government"[275].
The use of the regular army to suppress the peasants' anti-serfdom uprising in Sloboda Ukraine (the Shebelynka uprising of 1829) – one in a series of revolts caused by the "servile condition" of the military settlements' inhabitants[81].
In the spring of 1829, Commander-in-Chief Paskevich built the governance of Chechnya through the deliberate maintenance of a split of the people into two rival parties — the Shamkhal party and the Beibulat party. In his instruction of May 16, 1829 to Emanuel, commander of the troops on the Caucasian Line, Paskevich wrote: "it is not without use for us to have two parties in Chechnya which, both remaining obedient to our government, will through internecine strife be restrained from hostile designs against the Russians"[276]. To this end he dispatched couriers (messengers with a special commission) to the elders of the Beibulat party, instructed Engelhardt, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, to "assist as far as possible" in summoning them, and by the regulation of August 2, 1829 placed the son of the Shamkhal of Tarki over the Chechens as commissar[276].
On March 6, 1829, in Tarki, Beibulat Taimiev and 120 elders of Chechnya were forced to take an oath of allegiance through the Shamkhal of Tarki. The historian D. A. Khozhaev recorded the coerced nature of this step: the elders "tried to avoid subordination to the tsarist superintendents, to avert from Chechnya the threat of constant raids"[92]. The Chechens themselves, in a petition to Paskevich in April 1829, documented the backdrop against which the submission was being signed: the imperial command "arrested, took captive, hanged and exiled to Siberia and to other places many of those who, being obedient, served the great Sovereign"[276]. Emanuel, commander of the troops on the Caucasian Line, in a report to Paskevich of May 15, 1829, made the recognition of submission conditional: it "will be recognized as well-intentioned only when they unconditionally take the oath and hand over amanats"[276]. Holding Beibulat in Tiflis, Paskevich sealed the subjecthood with the "Regulation on the Submission of the Chechens to Russia" and the statute of August 2, 1829[92][276].
In the spring of 1829, Commander-in-Chief Paskevich neutralized the leading stratum of the Chechen resistance by luring Beibulat Taimiev and 60 elders of his party to Tiflis under the pretext of negotiations and holding them there by force. The historian D. A. Khozhaev wrote: "On arriving in Tiflis, Beibulat learns that Paskevich is with the army in the field. Realizing that he has been deceived, he tries to return to Chechnya immediately, but he is forcibly detained in Tiflis"[92]. Paskevich admitted the deception in his own hand in his instruction to Emanuel of August 2, 1829: "I at once resolved to summon to myself, under the guise of explanations, their elders and the elder Bei-Bulat known to you, so that, having drawn them away here, I might deprive this tribe of the possibility, in case of discontent, of undertaking anything hostile"[276].
From spring until the end of summer 1829, Commander-in-Chief Paskevich forcibly kept with the field army the Chechen elders who had been summoned for negotiations, directly calling them hostages. In his instruction to Emanuel of May 16, 1829, he wrote: "The mere absence of these people, who will be with us in the manner of amanats, will restrain the unpacified Chechens from any hostile attempts"[276]. He summed up the result on August 2, 1829: "The Chechen elders, having been graciously received by me, remained with the detachment and were with me in military operations against the Turks. Having kept them in this way for a whole summer, I secured tranquility for the Line on their part"[276]. By the same document, hostage-taking was entrenched as a system of governing Chechnya: "As a pledge of the submission of the said Chechens, the amanats presented by each eldership are to be kept in the fortress of Grozny; and if from any one an amanat has not yet been delivered, then the elder, until the amanat is delivered, is obliged... to remain himself as a pledge in the fortress of Grozny"[276].
By the regulation of August 2, 1829, Commander-in-Chief Paskevich locked the Chechens' access to trade onto a commissar appointed by the empire: travel to imperial territory was permitted only with tickets (written passes) — "To him is also granted the right to issue tickets to the said Chechens for travel into our domains on trade business"[276]. In practice, the pass system was supplemented by arbitrariness: Chechen society wrote to Paskevich on November 21, 1829 that Engelhardt and Khasai-Musa "order their subordinates to place under arrest all those Chechens who come to them with tickets from Shahbaz," while those obedient to Khasai-Musa act so "that we may thereby be deprived of the means of sustenance"[276].
The Russian Empire sent troops to ravage the lowland villages of the Nokhchi, choosing the moment most vulnerable for the inhabitants to strike. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that «in January 1826, having waited for a period inconvenient for the inhabitants of Chechnya, when the frosts made it difficult to shelter families, Yermolov launches a large punitive campaign into Chechnya», occupying the aul of Bolshaya Ataga on January 26[92]. General Yermolov himself, in a report to Emperor Nicholas I dated May 28, 1826, reported that the troops were methodically cutting roads and occupying villages: on April 12 «the village of Kurchali was occupied without a shot», on the 16th «the troops moved to the village of Gekhi», and on the 24th he «moved to the village of Malaya Roshni, which was found empty»[277].
Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that after February 17, 1826, Yermolov's troops «ravaged and destroyed the auls of Lesser Chechnya - Urus-Martan, Roshni, Gekhi, Belakai, Daut-Martan, and Shelchikhi», and by the end of the campaign «flourishing villages had been destroyed»[92]. General Yermolov himself, in a report to Emperor Nicholas I dated May 28, 1826, confirmed: during the storming of Urus-Martan «the village was burned», Bolshaya Roshni was «put to the torch», and the village of Shali, whose inhabitants «give an amanat, asked for time, and deceived», he «ordered to be destroyed»[277]. The imperial historian Volkonsky specifies that Shali stood empty by the time the troops arrived: Yermolov «did not find a single inhabitant there: all had scattered through the forests», after which he «burned their dwellings»[274].
Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that by May 18, 1826, the Nokhchi's «splendid fruit orchards had been cut down, fields burned»[92]. General Yermolov himself, in a report to Emperor Nicholas I dated May 28, 1826, admitted that at Urus-Martan «its splendid orchards were cut down», and for the village of Shali he gave the order «to cut down the orchards»[277].
The Russian Empire drove off livestock and plundered the ravaged villages of the Nokhchi. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that by May 18, 1826, «livestock had been driven off», and after the troops returned, Yermolov «sent a detachment of 500 Cossacks against Daut-Martan», and «the village was ravaged and plundered»[92].
Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that by May 18, 1826, «women and children had been taken captive» from the Nokhchi[92]. General Yermolov himself, in a report to Emperor Nicholas I dated May 28, 1826, specified the number: in the surprise attack on the village of Stavna-kul on May 2, «16 souls of both sexes were taken captive», and in the attack on Malaya Ataga on May 16 he «captured 15 souls of both sexes»[277]. The imperial historian Volkonsky confirms the seizure at Stavnokol: the sudden movement «brought us sixteen captives»[274].
The Russian Empire condemned the Nokhchi inhabitants to famine by ravaging their villages, crops, and stores. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that after Yermolov's campaign, deprived of shelter and food, «people were dying of hunger, cold, and disease»[92].
The Russian Empire set a neighboring people against the Nokhchi in order to weaken their resistance. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that Yermolov, «attempting to provoke a clash between the Chechens and the Ingush… forcibly conscripted the Ingush into a militia and sent them together with tsarist detachments against Chechen auls», although the Ingush «refused to go against their kin… deserting from the militia»[92].
On the night of January 10, 1827, General Laptev, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line, led a detachment of 350 Line Cossacks with two horse guns and four hundred Chechens of subordinated communities compelled to take part against the village of Uzeni-Yurt - a refuge for the inhabitants of villages ravaged by troops in Yermolov's punitive campaign of 1826 - in order to destroy it as punishment for raids on the Line and in the absence of the Karabulak leader Astemir. The imperial historian Potto wrote: «Laptev decided to take advantage of that moment to strike a blow in Astemir's absence... and, quickly assembling a detachment, on the night of the tenth of January led it against Uzdeni-Yurt. By dawn the troops already stood before the aul»[275].
At dawn on January 10, 1827, the Cossacks of the detachment of General Laptev, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line, having burst into the village of Uzeni-Yurt, cut down unarmed inhabitants fleeing across the Argun. The imperial historian Potto recorded: the Cossacks, «having barely managed to overtake the tail of the fleeing, seized only three women and killed and wounded some fifteen people»[275]. The killed and wounded were unarmed people overtaken in flight. Armed resistance, as the same Potto wrote, was mounted later only by those inhabitants who had managed to take refuge in the forest.
On January 10, 1827, the troops of General Laptev, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line, razed the village of Uzeni-Yurt on the bank of the Argun, whose inhabitants had fled across the river. The imperial historian Potto acknowledges: «the village of Uzeni-Yurt, with all its property... was destroyed to its foundations»[275]. The village had served as home to people whose former auls had been exterminated by troops in Yermolov's punitive campaign of 1826 and who had refused to resettle under the conqueror's control.
On January 10, 1827, during the razing of the village of Uzeni-Yurt, the troops of General Laptev, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, destroyed the inhabitants' livestock — the basis of a peasant household's sustenance. The imperial historian Potto recorded: the village, "with all its property and even its livestock, was destroyed to the ground"[275]. In the summer of 1827, the Cossacks of General Engelhardt, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, after seizing the population of Samashki, destroyed the standing crops of the Galgai who lived near the aul at mills and farmsteads. Potto wrote: "beforehand they ordered that they be shown the fields belonging to those Galgai who lived at the mills, and burned their grain where it stood"[275]. The destruction of livestock in winter and of ripened grain at harvest time deprived people of sustenance for a year ahead.
During the destruction of Uzeni-Yurt on January 10, 1827, Cossacks of the detachment of General Laptev, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, took captive three women from among the fleeing inhabitants. The imperial historian Potto recorded: the Cossacks "seized... three women"[275]. In the summer of 1827, having encircled the population of the aul of Samashki in an ambush during the harvest, the Cossacks of General Engelhardt, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, took captive the families of resistance leaders: the leader Tara-Adzuev and the family of Bakar-Bulatov; Bulatov himself managed to break through the cordon. Potto wrote: "Tara-Adzuev and Bulatov's family they carried off with them"[275].
In the winter of 1826–1827, General Laptev, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, extorted amanats (hostages) from the village of Geldigen, using a captured young man of Geldigen as leverage. The young man agreed to a staged "captivity" in order to avert the strike being prepared against the village: the occupation left the village no other way to buy safety than by handing over hostages. The imperial historian Potto admits: Laptev, having got the man into his hands, "rejected all offers and demanded one thing only — amanats. Willy-nilly this condition had to be accepted, and the people of Geldigen, who had always stood at the head of bloody movements, left in our hands the hostages of their tranquility"[275].
On the night of January 10, 1827, General Laptev, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, forced four hundred Chechens of subordinated communities to take part in a raid on the Nokhchi village of Uzeni-Yurt with a combat mission against their compatriots. The imperial historian Potto wrote: they "swam across the Argun and were to go by a roundabout road in order to cut off the inhabitants' retreat to the forest"[275]. In the summer of 1827, General Engelhardt, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, compelled to take part in the ambush on the inhabitants of Samashki, alongside a hundred Mozdok Cossacks, as Potto recorded, "as many peaceable Chechens"[275]. The subjugation of these communities was maintained by a system of hostages, as documented by Laptev's same practice with regard to Geldigen.
The Russian Empire exterminated people for show in order to terrorize the highlanders. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that at the Gerzel-aul fortification «the tsarist generals decided to stage a demonstrative execution to intimidate the highlanders», for which they summoned «318 respected men from the Aksai (Kumyk and Chechen) villages», whom General Lisanevich, «calling out those assembled one by one… threatened and subjected to insults»[92].
The Russian Empire exterminated unarmed people whom it had itself convened under the pretext of an inquiry. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that after General Grekov attempted «to inflict a physical insult» on the Chechen mullah Uchar-Hadji from the village of Mayrtup and was killed by him, «after Lisanevich's command „Stab them! the mass extermination by the soldiers of all the unarmed highlanders present in the fortification began»[92]. The imperial historian Potto confirms that both generals «fell at the hand of a fanatic»[278]."
The Russian Empire eliminated the leadership stratum of the resistance by luring it in under the pretext of an inquiry. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that under the guise of a «demonstrative execution», «318 respected men from the Aksai (Kumyk and Chechen) villages» — elders and revered men of the communities — were summoned to the Gerzel-aul fortification; General Lisanevich, «calling out those assembled one by one», after the killing of the generals ordered their extermination: «after Lisanevich's command „Stab them!" the mass extermination by the soldiers of all the unarmed highlanders present in the fortification began»[92].
The Russian Empire sent troops on punitive campaigns to punish the Nokhchi for resistance and drive them off the plain. Historian D. A. Khozhaev cites the report of Grekov, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, who stated the campaigns’ purpose plainly: to drive the Chechens into the forests, where "only snow and cold weather were lacking for the Chechen people… to feel the necessity of submitting," and notes that Grekov’s expedition "destroyed… two auls — Shali and Malaya Ataga, whose inhabitants had taken a more active part in the unrest"[92]. The imperial historian Potto confirms: on March 1, 1821, the troops "surrounded the village of Oisungur… and, to punish the inhabitants who had fled before their arrival, destroyed it completely," and in February 1822 Grekov "burned the villages of Shali and Malye Atagi"[278].
Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that the expedition of Grekov, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, "destroyed… two auls — Shali and Malaya Ataga"[92]. The imperial historian Potto confirms: on March 1, 1821, the troops "destroyed completely" the village of Oisungur, and in February 1822 Grekov "burned the villages of Shali and Malye Atagi"[278].
The Russian Empire compelled the Nokhchi themselves to cut military clearings through their own forests. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that in imposing the line, the conquerors "compelled the subordinated Highlanders to heavy labor building roads and bridges," while those who evaded it were "fined mercilessly, with their livestock and property confiscated"[92]. The imperial historian Potto confirms that the clearings from Amir-Adzhi-Yurt to Oisungur, Isti-Su, and Gerzel-Aul "through the narrow forested strip… were worked by the natives themselves, under the supervision of the Aksai princes"[278].
The Russian Empire cleared the forests of the Nokhchi to deprive their villages of natural protection. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that under Yermolov, punitive raids proceeded «with the destruction of the population, houses, crops, orchards, and forests»[92]. The imperial historian Potto confirms that on March 1, 1821, the forest was cut down «in one direction as far as Isti-Su, in the other — as far as the Michik», and in February 1822 «wide clearings were cut through the Gekhi, Goity, Shali, and Germenchug forests all the way to Mayurtup»[278].
The Russian Empire held hostages from among the Nokhchi and used them to compel submission. Historian D. A. Khozhaev cites Yermolov's «Address» to the Chechens containing a direct threat: at the slightest disobedience, «the amanats are hanged, villages are exterminated by fire, wives and children are slaughtered»[92]. The imperial historian Potto confirms that Grekov, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line, compelled submission precisely through hostages: any attack on a detachment «will inevitably entail the death penalty or exile to Siberia for the amanats», and therefore «the Chechens willy-nilly reconciled themselves to the fact that the forests — their age-old protection — were falling and disappearing»[278].
The Russian Empire sent troops on a punitive campaign to ravage Nokhchi villages and cut military roads through their lands. The imperial historian Potto writes that in the spring of 1820 Grekov, commander of the left flank, moved on the aul of Germenchuk "with a musket in one hand and an axe in the other," and on the night of March 6, 1820, covertly moved a detachment across the Sunzha, falling suddenly upon the aul of Topli[278]. General Yermolov himself, in an order to Grekov of March 15, 1820, sanctioned the design: "only the squeezing of the Chechens in their essential needs can make plain to them the advantage of submission, and I have long since authorized you to employ every possible means to that end"[277].
The imperial historian Potto describes how, on the night of March 6, 1820, the Greben Cossack regiment "burst without resistance into the aul [Topli], still sunk in deep sleep," the Cossacks "rushed through the saklias with daggers," and "part of the inhabitants were slaughtered before they could rise from their beds"[278].
The imperial historian Potto writes that after the night attack the aul of Topli was left as "smoldering ruins," and at the close of the campaign the troops "advanced forward, burned Germenchug, and drew back to Groznaya," even though the aul stood empty[278].
The Russian Empire forcibly compelled the Nokhchi to work for the conqueror — to cut clearings through their own forests. The imperial historian Potto writes that Grekov, commander of the left flank, "gathered the elders of the surrounding villages and ordered them to send out workers with axes for the felling at once," and under threat of reprisal "compelled the Chechens to obey," after which the conscripted inhabitants cut a clearing through their own forest[278].
The Russian Empire cut down the forests of the Nokhchi to strip their villages of natural protection and open a path for the troops. The imperial historian Potto writes that the "dense forest" stretching from the Argun to the Dzhalka, which served as "an obstacle to the destruction of the Germenchug fields and pastures," was cut through in three days by a wide clearing "opening onto a large glade on which stood Germenchug and a multitude of auls"[278].
The Russian Empire placed a chain of fortifications on the land taken from the Nokhchi to consolidate the seizure and hold the population in submission. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that Yermolov, moving the Caucasian Line to the Sunzha, was "squeezing unsubdued Chechnya with new fortresses and fortifications," and that "on the occupied territory fortifications were built… Neotstupny Stan, Zlobny Okop, Vnezapnaya (1819), and others"[92]. The imperial historian Potto confirms that in the summer of 1820, having barely finished the Germenchuk clearing, Grekov "set about felling the forest along the Sunzha and building on the cleared glades two new fortifications: the Ust-Martan redoubt and Zlobny Okop," and on the site of the demolished Kachkalyk village of Isti-Su he placed "Neotstupny Stan"[278].
The Russian Empire sent troops to lay waste to Nokhchi villages and drive their inhabitants off the land. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that under Yermolov "cruel punitive raids on peaceful Caucasian auls, disgracing Russian arms, with the destruction of the population, houses, crops, orchards, and forests, the driving off of livestock, and the plundering of property, became the rule"[92]. General Yermolov writes in his "Notes" that on September 30, 1819, he "went in person with 6 battalions and 16 artillery pieces toward the Kachkalyk villages" and on October 2 attacked "the village of Goryachevskaya, the strongest of them," while Major General Sysoyev simultaneously invaded from the direction of Groznaya through Khan-Kale, drawing the Chechens’ forces away from the Kachkalyk plain[279]. The imperial historian Potto confirms that the Apsheron men "burst into the aul and consigned it to the flames"[278].
The Russian Empire wiped Nokhchi villages off the face of the earth. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that following Dadi-Yurt, the Kachkalyk villages of Isti-Su, Noiberdy, Alleroy, and others were "taken by storm and destroyed"[92]. General Yermolov writes in his "Notes" that Noyen-Berdy and Allayar-Aul were "utterly devastated"[279]. The imperial historian Potto confirms that "both villages were completely devastated"[278].
The Russian Empire built a ring of fortresses around Chechnya in order to squeeze it and cut it off from its neighbors. Historian D. A. Khozhayev writes that following Groznaya, the fortress Vnezapnaya appeared in 1819, erected in order to "squeeze unsubdued Chechnya with new fortresses and fortifications"[92]. Imperial historian Potto confirms its purpose and date: founded on the eighteenth of July 1819, it "separated the Chechens from the Kumyks" and "barred [the Chechens’] way across the Salatau mountains," and it was linked to Groznaya by a chain of fortifications[278]. General Yermolov had planned this fortress as early as his most humble report of November 1817, proposing that "by extending the Line through the Aksai and Andreyevo villages to the Sulak River, Kizlyar will be covered"[277].
The Russian Empire sent troops to ravage Nokhchi villages as punishment for insubordination. Historian D. A. Khozhayev writes that general Yermolov ordered Major General Sysoyev and Colonel Bekovich-Cherkassky to "surround the peaceful village of Dadi-Yurt" and to "punish it by force of arms, giving quarter to no one"[92]. Yermolov confirms his order in his "Notes": to surround the aul, offer the inhabitants the chance to leave, "and should they resist, to punish them by force of arms, giving quarter to no one"[279]. On the fifteenth of September 1819 the aul was surrounded by six Kabardian companies and seven sotnias of Cossacks and taken by storm[278].
The Russian Empire destroyed a single village demonstratively, in order to terrorize the rest of the Nokhchi into abandoning their lands. Imperial historian Potto writes that general Yermolov decided to clear the Kumyk plain, "forcing the Chechens to withdraw… beyond the Kachkalyk mountain ridge," and they could be compelled to do so "only by an example of terror," and the aul of Dadi-Yurt "was chosen as the expiatory sacrifice"[278]. Yermolov himself admits this calculation in his "Notes": "only an example of terror can compel them to remove their wives," and after the destruction of the aul "the example of Dadan-Yurt spread terror everywhere"[279].
During the storming of a Nokhchi aul, the Russian Empire exterminated its inhabitants without distinction of sex or age. Historian D. A. Khozhayev writes that "the brutalized punitive forces spared neither women nor children," and, breaking into the houses, "slaughtered everyone without mercy"[92]. The organizer himself, general Yermolov, admits the toll in his "Notes": "all who bore arms were exterminated, and their number could not have been fewer than four hundred," while "a far greater number were slaughtered or perished in the houses from the effect of artillery and fire"[279]. Imperial historian Potto confirms that the aul was taken only when "every one of its defenders had been exterminated to a man," and those slaughtered or killed in the fire numbered twice as many as the one hundred forty who survived[278].
The Russian Empire led the Nokhchi who survived the destruction of an aul away as captives into its own territory. General Yermolov himself writes in his "Notes" that women and children "were taken prisoner numbering up to one hundred and forty"[279], and the imperial historian Potto confirms this[278]. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that during the crossing of the captives over the Terek, 46 captured girls, "not wishing to endure abuse in captivity," perished, "dragging their guards with them into the turbulent river"[92].
When laying waste to a Nokhchi aul, the Russian Empire handed its property over to the soldiers as spoils. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that the punitive raids under Yermolov proceeded "with the destruction of the population, houses, crops, orchards, and forests, the driving off of livestock, and the plundering of property," while Russian commanders invaded peaceful lands "to distinguish themselves or to seize booty"[92]. General Yermolov himself admits this in his "Notes": after the destruction of Dadi-Yurt, "the soldiers came away with rather rich spoils"[279].
The Russian Empire drove the Nokhchi from the lowland to clear it for itself and for loyal neighbors, and blocked their return with fortresses. Historian D. A. Khozhaev cites the admission of General Orbeliani that this expulsion was a system applied everywhere: "in all of Chechnya there remained not a single aul, not a single household, that had not been resettled from one place to another several times over"[92]. General Yermolov himself, in a report to the emperor, admits this with regard to the Kachkalyk Nokhchi: to clear the Aksai riverside he drove them out of it and placed the fortresses of Amir-Adzhi-Yurt and Vnezapnaya in their place, for the sake of "freeing it [the Aksai] from the Kachkalyks, whom I immediately ordered to be driven out of it; I established the fortress of Vnezapnaya"[277].
Solzha (Sunzhenskaya), one of the wealthiest villages, the Russian Empire kept as a source of supply for the fortress of Groznaya, and having seized the village by force, it spent several days carting away its stores. Historian D. A. Khozhayev records the ravaging of Solzha (Sunzhenskaya), as a consequence of which "most of the peaceful neighboring auls fled into the mountains, and the flourishing banks were left deserted for a long time thereafter"[92]. Imperial general Yermolov testifies in his "Notes" that he had earlier ordered the troops to spare the village so that the fortress "could obtain from it all necessary supplies," and when the troops seized the village, "grain, forage, and timber fit for building were carted away for several days"[279].
Solzha (Sunzhenskaya) the Russian Empire took by storm and ravaged as punishment for the village’s refusal to hand over a fellow villager who had shot at a soldier who was taking his ox. Historian D. A. Khozhayev records the ravaging of Solzha (Sunzhenskaya)[92]. Imperial general Yermolov testifies in his "Notes" that a villager shot at a soldier "when they would not give him back an ox from a state wagon, which he called his own," and the attempt to seize the shooter failed — the officer whose "horse was seized by the bridle" was nearly killed, and the detachment retreated; to the demand to hand over the shooter the villagers replied "that they would not surrender the man who shot at the soldier and would defend themselves if the troops came," after which the chief of the corps staff "went himself with several companies… but was met with gunfire," while "the wives and children and the best property had already been sent away; only men remained to defend the houses"; during the storming the troops were ordered to cut off the withdrawal — "to intercept the retreat in the forest" — but the defenders had withdrawn earlier[279].
The transfer of Cossacks to the status of rightless military settlers (the Arakcheev system), which provoked the uprising of 1817: "The trigger was the order abolishing the Buh Cossack Host and turning the Cossacks into military settlers… The reprisal against the rebellious Cossacks was extraordinarily brutal: many were cut down with sabers, drowned in the Southern Buh, flogged to death"[81]. There were two acts, on opposite sides of the uprising: the nominal decree of April 17, 1817 transferred the Buh Host's district "into direct military administration" (PSZRI, vol. XXXIV, no. 26,802) - this was the trigger; the decree of October 8, 1817 (no. 27,081), issued after the suppression, formalized the liquidation: "the name of the Buh Cossack Host is abolished"[280].
The luring of kish otaman Hladky over to the empire's side in 1828: part of the Danubians "headed by kish otaman Y. Hladky, on May 30 (18), 1828, crossed the Kiliya mouth of the Danube, entered the port of Izmail, and joined the Russian army"[75].
The otaman's defection left the Cossacks remaining beyond the Danube exposed to the Porte's retaliation and put an end to the last free Cossack host: the Danubian Sich "existed from the last quarter of the 18th century until 1828"[75].
The Regular Army of the Russian Empire moved troops onto the Nokhchi lands between the Terek and the Sunzha in order to forcibly shift the forward fortified line deep into Chechen territory and place the region under military control. Historian D. A. Khozhaev defines the meaning of moving the line as squeezing Chechnya that had not submitted «with new fortresses and fortifications»[92]. The imperial general Yermolov, in his «Notes», attests to the deployment of troops: «on May 24 the entire detachment crossed over… in a single march it moved from the Terek to the Sunzha River»[279].
The Regular Army of the Russian Empire built a fortress on the occupied territory as a stronghold, in order to keep the approaches to the Chechen lands under fire and cut the inhabitants off from their lands. Historian D. A. Khozhaev records that the fortress was built «on Chechen land»[92]. The imperial general Yermolov attests in his «Notes» that the fortress, «constraining the inhabitants in their possession of the best lands… not far from the entrance through the Khan-Kale gorge, was named Groznaya», and that the earthworks were completed by mid-October 1818[279]. The imperial historian Potto confirms the founding on June 10, 1818: «to the thunder of cannon, a strong fortress of six bastions was laid, which Yermolov named Groznaya»[278]. As early as his most humble report of November 1817, Yermolov directly named the purpose of the Sunzha fortresses: «We must occupy the Sunzha River and build fortresses along its course: then the Chechens will be confined in their mountains, deprived of land suitable for cultivation and of the pasture grounds where throughout the winter they shelter their herds from the harsh mountain climate»[277].
The Regular Army of the Russian Empire, having moved troops onto the Sunzha and occupied Chechen land, demanded that the elders of Chechen villages renew their oath of submission under threat of reprisal as against "open enemies." Imperial general Yermolov testifies in his "Notes" that in May 1818 "the elders of almost all the principal Chechen villages were summoned to me," to the military camp, and he demanded "that henceforth such [depredations] no longer be committed, and in confirmation they must renew their old oath of submission and return the captives held by them"[279]. The demand went unfulfilled: the elders "promised nothing"[279].
The Regular Army of the Russian Empire demolished Chechen villages to clear ground for a fortress. Historian D. A. Khozhayev records the destruction of eight villages: to make way for Groznaya, "eight flourishing Chechen villages (Bugun-Yurt, Amirkhan-Kichu, Kuli-Yurt, Sorochan-Yurt, Sunzha, N. Chechen, Topli, Alkhanchu) were destroyed"[92].
The Regular Army of the Russian Empire drove the population of the destroyed villages off their lands, which passed into the conqueror’s possession. Historian D. A. Khozhayev records that the inhabitants of the eight villages near Groznaya were "driven off the lands"[92]. Imperial general Yermolov wrote to Emperor Alexander I that if the population refused to submit, they would be offered "to withdraw and join the other brigands," and then "all the lands will remain at our disposal"[92].
The Regular Army of the Russian Empire held representatives of the villages along the Sunzha as a pledge of submission. Imperial general Yermolov testifies in his "Notes" that when the troops advanced to the Sunzha, "amanats (hostages) from their villages were taken into the camp"[279]. Imperial historian Potto confirms that Yermolov "took amanats from all the auls sitting along the Sunzha"[278].
The Regular Army of the Russian Empire compelled the Indigenous population to perform military service on the conqueror’s side, including against their own kin. Imperial general Yermolov testifies in his "Notes" that "instead of tribute it was ordained that men be sent out for service at the requisition of the commanders," and admits: "there has not yet been an instance of anyone being able to force the Chechens to use arms against their own countrymen, but the first step toward this has already been taken, and it has been impressed upon them that this will always be demanded of them"[279].
The Regular Army of the Russian Empire shifted the cost of the imposed military service onto the Indigenous population itself. Imperial general Yermolov testifies in his "Notes" that the men levied by requisition were sent out "with their own arms and at their own expense"[279].
The Regular Army of the Russian Empire forced Chechen villages to make deliveries and perform labor for the construction of the fortress. Imperial general Yermolov testifies in his "Notes": "the villages from which we held amanats were ordered to deliver timber for the construction"; the nearest villages "dared not show disobedience"[279].
The Regular Army of the Russian Empire instilled submission through fear of the demonstrative destruction of families. Imperial general Yermolov, in his "Address" to the Chechens, declared: "The slightest disobedience… and your auls will be destroyed, your families sold off into the mountains, the amanats hanged, villages exterminated by fire, women and children slaughtered"[92][278].
A years-long campaign of force against the peasant movement in Podillia: "In 1833–39 a special investigation into the case of Karmaliuk and his associates operated – the 'Haluzyntsi commission'… During its activity, about 20 thousand people passed through it as accused or suspected of ties with Karmaliuk"[209].
The Russian Empire carried out punitive raids beyond the Terek in order to force the Nokhchi into submission. The imperial historian Potto writes that Colonel Eristov «crossed the Terek a second time and, after a stubborn battle, destroyed several villages along the Sunzha»[281]. The punitive, rather than defensive, character of these raids was acknowledged by the imperial leadership itself. Commander-in-chief General Rtishchev condemned «such expeditions» and demanded that the mountaineers be won over «not by arms, but by kind treatment»[281]. Emperor Alexander I, upon learning «of yet another raid on peaceful Chechnya by Colonel Eristov», ordered by a special rescript «to establish tranquility on the Caucasian Line through friendliness and gentle indulgence»[92].
The Russian Empire razed and burned Nokhchi villages. The imperial historian Potto writes that Colonel Eristov, having crossed the Terek, after a stubborn battle burned and razed «several villages along the Sunzha»[281].
The Russian Empire used the devastation of villages to force the Nokhchi to hand over hostages. The imperial historian Potto writes that after Colonel Eristov had laid waste to the villages along the Sunzha, the Nokhchi «gave amanats (hostages), promising to trouble the Russian borders no more»[281].
The Russian Empire set neighboring peoples against the Nokhchi in order to weaken the Chechens through their enmity. In 1816, the Nokhchi led by Beibulat Taimiev took Major Shvetsov prisoner[92]. In response, the commander on the Terek, General Delpozzo, in a letter to the Kumyk lords of Endirey, Aksai, and Kostek, pressed them to go to war against the Chechens: «I ask you, I advise you, I order you to form among yourselves one council, one will, to return immediately by force of arms the captive Major Shvetsov, to put an end to the brigand people… to adopt such a resolution as would reduce the Chechens to weakness, to obedience to us, to complete slavery before you»[282]. The Kumyk lords signed «Obligations» in which they pledged «to cease all mutual enmities… and to form a brotherhood», «to receive none of the Chechens… but wherever any of them is encountered, to kill him or deliver him alive to the nearest Russian authorities», and to let no goods pass through to them[282].
Mass conscription into the militia and the formation of Cossack regiments on the basis of false promises to restore Cossack liberties: "Ukraine was used for the recruitment, equipping, and movement of troops… including a 75-thousand-strong militia from the Kyiv, Podillia, Chernihiv, and Poltava governorates"[81].
The use of regular troops to brutally suppress the unrest of the deceived population: the 1817 uprising of the Buh Cossacks against being turned into military settlers was crushed by four regiments - over 10,000 soldiers with artillery; the rebels were cut down with sabres, drowned in the Southern Buh, and flogged with whips[81].
The Russian Empire bought the loyalty of the Nokhchi elders in order to use them to incline the Chechens toward submission. To this end, the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Tormasov, through Esaul Chernov, ordered that the Chechen elders and clergy be given «250 rubles each, and others 150 silver rubles each, as a one-time payment, for which the required sum, 1,400 r. in total»[283]. Historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov notes that the colonial authorities generally acted by relying on the social elite, «bribing them with all manner of rewards and privileges for their service to the benefit of Russia»[130]. Historian D. A. Khozhaev cites the same formula with a direct indication of where the money came from: the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Tormasov, agreed «to win over the principal Chechen elders and their clergy… to give 250, and others 150 silver rubles each, and to collect the said money from their own villages» — that is, the bribery of the elite was paid for by exactions from the Chechen villages themselves[92].
The Russian Empire funneled the Nokhchi's supply of grain and salt through trading points under its control, making vitally important goods dependent on its administration. The sale of grain and salt to the Chechens was permitted only through barter yards under quarantine, established «for the peaceful Chechens in Naur… for the mountain Chechens in Lashchurin», with a duty paid to the treasury and disputes adjudicated through an imperial pristav (overseer)[283][130].
The Russian Empire shifted the blame for the devastation it had wrought onto the victimized people itself. In a proclamation to the inhabitants of the Chechen land, the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Tormasov, presented the pogrom of 1807 as a consequence of the inhabitants' own actions: «the raids and depredations that you carried out within the borders of Russia brought upon you righteous wrath… you yourselves were the cause of the misfortune that befell you three years ago» — and threatened a new invasion, «to bring sword and flame upon the guilty», offering «mercy» in exchange for submission[283].
The Russian Empire set neighboring Indigenous peoples against the Nokhchi in order to weaken Chechen resistance through their enmity. In July 1810, while pursuing a retreating Chechen party, the commanding general Ivelich, according to the imperial historian Potto, «talked the nearest Ingush auls, in view of the prospect of great gain, into cutting off its retreat»; the incited Ingush attacked the Chechens, and the latter «suffered such a loss that they abandoned even the body of their leader on the battlefield»[281]. The commander of the Caucasian Line, General Delpozzo, reported that the peaceful elders who had pledged to act against the Chechens were «promised rewards according to their merits»[283].
The Russian Empire sent troops into the lands of the Nokhchi in order to force its way deep into Greater Chechnya and break the resistance of its communities. The historian D. A. Khozhaev describes General Bulgakov's troops as having "come with fire and sword to the Chechen land," and the Khankala battle of 1807 as bloody[92]. In February 1807, three detachments under the overall command of the commander of the Caucasus Line, General Bulgakov, crossed the Terek; on February 13, the troops broke through the Khankala Gorge by storm, which the inhabitants had fortified with barricades, ditches, and abatis. The commander of the Caucasus Line, General Bulgakov, reported that he had entered "for the exemplary punishment" of the Nokhchi communities, that the inhabitants, having gathered in number about 10,000, "resolved to perish rather than let the Russian troops pass through the gorge"; during the storming of the gorge, of the defending Chechens, according to his report, there were "about 1,000 killed on the spot"[284]. The imperial historian Potto admits that after Bulgakov's storming of the Khankala Gorge, Russian attempts to penetrate deep into Chechnya "were never renewed"[278].
The Russian Empire dispatched troops to the lands of the Nokhchi to compel submission. The plan of the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Gudovich, was to strike the unprotected: to catch the inhabitants before "their livestock and families… are sheltered in the mountains," for "then… their punishment and complete success in the matter would be surer and more convenient." When the commander of the Caucasus Line, General Bulgakov, delayed by an expedition in Dagestan, gave the inhabitants time to fortify the Khankala Gorge and took it by a bloody storm, General Gudovich, in a directive of March 20, 1807, refused to take this "on his own account" and stressed that he had not sent him to wage war: "you were sent not to wage war with the Chechen peoples, but to punish them and bring them into complete submission." The commander of the Caucasus Line, General Bulgakov, considered the outcome of the campaign to be that the Chechens had by force of arms been "brought to such a state that they will long feel the blow dealt to them and, certainly, will not soon regain strength"[284].
The Russian Empire burned the villages of the Nokhchi, depriving the inhabitants of shelter and means of subsistence. General Ivelich reported that the village of Bolshaya Chechenskaya Ataga was "consigned to fire" by the detachment of the commander of the Caucasus Line, General Bulgakov, while the remaining inhabitants, "whose villages were destroyed by fire," agreed to subjecthood[284].
The Russian Empire compelled the Nokhchi communities by force of arms to swear an oath of subjecthood. After the devastation of the villages, the commander of the Caucasus Line, General Bulgakov, presented the Chechen people with a resolution by which the elders declared: "we submit ourselves with the whole Chechen people… into eternal loyal subjecthood… in witness whereof we give an oath according to our custom on the Holy Quran," and for any violation the people subjected itself "to the strictest punishment and to the devastation of our dwellings without resistance"; the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Gudovich, reported that the Chechens had been "completely subdued by force of arms and brought to an oath of eternal fidelity of subjecthood"[284].
The Russian Empire held hostages from among the Nokhchi inhabitants as a guarantee of submission. Under the resolution presented by the commander of the Caucasus Line, General Bulgakov, the Chechen elders undertook: "we give the foremost among us as amanats, at the choice of the Russian commander in this region"; the villages of Bolshaya Ataga, Malaya Ataga, and Gekhi "gave 3 amanats from the best families," whom the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Gudovich, ordered "to send to Kizlyar… to keep watch over them and to issue for their maintenance 10 r. per month each"[284].
The Russian Empire bought the loyalty of Nokhchi elders in order to use them to bring recalcitrant villages into subjecthood. The commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Gudovich, instructed the Andreyevo elder Hadji-Redjeb to incline the villages "into submission and subjecthood," and assigned a salary to the Chechen uzden Bik-Bulat — "I persuaded the Chechen uzden Bik-Bulat… to whom I said… a salary of 300 r. in silver per year"; for winning over the remaining villages, "about 3,000 r. in silver for bringing them into loyal subjecthood" was allocated[284]. The same bribery, from the Nokhchi side, is recorded by the historian D. A. Khozhaev: through the intermediary Hadji-Redjeb, in the name of the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Gudovich, the very head of the Chechen resistance, Beibulat Taimiev, was won over and took "an oath of fidelity of subjecthood to Russia," while Hadji-Redjeb asked the generals for another 3000 rubles in silver "for bringing the remaining unpacified Chechen villages into loyal subjecthood"[92].
The Russian Empire set neighboring Indigenous peoples against one another so that their mutual enmity would weaken the resistance of each and prevent them from uniting. For the 1807 campaign against the Chechens, the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Gudovich, coerced Kabardians into marching against the Nokhchi: for failure to appear, those "designated from the ranks of uzdens and begauls" faced a fine "of 50 r. in silver and 2 oxen." General Delpozzo reported that he had "inclined the Kabardians to set out on the campaign and to assist together with our troops in punishing the Chechens," and although "it was very difficult to persuade them," he gathered over 3,500 men who "crossed the Terek River and arrived… at the Sunzha River" against the Chechen and Karabulak villages; at the same time, the Kabardians themselves refused to go directly "against the Chechens," as their co-religionists, agreeing to act only "against the Karabulaks alone." General Gudovich stated the aim of this incitement outright — "to set these two peoples at odds with each other and bring them into enmity against one another, and thereby weaken them over time"[284].
The use of Ukrainian Cossack formations in the imperial war: "The Russian troops, which included the Ust-Danube Budjak Cossack Host, captured Khotyn, Bendery… Akkerman"[54].
The severing of Bessarabia from the Ottoman Empire and its official annexation under the Peace of Bucharest: the treaty "confirmed the annexation of Bessarabia to Russia and the transfer of the border from the Dniester to the Prut down to its confluence with the Danube"[54].
The Russian Empire, through the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Gudovich, addressed the elders of the Nokhchi with a proclamation offering economic benefits in exchange for accepting subjecthood and ceasing armed resistance. For submission, the elders were promised access to salt: they would be "permitted to take salt from the local salt lakes by tickets, irrevocably, paying a very small fixed price," as well as the right "to drive livestock to this side of the Terek and freely use the vacant pasture lands." The proclamation was conveyed to Chechen society and its elders (Kusu Al-Temir, Masarai, Idut), but subjecthood was not accepted; at the beginning of the following year the empire proceeded to armed invasion.[284]. The same offer is independently recorded by the imperial historian Dubrovin: the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Gudovich, "promised… to release salt in unlimited quantity, for the most trifling payment; to permit the driving of livestock for pasture in wintertime to the left bank of the Terek River… and, finally, to make them equal to Russian subjects"[285].
The erasure of historical borders and the introduction of the imperial vertical: "The governor-general concentrated the entire fullness of administrative power: he was endowed with the right of legislative initiative, determined the degree to which all-Russian laws extended within the governorate-general, and controlled the activity of state institutions, including judicial ones"[103].
In 1804-1811 the Russian Empire erected a cast-iron Monument of Glory in the center of Poltava in memory of its victory over the army of Charles XII on 27 June 1709 - with the city's own money and to a design sent from St. Petersburg. By the imperial decree to the Senate of 11 September 1804, "On leaving the villages formerly owned by the city of Poltava under state administration and on releasing the income collected from them to the local Governor-General for the erection in Poltava of a monument in memory of 27 June 1709," the city's revenues were assigned to the monument: "the community of Poltava citizens, through a petition submitted to Governor-General Prince Kurakin, has designated all these revenues for the construction in Poltava of a monument in memory of the day unforgettable for Russia, 27 June 1709, and so we command: the revenues now due for payment, as well as those henceforth collected in favor of this city, shall be released to the local Governor-General until the monument that has been begun is completely finished"[286]. By a second act, the imperial rescript of 9 May 1805 to the Governor-General of Little Russia, "On the erection of a monument in commemoration of the victory won at Poltava by Emperor Peter the Great," the emperor sent a ready-made design and ordered construction to begin: "I forward to you herewith the plans for this monument, drawn up here, charging you... to proceed with its erection on site, except for the bronze ornaments belonging to it, which will be made separately here and delivered to their destination"[286]. That is, Poltava pays, while Petersburg decides what the sign on its land will look like - down to the bronze, which is cast there and shipped ready-made. The monument was founded on 27 June 1804, the cast-iron column was raised in May 1809 under the direction of Moskvin, an engineer of the Luhansk works, and the whole ensemble was opened on 27 June 1811, for the next anniversary of the battle[287][288]. On the medallion of the upper square of the pedestal, inside a serpent ring between two quivers, stood "June the 27th, 1709," and on the opposite side - "Finished in 1809"[287]: the date of someone else's victory was made into the date of the place itself. Both inscriptions, together with the bronze bas-reliefs, disappeared in 1901 - the pre-revolutionary survey records it tersely: "This inscription and the preceding one were destroyed in 1901, and at the same time the bronze bas-reliefs that surrounded them were taken by persons unknown"[287]; they were restored only during the capital repairs of 1953[288]. The monument still stands in Poltava: as of August 2026 it is listed as a monument of national significance under heritage protection number 160010-Н[289], the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance recommended dismantling it in a letter of 29 July 2024[290], but decisions on monuments of national significance are made by the government, and the list of such decisions as of 20 May 2026 does not include the monument[291].
The occupation administration of the Russian Empire stripped the Indigenous population of the status of a legitimate adversary by applying an inversion of meanings: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that lawful defense was labeled with criminal terms, and «The anti-colonial and anti-feudal uprisings of the population of Chechnya, referred to in official documents as 'mischief', 'robberies', and 'murders', were perceived by the Russian autocracy as a challenge and an insult»[292], which served as a formal pretext for punitive actions.
The apparatus of the Russian Empire constructed an image of the Indigenous population as savages: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov points out that pre-revolutionary historiography described the highlanders' struggle as «the actions of barbarians devoid of 'civilized' notions of independence and freedom»[130], while the imperial historian and participant in the events V. A. Potto cites the words of General A. P. Yermolov, who declared that «the cruelty of the local mores cannot be tamed by mercy»[278]. In his «Notes», General Yermolov wrote of the Nokhchi: «the Chechens, the most vicious of the brigands, attacking the line», their land a refuge where «the villains of all other peoples, abandoning their own land on account of some crimes, were received amicably», while Chechnya itself «may justly be called the nest of all brigands», «were less filled than others with brigands who had previously taken part in all the raids of the Chechens on the line. In them predators gathered and took cover…»[279].
The propaganda apparatus of the Russian Empire used poetry to broadcast the logic of domination into society: the imperial historian and participant in the events V. A. Potto records that the poet A. S. Pushkin proclaimed in verse the inevitability of subjugation: «Submit, Caucasus - Yermolov is coming!»[278], while the poet V. A. Zhukovsky extolled the destruction of infrastructure by military commanders: «Scarcely at the villages - the villages blaze»[281].
The diplomatic collusion of the great powers behind the backs of the peoples of the dismembered republic: "Russia carried out the second partition of Poland jointly with Prussia"[79]; all three monarchies took part in the third – the fate of the Right Bank was decided in St. Petersburg, Berlin, and Vienna.
The seizure and incorporation into the empire of Right-Bank Ukraine, Volhynia, and Podillia: Russia received "the Kyiv, Bratslav, and Podillia voivodeships and the eastern half of the Volhynian voivodeship," and under the third partition – "the western part of the Volhynian voivodeship, the western parts of the Kholm land and the Belz voivodeship"[79].
The introduction of territorial discrimination: by the decree of 1791, the Jewish population's right to burgher and merchant status was confined to specific viceroyalties – Ekaterinoslav and Taurida[293] – the legal foundation of the future Pale of Settlement, which confined the area of residence and economic activity to the colonized governorates.
The use of Ukrainian Cossacks as a military resource for storming Turkish fortresses and consolidating imperial claims to Crimea: at Ochakiv "the 'loyal Cossacks' took part in the storming of the fortress"[206], and in the storming of Izmail "in total over 6 thousand Black Sea Cossacks took part in the battle"[75].
The colonization of the steppes adjacent to Crimea with settlers to create a loyal rear: as early as 1752, New Serbia was formed from Serbs – "officially – to guard the southern frontiers from Tatar and Turkish raids, but in fact – to subdue the Zaporozhians"[54], and in 1776 Potemkin directly ordered "not to return fugitives"[79], accelerating the settlement of the south.
The erasure of the historical names of the Cossack southern territories used as a springboard for the annexation of Crimea: Catherine II's manifesto of 3 August 1775 extirpated "the very name of the Zaporozhian Cossacks" and poured their lands into an imperial construct – "assigning them as convenient to the Novorossiysk Governorate"[294].
The abolition of the Cossack regimental order and the division of the Left Bank into imperial viceroyalties: the Kyiv Viceroyalty was established by the nominal decree to the Senate of September 16, 1781 (PSZRI, coll. 1, vol. XXI, no. 15,228; execution ordered from November)[295][296], "which finally abolished the remnants of the Hetmanate's autonomy and its regimental-sotnia administrative-political and military order"[209]; the same decree established the Chernihiv and Novhorod-Siverskyi viceroyalties.
The legal enserfment of Ukrainian peasants by Catherine II's decree of May 3, 1783, depriving them of the right of free movement: "For the certain and reliable collection of treasury revenues in the viceroyalties of Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Novhorod-Siverskyi and for the prevention of any flights… each of the villagers is to remain in the place and station where he is registered by the current last revision"[297].
The secularization and confiscation into the imperial treasury of the lands of Ukrainian Orthodox monasteries: "in 1786, during the secularization, the monastery was closed, and its property and lands passed to the state treasury"[54] – the fate of the Sviatohirsk monastery is typical of the entire 1786 campaign, which deprived the local church of its economic base.
The encirclement and forcible seizure of the Sich by imperial troops right after the Cossacks had helped the empire win the war. The manifesto records the operation matter-of-factly: "On June 4, Our Lieutenant-General Tekeli, with the troops entrusted to him by us, occupied the Zaporozhian Sich"[294].
The issuing of Catherine II's August manifesto, officially erasing the very memory of the Sich: it was destroyed "with the extirpation for the future of the very name of the Zaporozhian Cossacks," for the empire resolved "to destroy the Zaporozhian Sich and the name of the Cossacks derived from it"[294]. Hrushevsky: "The Sich was destroyed, and on 3 August a tsarist decree announced its abolition, 'with the annihilation of the very name of the Zaporozhian Cossacks'"[210].
The arrest and exile of the Sich's top leadership: "In July 1775, after the destruction of the New Sich, by order of Empress Catherine II, Kalnyshevsky was arrested and sent to the prison of the Solovetsky monastery"[209]. Kalnyshevsky spent more than 25 years in confinement; formally freed in 1801, he died in the monastery.
The mass confiscation of national educational and religious literature: "in 1769 the Holy Synod not only refused permission to print South Russian primers, but ordered the confiscation of those already in people's hands, since the primers of that time were regarded as church books"[232].
The Russification of teaching in the country's principal institution of learning: from 1784 metropolitan Samuil Myslavsky introduced new classes of geography and history at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy with an order to conduct them "in pure Russian," and by his order of 26 October 1784 demanded that teachers and students observe "the rules of orthography proper to the Russian language" - teachers faced dismissal for lapses, and students expulsion from the clerical estate[298]. The unification was completed by the order of February 13, 1786: "to adopt immediately for the Kyiv Academy the mode of instruction legalized for all schools in the All-Russian Empire"[52] – the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy was transferred to the empire-wide mode of teaching.
The displacement of the local population's language from the sacred sphere: metropolitan Samuil Myslavsky's order of 26 October 1784 demanded that students and future priests practice "the reading of church books of every kind, and above all the Bible, acquiring a good and pure pronunciation" - after the Moscow model instead of the Ukrainian church tradition, under the threat of expulsion from the clerical estate[298], and in 1786 metropolitan Myslavsky prescribed to the clergy the unification of pronunciation and orthography along the Russian model[52].
The use of Ukrainian Cossack regiments in the imperial war against the Ottoman Empire. The merits of the Zaporozhians and their kish otaman Kalnyshevsky in this war "were recognized by the tsarist government and the empress, who awarded him a gold medal with diamonds"[209] – which saved neither him nor the Sich from reprisal right after the victory.
The signing of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca: the diplomatic severing of Crimea from the Ottoman Empire through fictitious "independence" – "neither the Russian court nor the Ottoman Porte shall interfere in the election and elevation of the said khan, nor in their domestic, political, civil, and internal affairs under any pretext"[299] – in preparation for the subsequent annexation.
The liquidation of Cossack administrative units and the introduction of imperial division: the report of the Shakhovskoy-Panin commission confirmed by the empress on December 16, 1764 and Catherine II's manifesto of July 28, 1765[300][301] – "On the basis of the Sloboda regiments the Sloboda-Ukrainian Governorate was formed"[54].
Lowering the social status of the indigenous population for the purpose of economic extraction: "The Cossacks and their helpers were turned into military settlers and taxed with the poll tax," and those with the right to distill horilka "now had to pay… 95 kopecks per soul to the treasury"[302].
The forced incorporation of the autochthonous armed forces into the imperial army: "The Sloboda Cossack regiments were abolished and in their place it was ordered to form 5 hussar regiments"[302].
The final elimination of the office of the autonomy's leader: after Rozumovsky's forced abdication, Catherine II's decree of November 10, 1764 handed power to the Little Russian Collegium, whose president was instructed to act "with a governor's authority, that is, as our special plenipotentiary"[303]. Catherine II's instruction to procurator-general Vyazemsky (1764) stated the goal openly: "and when there is no hetman in Little Russia, one must strive that the very age and name of hetmans vanish"[304].
The establishment of a direct imperial organ – the Second Little Russian Collegium: four Great Russian members, four Little Russian ones, headed by Rumyantsev with the powers of a governor-general; the Zaporozhian Sich was also transferred to its jurisdiction: "the Zaporozhian Sich, which was under the hetman's jurisdiction, shall now be administered by this Little Russian government"[303].
The monarch's secret instruction on the cultural digestion of the land: "Little Russia, Livonia, and Finland are provinces governed by the privileges confirmed to them… These provinces, as well as Smolensk, must by the easiest means be brought to the point where they become Russified and cease looking to the forest like wolves"[304].
The occupation administration of the Russian Empire bought the loyalty of members of the local nobility with state payments: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov records «the granting of Russian stipends to 4 Chechen princes and their uzdens»[292].
The occupation administration of the Russian Empire imposed on the Indigenous population the legal codification of subordinate status, exploiting their economic need and presenting the oath as a rigid ultimatum: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that in 1747, in response to the highlanders' requests for resettlement, «official consent of the imperial court was given («to admit and assign») on the condition that the highlanders take an oath of Russian subjecthood»[292], while to those absent «officers were sent «to administer the oath»»[292]; similarly in 1748, when the mountain communities petitioned for subjecthood so that «traveling with merchandise to the town of Kizlyar... under protection would be free»[292], the administration «agreed to this proposal on the condition of the mandatory resettlement of the «Chebutlins» from the mountains to the lower reaches of the Sunzha»[292].
The occupation administration of the Russian Empire expanded the system of holding relatives of the nobility: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that, to control the territories, «amanats are handed over as a pledge of fidelity to the oath to the Russian authorities»[292].
The Government of the Russian Empire built up a military line through the engineering construction of fortified militarized outposts to isolate the Indigenous population: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that in 1736 «three new Cossack stanitsas: Borozdinskaya, Kargalinskaya, Dubovskaya»[292] were established, which, as historian I. Kh. Tkhamokova records, served as fortifications, since each such stanitsa «was in effect a small fortress serving for protection against enemy raids»[305].
The Government of the Russian Empire physically enlarged the buffer zone around the territories of the Nokhchi through the mass relocation of militarized settlers: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that «1736 - from the Greben stanitsas down the Terek to Kizlyar, three new Cossack stanitsas are established: Borozdinskaya, Kargalinskaya, Dubovskaya, and from Kizlyar to the sea another 430 Cossack families are settled»[292].
The occupation administration of the Russian Empire continued to physically hold relatives of the Nokhchi elite: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov records the existence of a document from 1738 identified as a «Letter from the Chechen lord A. Bartykhanov to Lieutenant Colonel Bunin regarding his loyal service to Russia and requesting the release of his sister from Kizlyar»[292].
The occupation administration of the Russian Empire bought the loyalty of the local nobility with state payments: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that, according to General-in-Chief V. Ya. Levashov, the senior Chechen prince Aidemir «was accepted into Russian subjecthood and was assigned a permanent tsarist stipend»[292], and in general «The princes and their uzdens even began to receive monetary allowances from the Russian government»[292].
The occupation administration of the Russian Empire institutionalized a system of holding relatives of the local elite: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov records that «In 1735, two amanats from the Chechen domain were already being held in Kizlyar: from Aidemir - Bardykhan, and from the Chechen lord Alisultan Kazbulatov - Bamat»[292].
Blocking the election of a new leader and creating a hybrid administration for direct control: "The Governance included the tsar's resident in Ukraine, Prince O. Shakhovskoy, with 2 Russian officials… as well as general quartermaster Ya. Lyzohub with 2 Ukrainian officers"[79] – a formally equal collegium actually headed by the tsar's resident.
The return of the Zaporozhian Sich under the empire's authority on the crown's terms: "For tactical reasons, in the course of preparations for the next Turkish war, Anna amnestied the Zaporozhians and allowed them to return to the old Sich grounds (1734) and found the New Sich"[81] – the amnesty formalized the Cossacks' passage under Russian authority with an obligation of military service.
Targeted demographic assimilation under Anna's secret decree of January 31, 1734 to governor Shakhovskoy: "that you with your skill, secretly and quietly, take special pains to divert the Little Russians from kinship… and to encourage them and skillfully bring them into kinship with… the Great Russian people"[306].
The Regular Army of the Russian Empire dispatched armed contingents to preemptively suppress an anti-colonial uprising: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov cites a report by General Douglas, who ordered that the assembled rebel force must, «not being allowed to multiply, be averted and destroyed by the dispatched detachment»[292], after which, as historian Sh. B. Akhmadov states, «on July 4, 1732, the tsarist authorities dispatched a military detachment to Chechnya, headed by General Douglas, who commanded the troops at the Holy Cross fortress»[130].
The Government of the Russian Empire organized an armed raid to physically punish the insurgent Indigenous population: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov points out that General Douglas «halted the movement of the main forces and sent toward Chechen-Aul a detachment of dragoons under Colonel Koch, totaling 300 soldiers and 200 Cossacks»[292].
The Regular Army of the Russian Empire physically eliminated a highlander settlement: historian Sh. B. Akhmadov states that the detachment under the command of Colonel Koch «entered the village of Chechen on July 7, burned it down completely, and began hastily withdrawing»[130].
Rejection of the treaty format: instead of a bilateral agreement – the tsar's "decisive" resolutions upon the hetman's requests, issued in the form of a decree. The autonomy ceased to be a party to a treaty and received its rules of existence from above.
Complete diplomatic isolation of the autonomy: "Article 19 forbids the hetman relations with other countries. He was to acquaint the tsar's resident with letters received from abroad, forward their translations to the tsar's court, and meanwhile detain the envoys"[54].
Embedding the autonomy's finances into the imperial system: the revenues from the indukta (duty on imported goods) "were to be transferred to the tsar's treasury"[54], while the host treasury was managed by two general treasurers – a Ukrainian and an appointed Russian.
The occupation administration of the Russian Empire levied discriminatory duties on the movement of goods of the Indigenous population: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov quotes the customs books, stating that in 1726 "on the travel document of the Terek resident, the Okochanin Kurman Bogomatov... duties of 24 altyns in money were collected by decree"[292].
The government of the Russian Empire dispatched specialists to collect data on the lands and population of the Nokhchi: historian Sh. B. Akhmadov points out that in 1728 the officer I. G. Gerber "on the government's assignment... compiled a description of the localities and population... as well as a map of this area"[130].
The Regular Army of the Russian Empire founded a new military base for infrastructural entrenchment in the region: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that in the autumn of 1722 Peter I "founded the fortress of the Holy Cross on the Sulak"[292].
Militarized Settlers of the Russian Empire were used for the mass settlement of new frontiers: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov points out that at the new fortress "1 thousand families of Cossacks from the Don are being settled"[292].
The occupation administration of the Russian Empire forcibly resettled the subordinated Indigenous population: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov records that "by 1724 the Terek town had been razed, and all of its population, including the Okotsk sloboda, populated by natives of Chechnya... was transferred to the new fortress"[292].
The introduction of the collegium as a parallel organ of power to seize judicial and fiscal functions from the hetman's administration: it acted "as the highest appellate instance and administrative-controlling organ"[103], and "the Little Russian Collegium for the first time channeled Ukrainian finances into the tsar's treasury in full"[103].
The arrest of the acting hetman and officers in St. Petersburg for petitions defending autonomous rights. Peter was preparing a demonstrative reprisal: "Peter I planned to hold a show trial of Polubotok and his associates, accuse them of 'high treason,' and liquidate the Ukrainian autonomy. A special General Court was created for this purpose"[307]. Only the prisoner's death derailed the plan: the hetman "died on December 21, 1724 (O.S.) of pneumonia"[307].
The Regular Army of the Russian Empire deployed armed contingents to suppress resistance in the region: historian Sh. B. Akhmadov records that "on July 23, 1722, a tsarist detachment headed by General Veterani... approached the village of Enderi"[130].
The government of the Russian Empire purposefully organized military actions to punish the defiant Indigenous population: historian Sh. B. Akhmadov points out that on August 4, 1722, by decree of Peter I, "a punitive expedition was carried out for a second time against the rebellious Chechens and Andreevtsy"[130].
The Regular Army of the Russian Empire destroyed the settlements and the food supply base of the highlanders: historian Sh. B. Akhmadov states that a tsarist detachment "came to Enderi and completely devastated and burned it, leaving nothing but ashes behind"[130], while during the August 1722 raid "3 thousand houses were destroyed and the grain in the fields was burned"[130].
The diplomatic apparatus of the Russian Empire enlisted loyal forces of neighboring peoples for joint armed actions against the Nokhchi societies: historian Sh. B. Akhmadov states that the 1722 military expedition included "an armed detachment of Kalmyks, sent by Ayuka Khan at the tsar's request, numbering 3,730 men"[130].
The diplomatic apparatus of the Russian Empire expanded the legal subjugation of the Nokhchi territories under threat of military annihilation: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that having suffered defeat in 1722, the local princes took an oath of allegiance, "'including in it for the first time also their Chechens'"[292].
The government of the Russian Empire justified expansion with ideas of enlightening undeveloped societies: historian Michael Khodarkovsky states the ambition of the metropole's officials "to bring both Christianity and civilization to the 'wild and uncivilized' peoples along its borders"[308].
The government of the Russian Empire deliberately constructed an image of the Indigenous population as criminal savages: historian Michael Khodarkovsky records that in administration documents the highlanders were labeled as "inconstant and treacherous," while their actions were explained by references to their "predatory craft, to which they are predisposed by their very nature and upbringing"[309].
The government of the Russian Empire fabricated historical accounts to provide legal justification for invasion: historian Michael Khodarkovsky points out that in 1748 and in the 1770s officials deliberately constructed fictitious claims that the Indigenous peoples of the Caucasus had allegedly been Christians in the past, in order to contest the claims of other empires and "legitimize their efforts at their 're-Christianization'"[309].
The occupation administration of the Russian Empire used religious pretexts for expansion: historian Michael Khodarkovsky cites a memorandum by Governor-General P. S. Potemkin, who in 1784 declared that under the pretext of returning the highlanders to the faith and sending priests to them, the empire would be able to shed "the light of divine bliss among all the peoples scattered in the mountains"[309].
The introduction of censorship over book printing by Peter I's decree of 5 October 1720: "no new books whatsoever are to be printed except previous church editions, and even those old church books… are to be corrected before printing"[310].
The ruler's direct decree against the very language of the local population in print: the same decree of Peter I ordered books to be checked against Muscovite ones, "so that there be no discord or distinct dialect in them"[310].
A covert operation by Muscovite emissaries disguised as monks to destroy ancient documents of the 11th–17th centuries: "The enormous archive and library burned down; the charters and grants… of princes, magnates, and hetmans perished"; "The fire destroyed the written memory of the Lavra's independent Ukrainian political and spiritual life"[311].
The government of the Tsardom of Muscovy organized attacks on the territories of the Nokhchi for the mass capture of prisoners and booty: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that in 1718 there took place a "predatory expedition of detachments of Don Cossacks and Kabardian princes allied with Peter I into the 'Chechen uezd' along the Sunzha and the Argun"[292], as a result of which "800 prisoners were captured, not counting 'belongings'"[292], and in 1721 the Astrakhan governor A. P. Volynsky "invited the Don Cossacks and, together with the Terek Cossacks, organized raids to the Agrakhan and Aksai rivers against the Kumyks and Chechens"[292].
The diplomatic apparatus of the Tsardom of Muscovy used loyal elites of neighboring peoples for joint armed actions against the Nokhchi societies: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that in 1718 an expedition into the lands of the Nokhchi was carried out by the forces of "Kabardian princes allied with Peter I"[292].
The collapse of the anti-Moscow coalition from within: on the Right Bank, the Tatar allies betrayed the Cossacks and turned to seizing the civilian population – "the Tatars, disobeying Orlyk, scattered in raiding parties and began taking yasyr captives across Ukrainian villages"[312]. Orlyk himself wrote to the Swedish king: "What atrocities unheard of under the moon did the wild Tatars then commit!"[312].
The empire's forcible retention of the Right Bank: the Bila Tserkva fortress with its Muscovite garrison held out, and the campaign collapsed after the Tatars' betrayal – "Orlyk retreated without taking Bila Tserkva"[312], and his army disintegrated.
The government of the Tsardom of Muscovy consolidated militarized settlements on the border with the lands of the Nokhchi to strengthen control: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that in 1711–1712 "the small Greben Cossack towns along the Terek were merged, by order of Tsar Peter I, into 5 stanitsas - from Chervlyonnaya to Kurdyukovskaya"[292].
The government of the Tsardom of Muscovy organized expeditions to study and inventory natural resources in the territories of the Indigenous population: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov records the 1717 "survey of mineral springs and other natural riches of the Terek River (including the Bragun warm springs) by Doctor Gottlieb Schober on the assignment of Peter I"[292].
Entrenchment of tsarist control over the autonomy's foreign policy: the articles "fully preserved the previously established control of the tsarist regime over… foreign policy"[54].
Preservation of tsarist representatives' oversight of the hetmanate's administrative apparatus: the articles "fully preserved the previously established control of the tsarist regime over local financing and the functioning of the administrative apparatus"[54]. The institution of the tsar's resident was established alongside the hetman: "The first tsar's resident was stolnik A. Izmailov, who in his work was guided by official and secret tsarist articles"; the residents "were given the right to control the election and official appointments of representatives of the starshyna"[54].
Preservation of the center's control over the region's finances: the articles "fully preserved the previously established control of the tsarist regime over local financing"[54].
Physical destruction of the armed forces of the supporters of independence in a general battle in order to eliminate the military potential of the resistance[314].
Mass executions of captured Cossacks after the capitulation at Perevolochna and Poltava for the final intimidation of the supporters of autonomy[314].
The liquidation of the autonomy's statehood and international agency as a result of the defeat of the Swedish-Ukrainian forces. The rout at Poltava set off an irreversible process of dismantlement: "In the hundred years after the famous Pereiaslav Council, Ukraine traveled the path from the 'Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky'… to the de facto liquidation of the autonomy and the hetmanate, to the country's transformation into an ordinary province of the Russian Empire"[314].
A punitive expedition against the Sich to physically annihilate the Lower Dnipro Cossacks: "Three infantry regiments led by Colonel P. Yakovlev were sent there. Keleberda was the first to be taken and burned on April 16. A stubborn battle was fought for Perevolochna"[315]. The assault on the Sich itself lasted four days. The punitive force was guided by mercenary colonel Hnat Galagan: in "1709 he took part in the destruction of the Zaporozhian Sich, for which he received four villages on the Right Bank"[78].
Total extermination of the defenders: when Perevolochna was taken, "All the Zaporozhians and inhabitants were killed (only 12 people were taken alive), and the neighboring kurins were also burned and slaughtered"[315].
Destruction of the military-economic base of the Lower Dnipro Cossacks. The Sich "was a kind of military base housing the fleet, artillery, and arsenal"[75] – all of this infrastructure was destroyed or seized during the assault.
Complete destruction of the Sich's buildings and neighboring fortifications: "the neighboring kurins were also burned and slaughtered"; "All the buildings were destroyed, as Menshikov wrote: 'To lay waste all their places, so that this treasonous nest be utterly uprooted'"[315].
The use of the church as an instrument of punishment: the anathema was proclaimed by the tsar's direct order - "be pleased to have him, for such a deed of his, publicly cursed in the cathedral church..."[314]. No theological grounding was supplied for it, and part of the Ukrainian clergy refused to accept the rite: a former Lokhvytsia archpriest said during the proclamation of the anathema, "Our Mazepa is holy and will be in heaven, and your sovereign will not"[314].
The destruction of the political leadership that supported the hetman: "the entire (!) general starshyna" followed Mazepa, and of the Left-Bank colonels only four remained loyal to the tsar[314]. The investigation of the officers was directed from the tsar's headquarters, where "being at Lebedyn and Sumy, Peter and Menshikov in January 1709" oversaw the reprisals[314]. The ecclesiastical punishment was arranged by the tsar's direct order - by a letter of 31 October 1708 (No. 2795) Peter I instructed metropolitan Stefan Yavorsky: "be pleased to have him, for such a deed of his, publicly cursed in the cathedral church..."[314][316].
Intimidation of the population by an exemplary reprisal against an entire town: during the capture of Baturyn "in the bloody massacre and fire a multitude of the town's defenders and inhabitants perished"[314], "the town was razed to the ground and its inhabitants annihilated," and the returning residents were charged a special tax "for treason"[81]. The devastation of the hetman capital also destroyed the state archive of the Hetmanate, which suffered "during the storming of Baturyn castle by A. Menshikov in 1708"[81].
The deployment of the regular army to physically destroy the Hetmanate's defiant capital: "On the morning of November 2, Russian troops burst into Baturyn. After a two-hour battle, the remnants of the garrison were slaughtered together with the entire civilian population"[315][314]. The town was looted and burned on Peter's direct order - his letter to Menshikov of 5 November 1708: "and Baturyn, as a mark against the traitors (for they resisted), burn entire, as an example to others"[316].
Total massacre of the civilian population: "Funck slaughtered more than a thousand people in the small town of Terey (Tereyska sloboda) and burned the town down, and also burned Dryhalov (Nedryhailiv)… and ordered everyone encountered to be killed, so as to instill horror in others"[317]. "In total, about 15 thousand Ukrainians died in the Baturyn tragedy, including all the women and children"[315][314].
The demonstrative destruction of the city as an act of intimidation for the rest of the country. Peter I personally gave the order: "and Baturyn, as a sign to the traitors (since they resisted), burn down entirely as an example to others"[315][314]. Hrushevsky: the Muscovite army, having taken Baturyn "through the treachery of one man," "dealt terribly with the populace: the people were slaughtered, the town razed to the ground, the commanders given over to terrible tortures"[210].
The anathema against Mazepa was proclaimed by the tsar's direct order - "be pleased to have him, for such a deed of his, publicly cursed in the cathedral church..."[314]. Part of the Ukrainian clergy refused to accept the rite: a former Lokhvytsia archpriest said during the proclamation of the anathema, "Our Mazepa is holy and will be in heaven, and your sovereign will not"[314]. The Ecumenical Patriarchate never recognized it: "the anathema was laid on Ivan Mazepa for political reasons and had no theological or canonical justification"[318].
The installation of a government fully controlled by Moscow after the destruction of the capital: the election of the new hetman took place in Peter's presence immediately after the execution of the Baturyn officers – "Under the circumstances, the officers simply confirmed Skoropadsky, presented by Peter"[315]. Hrushevsky records the mechanics of dependence: "The hetman's residence was moved from Baturyn to Hlukhiv, right up against the Muscovite border, and two Muscovite regiments were garrisoned there so that the residents could arrest the hetman and the officers at once," and "everyone in Ukraine understood that power lay not with the hetman but with those residents"[210].
The formalization of the occupation regime through sham procedures. The officers, terrorized by the massacre, were made to vote for the metropole's preferred candidate: "At the end of this spectacle came the execution of the officers captured in Baturyn, and then the formal election of a new hetman. Under the circumstances, the officers simply confirmed Skoropadsky, presented by Peter"[315][314].
The government of the Tsardom of Muscovy organized military operations against Nokhchi societies: the historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that «the measures taken by Peter I to combat the Bulavin «rebeliya» and other uprisings, including on the Terek against Chechnya, were in essence punitive»[292].
The regular army of the Tsardom of Muscovy physically exterminated inhabitants who refused to submit to the occupation: the historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that in 1708 «military detachments were sent to the Terek that physically annihilated any population showing the slightest disobedience»[292].
The diplomatic apparatus of the Tsardom of Muscovy concluded an alliance agreement with Kalmyk forces for joint actions against the Indigenous population: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that on September 30, 1708, "at the negotiations between Peter's military commander P.M. Apraksin and the Kalmyk khan Ayuka, an agreement of eight articles was concluded, including 'on the pursuit of the Chechens and Nogais'"[292].
The government of the Tsardom of Muscovy captured and physically eliminated a resistance leader: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that the tsar "personally decided the fate of the insurgent leaders"[292], as a result of which the leader Murat Kuchukov, "taken prisoner while wounded, was hanged"[292].
The government of the Tsardom of Muscovy used demonstrative brutal executions to psychologically break the Indigenous population: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov records that the captured leader of the uprising was "hanged by a rib on a hook in accordance with Peter I's order to P.M. Apraksin ('carry out a cruel death penalty')"[292].
The mass mobilization of Cossack regiments for penal construction labor: the digging of the Ladoga Canal "was carried out chiefly by the hands of Ukrainian Cossacks," and there "tens of thousands of people perished from back-breaking labor, hunger and the harsh climate"[103]. In 1721 a "10,000-strong Cossack corps" headed by P. Polubotok was dispatched to the canal[79]; the works continued through 1721–23[54].
Shifting the upkeep of the mobilized onto the subjects themselves: Cossacks dispatched to the imperial construction sites were left without supply and "suffer great want from hunger, having neither food for themselves, nor winter quarters, nor fodder for the horses"[314]. Workers for state construction the tsar simply ordered to be "taken from Ukraine, from those towns that are under your authority"[314], while at the works themselves people perished "from back-breaking labor, hunger and the harsh climate"[103].
Removing Cossack regiments from the Cossack hierarchy and placing them under the direct command of imperial officials: Peter I handed the direction of the Ladoga Canal works to B.-C. Münnich, who "took over from Prince A. Menshikov the direction of the construction (digging) of the Ladoga Canal"[103]; Cossack corps were dispatched to these works "by order of Tsar Peter I"[79].
The mass conscription of the population for the construction of military installations in Moscow's interests. The tsar officially thanked the hetman and the starshyna for their "diligent zeal (and considerable labors borne) in the making of the Pechersk fortification" and promised for this "service and labors in the making of the said fortification" his "most exalted favor"[314].
A course toward the complete absorption and destruction of the very name of the Cossack state. In the Bendery Constitution of 1710, Orlyk recorded Moscow's intention "to eradicate the Zaporozhian Host of the Lower Dnipro and to efface its name forever"[314]. Hrushevsky confirms the course was systemic: Mazepa's alliance with the Swedish king merely "gave the Muscovite government occasion… to take up more forcefully the abolition of Ukrainian autonomy. The Muscovite government had pursued this line from the very beginning"[210]. What was at stake was the enslavement of the entire people: the Muscovite state, per the preamble of Orlyk's constitution, managed to "violate and utterly destroy" the rights and liberties "and to cast a slave's yoke upon the free Cossack people, never conquered by it"[319].
The backroom partition of Ukraine along the Dnipro: by the "Eternal Peace" of 1686 Moscow officially ceded the Right Bank to Warsaw, without the participation or consent of Ukrainians themselves. The fate of the Right-Bank Cossacks was decided by foreign capitals: the ban of 1699 implemented this partition, against which Palii's Cossacks, "contrary to the terms of the 'Eternal Peace' of 1686," continued the struggle to unite both banks[79].
The abolition of the regimental-sotnia administrative order to serve the imperial partition of the lands: the Sejm of 1699 adopted the decision "banning the Cossacks on the Right Bank"[79].
The deployment of a network of military bases (Novobohorodytska, Kamianyi Zaton) near the Zaporozhian Sich. Under the pretext of protection, Moscow was establishing rigid military control: "The Zaporozhians... put forward the destruction of Kamianyi Zaton as a condition for any oath of allegiance"[314][315].
The regular army of the Tsardom of Muscovy carried out armed raids on the territories of Nokhchi societies: the historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that in 1691–1700 «punitive expeditions were carried out by the tsarist authorities in retaliation against the rebel Cossacks and their Highlander allies»[292] and records «retaliatory punitive raids by tsarist forces»[292].
The diplomatic apparatus of the Tsardom of Muscovy expanded the legal subordination of Nokhchi territories: the historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov records that in 1696 the metropole formalized «the expression of Russia's protection over the Braguny principality in Chechnya»[292].
The occupation administration of the Tsardom of Muscovy imposed discriminatory levies on Nokhchi societies for the internal movement of goods: the historian Sh. B. Akhmadov emphasizes that «the Okochans (Akkin Chechens) living in the town of Terki were obliged without exception to pay duty on the various goods and wares they took out for sale to their compatriots in Chechnya and Ingushetia»[130].
The occupation administration of the Tsardom of Muscovy engaged in systemic lawless arbitrariness against the Indigenous population: the historian Sh. B. Akhmadov states that «the venality and bribe-taking of the voivodes, who permitted themselves great abuses — all this was far from a new phenomenon»[130].
The systematic dismantling of the autonomy's democratic institutions. Moscow categorically forbade the Cossacks to elect their leaders independently and to conduct an independent foreign policy: "and without a petition and without a decree of the great sovereigns... a hetman shall not be elected... nor shall they, on their own... write anything to anyone"[314]. The abolition of the historical right to grant asylum: the autonomy was forced to perform the functions of the Muscovite punitive apparatus and to hand over fugitives: "and those fugitives and people of all ranks shall not be received, nor kept among them"[314].
To ensure constant armed oversight of the autonomy's top leadership and to prevent uprisings, the Tsardom of Muscovy stationed its regular troops directly in the hetman's capital: "with the hetman in Baturyn, for his protection and safety, there shall be a Muscovite streltsy regiment..."[314].
The introduction of strict political censorship. Under threat of punishment, the population was forbidden even to say aloud that their lands constituted a separate state entity: "and let no one utter such voices, that the Little Russian land is of the hetman's regiment"[314].
The use of demographic engineering to accelerate assimilation. Moscow openly proclaimed a course toward erasing ethnic boundaries by encouraging marriages with Great Russians: "to unite the Little Russian people with the Great Russian people by all measures and means... through matrimony and other conduct..."[314].
"In this provision of the articles, the tsarist government's aspiration to turn Ukraine into a region incorporated into the Russian state on ordinary terms was openly declared for the first time"[315].
The Tsardom of Muscovy enshrined in state documents its course toward the complete absorption of the region: "Prince Vasily declared in the articles the beginning of the process of Russification"[315].
To guarantee acceptance of the treaty's enslaving terms, the tsardom bribed the local starshyna with guarantees that they would keep their offices, placing the elite's personal ambitions above national ones: "the hetman shall not remove anyone of the general starshyna from office without the will and decree of their most serene tsarist majesty..."[314].
The division of spheres of influence behind the Ukrainian ally's back, accompanied by a financial deal for territory: under the 1686 treaty Moscow undertook "to count out one hundred forty-six thousand Muscovite rubles and hand them over to the Commonwealth"[320][315][314]. Ukrainian historiography recorded the deal as an ordinary purchase - Hrushevsky: Muscovy "concluded an eternal accord with Poland (paying, in addition, another 146 thousand rubles for Kyiv)"[210].
The complete exclusion of the autonomy from participation in international negotiations on the status of its own territories. In the legal partition of Ukrainian lands the opinion of the people themselves was ignored – contemporary Ukrainian historiography assesses the Eternal Peace "as a national tragedy of Ukraine"[315].
The diplomatic entrenchment of spiritual expansion: Moscow secured the inclusion in the treaty of an article on the position of the Orthodox in the Commonwealth – the 1686 treaty ordered the Polish side "to inflict no oppression and no coercion toward the Roman faith or the Union"[320] – and arrogated to itself the role of protector of Orthodoxy on Polish lands, relying on the Kyiv metropolitanate already subordinated to Moscow. The treaty also secured an ecclesiastical lever: the Orthodox eparchies in the Commonwealth "according to their spiritual rank and custom, are to receive blessing and ordination from the Metropolitan of Kyiv; and this shall harm none of them in the favor of His Royal Majesty"[321] - while the Kyiv metropolitanate was already subordinated to Moscow.
To gain control over the church, Moscow applied corruption at the international level: the Kyiv metropolitanate was seized "through bribery, manipulation, and blackmail"[322]. The payment was recorded by Patriarch Dionysius of Constantinople himself in a letter to the tsars: "We have received the alms of your holy tsardom from your envoy, lord Nikita Alekseevich – three forties of sables and two hundred gold pieces"[323].
The liquidation of independent jurisdiction to turn the church into an instrument of assimilation – the annexation of the Ukrainian church to the Muscovite one in 1686[324]. The Ecumenical Patriarchate later officially stated that these actions "were carried out entirely out of accord with the lawful canonical prescriptions"[325].
The introduction of censorship control over Ukrainian book printing. Patriarch Joachim banned publications without his sanction and sent a reprimand for publishing books without prior permission[315][314], and in 1690 "the Council of the Russian Orthodox Church condemned the 'new Kyivan books' of Petro Mohyla, Kyrylo Stavrovetsky, Ioanykii Galiatovsky, Sylvestr Kosov, Lazar Baranovych, and others, laying on them a curse and anathema"[326].
The annexation of the metropolitanate was disguised as the protection of co-religionists: the reform was carried out "relying on the Orthodox movement against the Turkish conquerors"[315], and "Golitsyn's main project concerning Ukraine… became the reform of the Ukrainian Orthodox church, or rather – the subordination of the Kyiv metropolitanate to the Moscow patriarch"[315][314].
Immediately after the subordination began the imposition of Muscovite church standards and rites, marginalizing the local tradition. The Ecumenical Patriarchate recorded the canonical illegality of the act itself directly: "the alienation from our Throne of the Metropolitanate of Kyiv and of the Orthodox Churches of Lithuania and Poland dependent on it, as well as their attachment to the Holy Church of Moscow, were from the very beginning carried out entirely out of accord with the lawful canonical prescriptions"[325].
Following the establishment of control over the metropolitanate came the gradual unification of liturgical printing and pronunciation along Muscovite models, culminating in Peter I's direct decree of 1720: church books could be printed only after being checked against Muscovite ones, "so that there be no discord or distinct dialect in them"[310].
The occupation administration sent subordinated Nokhchi (Okochans) to take part in armed conflicts (the Chyhyryn campaigns) on the territory of Ukraine: the historian I. Kh. Tkhamokova notes that in 1678 the Kabardian prince Kaspulat Mutsalovich Cherkassky (under whose authority the Okochans were) received a tsar's charter «for having taken part in the Crimean and Chyhyryn campaigns»[305]; the document registers for 1678 record a dispatch from the Chuhuiv voivode Ivan Rykhtarov to the Razryadny Prikaz «on the march of the regiment of Prince Kaspulat Mutsalovich Cherkassky to Chuhuiv»[327]; and in 1679 Tsar Fedor Alekseevich issued a decree to the Posolsky Prikaz «on his regiment performing guard duty in the vicinity of Chuhuiv and Kharkiv»[327].
For the ideological justification of the seizure, the Muscovite authorities received a ready-made historical canon: "the 'SYNOPSIS,' 'Synopsis, or a Brief Collection from Various Chroniclers on the Origin of the Slaveno-Rossian People' – a historical work first published by the printing house of the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra (1674)"[54] – the book constructed a shared "Slaveno-Rossian" past, legitimizing Moscow's rule over Kyiv retroactively.
The implantation of a narrative about the unbreakable bond between Kyiv and Moscow, serving the political aims of the metropole: the author sought "to give the Muscovite tsar the motivation to continue the struggle with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth" and "to ease the incorporation of the Hetmanate's elite into the Russian ruling estate"[328].
The deliberate dissolution of a distinct Ukrainian identity in the construct of a "single Orthodox people": the "Synopsis" subordinated Kyiv's history to the idea of a common "Slaveno-Rossian people"[54], and its political program presupposed a struggle for the "liberation… of the remaining part of the 'single Orthodox people'"[328]. Hrushevsky points out what exactly was erased: the "Synopsis" is "a brief history of Rus composed at the Pechersk Lavra, done very lifelessly and incompletely (the history of the Cossacks, the struggle against Poland, and all of Ukraine's recent history are almost entirely omitted from it)"[210].
The imperial historical myth was directly based on religious manipulation: expansion was justified by the concept of religious unity. The author constructed an ideologeme in order "to give the Muscovite tsar the motivation to continue the struggle with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth for the liberation from Catholic rule of the remaining part of the 'single Orthodox people'"[328].
Interference in internal governance: "the hetman was deprived of the right to arbitrarily (without a hearing before the military court) issue orders for the execution or dismissal of his subordinates"[329] – personnel and judicial decisions were removed from the hetman's sole authority. The norm itself is older than this treaty: it was first fixed by the Konotop Articles of 1672 ("executed and removed from office… by the judgment and proof of the Host's court")[330].
A wager on the estate interests of the officer class: "The Konotop Articles limited both the hetman's power and, accordingly, the autonomy of the Hetmanate, while significantly expanding the rights of the Cossack officers"[329] – by expanding the rights of the officer oligarchy at the hetman's expense, Moscow gained levers of influence over the autonomy through the hands of its own elite.
The official partition of Ukrainian lands between two neighboring states. The treaty was signed exclusively by representatives of Moscow and Warsaw: "Concluded on January 30 (February 9) in the village of Andrusovo, near Smolensk, for 13.5 years. The Russian delegation was headed by okolnichy A. L. Ordin-Nashchokin, the Polish one by commissioner Yu. Hlebowicz"[331]. The opinion of the autonomy itself was completely ignored: "The interests of the hetmans and of Ukraine were, of course, not taken into account"[315]. A separate knot of the collusion was Kyiv: article 7 of the Andrusovo treaty (30 January 1667) stipulated that "the very city of Kyiv… is to be handed over and vacated… that is, within two years, counting from the present treaty… in the coming year 1669, on the 15th day of April"[332]; "Muscovy then did not give it back"[210] - and in 1686 it legalized what it had withheld, "paying for Kyiv once more" (see the "Eternal Peace" campaign). The "territory for money" scheme was laid down in the same document: article 34 records Tsar Aleksei's consent to grant "a worthy treasury for the satisfaction of the szlachta exiles… from the part of Ukraine ceded to His Tsarist Majesty's side"[332] - with the sum deferred to future embassies.
In the legal partition of Ukrainian lands, the opinion of the people themselves or of their leaders was demonstratively ignored. The Hetmanate was treated exclusively as an object: "The interests of the hetmans and of Ukraine were, of course, not taken into account"[315].
The legal codification of the territory's division. Moscow deliberately fragmented a once unified country, turning such important regions as Zaporizhzhia into rightless buffer zones under joint administration: "...Zaporizhzhia (which under the treaty of 1667 was under the joint rule of Moscow and Warsaw)"[314].
Having gained political power over the Left Bank, Moscow immediately attempted to seize the right to collect taxes in order to extract resources directly: "the attempts of Russian voivodes... to introduce their own taxation system in Ukraine led only to revolts (for example... the attempted census of 1666...)"[314].
Expansion of the military occupation of the autonomy: in addition to reinforcing the garrisons of Kyiv, Chernihiv, Pereiaslav, and Nizhyn, "Russian military garrisons headed by voivodes were introduced into Poltava, Kremenchuk, Novhorod-Siverskyi, Oster, Kaniv, and other cities, as well as into Kodak in the Liberties of the Zaporozhian Host"[206] – the upkeep of the troops was placed on Ukrainian taxpayers.
Direct extraction of the autonomy's economic resources: "The collection of taxes from the Ukrainian population (except for the Cossack estate) was entrusted to the tsarist administration. The collected funds were channeled into the tsar's treasury"[206].
Depriving the autonomy of control over its own administrative and economic life: "direct control over the military-administrative and financial-economic life of Ukraine passed into the hands of the tsarist voivodes"[206] – the sovereign functions of the hetman's authority passed to representatives of the metropole.
The creation of a specialized agency to govern the autonomy: through the Little Russian Prikaz the tsarist government "exercised control over the political-administrative activity of the hetman's administration and the tsarist voivodes in Ukraine"[103] – the governance of the Hetmanate was embedded into Moscow's prikaz vertical.
The occupation administration of the Tsardom of Muscovy maintained the regime depriving the subordinated societies of the Nokhchi (the Okochans) of autonomy, officially formalizing the transfer of power over them to a new feudal lord loyal to the metropole: in 1661 Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich issued a charter of grant to the Kabardian prince Kaspulat Mutsalovich Cherkassky, instructing him «to be prince over the Okochans and over the Cherkas who serve us, the great sovereign, on the Terek, and to administer and judge them in military organization and in all our affairs»[333].
The central authorities of the Tsardom of Muscovy used an appointed ruler for the legal subordination of the region: in 1676 the Posolsky Prikaz sent an instruction to the Kabardian prince Kaspulat Mutsalovich Cherkassky on the necessity of arriving at the Terek town «to administer the oath of the population of the North Caucasus to Tsars Ivan and Peter Alekseevich»[327].
The appointed controlled administration sent subordinated Nokhchi (Okochans) to take part in the metropole's Crimean campaigns: a dispatch from the Kabardian prince Kaspulat Mutsalovich Cherkassky to the Posolsky Prikaz in 1675 states that for the campaign against the Crimean ulusy he had at his disposal «190 Okochan men»[327]; the historian I. Kh. Tkhamokova adds that in 1675 detachments fought in Crimea alongside the prince «with uzdens, with the newly baptized, and with «Okochans»»[305].
Taking advantage of the political crisis and having surrounded the autonomy's leaders with its troops, the tsardom forced them to sign a new, utterly enslaving treaty. The articles turned the confederative bond with Moscow into a federative one: "the Pereiaslav Articles converted Ukraine's confederative ties with Russia into the form of a federation. The Ukrainian state lost its independence and acquired the status of a political autonomy within the Russian state"[79]. The very basis of the treaty was forged: "Prince Trubetskoy took advantage of his military superiority over Yu. Khmelnytsky, rejected the Zherdiv Articles and forced the Ukrainian side to accept 14 points of the so-called old articles of 1654 (which in reality constituted a falsification of the 1654 treaty)"[79]. The 14 imposed points themselves are published in the "Collection of State Charters and Treaties"[330].
After forcing the signing of the treaty, Moscow moved to the direct occupation of the autonomy's living space. The articles codified the expansion of the military presence: "besides Kyiv, tsarist voivodes were introduced into Pereiaslav, Chernihiv, Nizhyn, Bratslav, and Uman"[79] – garrisons headed by voivodes ensured physical control over the territory from within.
Seeking to weaken the Hetmanate from within and prevent it from breaking vassalage, Moscow artificially fomented civil war, supporting and arming the internal opposition against the lawful hetman: "The proclamation of I. Vyhovsky as hetman was received negatively by the representatives of the forces opposed to him," led by Poltava colonel Pushkar and kish otaman Barabash[54]. Their revolt opened the period of the bloody Ruin.
When covert methods of destabilization proved insufficient, the tsardom moved to open military invasion. The regular Muscovite army tried to subdue the Hetmanate by force, which ended in catastrophe at Konotop. The imperial historian Soloviev admitted: "The flower of the Muscovite cavalry, which had made the fortunate campaigns of '54 and '55, perished in a single day… Never again was the tsar of Muscovy able to field such a strong host"[334].
The occupation administration dispatched emissaries to collect strategic, demographic, and economic data on the mountain societies of the Nokhchi: in 1658 the central apparatus of the Posolsky Prikaz instructed the Terek voivodes to find out «how many of them there are and what kind of people they are... and what fighting force they have... and what grows in their land, and what craftsmen there are»[333], in execution of which in 1659 the Terek voivodes Melenty Kvashnin and his associates «sent a streltsy commander into the Shibut land and ordered him to inspect in the Shibut land... the towns and places»[333], who, in an extract for the report of the Posolsky Prikaz to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich of 1660, reported that «[to]wns they have none, nor any fighting forces»[333].
The occupation administration made attempts to force the independent societies of the Nokhchi (the Shibutians) into legal subordination: an extract for the report of the Posolsky Prikaz to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich of 1660 states that the Terek voivodes Melenty Kvashnin and his associates sent a military emissary to the Highlanders and ordered him «to bring them to the oath»[333]; however, the attempt proved unsuccessful, and he «did not br[in]g the inhabitants of the Shibut land to the oath»[333].
The occupation administration set itself the task of extracting hostages from the mountain societies of the Nokhchi (the Shibutians), but the attempt did not succeed: in 1658 the central apparatus of the Posolsky Prikaz directly instructed the Terek voivodes «to order that amanats be taken from them — kinsmen of notable people»[333], after which the Terek voivodes Melenty Kvashnin and his associates ordered their military emissary «to take an amanat to the Terek»[333]; however, the extract for the report of the Posolsky Prikaz to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich of 1660 records no handover of new hostages and merely states the old fact that «on the Terek [there is an amanat] of theirs»[333].
As soon as political interests changed, Moscow went for a separate peace with its recent enemy – Poland – negotiating behind its Ukrainian ally's back: "The priorities at the negotiations were territorial and financial questions, as well as the terms of the election of the Russian tsar to the Polish throne"[81] – the fate of the Cossack lands became a bargaining chip in this deal. The negotiations were held at Niemieza near Vilna from August 1656; the armistice was signed on October 24[81].
The Tsardom of Muscovy physically and legally isolated the autonomy from participation in international politics, deciding the fate of the Cossack lands without regard for their national interests: "The plenipotentiary representatives of the Ukrainian Cossack state, headed by R. Haponenko, were not admitted to the negotiating table"[81]. The hetman's request to grant the envoys mandates as full participants was "let pass unheeded" by the tsar's government: the delegates "sat idle beside the commissioners, not admitted to the official sessions"[335].
The Tsardom of Muscovy exploited the critical position of the Hetmanate to impose a format of subordination, refusing from the outset to take on symmetrical obligations. To the Cossacks' demand for a mutual oath the tsar's envoy answered with a refusal - by the embassy's own report, swearing on behalf of the sovereign was "a thing that has never happened and never will, and it is unbecoming for the hetman even to say such things, for every subject must swear to his sovereign"[335]; Khmelnytsky had to convene the council three times in a single day, 18 (8) January 1654, yet Buturlin, citing the autocratic character of the Russian monarch's power, refused a second time[79]. The "treaty" itself was not a bilateral act: "The originals of the treaty documents have not survived. Only their copies and drafts are known"; the Ukrainian side submitted its terms "in the form of petitions to the tsar," while "the acts of the tsarist government took the form of 'grants' from the tsar"[81] - the written terms were drawn up only in Moscow in March 1654.
The seizure of a neighboring state's territories was presented to the population of the Tsardom of Muscovy not as an act of political or military expansion, but as a sacred mission of protecting brothers in faith. This myth outlived the centuries: as late as 1990 Solzhenitsyn reproduced it verbatim – "The return of these lands to Russia was then perceived by everyone as REUNIFICATION"[336].
From the very beginning, Moscow laid an asymmetric foundation for the relationship, harshly cutting off the autonomy's international agency. Tsar Aleksei's charter (27 March 1654) directly restricted the hetman's foreign relations: "And with the Turkish sultan and the Polish king, without our tsarist majesty's decree, no relations are to be maintained"[337].
The occupation administration handed out privileges and transferred to loyal Nokhchi leaders power over dependent people in order to win them over to its side: the register of cases of the Posolsky Prikaz for 1645 records a petition from the serving Okotsk murza Chepan Kokhostrov to Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich and a report extract by the central apparatus «on granting him an increase to his salary and possession of the uzdens and «people» of his brother, murza Albir Kokhostrov»[333].
The occupation administration forced the mountain societies of the Nokhchi into legal subordination: in 1647, under pressure from the Terek voivodes, the Shibutians «placed themselves under thy sovereign high hand in direct servitude... and swore the shert oath on the Quran»[333], while the Michkiz people «with all the Michkiz land placed themselves in servitude under thy sovereign high hand... and swore the shert on the Quran»[333].
The occupation administration used the taking of hostages from among the Indigenous population to guarantee the loyalty of the mountain societies of the Nokhchi: a dispatch from the Terek voivode Prince Venedikt Andreevich Obolensky and his associates to the Posolsky Prikaz in 1647 officially records the fact of «the giving of an amanat to the Terek town»[333]; the metropole instructed the voivodes «to order that amanats be taken from them — kinsmen of notable people»[333], as a result of which the Highlanders «gave a good amanat to the Terek town, Kasa»[333][338].
The metropole's occupation administration legally prohibited the free residence of the Indigenous population in Tersky Town, organizing the forced expulsion of unapproved persons and total demographic control: in 1631, Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich issued a decree to the Prikaz of the Kazan Palace ordering a census of the newly arrived Nokhchi (Michkizians and Okochans) and ruling that those of them «who cannot be trusted» must be «ordered to be expelled out of Tersky Town, and ordered to go back whence each had come»[327]; to ensure surveillance, in the state register of serving people for the region of the Prikaz of the Kazan Palace for 1637, the central authorities recorded in detail the number of subordinate residents of Tersky Town, including 350 «Okotsky people» and 680 newly arrived «Okochans, and Tatars, and Michkizians, and Shibutians»[333]; and in 1640, on the orders of the Terek voivode, the Terek syn boyarsky P. Lukin and the clerk F. Belkov compiled a name-by-name register of the population of the Terek slobodas, rigidly recording every household of the subordinate Nokhchi (Okochans)[327][333].
The occupation administration compelled the subordinate Nokhchi to take part in armed conflicts: in their petition to Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich, the Okotsky murza Kokhostrov Biytemirov and the serving Okochans of Tersky Town reported that «we, your sovereign's kholops (bonded servants), fight your sovereign's disobedient ones, not sparing our heads; for you, sovereign, we shed our blood and lay down our heads»[333].
The occupation administration and forces loyal to it sent the subordinate Nokhchi (Okochans) to take part in armed conflicts, including against their own compatriots: the historian I. Kh. Tkhamokova states that in 1626 the voivodes sent «252 Okochans»[305][327] on a campaign, and in 1628, during an armed incursion, the Kabardian murza Konshov-murza Bitemryukov «went against these "mountain people"... with the "Okochans"»[305].
Armed detachments loyal to the metropole carried out incursions into the territories of the Nokhchi mountain communities in order to suppress their resistance: the historian I. Kh. Tkhamokova notes that in 1628 the Kabardian murza Konshov-murza Bitemryukov «went against these "mountain people" together with the "free" atamans and Cossacks and with the "Okochans"»[305].
The occupation administration demanded that the Nokhchi mountain communities (the Shibutians) legally formalize their subordinate status: a report from the Terek voivodes Ivan Andreyevich Dashkov and Bogdan Gerasimovich Priklonsky to the Posolsky Prikaz records information about «the oath given by the Shibutians Lavarsan Yazyev and Zatyshka Lavarsanov on behalf of 20 households in 1627»[333], with a direct injunction that they «not fall away from the sovereign and remain under the sovereign's hand in outright bondage (kholopstvo)»[333].
The occupation administration imposed an annual tribute in kind on the Nokhchi mountain communities (the Shibutians): a report from the Terek voivodes Ivan Andreyevich Dashkov and Bogdan Gerasimovich Priklonsky to the Posolsky Prikaz states that when subjecthood was formalized in 1627, the mountaineers were required «to give yasak at one kul (sack) of honey per year»[333].
The occupation administration of Tersky Town mobilized the metropole's subordinate allies: in a petition to Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich, the Kabardian prince Sholokh reported that «the voivode Mikita Dmitreevich Velyaminov sent me... with my father on your sovereign's service... against your sovereign's disobedient ones — the Michkiz people, against their kabaks»[333].
The occupation administration of Tersky Town dispatched armed detachments which, as the Kabardian prince Sunchaley Yanglychevich Cherkassky and his son the Kabardian prince Sholokh reported to Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich, made their way «across the mountains and through mountain crevices, impassable places»[333] in order to suppress the defiant communities.
The occupation administration of Tersky Town deliberately organized a campaign of violent punishment: in his petition to Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich, the Kabardian prince Sholokh reported that the Terek voivode sent the armed detachments precisely «against your sovereign's disobedient ones — the Michkiz people, against their kabaks»[333].
During the punitive campaign, the military detachments burned entire auls to the ground: in a petition to Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich, the Kabardian prince Sunchaley Yanglychevich Cherkassky reported that they «burned down and utterly ruined many Shibut and Kalkan and Erokhan and Michkiz kabaks»[333].
The punitive detachments plundered and enslaved the population: in a petition to Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich, the Kabardian prince Sunchaley Yanglychevich Cherkassky reported that they «utterly ruined» the auls «and took many captives»[333].
The occupation administration of Tersky Town employed mass terrorizing violence: in a petition to Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich, the Kabardian prince Sunchaley Yanglychevich Cherkassky reported that the military detachments «burned down and utterly ruined many Shibut and Kalkan and Erokhan and Michkiz kabaks»[333] and «slew many peo[ple]»[333].
The punitive detachments physically exterminated the local population: in a petition to Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich, the Kabardian prince Sunchaley Yanglychevich Cherkassky reported that in the settlements they «slew many other peo[ple]»[333].
Under direct military threat, the mountain communities were forced to capitulate: in a petition to Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich, the Kabardian prince Sunchaley Yanglychevich Cherkassky reported that the mountaineers «brought their guilt... petitioned humbly and gave... the shert (oath of allegiance)»[333].
As a result of the devastation of their settlements, the subordinated communities handed people over to the occupation administration: in a petition to Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich, the Kabardian prince Sunchaley Yanglychevich Cherkassky records that they «gave amanats (hostages) to Tersky Town»[333].
The metropole's administration did not pay for forced labor and withheld food provisions for five years: a memorandum from the Posolsky Prikaz (Ambassadorial Office) to the Prikaz of the Kazan Palace records a complaint that the subordinate Okochans of Tersky Town «were not given the sovereign's grain allowance for the past years — for the 125th, and the 126th, and the 127th, and the 128th, and the 129th year»[333].
The occupation administration deliberately exhausted the Indigenous population materially, forcing them to perform compulsory service at their own expense: in a petition submitted to Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich, the Okotsky murza Kokhostrov Biytemirov and the serving Okochans of Tersky Town reported that, because their allowance went unpaid, they «were left without grain, have utterly perished from hunger and every hardship, have fallen, sovereign, into great debt, and are dying a death of starvation together with our wives and little children»[333].
Representatives of the metropole confiscated the personal property of a deceased Nokhchi delegate into the state treasury: a memorandum from the Posolsky Prikaz to the Prikaz of the Kazan Palace prescribed an investigation into the death of the drowned Okotsky murza Kokhostrov Biytemirov, while of what was found they «took his clothing and all his goods into our treasury»[333].
The occupation administration used the physical loss of documents to artificially lower the social status of local residents for the purpose of taxing them economically: an extract of the Posolsky Prikaz concerning a petition to Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich states that after «the sovereign's charter of grant was lost», the heirs of the deceased Nokhchi delegate were stripped of their privileges and «made equal in everything with the Okochans, with the plowing people, and carts and wagons are exacted from them», whereas previously «no taxes whatsoever had been taken» from them[333].
The metropole's occupation administration abolished Nokhchi self-governance, forcibly subordinating them to an alien elite: historian E. N. Kusheva states that in 1614 Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich ordered the Kabardian prince Sunchaley Yanglychevich Cherkassky «to be prince over all the Okochans... to judge them and to have charge of them in military organization and in all matters»[338].
The appointed administration forced the Indigenous population into unpaid labor: historian E. N. Kusheva points out that the Kabardian prince Sunchaley Yanglychevich Cherkassky compelled the service Okochans of the Terek town subordinate to him «to make all manner of wares for him, to plow the fields and to mow the hay»[338]. The metropole itself went years without paying for the military service of the Indigenous population: a report from the Terek voivode Pyotr Petrovich Golovin to the Astrakhan voivode Ivan Nikitich Odoyevsky records that they «serve the sovereign tsar... in all manner of the sovereign's Terek... services... yet have not been granted the sovereign's monetary and grain salary for the tenth year now»[327].
Representatives of the metropole's authorities openly seized property from the Nokhchi population, abusing their official position: in their petition to Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich, the service Okochans of the Terek town reported that the Kabardian prince Sunchaley Yanglychevich Cherkassky «having taken from us by force 8 good horses from the herd, sent them off to his kabaks (villages) in Kabarda»[327][333].
The appointed occupation administration enslaved the Indigenous population: a petition submitted to Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich by the service Okochans of the Terek town stated that the Kabardian prince Sunchaley Yanglychevich Cherkassky «wrongfully sold 4 of our fellow Okochans»[327][333] and «took a wife into bondage and sent her off to his kabaks in Kabarda»[327][333].
The appointed occupation administration used corporal punishment and unlawful arrests: a petition submitted to Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich by the service Okochans of the Terek town stated that the Kabardian prince Sunchaley Yanglychevich Cherkassky «orders us to be thrown into prison and beaten with the knout without your sovereign knowledge and without guilt»[327][333].
The appointed occupation administration used unlawful arrests to suppress the resisting Indigenous population: a petition submitted to Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich by the service Okochans of the Terek town stated that the Kabardian prince Sunchaley Yanglychevich Cherkassky «orders us to be thrown into prison and beaten with the knout without your sovereign knowledge and without guilt»[327][333].
The occupation administration forcibly sent subordinated Nokhchi to fight against their own compatriots: historian E. N. Kusheva indicates in the heading of a primary document that there took place a «campaign of Terek men-at-arms and Terek Okochans... against the Endirey ruler Saltan-Magmut and the people of the Okotsk and Michkiz kabaks who had joined him»[333].
The occupation administration imposed tribute on the highland Nokhchi societies: an extract from the book of the Terek town's Prikaz office records that the administration sent people «to the Michkizes for the sovereign's yasak»[333].
The metropole deliberately ignored official complaints by the Indigenous population about the arbitrary conduct of the appointed rulers, depriving them of the right to protection: the compilers of academic document collections state that, as regards the petition submitted to Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich, «the petition of the «Okochans» was not granted»[327].
The military forces of the Tsardom of Muscovy erected a new fortified base: historian E. N. Kusheva writes that they «were building it in 1588-1589... Mikhailo Burtsev and Kelar Protasyev... the main force of its garrison consisted of streltsy armed with «fire weaponry», with pishchal arquebuses»[338], while historians A. S. Kulikov and V. A. Runov add that in the early 17th century «the Terek fort had turned into a rather powerful fortress. Its artillery numbered 40 large guns»[339].
A permanent military contingent maintained at state expense was stationed in the territory: historian I. Kh. Tkhamokova quotes a tsar's decree according to which «in 1623, «upon the petition of the Terek and Greben Cossacks», a tsar's decree was sent to the Terek ordering the payment of salaries to 30 atamans and 470 rank-and-file Cossacks»[305]. New personnel were also sent in to hold the positions: historian I. Kh. Tkhamokova notes that «in 1589, soon after the town was built, 800 streltsy and Cossacks were to be sent there from Astrakhan, but the Astrakhan voivode sent only 600 men»[305].
The occupation administration systematically brought in regular troops to maintain the garrison: historians A. S. Kulikov and V. A. Runov note that in the early 17th century «the garrison numbered more than a thousand streltsy and Cossacks»[339].
The occupation administration imposed vassalage under the guise of an equal alliance: historian Murat Yasar notes that the rulers «regarded the shert rather as a military alliance»[340], whereas historian Michael Khodarkovsky points out that «in Moscow's eyes, the shert now signified an oath of allegiance by the tsar's new and loyal subjects»[308].
To secure the political subordination of the Nokhchi elite, the administration used financial incentives: historian Murat Yasar points out that «the signing of the shert went hand in hand with monetary allowances and gifts that the tsar gave to local rulers»[340].
As a guarantee of submission, the occupation administration detained representatives of the Nokhchi elite: historian E. N. Kusheva writes that «his nephew Batai was left as an amanat (hostage) in the Terek town»[333].
The occupation administration obliged the subordinated Nokhchi societies to take part in military campaigns: historian E. N. Kusheva points to documents «on the possibility of the participation of Murza Shikh... in a campaign of Russian men-at-arms»[333].
The military forces of the Tsardom of Muscovy repeatedly rebuilt the fortified outpost on the lands of the Nokhchi: historian E. N. Kusheva writes that "in 1577 - 1578... the Russian town was reestablished on the Terek River at the mouth of the Sunzha"[338], while the compiler of the collection of documents E. N. Kusheva indicates that the military forces of the Tsardom of Muscovy "rebuilt the ostrog in 1590 and 1635"[333] and that "in 1651 a Russian ostrog was built anew on the left bank of the Sunzha"[333].
The occupation administration of the Tsardom of Muscovy systematically brought armed detachments into the lands of the Nokhchi to hold the bridgehead: the compiler of the collection of documents E. N. Kusheva indicates that at the site of the fortress, "by order of the Terek voivodes, a detachment of streltsy and Cossacks was permanently stationed"[333], and during the siege of 1653 it held "Russian service men, Terek atamans, and Cossacks"[333].
The military forces of the Tsardom of Muscovy erected a fortified outpost on the lands of the Nokhchi: historian E. N. Kusheva states that in 1567 "the Russian town... was erected in that same year"[338].
To construct the base on the lands of the Nokhchi, the administration brought in armed detachments: historian E. N. Kusheva writes that in the spring of 1567 the voivodes A. S. Babichev and P. Protasyev were dispatched from Moscow "with many men, as well as ordnance, cannons, and arquebuses"[338], while historians A. S. Kulikov and V. A. Runov note that they were sent "with firepower and many men"[339].
The government of the Tsardom of Muscovy used religious identity and the concept of protecting co-religionists as ideological cover for military expansion: historian Michael Khodarkovsky states that the diplomatic apparatus positioned the tsar as a "universal Christian ruler who 'upheld the true Christian faith'"[308], while invasions were motivated by a "divine obligation to rescue Orthodox Christians from infidel captivity"[308]; as a result, as historian Michael Khodarkovsky summarizes, in the advance into new territories "Moscow's military and political interests could no longer be separated from the ideological and theological rhetoric of expansion"[308], because of which the North Caucasus "became a religious frontier"[309].
The government of the Tsardom of Muscovy fabricated historical narratives to provide legal justification for the invasion of new territories: historian Michael Khodarkovsky points out that in diplomatic correspondence officials deliberately constructed fictitious claims that the Indigenous peoples of the Caucasus had allegedly, since ancient times, been Muscovite "subjects in the Riazan region, who then fled from Riazan and settled in the mountains"[308].