Regular Army
Armed forces under direct state control.
Techniques Applied
Actors
| ID | Name | Procedures |
|---|---|---|
| G0009 | Russian Empire | 268 |
| G0008 | Tsardom of Muscovy | 37 |
| G0010 | USSR | 26 |
| G0013 | Soviet Russia (RSFSR) | 14 |
| G0014 | White Movement (AFSR) | 10 |
| G0011 | Russian Federation | 4 |
Campaigns Conducted
Procedures Carried Out
The military forces of the Tsardom of Muscovy erected a fortified outpost on the lands of the Nokhchi: historian E. N. Kusheva states that in 1567 "the Russian town... was erected in that same year"[1].
To construct the base on the lands of the Nokhchi, the administration brought in armed detachments: historian E. N. Kusheva writes that in the spring of 1567 the voivodes A. S. Babichev and P. Protasyev were dispatched from Moscow "with many men, as well as ordnance, cannons, and arquebuses"[1], while historians A. S. Kulikov and V. A. Runov note that they were sent "with firepower and many men"[2].
The military forces of the Tsardom of Muscovy repeatedly rebuilt the fortified outpost on the lands of the Nokhchi: historian E. N. Kusheva writes that "in 1577 - 1578... the Russian town was reestablished on the Terek River at the mouth of the Sunzha"[1], while the compiler of the collection of documents E. N. Kusheva indicates that the military forces of the Tsardom of Muscovy "rebuilt the ostrog in 1590 and 1635"[3] and that "in 1651 a Russian ostrog was built anew on the left bank of the Sunzha"[3].
The occupation administration of the Tsardom of Muscovy systematically brought armed detachments into the lands of the Nokhchi to hold the bridgehead: the compiler of the collection of documents E. N. Kusheva indicates that at the site of the fortress, "by order of the Terek voivodes, a detachment of streltsy and Cossacks was permanently stationed"[3], and during the siege of 1653 it held "Russian service men, Terek atamans, and Cossacks"[3].
The military forces of the Tsardom of Muscovy erected a new fortified base: historian E. N. Kusheva writes that they «were building it in 1588-1589... Mikhailo Burtsev and Kelar Protasyev... the main force of its garrison consisted of streltsy armed with «fire weaponry», with pishchal arquebuses»[1], while historians A. S. Kulikov and V. A. Runov add that in the early 17th century «the Terek fort had turned into a rather powerful fortress. Its artillery numbered 40 large guns»[2].
A permanent military contingent maintained at state expense was stationed in the territory: historian I. Kh. Tkhamokova quotes a tsar's decree according to which «in 1623, «upon the petition of the Terek and Greben Cossacks», a tsar's decree was sent to the Terek ordering the payment of salaries to 30 atamans and 470 rank-and-file Cossacks»[4]. New personnel were also sent in to hold the positions: historian I. Kh. Tkhamokova notes that «in 1589, soon after the town was built, 800 streltsy and Cossacks were to be sent there from Astrakhan, but the Astrakhan voivode sent only 600 men»[4].
The occupation administration systematically brought in regular troops to maintain the garrison: historians A. S. Kulikov and V. A. Runov note that in the early 17th century «the garrison numbered more than a thousand streltsy and Cossacks»[2].
As a guarantee of submission, the occupation administration detained representatives of the Nokhchi elite: historian E. N. Kusheva writes that «his nephew Batai was left as an amanat (hostage) in the Terek town»[3].
When covert methods of destabilization proved insufficient, the tsardom moved to open military invasion. The regular Muscovite army tried to subdue the Hetmanate by force, which ended in catastrophe at Konotop. The imperial historian Soloviev admitted: "The flower of the Muscovite cavalry, which had made the fortunate campaigns of '54 and '55, perished in a single day… Never again was the tsar of Muscovy able to field such a strong host"[5].
After forcing the signing of the treaty, Moscow moved to the direct occupation of the autonomy's living space. The articles codified the expansion of the military presence: "besides Kyiv, tsarist voivodes were introduced into Pereiaslav, Chernihiv, Nizhyn, Bratslav, and Uman"[6] – garrisons headed by voivodes ensured physical control over the territory from within.
Expansion of the military occupation of the autonomy: in addition to reinforcing the garrisons of Kyiv, Chernihiv, Pereiaslav, and Nizhyn, "Russian military garrisons headed by voivodes were introduced into Poltava, Kremenchuk, Novhorod-Siverskyi, Oster, Kaniv, and other cities, as well as into Kodak in the Liberties of the Zaporozhian Host"[7] – the upkeep of the troops was placed on Ukrainian taxpayers.
To ensure constant armed oversight of the autonomy's top leadership and to prevent uprisings, the Tsardom of Muscovy stationed its regular troops directly in the hetman's capital: "with the hetman in Baturyn, for his protection and safety, there shall be a Muscovite streltsy regiment..."[8].
The regular army of the Tsardom of Muscovy carried out armed raids on the territories of Nokhchi societies: the historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that in 1691–1700 «punitive expeditions were carried out by the tsarist authorities in retaliation against the rebel Cossacks and their Highlander allies»[9] and records «retaliatory punitive raids by tsarist forces»[9].
The deployment of a network of military bases (Novobohorodytska, Kamianyi Zaton) near the Zaporozhian Sich. Under the pretext of protection, Moscow was establishing rigid military control: "The Zaporozhians... put forward the destruction of Kamianyi Zaton as a condition for any oath of allegiance"[8][10].
The mass conscription of the population for the construction of military installations in Moscow's interests. The tsar officially thanked the hetman and the starshyna for their "diligent zeal (and considerable labors borne) in the making of the Pechersk fortification" and promised for this "service and labors in the making of the said fortification" his "most exalted favor"[8].
The mass mobilization of Cossack regiments for penal construction labor: the digging of the Ladoga Canal "was carried out chiefly by the hands of Ukrainian Cossacks," and there "tens of thousands of people perished from back-breaking labor, hunger and the harsh climate"[11]. In 1721 a "10,000-strong Cossack corps" headed by P. Polubotok was dispatched to the canal[6]; the works continued through 1721–23[12].
Removing Cossack regiments from the Cossack hierarchy and placing them under the direct command of imperial officials: Peter I handed the direction of the Ladoga Canal works to B.-C. Münnich, who "took over from Prince A. Menshikov the direction of the construction (digging) of the Ladoga Canal"[11]; Cossack corps were dispatched to these works "by order of Tsar Peter I"[6].
The government of the Tsardom of Muscovy organized military operations against Nokhchi societies: the historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that «the measures taken by Peter I to combat the Bulavin «rebeliya» and other uprisings, including on the Terek against Chechnya, were in essence punitive»[9].
The regular army of the Tsardom of Muscovy physically exterminated inhabitants who refused to submit to the occupation: the historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that in 1708 «military detachments were sent to the Terek that physically annihilated any population showing the slightest disobedience»[9].
The deployment of the regular army to physically destroy the Hetmanate's defiant capital: "On the morning of November 2, Russian troops burst into Baturyn. After a two-hour battle, the remnants of the garrison were slaughtered together with the entire civilian population"[10][8]. The town was looted and burned on Peter's direct order - his letter to Menshikov of 5 November 1708: "and Baturyn, as a mark against the traitors (for they resisted), burn entire, as an example to others"[13].
Total massacre of the civilian population: "Funck slaughtered more than a thousand people in the small town of Terey (Tereyska sloboda) and burned the town down, and also burned Dryhalov (Nedryhailiv)… and ordered everyone encountered to be killed, so as to instill horror in others"[14]. "In total, about 15 thousand Ukrainians died in the Baturyn tragedy, including all the women and children"[10][8].
The demonstrative destruction of the city as an act of intimidation for the rest of the country. Peter I personally gave the order: "and Baturyn, as a sign to the traitors (since they resisted), burn down entirely as an example to others"[10][8]. Hrushevsky: the Muscovite army, having taken Baturyn "through the treachery of one man," "dealt terribly with the populace: the people were slaughtered, the town razed to the ground, the commanders given over to terrible tortures"[15].
The installation of a government fully controlled by Moscow after the destruction of the capital: the election of the new hetman took place in Peter's presence immediately after the execution of the Baturyn officers – "Under the circumstances, the officers simply confirmed Skoropadsky, presented by Peter"[10]. Hrushevsky records the mechanics of dependence: "The hetman's residence was moved from Baturyn to Hlukhiv, right up against the Muscovite border, and two Muscovite regiments were garrisoned there so that the residents could arrest the hetman and the officers at once," and "everyone in Ukraine understood that power lay not with the hetman but with those residents"[15].
The formalization of the occupation regime through sham procedures. The officers, terrorized by the massacre, were made to vote for the metropole's preferred candidate: "At the end of this spectacle came the execution of the officers captured in Baturyn, and then the formal election of a new hetman. Under the circumstances, the officers simply confirmed Skoropadsky, presented by Peter"[10][8].
A punitive expedition against the Sich to physically annihilate the Lower Dnipro Cossacks: "Three infantry regiments led by Colonel P. Yakovlev were sent there. Keleberda was the first to be taken and burned on April 16. A stubborn battle was fought for Perevolochna"[10]. The assault on the Sich itself lasted four days. The punitive force was guided by mercenary colonel Hnat Galagan: in "1709 he took part in the destruction of the Zaporozhian Sich, for which he received four villages on the Right Bank"[16].
Total extermination of the defenders: when Perevolochna was taken, "All the Zaporozhians and inhabitants were killed (only 12 people were taken alive), and the neighboring kurins were also burned and slaughtered"[10].
Destruction of the military-economic base of the Lower Dnipro Cossacks. The Sich "was a kind of military base housing the fleet, artillery, and arsenal"[17] – all of this infrastructure was destroyed or seized during the assault.
Complete destruction of the Sich's buildings and neighboring fortifications: "the neighboring kurins were also burned and slaughtered"; "All the buildings were destroyed, as Menshikov wrote: 'To lay waste all their places, so that this treasonous nest be utterly uprooted'"[10].
Physical destruction of the armed forces of the supporters of independence in a general battle in order to eliminate the military potential of the resistance[8].
Mass executions of captured Cossacks after the capitulation at Perevolochna and Poltava for the final intimidation of the supporters of autonomy[8].
The empire's forcible retention of the Right Bank: the Bila Tserkva fortress with its Muscovite garrison held out, and the campaign collapsed after the Tatars' betrayal – "Orlyk retreated without taking Bila Tserkva"[18], and his army disintegrated.
The Regular Army of the Russian Empire deployed armed contingents to suppress resistance in the region: historian Sh. B. Akhmadov records that "on July 23, 1722, a tsarist detachment headed by General Veterani... approached the village of Enderi"[19].
The Regular Army of the Russian Empire destroyed the settlements and the food supply base of the highlanders: historian Sh. B. Akhmadov states that a tsarist detachment "came to Enderi and completely devastated and burned it, leaving nothing but ashes behind"[19], while during the August 1722 raid "3 thousand houses were destroyed and the grain in the fields was burned"[19].
The Regular Army of the Russian Empire founded a new military base for infrastructural entrenchment in the region: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that in the autumn of 1722 Peter I "founded the fortress of the Holy Cross on the Sulak"[9].
The Regular Army of the Russian Empire dispatched armed contingents to preemptively suppress an anti-colonial uprising: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov cites a report by General Douglas, who ordered that the assembled rebel force must, «not being allowed to multiply, be averted and destroyed by the dispatched detachment»[9], after which, as historian Sh. B. Akhmadov states, «on July 4, 1732, the tsarist authorities dispatched a military detachment to Chechnya, headed by General Douglas, who commanded the troops at the Holy Cross fortress»[19].
The Regular Army of the Russian Empire physically eliminated a highlander settlement: historian Sh. B. Akhmadov states that the detachment under the command of Colonel Koch «entered the village of Chechen on July 7, burned it down completely, and began hastily withdrawing»[19].
The forced incorporation of the autochthonous armed forces into the imperial army: "The Sloboda Cossack regiments were abolished and in their place it was ordered to form 5 hussar regiments"[20].
The use of Ukrainian Cossack regiments in the imperial war against the Ottoman Empire. The merits of the Zaporozhians and their kish otaman Kalnyshevsky in this war "were recognized by the tsarist government and the empress, who awarded him a gold medal with diamonds"[21] – which saved neither him nor the Sich from reprisal right after the victory.
The encirclement and forcible seizure of the Sich by imperial troops right after the Cossacks had helped the empire win the war. The manifesto records the operation matter-of-factly: "On June 4, Our Lieutenant-General Tekeli, with the troops entrusted to him by us, occupied the Zaporozhian Sich"[22].
The use of Ukrainian Cossacks as a military resource for storming Turkish fortresses and consolidating imperial claims to Crimea: at Ochakiv "the 'loyal Cossacks' took part in the storming of the fortress"[7], and in the storming of Izmail "in total over 6 thousand Black Sea Cossacks took part in the battle"[17].
The seizure and incorporation into the empire of Right-Bank Ukraine, Volhynia, and Podillia: Russia received "the Kyiv, Bratslav, and Podillia voivodeships and the eastern half of the Volhynian voivodeship," and under the third partition – "the western part of the Volhynian voivodeship, the western parts of the Kholm land and the Belz voivodeship"[6].
The use of Ukrainian Cossack formations in the imperial war: "The Russian troops, which included the Ust-Danube Budjak Cossack Host, captured Khotyn, Bendery… Akkerman"[12].
The Russian Empire sent troops into the lands of the Nokhchi in order to force its way deep into Greater Chechnya and break the resistance of its communities. The historian D. A. Khozhaev describes General Bulgakov's troops as having "come with fire and sword to the Chechen land," and the Khankala battle of 1807 as bloody[23]. In February 1807, three detachments under the overall command of the commander of the Caucasus Line, General Bulgakov, crossed the Terek; on February 13, the troops broke through the Khankala Gorge by storm, which the inhabitants had fortified with barricades, ditches, and abatis. The commander of the Caucasus Line, General Bulgakov, reported that he had entered "for the exemplary punishment" of the Nokhchi communities, that the inhabitants, having gathered in number about 10,000, "resolved to perish rather than let the Russian troops pass through the gorge"; during the storming of the gorge, of the defending Chechens, according to his report, there were "about 1,000 killed on the spot"[24]. The imperial historian Potto admits that after Bulgakov's storming of the Khankala Gorge, Russian attempts to penetrate deep into Chechnya "were never renewed"[25].
The Russian Empire dispatched troops to the lands of the Nokhchi to compel submission. The plan of the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Gudovich, was to strike the unprotected: to catch the inhabitants before "their livestock and families… are sheltered in the mountains," for "then… their punishment and complete success in the matter would be surer and more convenient." When the commander of the Caucasus Line, General Bulgakov, delayed by an expedition in Dagestan, gave the inhabitants time to fortify the Khankala Gorge and took it by a bloody storm, General Gudovich, in a directive of March 20, 1807, refused to take this "on his own account" and stressed that he had not sent him to wage war: "you were sent not to wage war with the Chechen peoples, but to punish them and bring them into complete submission." The commander of the Caucasus Line, General Bulgakov, considered the outcome of the campaign to be that the Chechens had by force of arms been "brought to such a state that they will long feel the blow dealt to them and, certainly, will not soon regain strength"[24].
The Russian Empire burned the villages of the Nokhchi, depriving the inhabitants of shelter and means of subsistence. General Ivelich reported that the village of Bolshaya Chechenskaya Ataga was "consigned to fire" by the detachment of the commander of the Caucasus Line, General Bulgakov, while the remaining inhabitants, "whose villages were destroyed by fire," agreed to subjecthood[24].
The Russian Empire compelled the Nokhchi communities by force of arms to swear an oath of subjecthood. After the devastation of the villages, the commander of the Caucasus Line, General Bulgakov, presented the Chechen people with a resolution by which the elders declared: "we submit ourselves with the whole Chechen people… into eternal loyal subjecthood… in witness whereof we give an oath according to our custom on the Holy Quran," and for any violation the people subjected itself "to the strictest punishment and to the devastation of our dwellings without resistance"; the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Gudovich, reported that the Chechens had been "completely subdued by force of arms and brought to an oath of eternal fidelity of subjecthood"[24].
The Russian Empire held hostages from among the Nokhchi inhabitants as a guarantee of submission. Under the resolution presented by the commander of the Caucasus Line, General Bulgakov, the Chechen elders undertook: "we give the foremost among us as amanats, at the choice of the Russian commander in this region"; the villages of Bolshaya Ataga, Malaya Ataga, and Gekhi "gave 3 amanats from the best families," whom the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Gudovich, ordered "to send to Kizlyar… to keep watch over them and to issue for their maintenance 10 r. per month each"[24].
The Russian Empire bought the loyalty of Nokhchi elders in order to use them to bring recalcitrant villages into subjecthood. The commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Gudovich, instructed the Andreyevo elder Hadji-Redjeb to incline the villages "into submission and subjecthood," and assigned a salary to the Chechen uzden Bik-Bulat — "I persuaded the Chechen uzden Bik-Bulat… to whom I said… a salary of 300 r. in silver per year"; for winning over the remaining villages, "about 3,000 r. in silver for bringing them into loyal subjecthood" was allocated[24]. The same bribery, from the Nokhchi side, is recorded by the historian D. A. Khozhaev: through the intermediary Hadji-Redjeb, in the name of the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Gudovich, the very head of the Chechen resistance, Beibulat Taimiev, was won over and took "an oath of fidelity of subjecthood to Russia," while Hadji-Redjeb asked the generals for another 3000 rubles in silver "for bringing the remaining unpacified Chechen villages into loyal subjecthood"[23].
The Russian Empire set neighboring Indigenous peoples against one another so that their mutual enmity would weaken the resistance of each and prevent them from uniting. For the 1807 campaign against the Chechens, the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Gudovich, coerced Kabardians into marching against the Nokhchi: for failure to appear, those "designated from the ranks of uzdens and begauls" faced a fine "of 50 r. in silver and 2 oxen." General Delpozzo reported that he had "inclined the Kabardians to set out on the campaign and to assist together with our troops in punishing the Chechens," and although "it was very difficult to persuade them," he gathered over 3,500 men who "crossed the Terek River and arrived… at the Sunzha River" against the Chechen and Karabulak villages; at the same time, the Kabardians themselves refused to go directly "against the Chechens," as their co-religionists, agreeing to act only "against the Karabulaks alone." General Gudovich stated the aim of this incitement outright — "to set these two peoples at odds with each other and bring them into enmity against one another, and thereby weaken them over time"[24].
The Russian Empire bought the loyalty of the Nokhchi elders in order to use them to incline the Chechens toward submission. To this end, the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Tormasov, through Esaul Chernov, ordered that the Chechen elders and clergy be given «250 rubles each, and others 150 silver rubles each, as a one-time payment, for which the required sum, 1,400 r. in total»[26]. Historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov notes that the colonial authorities generally acted by relying on the social elite, «bribing them with all manner of rewards and privileges for their service to the benefit of Russia»[19]. Historian D. A. Khozhaev cites the same formula with a direct indication of where the money came from: the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Tormasov, agreed «to win over the principal Chechen elders and their clergy… to give 250, and others 150 silver rubles each, and to collect the said money from their own villages» — that is, the bribery of the elite was paid for by exactions from the Chechen villages themselves[23].
The Russian Empire set neighboring Indigenous peoples against the Nokhchi in order to weaken Chechen resistance through their enmity. In July 1810, while pursuing a retreating Chechen party, the commanding general Ivelich, according to the imperial historian Potto, «talked the nearest Ingush auls, in view of the prospect of great gain, into cutting off its retreat»; the incited Ingush attacked the Chechens, and the latter «suffered such a loss that they abandoned even the body of their leader on the battlefield»[27]. The commander of the Caucasian Line, General Delpozzo, reported that the peaceful elders who had pledged to act against the Chechens were «promised rewards according to their merits»[26].
Mass conscription into the militia and the formation of Cossack regiments on the basis of false promises to restore Cossack liberties: "Ukraine was used for the recruitment, equipping, and movement of troops… including a 75-thousand-strong militia from the Kyiv, Podillia, Chernihiv, and Poltava governorates"[28].
The use of regular troops to brutally suppress the unrest of the deceived population: the 1817 uprising of the Buh Cossacks against being turned into military settlers was crushed by four regiments - over 10,000 soldiers with artillery; the rebels were cut down with sabres, drowned in the Southern Buh, and flogged with whips[28].
A years-long campaign of force against the peasant movement in Podillia: "In 1833–39 a special investigation into the case of Karmaliuk and his associates operated – the 'Haluzyntsi commission'… During its activity, about 20 thousand people passed through it as accused or suspected of ties with Karmaliuk"[21].
The Russian Empire carried out punitive raids beyond the Terek in order to force the Nokhchi into submission. The imperial historian Potto writes that Colonel Eristov «crossed the Terek a second time and, after a stubborn battle, destroyed several villages along the Sunzha»[27]. The punitive, rather than defensive, character of these raids was acknowledged by the imperial leadership itself. Commander-in-chief General Rtishchev condemned «such expeditions» and demanded that the mountaineers be won over «not by arms, but by kind treatment»[27]. Emperor Alexander I, upon learning «of yet another raid on peaceful Chechnya by Colonel Eristov», ordered by a special rescript «to establish tranquility on the Caucasian Line through friendliness and gentle indulgence»[23].
The Russian Empire razed and burned Nokhchi villages. The imperial historian Potto writes that Colonel Eristov, having crossed the Terek, after a stubborn battle burned and razed «several villages along the Sunzha»[27].
The Russian Empire used the devastation of villages to force the Nokhchi to hand over hostages. The imperial historian Potto writes that after Colonel Eristov had laid waste to the villages along the Sunzha, the Nokhchi «gave amanats (hostages), promising to trouble the Russian borders no more»[27].
The Russian Empire set neighboring peoples against the Nokhchi in order to weaken the Chechens through their enmity. In 1816, the Nokhchi led by Beibulat Taimiev took Major Shvetsov prisoner[23]. In response, the commander on the Terek, General Delpozzo, in a letter to the Kumyk lords of Endirey, Aksai, and Kostek, pressed them to go to war against the Chechens: «I ask you, I advise you, I order you to form among yourselves one council, one will, to return immediately by force of arms the captive Major Shvetsov, to put an end to the brigand people… to adopt such a resolution as would reduce the Chechens to weakness, to obedience to us, to complete slavery before you»[29]. The Kumyk lords signed «Obligations» in which they pledged «to cease all mutual enmities… and to form a brotherhood», «to receive none of the Chechens… but wherever any of them is encountered, to kill him or deliver him alive to the nearest Russian authorities», and to let no goods pass through to them[29].
The transfer of Cossacks to the status of rightless military settlers (the Arakcheev system), which provoked the uprising of 1817: "The trigger was the order abolishing the Buh Cossack Host and turning the Cossacks into military settlers… The reprisal against the rebellious Cossacks was extraordinarily brutal: many were cut down with sabers, drowned in the Southern Buh, flogged to death"[28]. There were two acts, on opposite sides of the uprising: the nominal decree of April 17, 1817 transferred the Buh Host's district "into direct military administration" (PSZRI, vol. XXXIV, no. 26,802) - this was the trigger; the decree of October 8, 1817 (no. 27,081), issued after the suppression, formalized the liquidation: "the name of the Buh Cossack Host is abolished"[30].
The Regular Army of the Russian Empire moved troops onto the Nokhchi lands between the Terek and the Sunzha in order to forcibly shift the forward fortified line deep into Chechen territory and place the region under military control. Historian D. A. Khozhaev defines the meaning of moving the line as squeezing Chechnya that had not submitted «with new fortresses and fortifications»[23]. The imperial general Yermolov, in his «Notes», attests to the deployment of troops: «on May 24 the entire detachment crossed over… in a single march it moved from the Terek to the Sunzha River»[31].
The Regular Army of the Russian Empire built a fortress on the occupied territory as a stronghold, in order to keep the approaches to the Chechen lands under fire and cut the inhabitants off from their lands. Historian D. A. Khozhaev records that the fortress was built «on Chechen land»[23]. The imperial general Yermolov attests in his «Notes» that the fortress, «constraining the inhabitants in their possession of the best lands… not far from the entrance through the Khan-Kale gorge, was named Groznaya», and that the earthworks were completed by mid-October 1818[31]. The imperial historian Potto confirms the founding on June 10, 1818: «to the thunder of cannon, a strong fortress of six bastions was laid, which Yermolov named Groznaya»[25]. As early as his most humble report of November 1817, Yermolov directly named the purpose of the Sunzha fortresses: «We must occupy the Sunzha River and build fortresses along its course: then the Chechens will be confined in their mountains, deprived of land suitable for cultivation and of the pasture grounds where throughout the winter they shelter their herds from the harsh mountain climate»[32].
The Regular Army of the Russian Empire, having moved troops onto the Sunzha and occupied Chechen land, demanded that the elders of Chechen villages renew their oath of submission under threat of reprisal as against "open enemies." Imperial general Yermolov testifies in his "Notes" that in May 1818 "the elders of almost all the principal Chechen villages were summoned to me," to the military camp, and he demanded "that henceforth such [depredations] no longer be committed, and in confirmation they must renew their old oath of submission and return the captives held by them"[31]. The demand went unfulfilled: the elders "promised nothing"[31].
The Regular Army of the Russian Empire demolished Chechen villages to clear ground for a fortress. Historian D. A. Khozhayev records the destruction of eight villages: to make way for Groznaya, "eight flourishing Chechen villages (Bugun-Yurt, Amirkhan-Kichu, Kuli-Yurt, Sorochan-Yurt, Sunzha, N. Chechen, Topli, Alkhanchu) were destroyed"[23].
The Regular Army of the Russian Empire drove the population of the destroyed villages off their lands, which passed into the conqueror’s possession. Historian D. A. Khozhayev records that the inhabitants of the eight villages near Groznaya were "driven off the lands"[23]. Imperial general Yermolov wrote to Emperor Alexander I that if the population refused to submit, they would be offered "to withdraw and join the other brigands," and then "all the lands will remain at our disposal"[23].
The Regular Army of the Russian Empire held representatives of the villages along the Sunzha as a pledge of submission. Imperial general Yermolov testifies in his "Notes" that when the troops advanced to the Sunzha, "amanats (hostages) from their villages were taken into the camp"[31]. Imperial historian Potto confirms that Yermolov "took amanats from all the auls sitting along the Sunzha"[25].
The Regular Army of the Russian Empire compelled the Indigenous population to perform military service on the conqueror’s side, including against their own kin. Imperial general Yermolov testifies in his "Notes" that "instead of tribute it was ordained that men be sent out for service at the requisition of the commanders," and admits: "there has not yet been an instance of anyone being able to force the Chechens to use arms against their own countrymen, but the first step toward this has already been taken, and it has been impressed upon them that this will always be demanded of them"[31].
The Regular Army of the Russian Empire shifted the cost of the imposed military service onto the Indigenous population itself. Imperial general Yermolov testifies in his "Notes" that the men levied by requisition were sent out "with their own arms and at their own expense"[31].
The Regular Army of the Russian Empire forced Chechen villages to make deliveries and perform labor for the construction of the fortress. Imperial general Yermolov testifies in his "Notes": "the villages from which we held amanats were ordered to deliver timber for the construction"; the nearest villages "dared not show disobedience"[31].
The Regular Army of the Russian Empire instilled submission through fear of the demonstrative destruction of families. Imperial general Yermolov, in his "Address" to the Chechens, declared: "The slightest disobedience… and your auls will be destroyed, your families sold off into the mountains, the amanats hanged, villages exterminated by fire, women and children slaughtered"[23][25].
Solzha (Sunzhenskaya), one of the wealthiest villages, the Russian Empire kept as a source of supply for the fortress of Groznaya, and having seized the village by force, it spent several days carting away its stores. Historian D. A. Khozhayev records the ravaging of Solzha (Sunzhenskaya), as a consequence of which "most of the peaceful neighboring auls fled into the mountains, and the flourishing banks were left deserted for a long time thereafter"[23]. Imperial general Yermolov testifies in his "Notes" that he had earlier ordered the troops to spare the village so that the fortress "could obtain from it all necessary supplies," and when the troops seized the village, "grain, forage, and timber fit for building were carted away for several days"[31].
Solzha (Sunzhenskaya) the Russian Empire took by storm and ravaged as punishment for the village’s refusal to hand over a fellow villager who had shot at a soldier who was taking his ox. Historian D. A. Khozhayev records the ravaging of Solzha (Sunzhenskaya)[23]. Imperial general Yermolov testifies in his "Notes" that a villager shot at a soldier "when they would not give him back an ox from a state wagon, which he called his own," and the attempt to seize the shooter failed — the officer whose "horse was seized by the bridle" was nearly killed, and the detachment retreated; to the demand to hand over the shooter the villagers replied "that they would not surrender the man who shot at the soldier and would defend themselves if the troops came," after which the chief of the corps staff "went himself with several companies… but was met with gunfire," while "the wives and children and the best property had already been sent away; only men remained to defend the houses"; during the storming the troops were ordered to cut off the withdrawal — "to intercept the retreat in the forest" — but the defenders had withdrawn earlier[31].
The Russian Empire built a ring of fortresses around Chechnya in order to squeeze it and cut it off from its neighbors. Historian D. A. Khozhayev writes that following Groznaya, the fortress Vnezapnaya appeared in 1819, erected in order to "squeeze unsubdued Chechnya with new fortresses and fortifications"[23]. Imperial historian Potto confirms its purpose and date: founded on the eighteenth of July 1819, it "separated the Chechens from the Kumyks" and "barred [the Chechens’] way across the Salatau mountains," and it was linked to Groznaya by a chain of fortifications[25]. General Yermolov had planned this fortress as early as his most humble report of November 1817, proposing that "by extending the Line through the Aksai and Andreyevo villages to the Sulak River, Kizlyar will be covered"[32].
The Russian Empire sent troops to ravage Nokhchi villages as punishment for insubordination. Historian D. A. Khozhayev writes that general Yermolov ordered Major General Sysoyev and Colonel Bekovich-Cherkassky to "surround the peaceful village of Dadi-Yurt" and to "punish it by force of arms, giving quarter to no one"[23]. Yermolov confirms his order in his "Notes": to surround the aul, offer the inhabitants the chance to leave, "and should they resist, to punish them by force of arms, giving quarter to no one"[31]. On the fifteenth of September 1819 the aul was surrounded by six Kabardian companies and seven sotnias of Cossacks and taken by storm[25].
The Russian Empire destroyed a single village demonstratively, in order to terrorize the rest of the Nokhchi into abandoning their lands. Imperial historian Potto writes that general Yermolov decided to clear the Kumyk plain, "forcing the Chechens to withdraw… beyond the Kachkalyk mountain ridge," and they could be compelled to do so "only by an example of terror," and the aul of Dadi-Yurt "was chosen as the expiatory sacrifice"[25]. Yermolov himself admits this calculation in his "Notes": "only an example of terror can compel them to remove their wives," and after the destruction of the aul "the example of Dadan-Yurt spread terror everywhere"[31].
During the storming of a Nokhchi aul, the Russian Empire exterminated its inhabitants without distinction of sex or age. Historian D. A. Khozhayev writes that "the brutalized punitive forces spared neither women nor children," and, breaking into the houses, "slaughtered everyone without mercy"[23]. The organizer himself, general Yermolov, admits the toll in his "Notes": "all who bore arms were exterminated, and their number could not have been fewer than four hundred," while "a far greater number were slaughtered or perished in the houses from the effect of artillery and fire"[31]. Imperial historian Potto confirms that the aul was taken only when "every one of its defenders had been exterminated to a man," and those slaughtered or killed in the fire numbered twice as many as the one hundred forty who survived[25].
The Russian Empire led the Nokhchi who survived the destruction of an aul away as captives into its own territory. General Yermolov himself writes in his "Notes" that women and children "were taken prisoner numbering up to one hundred and forty"[31], and the imperial historian Potto confirms this[25]. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that during the crossing of the captives over the Terek, 46 captured girls, "not wishing to endure abuse in captivity," perished, "dragging their guards with them into the turbulent river"[23].
When laying waste to a Nokhchi aul, the Russian Empire handed its property over to the soldiers as spoils. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that the punitive raids under Yermolov proceeded "with the destruction of the population, houses, crops, orchards, and forests, the driving off of livestock, and the plundering of property," while Russian commanders invaded peaceful lands "to distinguish themselves or to seize booty"[23]. General Yermolov himself admits this in his "Notes": after the destruction of Dadi-Yurt, "the soldiers came away with rather rich spoils"[31].
The Russian Empire drove the Nokhchi from the lowland to clear it for itself and for loyal neighbors, and blocked their return with fortresses. Historian D. A. Khozhaev cites the admission of General Orbeliani that this expulsion was a system applied everywhere: "in all of Chechnya there remained not a single aul, not a single household, that had not been resettled from one place to another several times over"[23]. General Yermolov himself, in a report to the emperor, admits this with regard to the Kachkalyk Nokhchi: to clear the Aksai riverside he drove them out of it and placed the fortresses of Amir-Adzhi-Yurt and Vnezapnaya in their place, for the sake of "freeing it [the Aksai] from the Kachkalyks, whom I immediately ordered to be driven out of it; I established the fortress of Vnezapnaya"[32].
The Russian Empire sent troops to lay waste to Nokhchi villages and drive their inhabitants off the land. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that under Yermolov "cruel punitive raids on peaceful Caucasian auls, disgracing Russian arms, with the destruction of the population, houses, crops, orchards, and forests, the driving off of livestock, and the plundering of property, became the rule"[23]. General Yermolov writes in his "Notes" that on September 30, 1819, he "went in person with 6 battalions and 16 artillery pieces toward the Kachkalyk villages" and on October 2 attacked "the village of Goryachevskaya, the strongest of them," while Major General Sysoyev simultaneously invaded from the direction of Groznaya through Khan-Kale, drawing the Chechens’ forces away from the Kachkalyk plain[31]. The imperial historian Potto confirms that the Apsheron men "burst into the aul and consigned it to the flames"[25].
The Russian Empire wiped Nokhchi villages off the face of the earth. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that following Dadi-Yurt, the Kachkalyk villages of Isti-Su, Noiberdy, Alleroy, and others were "taken by storm and destroyed"[23]. General Yermolov writes in his "Notes" that Noyen-Berdy and Allayar-Aul were "utterly devastated"[31]. The imperial historian Potto confirms that "both villages were completely devastated"[25].
The Russian Empire sent troops on a punitive campaign to ravage Nokhchi villages and cut military roads through their lands. The imperial historian Potto writes that in the spring of 1820 Grekov, commander of the left flank, moved on the aul of Germenchuk "with a musket in one hand and an axe in the other," and on the night of March 6, 1820, covertly moved a detachment across the Sunzha, falling suddenly upon the aul of Topli[25]. General Yermolov himself, in an order to Grekov of March 15, 1820, sanctioned the design: "only the squeezing of the Chechens in their essential needs can make plain to them the advantage of submission, and I have long since authorized you to employ every possible means to that end"[32].
The imperial historian Potto describes how, on the night of March 6, 1820, the Greben Cossack regiment "burst without resistance into the aul [Topli], still sunk in deep sleep," the Cossacks "rushed through the saklias with daggers," and "part of the inhabitants were slaughtered before they could rise from their beds"[25].
The imperial historian Potto writes that after the night attack the aul of Topli was left as "smoldering ruins," and at the close of the campaign the troops "advanced forward, burned Germenchug, and drew back to Groznaya," even though the aul stood empty[25].
The Russian Empire forcibly compelled the Nokhchi to work for the conqueror — to cut clearings through their own forests. The imperial historian Potto writes that Grekov, commander of the left flank, "gathered the elders of the surrounding villages and ordered them to send out workers with axes for the felling at once," and under threat of reprisal "compelled the Chechens to obey," after which the conscripted inhabitants cut a clearing through their own forest[25].
The Russian Empire cut down the forests of the Nokhchi to strip their villages of natural protection and open a path for the troops. The imperial historian Potto writes that the "dense forest" stretching from the Argun to the Dzhalka, which served as "an obstacle to the destruction of the Germenchug fields and pastures," was cut through in three days by a wide clearing "opening onto a large glade on which stood Germenchug and a multitude of auls"[25].
The Russian Empire placed a chain of fortifications on the land taken from the Nokhchi to consolidate the seizure and hold the population in submission. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that Yermolov, moving the Caucasian Line to the Sunzha, was "squeezing unsubdued Chechnya with new fortresses and fortifications," and that "on the occupied territory fortifications were built… Neotstupny Stan, Zlobny Okop, Vnezapnaya (1819), and others"[23]. The imperial historian Potto confirms that in the summer of 1820, having barely finished the Germenchuk clearing, Grekov "set about felling the forest along the Sunzha and building on the cleared glades two new fortifications: the Ust-Martan redoubt and Zlobny Okop," and on the site of the demolished Kachkalyk village of Isti-Su he placed "Neotstupny Stan"[25].
The Russian Empire sent troops on punitive campaigns to punish the Nokhchi for resistance and drive them off the plain. Historian D. A. Khozhaev cites the report of Grekov, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, who stated the campaigns’ purpose plainly: to drive the Chechens into the forests, where "only snow and cold weather were lacking for the Chechen people… to feel the necessity of submitting," and notes that Grekov’s expedition "destroyed… two auls — Shali and Malaya Ataga, whose inhabitants had taken a more active part in the unrest"[23]. The imperial historian Potto confirms: on March 1, 1821, the troops "surrounded the village of Oisungur… and, to punish the inhabitants who had fled before their arrival, destroyed it completely," and in February 1822 Grekov "burned the villages of Shali and Malye Atagi"[25].
Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that the expedition of Grekov, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, "destroyed… two auls — Shali and Malaya Ataga"[23]. The imperial historian Potto confirms: on March 1, 1821, the troops "destroyed completely" the village of Oisungur, and in February 1822 Grekov "burned the villages of Shali and Malye Atagi"[25].
The Russian Empire compelled the Nokhchi themselves to cut military clearings through their own forests. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that in imposing the line, the conquerors "compelled the subordinated Highlanders to heavy labor building roads and bridges," while those who evaded it were "fined mercilessly, with their livestock and property confiscated"[23]. The imperial historian Potto confirms that the clearings from Amir-Adzhi-Yurt to Oisungur, Isti-Su, and Gerzel-Aul "through the narrow forested strip… were worked by the natives themselves, under the supervision of the Aksai princes"[25].
The Russian Empire cleared the forests of the Nokhchi to deprive their villages of natural protection. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that under Yermolov, punitive raids proceeded «with the destruction of the population, houses, crops, orchards, and forests»[23]. The imperial historian Potto confirms that on March 1, 1821, the forest was cut down «in one direction as far as Isti-Su, in the other — as far as the Michik», and in February 1822 «wide clearings were cut through the Gekhi, Goity, Shali, and Germenchug forests all the way to Mayurtup»[25].
The Russian Empire held hostages from among the Nokhchi and used them to compel submission. Historian D. A. Khozhaev cites Yermolov's «Address» to the Chechens containing a direct threat: at the slightest disobedience, «the amanats are hanged, villages are exterminated by fire, wives and children are slaughtered»[23]. The imperial historian Potto confirms that Grekov, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line, compelled submission precisely through hostages: any attack on a detachment «will inevitably entail the death penalty or exile to Siberia for the amanats», and therefore «the Chechens willy-nilly reconciled themselves to the fact that the forests — their age-old protection — were falling and disappearing»[25].
The Russian Empire exterminated people for show in order to terrorize the highlanders. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that at the Gerzel-aul fortification «the tsarist generals decided to stage a demonstrative execution to intimidate the highlanders», for which they summoned «318 respected men from the Aksai (Kumyk and Chechen) villages», whom General Lisanevich, «calling out those assembled one by one… threatened and subjected to insults»[23].
The Russian Empire exterminated unarmed people whom it had itself convened under the pretext of an inquiry. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that after General Grekov attempted «to inflict a physical insult» on the Chechen mullah Uchar-Hadji from the village of Mayrtup and was killed by him, «after Lisanevich's command „Stab them! the mass extermination by the soldiers of all the unarmed highlanders present in the fortification began»[23]. The imperial historian Potto confirms that both generals «fell at the hand of a fanatic»[25]."
The Russian Empire eliminated the leadership stratum of the resistance by luring it in under the pretext of an inquiry. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that under the guise of a «demonstrative execution», «318 respected men from the Aksai (Kumyk and Chechen) villages» — elders and revered men of the communities — were summoned to the Gerzel-aul fortification; General Lisanevich, «calling out those assembled one by one», after the killing of the generals ordered their extermination: «after Lisanevich's command „Stab them!" the mass extermination by the soldiers of all the unarmed highlanders present in the fortification began»[23].
On the night of January 10, 1827, General Laptev, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line, led a detachment of 350 Line Cossacks with two horse guns and four hundred Chechens of subordinated communities compelled to take part against the village of Uzeni-Yurt - a refuge for the inhabitants of villages ravaged by troops in Yermolov's punitive campaign of 1826 - in order to destroy it as punishment for raids on the Line and in the absence of the Karabulak leader Astemir. The imperial historian Potto wrote: «Laptev decided to take advantage of that moment to strike a blow in Astemir's absence... and, quickly assembling a detachment, on the night of the tenth of January led it against Uzdeni-Yurt. By dawn the troops already stood before the aul»[33].
At dawn on January 10, 1827, the Cossacks of the detachment of General Laptev, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line, having burst into the village of Uzeni-Yurt, cut down unarmed inhabitants fleeing across the Argun. The imperial historian Potto recorded: the Cossacks, «having barely managed to overtake the tail of the fleeing, seized only three women and killed and wounded some fifteen people»[33]. The killed and wounded were unarmed people overtaken in flight. Armed resistance, as the same Potto wrote, was mounted later only by those inhabitants who had managed to take refuge in the forest.
On January 10, 1827, the troops of General Laptev, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line, razed the village of Uzeni-Yurt on the bank of the Argun, whose inhabitants had fled across the river. The imperial historian Potto acknowledges: «the village of Uzeni-Yurt, with all its property... was destroyed to its foundations»[33]. The village had served as home to people whose former auls had been exterminated by troops in Yermolov's punitive campaign of 1826 and who had refused to resettle under the conqueror's control.
On January 10, 1827, during the razing of the village of Uzeni-Yurt, the troops of General Laptev, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, destroyed the inhabitants' livestock — the basis of a peasant household's sustenance. The imperial historian Potto recorded: the village, "with all its property and even its livestock, was destroyed to the ground"[33]. In the summer of 1827, the Cossacks of General Engelhardt, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, after seizing the population of Samashki, destroyed the standing crops of the Galgai who lived near the aul at mills and farmsteads. Potto wrote: "beforehand they ordered that they be shown the fields belonging to those Galgai who lived at the mills, and burned their grain where it stood"[33]. The destruction of livestock in winter and of ripened grain at harvest time deprived people of sustenance for a year ahead.
During the destruction of Uzeni-Yurt on January 10, 1827, Cossacks of the detachment of General Laptev, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, took captive three women from among the fleeing inhabitants. The imperial historian Potto recorded: the Cossacks "seized... three women"[33]. In the summer of 1827, having encircled the population of the aul of Samashki in an ambush during the harvest, the Cossacks of General Engelhardt, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, took captive the families of resistance leaders: the leader Tara-Adzuev and the family of Bakar-Bulatov; Bulatov himself managed to break through the cordon. Potto wrote: "Tara-Adzuev and Bulatov's family they carried off with them"[33].
In the winter of 1826–1827, General Laptev, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, extorted amanats (hostages) from the village of Geldigen, using a captured young man of Geldigen as leverage. The young man agreed to a staged "captivity" in order to avert the strike being prepared against the village: the occupation left the village no other way to buy safety than by handing over hostages. The imperial historian Potto admits: Laptev, having got the man into his hands, "rejected all offers and demanded one thing only — amanats. Willy-nilly this condition had to be accepted, and the people of Geldigen, who had always stood at the head of bloody movements, left in our hands the hostages of their tranquility"[33].
On the night of January 10, 1827, General Laptev, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, forced four hundred Chechens of subordinated communities to take part in a raid on the Nokhchi village of Uzeni-Yurt with a combat mission against their compatriots. The imperial historian Potto wrote: they "swam across the Argun and were to go by a roundabout road in order to cut off the inhabitants' retreat to the forest"[33]. In the summer of 1827, General Engelhardt, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, compelled to take part in the ambush on the inhabitants of Samashki, alongside a hundred Mozdok Cossacks, as Potto recorded, "as many peaceable Chechens"[33]. The subjugation of these communities was maintained by a system of hostages, as documented by Laptev's same practice with regard to Geldigen.
The Russian Empire sent troops to ravage the lowland villages of the Nokhchi, choosing the moment most vulnerable for the inhabitants to strike. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that «in January 1826, having waited for a period inconvenient for the inhabitants of Chechnya, when the frosts made it difficult to shelter families, Yermolov launches a large punitive campaign into Chechnya», occupying the aul of Bolshaya Ataga on January 26[23]. General Yermolov himself, in a report to Emperor Nicholas I dated May 28, 1826, reported that the troops were methodically cutting roads and occupying villages: on April 12 «the village of Kurchali was occupied without a shot», on the 16th «the troops moved to the village of Gekhi», and on the 24th he «moved to the village of Malaya Roshni, which was found empty»[32].
Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that after February 17, 1826, Yermolov's troops «ravaged and destroyed the auls of Lesser Chechnya - Urus-Martan, Roshni, Gekhi, Belakai, Daut-Martan, and Shelchikhi», and by the end of the campaign «flourishing villages had been destroyed»[23]. General Yermolov himself, in a report to Emperor Nicholas I dated May 28, 1826, confirmed: during the storming of Urus-Martan «the village was burned», Bolshaya Roshni was «put to the torch», and the village of Shali, whose inhabitants «give an amanat, asked for time, and deceived», he «ordered to be destroyed»[32]. The imperial historian Volkonsky specifies that Shali stood empty by the time the troops arrived: Yermolov «did not find a single inhabitant there: all had scattered through the forests», after which he «burned their dwellings»[34].
Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that by May 18, 1826, the Nokhchi's «splendid fruit orchards had been cut down, fields burned»[23]. General Yermolov himself, in a report to Emperor Nicholas I dated May 28, 1826, admitted that at Urus-Martan «its splendid orchards were cut down», and for the village of Shali he gave the order «to cut down the orchards»[32].
The Russian Empire drove off livestock and plundered the ravaged villages of the Nokhchi. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that by May 18, 1826, «livestock had been driven off», and after the troops returned, Yermolov «sent a detachment of 500 Cossacks against Daut-Martan», and «the village was ravaged and plundered»[23].
Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that by May 18, 1826, «women and children had been taken captive» from the Nokhchi[23]. General Yermolov himself, in a report to Emperor Nicholas I dated May 28, 1826, specified the number: in the surprise attack on the village of Stavna-kul on May 2, «16 souls of both sexes were taken captive», and in the attack on Malaya Ataga on May 16 he «captured 15 souls of both sexes»[32]. The imperial historian Volkonsky confirms the seizure at Stavnokol: the sudden movement «brought us sixteen captives»[34].
The Russian Empire condemned the Nokhchi inhabitants to famine by ravaging their villages, crops, and stores. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that after Yermolov's campaign, deprived of shelter and food, «people were dying of hunger, cold, and disease»[23].
The Russian Empire set a neighboring people against the Nokhchi in order to weaken their resistance. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that Yermolov, «attempting to provoke a clash between the Chechens and the Ingush… forcibly conscripted the Ingush into a militia and sent them together with tsarist detachments against Chechen auls», although the Ingush «refused to go against their kin… deserting from the militia»[23].
In the spring of 1829, Commander-in-Chief Paskevich built the governance of Chechnya through the deliberate maintenance of a split of the people into two rival parties — the Shamkhal party and the Beibulat party. In his instruction of May 16, 1829 to Emanuel, commander of the troops on the Caucasian Line, Paskevich wrote: "it is not without use for us to have two parties in Chechnya which, both remaining obedient to our government, will through internecine strife be restrained from hostile designs against the Russians"[35]. To this end he dispatched couriers (messengers with a special commission) to the elders of the Beibulat party, instructed Engelhardt, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, to "assist as far as possible" in summoning them, and by the regulation of August 2, 1829 placed the son of the Shamkhal of Tarki over the Chechens as commissar[35].
On March 6, 1829, in Tarki, Beibulat Taimiev and 120 elders of Chechnya were forced to take an oath of allegiance through the Shamkhal of Tarki. The historian D. A. Khozhaev recorded the coerced nature of this step: the elders "tried to avoid subordination to the tsarist superintendents, to avert from Chechnya the threat of constant raids"[23]. The Chechens themselves, in a petition to Paskevich in April 1829, documented the backdrop against which the submission was being signed: the imperial command "arrested, took captive, hanged and exiled to Siberia and to other places many of those who, being obedient, served the great Sovereign"[35]. Emanuel, commander of the troops on the Caucasian Line, in a report to Paskevich of May 15, 1829, made the recognition of submission conditional: it "will be recognized as well-intentioned only when they unconditionally take the oath and hand over amanats"[35]. Holding Beibulat in Tiflis, Paskevich sealed the subjecthood with the "Regulation on the Submission of the Chechens to Russia" and the statute of August 2, 1829[23][35].
In the spring of 1829, Commander-in-Chief Paskevich neutralized the leading stratum of the Chechen resistance by luring Beibulat Taimiev and 60 elders of his party to Tiflis under the pretext of negotiations and holding them there by force. The historian D. A. Khozhaev wrote: "On arriving in Tiflis, Beibulat learns that Paskevich is with the army in the field. Realizing that he has been deceived, he tries to return to Chechnya immediately, but he is forcibly detained in Tiflis"[23]. Paskevich admitted the deception in his own hand in his instruction to Emanuel of August 2, 1829: "I at once resolved to summon to myself, under the guise of explanations, their elders and the elder Bei-Bulat known to you, so that, having drawn them away here, I might deprive this tribe of the possibility, in case of discontent, of undertaking anything hostile"[35].
From spring until the end of summer 1829, Commander-in-Chief Paskevich forcibly kept with the field army the Chechen elders who had been summoned for negotiations, directly calling them hostages. In his instruction to Emanuel of May 16, 1829, he wrote: "The mere absence of these people, who will be with us in the manner of amanats, will restrain the unpacified Chechens from any hostile attempts"[35]. He summed up the result on August 2, 1829: "The Chechen elders, having been graciously received by me, remained with the detachment and were with me in military operations against the Turks. Having kept them in this way for a whole summer, I secured tranquility for the Line on their part"[35]. By the same document, hostage-taking was entrenched as a system of governing Chechnya: "As a pledge of the submission of the said Chechens, the amanats presented by each eldership are to be kept in the fortress of Grozny; and if from any one an amanat has not yet been delivered, then the elder, until the amanat is delivered, is obliged... to remain himself as a pledge in the fortress of Grozny"[35].
By the regulation of August 2, 1829, Commander-in-Chief Paskevich locked the Chechens' access to trade onto a commissar appointed by the empire: travel to imperial territory was permitted only with tickets (written passes) — "To him is also granted the right to issue tickets to the said Chechens for travel into our domains on trade business"[35]. In practice, the pass system was supplemented by arbitrariness: Chechen society wrote to Paskevich on November 21, 1829 that Engelhardt and Khasai-Musa "order their subordinates to place under arrest all those Chechens who come to them with tickets from Shahbaz," while those obedient to Khasai-Musa act so "that we may thereby be deprived of the means of sustenance"[35].
The use of the regular army to suppress the peasants' anti-serfdom uprising in Sloboda Ukraine (the Shebelynka uprising of 1829) – one in a series of revolts caused by the "servile condition" of the military settlements' inhabitants[28].
The deployment of troops to forcibly suppress the liberation movement: the detachments created by the insurgents "were routed by the tsarist troops in April–May 1831"[6].
Reprisals against the insurgents to preserve imperial control: "The tsarist government resorted to brutal repressions against the participants of the uprising, abolished the constitution of the Kingdom of Poland and, simultaneously, most attributes of the Polish lands' autonomy… introduced martial law (which lasted a quarter of a century)"[6].
In 1830, during an ongoing earthquake, General Rozen 4th, who commanded the troops on the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the eastern section of the empire's fortified border along the Terek and Sunzha rivers), on the orders of commander-in-chief Paskevich sent proclamations out to the auls, instilling in the people an artificial picture of the world: the natural disaster was declared God's punishment for resisting the empire. The historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov wrote about how this lie sounded among the Nokhchi: "supporters of the Russian orientation claimed that the earthquake was caused by the wrath of Allah over the attempt at an armed uprising"[36]. The imperial historian Volkonsky acknowledges the source of the suggestion: the commander-in-chief "ordered General Rozen 4th to spread entirely opposite rumors among the people, namely, that the earthquake had been sent down by God upon the Mountain Peoples for their ill-intentioned acts against the Russian government"[34]. The imperial historian Potto recorded the act: Rozen "resorted to proclamations in which he sought to assure the people that the earthquake had been sent down upon them as punishment for their treason and their ill-intentioned acts against the Russian government"[33].
From December 18, 1830 to January 26, 1831, General Velyaminov conducted a sweeping march through lowland Chechnya as punishment of the people for supporting the resistance, systematically devastating villages from the Sunzha River to the Kachkalyk Ridge. The imperial historian Potto wrote of the method: Velyaminov "would usually mark out a point toward which he advanced unswervingly with his entire detachment, and then, upon reaching it, immediately set up camp and established a fortified wagenburg (a camp enclosed by wagons), from which the troops were dispatched in turn in small columns to exterminate the neighboring auls"[33]. Potto acknowledges the outcome of the campaign: "the whole of lowland Chechnya, traversed through and through as far as the Kochalyk Ridge, was put to fire and sword by Velyaminov"[33].
At dawn on December 19, 1830, Cossacks of General Velyaminov's detachment, having burst into the sleeping village of Dzulgai-Yurt, cut down the inhabitants caught unawares. The imperial historian Potto recorded: "thirty-nine people were taken prisoner, and about twelve were cut down. The rest, having taken cover in the forest, opened an exchange of fire"[33]. Those cut down were inhabitants overtaken during the sudden nighttime seizure of the village; armed resistance was mounted later only by those who managed to reach the forest.
In December 1830 – January 1831, General Velyaminov's troops razed and burned the villages of lowland Chechnya: Kiter-Yurt, Pkhan-Kichu, Edin-Yurt, Daut-Yurt, Engeli, Uzeken-Yurt, Besenber with its hamlets, Avtury, Geldigen, and Mairtup with the surrounding auls. The imperial historian Potto wrote: Kiter-Yurt "was immediately given over to the flames," "over the following two days the Butyrsky and Tarutinsky regiments burned the village of Pkhan-Kichu," "along the way they burned two more unsubmissive villages: Edin-Yurt and Daut-Yurt," the troops "managed to exterminate one more aul, Engeli," the regiments "burned the unsubmissive village of Uzeken-Yurt," "exterminated in the vicinity the aul of Besenber, with all the hamlets adjoining it," and on January 21, 1831, "the same fate befell Maiortup itself"[33]. The submission offered by the villages of Avtury, Geldigen, and Mairtup, together with the handing over of hostages, Velyaminov rejected, demanding the impossible — the surrender of all Russian captives and fugitives — in order to preserve a pretext for exterminating the villages: submission, as Potto admits, "was not at all part of Velyaminov's designs, as he understood the necessity of punishing these auls cruelly"[33].
At dawn on December 19, 1830, during the seizure of the village of Dzulgai-Yurt, Cossacks of General Velyaminov's detachment captured the family of a resistance leader — the Karabulak chieftain Astemir, who himself managed to escape into the forest. The imperial historian Potto wrote: "his family — a young son, a daughter, a grandson, and a cousin — fell into the hands of the Cossacks. Besides them, thirty-nine people were taken prisoner"[33].
In the autumn of 1830, General Velyaminov introduced collective property levies on Chechen villages that bore no responsibility for the actions of others: for the driving off by Chechens of ten head of cattle from the stanitsa of Chervlennaya, he "immediately ordered that ten head of cattle likewise be taken from the inhabitants of the two villages of Braguny and Novy-Yurt, past which the party had traveled, and returned to the Cossacks"; for the driving off of a herd of horses in the Nogai steppe, "Braguny once again paid with exactly the same number of head"; and Shakh-Girei, the owner of Novy-Yurt, was confined to a casemate — a prison cell of the Groznaya fortress — for the inaction of the village watch. This was recorded by the imperial historian Potto[33].
In December 1830 – January 1831, General Velyaminov's troops deliberately destroyed the winter stores of food and fodder of the villages being devastated. The imperial historian Potto wrote: during the burning of Edin-Yurt and Daut-Yurt, the troops "destroyed enormous stores of harvested hay"[33]; on January 17, 1831, Geldigen was put to the torch "with all its stores"[33]. The destruction of hay and grain stores in the depths of winter condemned the inhabitants, who had fled to the mountains and forests, to famine.
In January 1831, General Velyaminov's troops cut a clearing and cleared a road through the forest between the settlement of Aldy and the Groznaya fortress, depriving the inhabitants of forest cover for the sake of a military passage to the south. The imperial historian Potto wrote: Velyaminov "set about cutting a clearing and clearing a road between Aldy and Groznaya in order to prepare for himself a secure gateway to the south"[33]. On January 21, 1831, Mairtup was exterminated "with its luxuriant gardens and plantations" — orchards of many years' standing, the foundation of the village's way of life, were destroyed[33].
In December 1830, during the encirclement of the village of Daut-Martan, the troops of General Velyaminov appropriated the property of the fleeing inhabitants: the imperial historian Potto records that "the inhabitants managed to flee, but all their property became the booty of the detachment"[33].
On July 14, 1831, near the Tashkichu fortification, Beibulat Taimiev, leader of the Chechen resistance and head of the uprising of 1825–1826, was killed from ambush — eliminated after open repression had been deemed too dangerous by the command. The historian D. A. Khozhaev wrote: "The tsarist command intended several times to do away with Beibulat, but feared to repress him openly... Preparations for the murder of Beibulat began, and it was soon carried out"[23]. The killer — Prince Sali, who was in imperial service — went unpunished, although other cases of blood vengeance were harshly prosecuted; commander-in-chief Paskevich wrote back that Beibulat "was a traitor to the end, and therefore the killer should not be punished"[23].
In the winter of 1831–1832, General Velyaminov, from his camp near the Groznaya fortress, dispatched troops against Chechen settlements in revenge for their support of the uprising: on December 23, 1831, Lieutenant Colonel Zass, commander of the Mozdok Cossack Regiment, devastated the hamlets on the right side of the Sunzha opposite the village of Chertugai, and in February 1832 Velyaminov "undertook an expedition to punish the Chechen villages lying up the Sunzha from the Groznaya fortress" — this is acknowledged by the imperial survey of military operations[37]. The imperial historian Volkonsky wrote of the purpose of the raids: "to harass the enemy and divert his attention from our borders"[34]. The historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov recorded: "Another large expedition was directed against the Chechen auls situated along the banks of the Sunzha"[36].
On December 23, 1831, during the devastation of the hamlets near the village of Chertugai, Cossacks of the detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Zass, commander of the Mozdok Cossack Regiment, took three women captive. The imperial historian Volkonsky wrote: Zass "delivered three captive women to the camp"[34].
On December 23, 1831, the detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Zass, commander of the Mozdok Cossack Regiment, dispatched by General Velyaminov, drove off the livestock of the inhabitants of the devastated hamlets near the village of Chertugai. The imperial historian Volkonsky wrote: Zass "delivered to the camp... up to 250 head of cattle"[34]. Driving off 250 head of livestock in the middle of winter deprived the inhabitants of the devastated hamlets of their basic means of subsistence.
From August 22 to the end of September 1832, corps commander Rosen conducted a campaign through Chechnya and Ichkeria (the mountainous southeastern part of the Chechen land) in retribution against the people for the uprising, applying a uniform scheme: a village that failed to meet the conditions was exterminated. Rosen acknowledged the scheme in a report to Minister of War Chernyshev: the villages, "being unable to agree among themselves on the release of our prisoners, have been punished by the destruction of dwellings and plowed fields"[37]. Historian D. A. Khozhaev wrote: "In the summer and autumn of 1832, the troops of General Rosen swept through Chechnya, leaving death and destruction in their wake"[23].
On August 23, 1832, during the storming of Germenchuk, the troops of corps commander Rosen burned alive about 60 encircled defenders of the village, led by Mullah Abdurakhman, who had refused to surrender. Rosen reported to Minister of War Chernyshev: a group "numbering about 60 men ... led by ... Mullah Abdur-Rakhman, was cut off and surrounded by us in one large house"[37]. The imperial historian Volkonsky, writing on the basis of Rosen’s dispatches, acknowledges the method of the massacre: "Major General Volkhovsky ordered burning firewood and hay to be thrown into the chimneys. This had its effect... while the greater part, together with Mullah Abdurakhman, perished in the flames, continuing to chant verses of the Quran"[34]. The demonstrative burning of people alive served to terrorize all of Chechnya; Volkonsky acknowledges the calculation: the destruction of Germenchuk "was bound to have the most crushing effect on the Chechens"[34].
From August 22 to September 23, 1832, the troops of corps commander Rosen razed dozens of villages of Chechnya and Ichkeria: Belgatoy and Dzhan-yurt, the houses of the six-hundred-household Germenchuk, Shali (except for 11 households), Alkhan-yurt, Sala-yurt, Katar-yurt, Lyalsin-yurt, Nazari-yurt, Uzden-yurt, Uruzbey-yurt, Khyzin-Erzo-yurt, Anzeli-yurt, Chingaroy-yurt, Said-yurt, Anto-yurt, Askhor-yurt, Taba-yurt, Kudish-yurt, Mairtup, Shoni, Tsentoroy, the hamlet of Khamer, Ali-yurt, Bey-Bulat-yurt, Bachin-yurt, Khelboyn-yurt, Benoy, and others. Rosen reported to Minister of War Chernyshev on the dispatch of Colonel Shumsky, by whom "Alkhan-yurt, Sala-yurt, Katar-yurt, Lyalsin-yurt, Nazari-yurt, Uzden-yurt, Uruzbey-yurt and Khyzin-Erzo-yurt have been exterminated"[37], and summed up the result himself: "Of unsubmitted villages, 61 have been exterminated"[37]. Historian D. A. Khozhaev wrote: "The general’s troops burned Benoy and other Chechen villages"[23].
In August–September 1832, the troops of corps commander Rosen destroyed the crops and plowed fields of the villages being ravaged — the people’s food base on the eve of winter. Rosen acknowledged this in a report to Minister of War Chernyshev: the villages that had not submitted were "punished by the destruction of dwellings and plowed fields"[37]. The imperial historian Volkonsky wrote: on September 1, the residents of Avtury, for refusing to hand over prisoners, were "punished by the destruction of crops and dwellings"; on September 3, near Geldigen, the detachment "exterminated their plowed fields and houses"[34].
Following the campaign of August - September 1832, the troops of corps commander Rosen exacted tribute and fines in money and livestock from the Chechen villages: Rosen reported to Minister of War Chernyshev that in total over the campaign "tribute and fines in money and livestock have been paid... about 5 th. r. s. [five thousand rubles in silver]"[37].
In September 1832, corps commander Rosen imposed on the villages of Chechnya and Ichkeria an annual tribute from each household as a condition of being spared. The imperial historian Volkonsky wrote: "from the village of Metso-erzo-yurt, amanats (hostages) were taken along with a tribute of one ruble per hearth"; the villages of Eshta-kale and Eyni-kale undertook "to pay henceforth a tribute of 1 ruble per hearth"[34]. Rosen reported to Minister of War Chernyshev: the village of Gurdali "handed over an amanat and undertook to pay tribute"[37]. The tribute was exacted from a people whose villages and crops were in those very days being exterminated by the troops.
In August–September 1832, corps commander Rosen coerced the villages of Chechnya and Ichkeria into handing over amanats (hostages) under direct threat of extermination. Rosen reported to Minister of War Chernyshev regarding the village of Miskit: "when it was announced to them that in the event of the slightest resistance the entire village, the grain and the hay would be exterminated, they immediately presented amanats"[37]. Rosen summed up the result in the same report: subjugation through hostage-taking covered "more than 80 Chechen and Ichkerian villages"[37].
On September 9, 1832, during the seizure of the village of Tsentoroy in Ichkeria, the column of General Volkhovsky from the detachment of corps commander Rosen took captive a woman from among the residents who had not managed to flee. The imperial historian Volkonsky wrote: "one woman was taken prisoner"[34]. On September 15, near the village of Dungen-yurt, the cavalry of Major Boreysha took captive residents caught while attempting to leave their homes. Rosen reported to Minister of War Chernyshev: the cavalry "managed to take prisoner 4 persons and 1 woman"[37].
In the campaign of August - September 1832 the troops of corps commander Rosen appropriated the property and livestock of the residents of the villages being devastated. The imperial historian Volkonsky wrote: the property of 50 families who had taken refuge in the forest near Mairtup "fell as booty to the detachment", and near Tsentoroy "6 horses and 50 head of cattle were seized"[34]. Rosen reported to Minister of War Chernyshev that on September 15, near the village of Dungen-yurt, the cavalry "seized 140 sheep and 9 head of cattle"[37].
In 1836, corps commander Rosen sent covert topographers through Chechnya for the clandestine surveying of the land that had not submitted. In a report to the emperor, Rosen acknowledges: "in 1836, to survey the direct route leading from Kakheti to Chechnya, a topographer was sent who, having crossed the snow ridge, came out onto the Caucasian Line at the fortress of Groznaya, and from there, through Chechnya and the lands of the Kistins and the Didois, returned to Kakheti"; at the same time "I sent from Vladikavkaz Ensign Prince Utsmiev of the Life Guards Grenadier Regiment with a topographer, through Chechnya, to Andia"[37]. Rosen named the method outright: "covert surveys of the lands of the mountaineers hostile to us"[37].
In 1835–1836, Colonel Pullo, chief of the Sunzha fortified line, conducted systematic expeditions against Chechen villages that supported Imam Tashu-Hajji. The imperial review of military operations acknowledges: Tashu-Hajji’s attempts "were preempted in good time by the expeditions of the chief of the Sunzha line, Col. Pullo, which inflicted utter ruin on the residents"[37]. On August 23, 1836, Pullo led a detachment by a covert night march to the aul of Zandak on the Yaman-su River. Corps commander Rosen reported to the Minister of War on the objective: "in order to shake the influence of Tashev-Hajji and to quell the unrest among the Chechens and instill fear in them, I resolved to undertake movements to punish the residents of the village of Zandak"[37].
On August 23, 1836, the detachment of Colonel Pullo, chief of the Sunzha fortified line, ravaged the aul of Zandak on the Yaman-su River. Corps commander Rosen reported to the Minister of War on the destruction in the aul of the houses of murids and of "other principal adherents of Tashev-Hajji"[37]. The Chechen writer Abuzar Aydamirov, in his "Chronology of the History of Checheno-Ingushetia," recorded: "Punitive expedition of Colonel Pullo to the auls on the Yaman-Su River. Destruction of the aul of Zandak"[38].
On August 23, 1836, during the sudden seizure of the aul of Zandak, the detachment of Colonel Pullo, chief of the Sunzha fortified line, took captive residents who had not managed to escape through the ravines and the forest. Corps commander Rosen reported to the Minister of War: the infantry drove out the defenders, "having taken prisoner 31 souls of male and female sex"[37].
On August 23, 1836, during the destruction of the aul of Zandak, the detachment of Colonel Pullo, commander of the Sunzha fortified line, appropriated the property and livestock of the inhabitants. Corps commander Rosen reported to the Minister of War: "our troops received as booty the property of the inhabitants and 384 head of cattle"[37].
On 27 August 1836, Colonel Pullo accepted at the Groznaya fortress the forced "submission" of the aul of Zandak on the Yaman-su river, devastated by his detachment on 23 August 1836 (campaign C1156). The subordination was engineered by the devastation itself: in a report to General Petrov dated 27 August 1836, Pullo admitted: "Being certain that the inhabitants of Zandak, following the common custom of the Chechens, would ask for submission after punishment, and considering such submission useful for the government, I did not order the village burned"[39]. The same report recorded the state in which the village went to its subordination: the devastation "brought both the inhabitants of the village and all those living in its vicinity into fear and despondency"[39]. The elders sent "a plea to be accepted into submission to the Russian government", and subjecthood was formalized on terms dictated by the empire: loyalty, a complete break with Tashu-Hadji, the leader of the Chechen resistance, a ban on assemblies, the handover of Russian captives in exchange for the inhabitants of Zandak seized during the devastation, and the established tribute[39]. Rozen recorded the fact and the date of the formalization in a dispatch to the Minister of War: "On 27 August the Zandak elders appeared before the commander of the Sunzha Line declaring their submission, which was accepted from them in the established order"[37].
On 27 August 1836, Colonel Pullo imposed tribute on the aul of Zandak on the Yaman-su river, devastated by his detachment on 23 August 1836 (campaign C1156): payment of tribute became a condition for accepting the crushed village's "submission". In a report to General Petrov dated 27 August 1836, Pullo recorded the obligation accepted by the elders at the Groznaya fortress: "to pay, on a par with the Aukhovites and other submissive tribes, the established tribute"[39]. The tribute was not the village's counter-offer but the empire's standing norm for taxing the societies it deemed "submissive"; refusal would have meant the return of the "avenging arms of the Russians" - the village had just survived devastation, the captivity of its inhabitants, and the seizure of its livestock[39].
In 1836, the command of the Russian Caucasus Corps under General Rozen established under its own control the post of spiritual leader of all the Sunnis of the Caucasus, and appointed to it the hired Kazan efendi (Muslim theologian) Taj ad-Din Mustafin, maintained at the treasury's expense - an attempt to tie the Sunni clergy of the colonized peoples, including the Nokhchi, to a figure subordinate to the empire. The historian N. I. Pokrovsky wrote: "a broad project emerges for subordinating the entire mountain Sunni clergy to a special spiritual person"; the task set was "to turn the highlanders onto the true path, subordinate them to the Russian government, and destroy or hand over Shamil to us alive" (Shamil - imam, leader of the Dagestani and Chechen highlanders' resistance to the Russian conquest)[40]. Only the establishment of the post, the appointment, and the preacher's years-long payment took place; subordinating the clergy did not succeed: "The preacher did not dare to show himself in the mountains"[40]. The empire wound down the project only six years later: Golovin, who succeeded Rozen, agreed to release Mustafin based on a report by Minister of War Chernyshev of 13 November 1841 - "the teaching of Tajudin Effendi over the course of 6 years did not change the highlanders' attitude toward us in the slightest"[40].
In 1836, the command of the Russian Caucasus Corps sent the hired preacher Taj ad-Din Mustafin, paid by the treasury, to the Groznaya fortress to undermine the influence of Tashu-Hadji (sheikh, imam of Chechnya in 1834-1836, spiritual and military leader of the Chechen resistance) - a spiritual track running parallel to the punitive military actions against the villages that had harbored Tashu-Hadji (campaign C1158). The goal was stated in the source: "with the aim of undermining the spiritual influence" of Tashu-Hadji "and reducing the effectiveness of the preaching of ghazawat" (ghazawat - the highlanders' war for independence from the Russian conquest)[36]. The agent "had managed to make a trip to the lowland societies of Dagestan" when Tashu-Hadji, by letter, "under threat of death forbade him to appear on Chechen territory"[36]; the response is cited by the historian Pokrovsky: "I instruct you that you shall not travel about in these lands without our permission, and if you are not foolish, you should withdraw before harm is done to you"[40].
In 1836-1840 Pullo, commander of the Sunzha Line and then of the left flank of the Caucasus Line (a chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), made hostage-taking the load-bearing institution of the amanat-and-tribute system in the auls of Chechnya seized by the empire. An amanat is a person whom the empire took away from a family or community as a hostage; the threat of reprisal against the taken one held the relatives and the whole aul in subjection. In a memorandum of 1840 Pullo described the method: "I took amanats not indiscriminately, as was done before, but from the most respected or least reliable families, and by this means many auls plotting revolt were repeatedly kept in obedience" - and the scale of the institution: "up to 20 thousand rubles... were spent yearly on the upkeep of amanats"[39]. The taking of hostages went in waves as the troops advanced: the imperial historian Yurov recorded of December 1839 that under the pressure of the detachment even the villages that barred the entrance to the Argun gorge "humbled themselves, handed over amanats" - the troops took people as a "token of submission"[41]. Yurov described the conditions in which the hostages were kept: "prisoners and even amanats were treated inhumanly, kept in a damp pit, where they often fell ill"[41]. In the same memorandum Pullo demanded that hostageship be made perpetual: for the offenses of those under warranty, amanats "must without fail, according to their age, be transferred into cantonists or convict companies, replacing the departed with other amanats" - child hostages to be handed into the cantonists (a military estate into which the empire forcibly enrolled minors), adults into convict companies (forced labor under military escort); in the memorandum of 1840 this is recorded as a plan[39].
The empire placed appointed overseers - pristavs - over the seized auls of Chechnya. The empire's Minister of War Chernyshev, by an official communication of 15 January 1839, conveyed to general Golovin, commander of the Separate Caucasus Corps - the head of the empire's troops and administration in the Caucasus, the will of emperor Nicholas I: in the communities that submitted voluntarily, "the authority over them is to be entrusted to natives devoted to us, members of those same communities", while communities "that will be subjugated by force of arms" were "to be entrusted temporarily to the authority of Russian military officials"[42]. The pristavs in Chechnya were installed by Pullo, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line (a chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi): the imperial historian Yurov writes that Pullo "was ordered - for the installation of our pristavs, to uphold their prestige at the outset... to carry out in the winter of 1839-1840 a movement into Chechnya, to the Michik and to the Qachqalyq people", and the pristavs themselves "were chosen predominantly, if not exclusively, from among the militiamen" - from the highland militia, armed units of highlanders in the empire's service[41]. The historian D. A. Khozhaev writes: "Appointed on 30 November commander of the Separate Caucasus Corps... Golovin, on the tsar's instruction, begins to introduce Russian administration on the occupied territory"[23]. The regime of surveillance was described by general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line and Pullo's superior, in a report to Minister of War Chernyshev of 23 March 1840: "When our pristavs entered upon the administration of the tribes entrusted to them, their strict surveillance cut off the constant relations of the peaceful auls with the unsubdued"[42]. The implanting of puppet religious authorities proceeded under the same directive (campaign C1159).
The amanat-and-tribute system of Pullo, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line (a chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), imposed a tribute on the seized auls of Chechnya. Pullo in a memorandum of 1840: "As the highland communities were subjugated, each handed over amanats, paid a tribute of one silver ruble per saklia, handed over all Russian captives held by it" (saklia - a highlander's house: the tribute was levied on every house; amanats - hostages whom the empire took away from the auls to control them)[39]. The 1840 register of the highland peoples, published in the documentary collection «Движение горцев северо-восточного Кавказа в 20-50 гг. XIX века» together with Pullo's memorandum, calls the tribute a punishment outright: the Qachqalyq people, the Michik Chechens and the Aukhovites (Chechen communities of eastern Chechnya) "pay a tribute imposed on them as punishment for repeated revolts", and the Chechens living beyond the Sunzha river, "as punishment for revolt, have been burdened with a tribute"[39]. The money was squeezed out regularly: general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line and Pullo's superior, in a report to the empire's Minister of War Chernyshev of 23 March 1840, named the regular payment of tributes a sign of the "tranquility" that had set in - the report lists the "regular payment of tributes and duties" weeks before the uprising[42]. Muhammad Tahir al-Qarakhi, the chronicler of Shamil (Shamil - imam, leader of the resistance of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest), named this exaction - one ruble from every house and one gun from every ten houses - as the reason the Chechens called upon Shamil.
Part of the amanat-and-tribute system of Pullo, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line (a chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), was a regime of economic blockade of the auls of Chechnya that had not submitted. Pullo in a memorandum of 1840: the overseers appointed by the empire over the auls (the pristavs) and the troops "cut off the relations of the submitted with the unsubdued and forbade the former to sell bread to the nemirnye and to pasture their cattle on their fields" ("nemirnye" - in the imperial lexicon, auls that had not submitted to the empire)[39]. The permitted trade was driven under control: "In Kizlyar and at some other points trading fairs opened" - exchange took place only at points controlled by the empire[39]. The workings of the blockade were admitted by its own authors: general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line and Pullo's superior, in a report to the empire's Minister of War Chernyshev of 23 March 1840, wrote that the mountain auls "could no longer have tillage and pasture on the plain", which "further aggravated the distressed condition of the inhabitants of highland Chechnya"; some of the inhabitants thought of submitting "to avert famine", others resolved "to rid themselves of the Russian yoke"[42]. In a plan for the conquest of the highlanders of the left flank drawn up in 1840 (the "Proposition... for the subjugation of the tribes"), Grabbe formulated how the blockade worked: the pristavs' surveillance "threatened the unsubdued with famine. Shamil took advantage of this disposition of minds" (Shamil - imam, leader of the resistance of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest)[42].
The overseers appointed by the empire over the auls (the pristavs), within the amanat-and-tribute system of Pullo, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line (a chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), systematically robbed the inhabitants of the seized auls of Chechnya under the guise of collections. The imperial historian Yurov described the mechanism - the pristavs lived off exactions, since "not all pristavs received a salary": from the Chechens, "under the pretext of collecting tributes and fines, the best weapons were taken away, and other entirely harmless but valuable articles of everyday use; it happened that people innocent of anything were arrested at the prompting of simple and often ill-intentioned interpreters... and during expeditions forced collections were permitted"[41]. The empire knew and would not listen: the historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write from archival documents that two Chechen elders brought to the Kabardian prince Bekovich-Cherkassky, who served the empire and was influential on the Terek river, "a petition drawn up on behalf of many Chechens, in which they complain of the oppressions and injustices of major-general Pullo" - the prince refused to accept the petition[36]; according to Yurov, the Chechens "had prepared a petition against him, but did not dare to set it in motion for fear that this general would remain their superior as before"[41]. The empire's survey "The Region in Political and Military Respects", sent by the empire's Minister of War Chernyshev to general Neidhardt, who soon headed the empire's troops in the Caucasus, on 2 April 1842, summed it up: "taking advantage of the abuses, the exactions and the indignation arising from the confiscation of weapons, Shamil little by little stirred all Chechnya to revolt" (Shamil - imam, leader of the resistance of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest)[40].
The amanat-and-tribute system of Pullo, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line (a chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), included forced labor: the troops forced the inhabitants of the seized auls of Chechnya to fell their own forest by allotment. The imperial historian Yurov recorded of the December 1839 expedition that under the pressure of the detachment the inhabitants of the auls "felled forest by allotment at Gekhi, at the Valerik tract and between the villages of Shali and Malaya Ataga" (Gekhi, Valerik, Shali, Malaya Ataga - Chechen villages and tracts; "by allotment" - by a forced apportionment imposed by the troops alongside the tribute and the surrender of weapons)[41]. The forest the inhabitants were made to fell was the environment of life and the shelter of the Chechen communities.
Within the amanat-and-tribute system of Pullo, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line (a chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), the troops destroyed the Chechen forests - the environment of life and the protection of the Chechen communities. Pullo reported in a memorandum of 1840: "we cleared all the forests to the distance of a gunshot on both sides of the road, in the direction from the Groznaya fortress through Martan, Achkhoy and Kurchali to the Military-Georgian road, and in the other direction through Germenchuk, Geldygen and along the Michik into highland Chechnya, altogether over a stretch of 165 versts" (the listed names are Chechen villages and rivers from the Groznaya fortress to mountain Chechnya; a verst is slightly over a kilometer)[39]. The Chechen writer Abuzar Aydamirov records the continuation of the clearing (a strip cut through the forest for the passage of troops) from the Groznaya fortress toward the village of Shali in 1837[38].
The amanat-and-tribute system of Pullo, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line (a chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), was anchored by new fortifications on Chechen land. The Chechen writer Abuzar Aydamirov records the founding of the Umakhan-Yurt fortification on the Sunzha river in 1837[38]. The plan of general Golovin, commander of the Separate Caucasus Corps (the head of the empire's troops in the Caucasus), for 1840 prescribed "to erect a fortification at Cherkey and near old Aksai (at Gerzel-aul)" - Gerzel-aul stands on the border of Chechnya and the Kumyk plain; the construction went on all winter: the imperial historian Yurov writes that in March 1840 Pullo was personally "at Gerzel-aul to bring it into a better defensive condition", and the fortification "was finished after a fashion"[41].
The method of the amanat-and-tribute system of Pullo, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line (a chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), was deliberately induced fear. Pullo described it plainly in a memorandum of 1840: "by threatening all the unsubmissive communities with the annihilation of their property, I instilled in them such fear, brought them to such a state, that one after another they began to submit. From 1834 to 1840 the auls of the Michik people, the Aukhovites and the Salatavians that had broken away, of Greater and Lesser Chechnya, and the never-subjugated villages of the Ichkerians and the Gumbetovians recognized the authority of the Russian government" (the listed names are highland communities of Chechnya and neighboring Dagestan)[39]. Fear was not a side effect but a declared instrument: Pullo credits the submission of the communities as the direct result of threats of annihilation.
The amanat-and-tribute system of Pullo, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line (a chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), rested on punitive sorties of the troops against the seized auls of Chechnya. Pullo described the practice in a memorandum of 1840: "I would appear unexpectedly before the astonished population of the most remote auls and, according to the degree of the village's guilt, either annihilated it or contented myself with imposing a fine, taking amanats and arresting the most guilty persons" (a fine here is a monetary penalty; amanats - hostages whom the empire took away from the auls; the "annihilation" of a village in the imperial lexicon means the destruction of its buildings and property, not of its inhabitants); auls suspected of ties with the resistance "were immediately punished with fines, with the arrest of ill-intentioned people, and in extreme cases even with the annihilation of auls"[39]. Punishment is the administrative routine of the system: the destruction of a village stands in one row with fines and arrests as a grade of punishment.
The amanat-and-tribute system of Pullo, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line (a chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), created within Chechen society a privileged layer with power over its compatriots. The offices of the overseers appointed by the empire over the auls (the pristavs) were handed by the empire to Chechens themselves: the imperial historian Yurov writes that the pristavs "were chosen predominantly, if not exclusively, from among the militiamen" - from the highland militia, armed units of highlanders in the empire's service[41]. The historian N. I. Pokrovsky showed the mechanics of the split: the office of pristav was unpaid, so only "certain representatives of strong families" could take it, and they "took advantage of the opportunity to use their power for further accumulation"; "by creating in Chechnya a local administration, Chechen by nationality, tsarism hoped to create at the same time the Chechen 'aristocracy' it so needed"[40]. The empire gave part of the society power and privileges over the rest and bound this layer to itself, not to the people: the handing of offices to the "strong families" is documented; the calculation of growing a loyal "aristocracy" was formulated by the historian N. I. Pokrovsky.
The amanat-and-tribute system of Pullo, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line (a chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), included the systematic confiscation of weapons from the inhabitants of the seized auls of Chechnya. Pullo in a memorandum of 1840 called it a program of his own: "the power of the pristavs was consolidated, and at the same time a beginning was laid to the system of disarming the highlanders, by exacting from all auls one gun from every 10 saklias. In all, upward of 1900 guns were collected - a circumstance important both for the quantity of weapons collected and especially because for the first time the thought was instilled in the highlanders that the government has the right to deprive of weapons those who have used them for evil" (saklia - a highlander's house; pristav - a superintendent over the auls appointed by the empire; the figure of 1900 is Pullo's self-report; the historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov count about one and a half thousand from the archives)[39]. The historian D. A. Khozhaev writes: "The expeditions of general Pullo in December 1839 and January 1840 to uphold Russian administration, and the disarmament of the Chechen lowland auls that had begun, when Pullo demanded the surrender of one gun from every ten houses, aroused indignation in broad layers of the Chechen people"[23]. The historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov name disarmament the trigger of the uprising: "The fear that after the disarmament the authorities would introduce in Chechnya the all-Russian serfdom order, shameful for people of noble standing, which practically all Chechens considered themselves to be, made the highlanders take up arms"[36].
The amanat-and-tribute system of Pullo, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line (a chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), formalized the subordination of Chechen communities as "submission" with obligations to the empire. The 1840 register of the highland peoples, published in the documentary collection «Движение горцев северо-восточного Кавказа в 20-50 гг. XIX века», records the outcome for the Ako community (the Akintsy - a Chechen community in the upper reaches of the Gekhi river): "Declared submission in 1839, handed over amanats and pledged to pay a tribute of one silver ruble per house" (amanats - hostages whom the empire took away from the auls to control them)[39]. The formalization proceeded under the system of fear that Pullo described in a memorandum of 1840: "by threatening all the unsubmissive communities with the annihilation of their property, I instilled in them such fear... that one after another they began to submit"[39].
In late December 1836, Colonel Pullo carried out a punitive raid on the Chechen village of Kishkeroy-Yurt (Keshkeroy) beyond the Gudermes river, to punish its inhabitants for harboring Tashu-Hadji, the leader of the Chechen resistance. In April 1836, Nicholas I had demanded that action against Tashu-Hadji be undertaken "not otherwise than with complete confidence of success"[37], and on 10 December 1836 Rozen reported to the Minister of War Chernyshev that he "had authorized Col. Pullo to act at once against the unsubmissive Chechen villages"[37]. Over the four days of the raid, the village was exterminated together with 76 inhabitants and defenders, and 40 people were led away into captivity[39].
On 28 December 1836, during the sudden encirclement of Kishkeroy-Yurt, Pullo's troops killed inhabitants who tried to escape, as well as families in their houses: "those seeking salvation in flight were caught or exterminated", "the inhabitants, having barricaded themselves in their houses with their families, were put to the bayonet", and two were smoked out "by straw thrown into the chimneys"[39]. Upon the occupation of the village, 76 bodies of the slain were found[39]. Some of the inhabitants mounted an armed defense, and among the 76 killed are those who fell bearing arms; the technique is recorded on the basis of the killing of those fleeing and of families trapped in their houses.
On 29-31 December 1836, Pullo's detachment completely destroyed Kishkeroy-Yurt: "the village of Kishkeroy, consisting of 63 households, with a considerable stock of grain and hay, was put to the torch", and on withdrawing on 31 December Pullo "marched out of Kishkeroy-Yurt, having set fire to the houses that remained undestroyed"[39].
In the course of the extermination of Kishkeroy-Yurt, Pullo's detachment deliberately destroyed the winter stores: the village was burned "with a considerable stock of grain and hay," and the following day part of the detachment "was occupied with the destruction of the hay stored in the surrounding area"[39]. The destruction of grain and fodder stores in the depth of winter left the surviving inhabitants without means to survive it.
In the course of the extermination of Kishkeroy-Yurt on 28-31 December 1836, Pullo's detachment led away 40 inhabitants into captivity: "40 souls of both sexes were taken captive"[39].
In the course of the extermination of Kishkeroy-Yurt on 28-31 December 1836, Pullo's detachment appropriated the inhabitants' property, including weapons taken from the bodies of the slain: "all the property of the inhabitants and the weapons taken from the slain fell to our troops"[39].
On 23-29 January 1837, a detachment under General Feze - 4 battalions of the Kurinsky and 2 of the Apsheronsky regiments, 257 Cossacks, 3249 men in all with 12 guns - marched out of the Groznaya fortress into Lesser Chechnya. Rozen, in a report to Minister of War Chernyshev of 11 February 1837, named the purpose plainly: "to punish the Chechens of the western part of Chechnya who have evaded obedience"[37]. The campaign continued the winter punitive operations after the December extermination of Kishkeroy-Yurt (campaign C1158): within a week, according to the expedition journal appended to the same report, Shalazh-yurt and the dwellings on both banks of the Shalazha were destroyed, more than a thousand saklias (saklia - a highlander's house) were burned, and 92 captives were taken[37].
During the annihilation of Lesser Chechnya by Feze's expedition in January 1837, the troops killed inhabitants who offered no armed resistance. The expedition journal, presented by Rozen to Minister of War Chernyshev on 11 February 1837, records: Shalazh-yurt, surrounded on the night of 24 January, was taken "without a shot, laying 14 souls on the spot"[37] - killings in a village that put up no armed fight. On 25 January Feze, according to the same journal, dispatched columns "to discover and destroy the population in the dense forests up both banks of the Shalazha river" - an order for the destruction of the population in so many words[37]. At Urus-Martan, after the inhabitants had fled, the journal records, "23 enemy bodies remained on the spot"[37]. The total number of the killed is not summed up by episode in the journal; some of the fallen fought an armed defense - the technique is recorded on the basis of the killings in a village taken without a shot and of the order to destroy the population.
In the course of the annihilation of Lesser Chechnya by Feze's expedition in January 1837, the troops took hostages from auls faced with the choice between subjugation and the fate of their neighbors. According to the expedition journal presented by Rozen to Minister of War Chernyshev on 11 February 1837, on 26 January 6 amanats "from the families of the most honored elders" were taken in Achkhoy, and 4 in Phan-kichu (amanat - a person whom the empire took from a community as a guarantee of subjugation; the journal frames the seizure of people with the word "handed over")[37]. Hostages from the most influential families made every community answerable to the empire with the lives of its own people.
During the annihilation of Lesser Chechnya by Feze's expedition on 23-29 January 1837, the troops led 92 inhabitants away into captivity. The expedition journal, presented by Rozen to Minister of War Chernyshev on 11 February 1837, counts by episode: at the taking of Shalazh-yurt "67 souls were taken captive", at Urus-Martan "13 souls were captured", at Khankharik-Roshnya and Birzul the detachment "took 12 souls captive"[37].
Feze's expedition through Lesser Chechnya on 23-29 January 1837 destroyed housing and livelihood outright. The expedition journal, presented by Rozen to Minister of War Chernyshev on 11 February 1837, records: "Having burned Shalazh-yurt", the troops "destroyed the winter quarters... and the dwellings of the Chechens on both banks of the Shalazha", and "on the way back more than a thousand saklias were burned along the Martan and Tengin gorges" (saklia - a highlander's house)[37].
Completing the annihilation of Lesser Chechnya, Feze's troops destroyed the survivors' food as well: on 29 January 1837, according to the expedition journal appended to Rozen's report to Minister of War Chernyshev of 11 February 1837, "by noon the detachment completed the destruction of the dwellings and of the stores of grain and hay along the Martan gorge"[37]. The destruction of food and fodder in the middle of winter left the survivors without means to live through it.
In Feze's annihilating expedition through Lesser Chechnya in January 1837, the empire led highlanders against highlanders. The expedition journal, presented by Rozen to Minister of War Chernyshev on 11 February 1837, names the composition of Colonel Shiroky's column: "a hundred Cossacks and 800 horsemen of Ossetians and Ingush" (the Ossetian and Ingush militia - auxiliary units of highlanders in the empire's service)[37]. The use of neighboring peoples in a punitive campaign shifted part of the suppression onto the colonized themselves and entrenched enmity between them.
On 26 January 1837, on the fourth day of the annihilation of Lesser Chechnya by Feze's expedition - two days after the taking of neighboring Shalazh-yurt with 14 killed - the troops, entering the aul of Achkhoy, took from it an oath "of submission" and 6 amanats (amanat - a person whom the empire took from a community as a guarantee of subordination)[37]. The frame is spelled out by the expedition journal itself, presented by Rozen to Minister of War Chernyshev on 11 February 1837: "the troops are proceeding to them not to punish them, but properly to confirm them in submission"[37] - subordination secured under military pressure and framed by the empire as a voluntary act of those who had submitted.
In February-April 1837, continuing the January annihilation of Lesser Chechnya (campaign C1160), the command of the Russian Caucasus Corps conducted a series of expeditions under General Feze across eastern and central Chechnya: the February movement through Shali, Germenchuk and the Michik, the March march up the Dzhalka, and the April night raid on the Gertli settlement. Rozen set out the sanction in a dispatch to Minister of War Chernyshev: a campaign "beyond the Argun" - "for diminishing the Chechens' trust in the instigators and turning them away from the intention of joining Shamil" (Shamil - imam, leader of the Dagestani and Chechen highlanders' resistance to the Russian conquest)[37]. The Gertli raid was declared a punishment in Rozen's report to Chernyshev of 30 May 1837: "for the devastation or final annihilation of this brigand party... and for the punishment of its inhabitants"[37].
Feze's spring tour across Chechnya (February-April 1837) was built on demonstrative violence converted into submission. Rozen's report to Minister of War Chernyshev of 4 March 1837 records the result of the annihilation of the auls: "the Chechens, gripped by fear from the preceding actions... fell into great despondency"[37] - after which the oaths followed one after another. Feze himself reported the calculation to General Velyaminov on 15 March 1837: he acted "with the intention of making use, as far as possible, of the panic fear" that had gripped "the Tavlins and the Andians" after the battle at Avtury[39]; Rozen's report of 11 March uses the same word for the demand of submission from the Andians - "wishing to make use of the fear"[37]. Fear drove people off their land: after the March sweeps through the forests the inhabitants, according to the report of 12 April, "were compelled by these searches to withdraw into the distant mountains"[37].
In February-March 1837, Feze's troops, annihilating the auls of those who evaded, took oaths to the empire from the Chechen communities one after another - Rozen's reports to Minister of War Chernyshev count them by date: on 6 February Shali ("brought an oath of submission to our government and presented amanats as its pledge"), on 8 February Germenchuk ("the oath of subjecthood was renewed"), on 15 February Geldigen ("brought an oath of allegiance and handed over amanats chosen from the best families"), on 21 February six auls of the Michik, on 25 February the auls along the Yaman-su from Balan-su to Biletli and on the Aksai[37]. By 24 February, according to the report of 11 March, Feze "brought to submission the Chechens dwelling along the Michik river"; at the end of March, at the camp at Ustar-khan, the troops took an oath from the elders of the Goyta forest and the Martan gorge - they "brought an oath of allegiance to the Sovereign Emperor and presented amanats as security for their submission"[37]. An oath taken under the guns of troops that had just annihilated the neighboring auls fixed subordination as a legal fact (amanat - a person whom the empire took from a community as a guarantee of subordination).
Every oath of Feze's spring tour (February-April 1837) was paid for in people: the troops took amanats (amanat - a person whom the empire took from a community as a guarantee of subordination) from every community that submitted. Rozen's reports to Minister of War Chernyshev record the mechanism: Shali - "presented amanats as its pledge", Geldigen - "handed over amanats chosen from the best families", the Yaman-su and the Aksai - "with amanats as its security", the Goyta forest and the Martan gorge - "presented amanats as security for their submission"; the summary of 4 March 1837 counts: for 12-22 February "52 amanats were taken"[37]. In April, in the Gertli settlement, according to the report of 30 May, "Feze ordered the elder's family and 12 more souls to be taken into custody"[37].
Over Feze's spring tour across Chechnya (February-April 1837), the troops led away dozens of inhabitants into captivity, most of them unarmed. The summary in Rozen's report to Minister of War Chernyshev of 4 March 1837: for 12-22 February "52 souls of inhabitants who did not submit voluntarily were taken captive by our troops, including 8 armed men"[37] - that is, 44 of the 52 captives bore no arms. The report of 23 February on the burning of Seid-yurt and Avtur: "one Chechen and three women who had not managed to get away into the forest" were taken[37]. On the night of 22 March at Gurdali, according to the report of 12 April, Lieutenant Colonel Panteleyev "took captive 9 unsubmissive Chechens"; in the April raid on the Gertli settlement "18 more souls belonging to the families of the brigands were seized"[37].
Feze's spring tour (February-April 1837) destroyed the housing and winter livelihood of the Chechen communities. Rozen's report to Minister of War Chernyshev of 23 February 1837: on 5 February "our troops annihilated the auls of Akhoy-yurt and Lyumik-yurt lying on the way and the khutors of the hostile Chechens"; on 9 February Seid-yurt and Avtur were annihilated[37]. In the March march up the Dzhalka, according to the report of 12 April, "the four auls they had abandoned were occupied and annihilated without resistance. Then the troops penetrated into the thick of the forest and destroyed the kutans (winter shelters for livestock)"; on 26 March the troops were destroying kutans near Shali, and Birzul's column did the same along its own route[37].
Destroying the kutans (winter shelters for livestock) along the Dzhalka and near Shali in March 1837, Feze's troops deliberately burned food. Rozen's report to Minister of War Chernyshev of 12 April 1837 records: in the kutans they "burned a considerable quantity of the grain found in them"; near Shali the troops "seized the watchmen present at them and a multitude of food supplies"; and Birzul's column burned "several hundred chetverts of the grain found in them" (chetvert - an old grain measure of about 210 liters)[37]. Burning hundreds of chetverts of grain at the end of winter left the families who had fled to the forests and mountains without means to survive until the harvest.
Throughout Feze's spring tour (February-April 1837), the troops took the Chechens' livestock and property. According to Rozen's reports to Minister of War Chernyshev: on 5 February the livestock of mullah Udi's detachment was taken - "148 head of livestock of various kinds"; on 11 February "213 head of livestock of various kinds belonging to the unsubmissive Chechens were seized"; against those hiding in the forests "searches were made in various directions... and livestock of various kinds and property were seized from many of them"[37]. The April raid on the Gertli settlement, according to the report of 30 May, took "465 head of small livestock"[37].
Feze's spring tour (February-April 1837) cut military roads through the Chechen forests. According to Rozen's reports to Minister of War Chernyshev: in February a road was cut "in the forests through the Qachqalyq mountains along the Michik and between the auls of Kazbek and Aku-yurt"; the report of 12 April notes that the March march went "by the clearing cut by him in February of this year"; Feze himself moved at the end of February "working the pack trail into a road fit for the passage of all kinds of loads"[37]. Clearings and roads through the forests deprived the Chechen communities of their natural protection and opened the troops permanent access into the depth of the country.
The submission taken by Feze's troops in February 1837 immediately turned into labor duty. Rozen's report to Minister of War Chernyshev of 4 March 1837 records: on 21 February "the inhabitants of six neighboring auls declared their submission and sent out workers to cut, together with the Kumyks, a road in the forests through the Qachqalyq mountains along the Michik"[37] - communities just subordinated were set by the empire to cut the forest for a military road against themselves; the duty came as part of the package of submission, as the standard "Conditions Prescribed to Submitting Highlanders" would later codify it.
By the April 1837 raid on the Gertli settlement the troops of General Feze imposed a collective property levy on the whole village: according to Rozen's report to Minister of War Chernyshev of 30 May, on top of the livestock taken during the raid "a fine of 132 head of livestock was imposed on the settlement"[37] - the settlement paid as a whole, with no regard to the personal involvement of its residents.
In September 1837, preparing Nicholas I's visit to the Caucasus, the empire tried to recruit Shamil (Shamil - imam, leader of the resistance of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest), offering him power and honors in exchange for subordination to the empire. General Adlerberg conveyed the emperor's will to general Rozen in a letter of 10 August 1837: to give "Shamil and his chief accomplices Tashav-Hadji, Kibit-Magomet and the Qarakh qadi Abdurrahman suggestions... to beg the mercy of appearing before the face of the Monarch Himself" in Tiflis[43]; Tashu-Hadji (sheikh, in 1834-1836 the imam of Chechnya, spiritual and military leader of the Chechen resistance) is named first on the list. Carrying this out, general Klugenau obtained a personal meeting with Shamil on 18 September 1837 at a spring near the aul of Karanay; as recorded by Shamil's chronicler Muhammad Tahir al-Qarakhi, the general "began to speak, asking Shamil to come for a meeting with the Russian Nicholas. He asserted that the emperor would exalt him, Shamil, show him honor, and make him the administrator of the affairs of all Dagestani Muslims. From the emperor, he said, there would be no treachery"[44]. In parallel, general Feze instructed Akhmed Khan of Mekhtuli "to persuade Shamil to arrive in Tiflis by the time of His Majesty's arrival there", as general Rozen reported to Chernyshev on 25 September 1837[37], and colonel Pullo demanded of Shamil by letter that he send "to the Groznaya fortress two deputies to be presented to the Sovereign"[43]. The bribe was delivered to its addressee and rejected: on 28 September 1837 Shamil replied to Klugenau by letter - "I have resolved not to go to Tiflis even if I am cut to pieces, because I have many times seen treachery from you"[43]; neither Shamil nor Tashu-Hadji went to Tiflis. The offer to Shamil of the post of "administrator of the affairs of all Dagestani Muslims" repeated the same policy line by which the empire, in those same years, was creating loyal religious institutions (campaign C1159).
In 1838-1840 the empire eliminated leaders of the Chechen resistance by contract killings and arrests. General Golovin, commander of the Separate Caucasus Corps (head of the empire's troops and administration in the Caucasus), by a secret instruction of 17 November 1838 ordered general Pullo, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), to arrange the assassination of Shamil (Shamil - the imam, leader of the resistance of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest): "Among the highlanders devoted to us there will doubtless be daring men who, for a good monetary reward, will undertake to deliver the head of the instigator. I charge you to try this measure, secretly offering to kill Shamil... promising a reward of up to 1,000 chervonets" (chervonets - a gold coin of the empire)[42]. In autumn 1839, after the rout of Akhulgo (Shamil's mountain stronghold in Dagestan), Ullu-bey of Erpeli - a highlander in the empire's service, installed as pristav (superintendent appointed by the empire) over the Koysubu community - twice sent poisoners to Shamil in the Chechen village of Vedeno: Shamil's chronicler Muhammad Tahir al-Qarakhi recorded that "Ullubiy sent Shamil's nephew Ibrahim, son of Bartikhan, with poison, together with two companions... while the latter was in the village of Vedeno of the Chechen vilayat" (vilayat - an administrative province of the Imamate)[44]. During the winter expeditions of December 1839 - January 1840 Pullo's troops took from the auls people whom the empire had outlawed: historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write - "In December 1839 major-general Pullo passed through 28 villages without a single shot, collected 4 thousand rubles in silver from the Chechens, confiscated 455 rifles and seized 97 abreks" (abrek - the empire's label for an outlawed highlander)[36]; in the January march along the Michik the troops took 30 more people[41].
The invasion of Ichkeria (mountainous south-eastern Chechnya) by imperial troops in May 1839 opened with a public threat of annihilation. General Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), in a proclamation "to the Ichkerian people" threatened: "Those auls which give refuge to Tashev-hadji will all be annihilated to their foundations, and your children will long remember how all instigators are punished" (Tashu-Hadji - a sheikh, in 1834-1836 the imam of Chechnya, spiritual and military leader of the Chechen resistance)[42].
During the May 1839 invasion of Ichkeria (mountainous south-eastern Chechnya) the imperial troops tortured their captives. The imperial officer Milyutin, a participant of the march, recorded that five Aukhovites (the Aukhovites - a Chechen community in the north-east, by the Kumyk border) captured with weapons after a fight were made to run the gauntlet on 15 May 1839 near the village of Yaryksu-Aukh (an execution-torture: a man was led between two ranks of soldiers, each of whom struck him with a shpitsruten rod): they "were subjected to cruel torture by being driven through the gauntlet. The soldiers vented their spite on these unfortunates; of the five only one remained alive"[45].
In 1839-1840 punitive marches of imperial troops swept across Chechnya in waves. In May 1839 general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), invaded Ichkeria (mountainous south-eastern Chechnya); he named the goal himself in a report to Minister of War Chernyshev of 10 May 1839: "to punish both this village [Benoy] and all other unsubmissive villages"[39]. The imperial officer Milyutin, a participant of the invasion, admitted the outcome: "The burning of several Aukh and Ichkerian villages only embittered the nearest highlanders still more, and the very end of our raid nonetheless looked as if they had driven out uninvited guests"[45]. In winter the troops of general Pullo, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line, twice marched through the auls that had submitted: on 18-30 December 1839 - 28 auls of Lesser Chechnya (the lowland-piedmont western part of Chechnya), from 26 January 1840 - the auls along the Michik river; historian Sh. A. Gapurov writes of these marches: "He exacted tribute from the destitute people wholesale, disarmed them, demanded the surrender of captives, forced them to fell timber"[46]. After the uprising the punitive actions continued: in late April 1840 the troops marched into Aukh (the Chechen region in the north-east) - the imperial historian Yurov recorded: "Having destroyed the orchards and given the saklias to the flames..." (saklia - a highlander's house)[41]; on 6-14 July the detachment of general Galafeyev, who had taken over the troops of the left flank after Pullo, marched across Lesser Chechnya - historian N. I. Pokrovsky: "From 6 to 14 July general Galafeyev passed through Lesser Chechnya with fire and sword"[40]; historian D. A. Khozhayev cites the imperial goal: to "punish exemplarily" the Chechens "who had joined Shamil" (Shamil - the imam, leader of the resistance of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest)[23]. The autumn marches were sanctioned by general Golovin, commander of the Separate Caucasus Corps, in an instruction to general Grabbe of 17 August 1840 "to employ the troops... for the strict punishment of the mutinous Chechens"[39]; Nicholas I approved the plan through Minister of War Chernyshev on 10 September 1840[47]. Galafeyev's detachment passed through Greater Chechnya (the lowland eastern part of Chechnya) from 26 September to 18 October; Grabbe's detachments - through Lesser Chechnya from 27 October to 5 November and through Greater Chechnya from 10 to 18 November[40]. Historian N. I. Pokrovsky conveys the calculation of the last expedition from Grabbe's dispatches: "He counted on the stunning impression of this expedition"[40].
The empire answered the Chechen uprising by sending in troops. General Pullo, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), reported on 9 March 1840 about marching out against the insurgents: "I set out yesterday for Khankala with 5 companies" (Khankala - a tract by the Groznaya fortress)[39]. The second deployment was a detachment on the Sunzha river: an imperial instruction of 25 March 1840 set it the task of "keeping the Karabulaks in submission" (the Karabulaks - a Vainakh community between Chechnya and Ingushetia; "submission" - the empire's formula of subordination)[39].
The winter expeditions of general Pullo, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), in December 1839 - February 1840 carried out the physical seizure of weapons from the inhabitants of Chechnya's auls. The system was conceived by Pullo himself: in his 1840 memorandum he wrote that it was then that "a beginning was laid to the system of disarming the highlanders, by levying one gun from every 10 saklias from all the auls"[39]. The imperial historian Yurov recorded of the December 1839 march: the inhabitants "unquestioningly paid the tribute or, instead of money, handed over weapons"[41]. Historian Sh. A. Gapurov gives the tally from the archives: 455 rifles for the December march through Lesser Chechnya and 545 for the January march along the Michik[46]; Pullo himself, in his memorandum of 1840, reported the seizure of "upwards of 1900 rifles"[39]. In June 1840 the seizure of weapons was fixed as a norm: point 9 of the "Conditions prescribed to submitting highlanders", issued by general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line, on 15 June 1840, prescribed "To hand over one good rifle from every 10 saklias, as a pledge of their submission" (saklia - a highlander's house)[39].
The winter expeditions of general Pullo, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), collected money from the Chechen auls under the name of tribute. The imperial historian Yurov tallied the December 1839 march: "In all, during this bloodless military promenade, 3779 rubles and 455 rifles were collected, and 97 abreks, 7 captives and two fugitives were handed over" (abrek - the empire's label for an outlawed highlander)[41], and the January 1840 march along the Michik river: the auls "obediently presented 2463 rubles, 545 rifles, cattle for the detachment's provisioning, and handed over 30 abreks"[41]. After the suppression of the uprising the levy was fixed as a fine: point 10 of the "Conditions prescribed to submitting highlanders", issued by general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line, on 15 June 1840, prescribed "As punishment for participation in Shamil's uprising, to pay a fine of two rams from every saklia" (saklia - a highlander's house; Shamil - the imam, leader of the resistance of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest)[39].
While suppressing the uprising of 1840, the imperial troops kept taking hostages (amanat - a person whom the empire took from a family or community as a hostage; the threat of reprisal against the taken kept the relatives and the whole aul in subjection). On 15 March 1840 general Pullo, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), took hostages in the aul of Aldy by the Groznaya fortress - captain Pushkin reported to Traskin, chief of staff of the troops of the Caucasus Line: "gen. Pullo... entered there himself and took five new amanats"[39]. The "Conditions prescribed to submitting highlanders", issued by general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line, on 15 June 1840, open with a demand for hostages: "Immediately hand over amanats from these auls. The commander of the troops reserves to himself to designate how many and from which families the said amanats must be handed over" - and close with a threat: "the amanats of unsubmissive auls are exiled to Siberia"[39].
In 1839-1840 the imperial troops burned dozens of Chechen settlements. In the May 1839 invasion of Ichkeria (mountainous south-eastern Chechnya) the imperial officer Milyutin, a participant of the march, recorded day by day: "The nearby aul of Balansu was found abandoned by its inhabitants and given to the flames", "All the auls lying on either side of the road (Nake-Yurt, Tsezyn-Irzau, Doba-Yurt) were found abandoned by their inhabitants and given to the flames", and of the rout on 12 May of Sayasan, the residence of sheikh Tashu-Hadji (in 1834-1836 the imam of Chechnya, leader of the Chechen resistance): "The fortification was devastated, and the village given to the flames"[45]. In the January 1840 march the troops of general Pullo, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), wiped out two auls: the imperial historian Yurov - "the auls of Kazbek-Yurt and Batash-Yurt, populated mostly by relatives and namesakes of Shuaib-Mulla, which met the detachment with weapons in hand. After a minor skirmish both villages were levelled to the ground"[41]; historian D. A. Khozhayev adds: "The Russians burned the Benoy hamlet of Gurzhiyn-mokhk and the neighbouring auls of Zandak-Ara and Genderghen, and retreated"[23]. In summer 1840 the detachment of general Galafeyev, who had taken over the troops of the left flank, burned the auls of Lesser Chechnya (the lowland-piedmont western part of Chechnya): historian D. A. Khozhayev lists the destroyed Bolshoy Chechen, Dudu-yurt, Akhshpatoy-Goyta, Chunguroy-yurt, Urus-Martan, Gurak-Roshni, Khazhi-Roshni, Taib and Achkhoy - the troops marched on, "leaving behind them destroyed and burned villages"[23]; the detachment's journal of military operations confirms the route and adds Peshkhoy-Roshni[47]. In autumn the same detachment burned Greater Chechnya (the lowland eastern part of Chechnya): the imperial survey of 27 October 1840 records - "on 3 and 4 October the troops... burned both villages" (Shali and Germenchuk), "on 7 October the detachment burned 5 hamlets attached to the aul of Shali", and of Said-Yurt, the hamlet of Ersenei and the village of Avtury on 10 October: "gave them to the flames and annihilated the houses and all the property of the inhabitants"[39]. Muhammad Tahir al-Qarakhi, Shamil's chronicler (Shamil - the imam, leader of the resistance of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest), recorded that the inhabitants of Shali and Germenchuk abandoned and burned their own villages on Shamil's order long before the troops came: "Shamil ordered them to burn those ancient, well-settled and beautiful villages. It was hard for the lower Chechens, but they did it nonetheless" - part of the imperial burnings went through villages already empty; of Said-Yurt he gives the mirror version of the fight: the murids (the imam's disciples and warriors) "fought them and slew a great number of them. The murids put the Russians to flight"[44]. In the November marches of general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line, Gekhi and the auls along the Sunzha were devastated - historian N. I. Pokrovsky: "On 27 October Grabbe marched into Lesser Chechnya, devastated Gekhi, on 4 November laid waste the auls situated along the Sunzha"[40]; the imperial historian Yurov recorded: "During the rearguard action general Galafeyev managed to take by fighting and annihilate to its foundations the village of Mirti-Irzau", then on 13 November Germenchuk with its hamlets was destroyed, on 15 November - Lachi-Yurt and Indi-Yurt, on 17 November the troops seized and burned Batash-Yurt, the home of Shuaib-Mulla (naib - the deputy of imam Shamil in Greater Chechnya)[41].
In spring 1840 the empire imposed a grain blockade on Chechnya amid famine that was already documented. On 14 March 1840 general Piryatinsky, commander of the centre of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), reported: "throughout Chechnya there is no grain at all, the people suffer great extremity from famine"[39]. Three weeks later, on 8 April 1840, general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line, by an instruction to general Galafeyev sanctioned the ban the latter had introduced: "Your directive concerning the prohibition of the sale of grain I fully approve, and I permit you to extend this prohibition to all those parts of the region entrusted to you where you deem it necessary"[39]. In summer the troops destroyed the harvest where it stood: the journal of military operations of general Galafeyev's detachment (6-17 July 1840) names the goal outright - "the punishment of the mutinous villages by annihilating them and destroying their means of existence, for now a certain shortage in the inhabitants' food supply can be foreseen"[47]. In autumn the stores were annihilated just before winter: the imperial survey of 27 October 1840 records that the troops marched, "having annihilated on their way a very considerable quantity of stores of food and hay"[39]. General Golovin, commander of the Separate Caucasus Corps (head of the empire's troops and administration in the Caucasus), admitted the calculation in a memorandum of 26 April 1841: "In vain did we expect that after the annihilation, in last year's expedition, of the highlanders' food stores, their villages and various property, famine, cold and extreme destitution would shake the fierce power of the instigator" ("instigator" - the empire's label for Shamil, leader of the highlanders' resistance)[40].
The empire registered the subordination of the Chechen communities as "submission" (the imperial formula of subjecthood). After the invasion of Ichkeria (mountainous south-eastern Chechnya) in May 1839 by general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), the imperial survey of 1840 recorded: "The Ichkerians, in consequence of gen. Grabbe's expedition against them in 1839, declared their submission, but such is hardly consolidated" - the doubt about the firmness of the "submission" belongs to the imperial document itself[39]. After the suppression of the uprising Grabbe on 14 June 1840 issued a proclamation to the insurgents: "Come to your senses and save yourselves now by sincere repentance and immediate submission. Otherwise our troops will pass everywhere...", and on 15 June - the twelve points of the "Conditions prescribed to submitting highlanders", whose second point is the oath: "To take an oath of submission to the Russian emperor, and to present the oath sheets through the elders to the Russian authorities" (elders - the heads of aul communities)[39].
Suppressing the uprising of 1840, the empire demanded of the Chechens a public renunciation of resistance. General Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), in an appeal to the insurgents of 14 June 1840 demanded repentance: "Come to your senses and save yourselves now by sincere repentance and immediate submission" ("submission" - the imperial formula of subordination)[39]. The next day, 15 June 1840, he issued the "Conditions prescribed to submitting highlanders", whose point 8 prescribed that the insurgent auls "renounce all participation in the pernicious teaching of Shamil" (Shamil - the imam, leader of the resistance of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest; "pernicious teaching" - the imperial label for muridism, the religious movement of the resistance)[39].
The uprising of 1840 swept away the power of imperial appointees over lowland Chechnya - before it, the auls that had submitted lived under superintendents-pristavs appointed by the empire. The "Conditions prescribed to submitting highlanders", issued by general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), on 15 June 1840, re-established this power as a norm and built it further. Point 3 prescribed: "To fulfil all demands and orders of the Russian pristav who will be appointed by the government" (pristav - a superintendent over the auls appointed by the empire); point 6 obliged every aul: "To elect from among themselves one qadi, who is obliged to fulfil all orders of the pristav" (qadi - a Muslim judge); point 7 - an elder in every aul (elder - the head of an aul community), "who is confirmed by the Russian authorities, watches over public tranquillity and carries out all orders of the authorities". A surrendering aul was accepted under the empire's power only together with this structure[39].
The "Conditions prescribed to submitting highlanders", issued by general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), on 15 June 1840, imposed labour duty on the Chechen auls. Point 4 prescribed: "in case of a detachment's movement to allot people for building roads and bridges, to keep at the pristav's disposal a sufficient number of people for carrying papers or orders from one aul to another, to give mounted men for escort duty" (pristav - a superintendent over the auls appointed by the empire)[39].
The "Conditions prescribed to submitting highlanders", issued by general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), on 15 June 1840, obliged the Chechen auls to hand over the working cattle and transport of their households for the empire's use: at the first demand of the pristav (a superintendent appointed by the empire) to provide arbas (two-wheeled carts) and donkeys. Point 4 prescribed: "At the pristav's demand to provide arbas or donkeys for hauling loads"[39].
The "Conditions prescribed to submitting highlanders", issued by general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), on 15 June 1840, forbade the Chechens to choose freely where to live. Point 5 prescribed: "Not to move from one aul to another for permanent residence without the permission of the local authorities"[39]. The right to live on their own land, where they had lived for generations, the empire turned into a permit issued by the authorities.
The "Conditions prescribed to submitting highlanders", issued by general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), on 15 June 1840, obliged the Chechen auls to refuse shelter to members of the resistance and to hand over people who had escaped the empire's power. Point 8 prescribed: "Not to give refuge in their auls to abreks, murids and unsubdued highlanders" (abrek - the imperial label for a highlander declared an outlaw; murids - the imam's disciples and warriors); point 11: "To hand over all Russian prisoners and runaways staying in the mountains" - by runaways the empire meant its own soldiers and serfs who had gone over to the highlanders[39]. Handovers went on even before the decree, under the pressure of the winter expeditions: the imperial historian Yurov recorded of the outcome of the December 1839 march of general Pullo, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line, through Lesser Chechnya (the lowland-piedmont western part of Chechnya): "97 abreks, 7 prisoners and two runaways were handed over", and of the January 1840 march along the Michik river - the auls "handed over 30 abreks"[41].
The empire seized the Chechens' property and land by decree. In April 1840 an imperial directive prescribed "to sequester the Aukh herds wherever they are found at pasture in the Kumyk domain" (the Aukhovites - a Chechen community in the north-east, by the Kumyk border)[39]. The land of the Chechens the empire handed out to loyalists: a contemporary's letter from Tiflis, cited by historian N. I. Pokrovsky, names among the causes of the 1840 uprising "the endowment of prince Bekovich-Cherkassky with lands owned by the Chechens" (Bekovich-Cherkassky - a Kabardian prince in Russian service)[40].
At the destruction of the aul of Mirti-Irzau on 4-5 November 1840 (an aul on the Sunzha where the inhabitants of Zakan-Yurt and Samashki had resettled) the troops under general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), led away Chechen families into captivity. The imperial historian Yurov recorded: "We took captive several families of the Terek-side Chechens, numbering 35 souls, and seized 150 head of horned cattle" (Terek-side - the Chechens of the left bank of the Terek)[41]. The captivity of families stands in the imperial account in one line with the driven-off cattle.
In the marches of 1839-1840 the troops fed themselves on cattle taken from the Chechens and carried off the goods of the auls they were devastating. Of the December 1839 march of the detachment of general Pullo, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), the imperial historian Yurov wrote: "on the march the men subsisted on ration cattle taken from the natives by way of fine"[41] - the army supplied itself with the population's property, framing the seizure as a fine. In the summer of 1840 the troops of general Galafeyev plundered the auls of Lesser Chechnya they were devastating: historian D. A. Khozhayev - "The detachment rode out onto the clearing with the goods looted in the devastated auls"[23]. In November, at the destruction of the aul of Mirti-Irzau, the imperial historian Yurov recorded: "150 head of horned cattle were seized"[41].
In 1841-1846 the empire held Chechnya, which had not submitted, under a trade blockade. On 7 May 1841 general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), sent to six sector commanders of the line an instruction "to take the strictest measures so that no gunpowder, sulphur, lead or any other supplies be passed to the unsubmissive highlanders, and on our side to keep unflagging and constant watch over the execution of this"[39]. The blockade's effect was admitted by the imperial memorandum "On the political condition of Chechnya" attached to the report of general Neidhardt, head of the empire's troops in the Caucasus, of 20 November 1843: the Chechens lack cloth, iron and salt, and "the cause of this must be sought in the cessation of trade ties with the Russians, and not in a shortage of means of subsistence"[39]. The historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write that the Chechen naibstvos (districts of the imamate governed by the imam's deputies, the naibs) became its economic base: the grain and other farm produce of Chechen peasants gave "the imamate the possibility of living for almost two decades under conditions of a complete economic blockade"[36].
The trade with Chechnya that remained permitted, the empire drove under its own control - into state barter yards (exchange points supervised by officials). Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "Free trade of Russians with the highlanders on the border line, including with the Chechens, was forbidden. All trade operations had to pass under the control of state officials, who saw to it that goods of military character did not reach the highlanders - 'beyond the border'. In addition, a number of restrictions were introduced on the sale of iron, salt, gold and other goods"[36]. The network of controlled points expanded: in the second half of the 1840s the number of barter yards was brought to 11; in 1846 barter points were opened in the Cossack stanitsas of Chervlennaya and Mozdokskaya; over 1846 the highlanders brought goods worth 231 thousand rubles to all the barter yards[36].
The empire demanded that Chechen communities hand over soldiers who had fled to them from the imperial army, and set salt as the price of that surrender. Minister of War Chernyshev, in an official service letter (otnoshenie) of 6 September 1842, conveyed to general Golovin, commander of the Separate Caucasus Corps (head of the imperial troops and administration in the Caucasus), the order of emperor Nicholas I: the local command was to ""demand the return of the servicemen who had hidden among the highlanders who had declared their submission to us"", and from the communities that had not submitted to obtain the surrender through need - ""to endeavour to induce the unsubmitted to hand over deserters in exchange for salt""[39]. The emperor expressly forbade ransoming the fugitives with money: the payment for the people handed over was access to the salt the empire kept under embargo.
Hostages were taken not as punishment for a rising but on suspicion - before an aul had done anything. On 9 January 1842 the commander of the Sunzha Line, in a report to general Olshevsky, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), described his order for the Kumyk plain (the lowland to the north-east of Chechnya): ""I instructed Colonel Freitag... if there is a suspicion that some village wants to flee, then at once to take from it a large number of amanats, so that the inhabitants themselves should feed them"" (an amanat is a person whom the empire took from a community as a hostage; the threat of reprisal against the one taken held the family and the whole aul in submission)[39]. The same report admits what the empire holds the people with: ""Winter and the amanats restrain them, at the present time, from fleeing to Chechnya""[39]. Hostages from Vainakh communities were also taken by the empire's civil administration in Georgia - on the mere news of a defection to the resistance. On 26 May 1841 the civil governor of Georgia-Imereti reported to Brayko, administrator of the civil department of the Transcaucasian region, that on news of the defection of the Kistins (a Vainakh community on the border with Georgia) to the side of Shamil (the imam, leader of the resistance of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest), provincial secretary Limmerman instructed the district assessors (officials of the district administration) ""to detain here, under a plausible pretext, all the Kistins who wintered in Tusheti and on the Alvani field"" (Tusheti and the Alvani field are a mountain region and a plain in north-eastern Georgia)[39]. Those detained were not the ones who had defected but those who had come for the winter; the pretext for the detention is called ""plausible"" by the document itself.
On 29 January 1841 general Golovin, commander of the Separate Caucasus Corps (head of the empire's troops and administration in the Caucasus), instructed general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), to organise the assassination of Akhverdy-Magoma, Shamil's naib in Lesser Chechnya (the deputy of the imam, leader of the resistance of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest): "it may be supposed that for good pay men will be found who will resolve on the destruction of Akhverdy-Magoma. There is no doubt that through the elimination of this enterprising associate of Shamil we would rid ourselves of one of his most dangerous instruments, and the pacification of Chechnya would then be a far less difficult matter"[39]. Golovin allotted a budget and an executor: Grabbe was granted "the right to employ at your discretion up to two thousand rubles in silver from the extraordinary sums", and "the execution of this affair is most fittingly to be laid upon maj.-gen. Olshevsky", commander of the left flank of the line[39]. The death of Akhverdy-Magoma is not connected with this order: in the summer of 1843 he died in a fight near the village of Shatili on the border with Georgia - historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "To the satisfaction of the Russian command, Akhverdy-Magoma perished in the summer of 1843 in a clash near the Khevsur village of Shatili"[36]. Participants of the resistance the empire handed over to military courts with expedited punishment. The commands of emperor Nicholas I of 29 December 1843 and 14 February 1844, conveyed to the troops on 24 May 1844, prescribed: "Officers from among the highlanders who took part in the revolt, as well as qadis and other chief instigators, are to be handed over to a military court under the field criminal code... The sentences of the court, upon final confirmation by me, are to be carried out without delay" (qadi - a Muslim judge)[39]. Under this norm it was not enemy soldiers who went before the field court-martial, but spiritual and communal leaders - "qadis and other chief instigators".
The empire kept secret agents inside the administration of the Imamate of Shamil (the imam, leader of the resistance of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest). Historian N. I. Pokrovsky writes from imperial military materials: "Akhverdy-Magoma replaced the chief of the guard posts between the Argun and the Sunzha, Mulla-Gazi, who had been a secret agent of the tsarist government" (Akhverdy-Magoma - the deputy of the imam in Lesser Chechnya; the Argun and the Sunzha - rivers in Chechnya)[40]. The second agent was an elder of the trans-Argun communities: general Zavadovsky, temporarily commanding the troops of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), in a report to general Neidhardt, head of the empire's troops in the Caucasus, of 24 February 1845, forwarded a dispatch from the left flank about information received "through a messenger who came to him from the trans-Argun elder, a man of weight among the people who is in secret communication with lt.-gen. Gaksfort": the agent reported that Shamil was convening a council of naibs (the imam's deputies) in Dargo, the imam's residence[40]. Defectors the empire formalised into agents and guides on the terms of a bargain. General Labyntsev, commander of the Sunzha Line, in a report to Vorontsov, viceroy in the Caucasus, in summer 1846 described the terms of the Chechen Topi: "Having promised, should this be carried into effect, not only to be a scout in the mountains and a guide for our troops, but, acting in our favour by his example and persuasion, to incline others to the offering of submission... I permitted the families of Topi... to settle among the resettlers located by the fortification"[39]. The agent was paid not in money but with his family's right to live by the fortification - under the control of the same empire.
The bribery of the highland elite the empire put on a programmatic footing. War minister Chernyshev, in a secret letter to general Golovin, commander of the Separate Caucasus Corps (head of the empire's troops and administration in the Caucasus), of 19 July 1842, proposed adopting the experience of British India: "The English knew how to establish their dominion in India by political means... Should not we too try this system?"[39]. Golovin, in a reply of 28 August 1842, drew up a list of candidates for buying over from the circle of Shamil (the imam, leader of the resistance of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest) and requested a fund: "By inclining to our side some of the above-mentioned persons, one would greatly weaken the union of muridism... I consider it necessary for the chief authority here to have at its disposal up to 15 thousand chervonets in ready money" (chervonets - a gold coin of the empire; muridism - in the imperial lexicon, the highlanders' resistance movement)[39]. On 1 February 1844 emperor Nicholas I approved the fund above the request: by an official service letter of Chernyshev to general Neidhardt, who had replaced Golovin at the head of the empire's troops in the Caucasus, "concerning your designs for secret dealings with the highlanders" it was commanded "instead of the 10 thousand chervonets you requested for this purpose, to assign to your charge 15 thousand chervonets"[39]. For the Dargo expedition of 1845 (the imperial army's march on Shamil's residence, the aul of Dargo) historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov record a separate fund: "for the bribery of influential persons from among the highlanders, 45 thousand rubles in silver were allocated"[36]. On the Sunzha Line under construction (the chain of imperial Cossack stanitsas and fortifications on the Sunzha river) the empire bought the loyalty of individual Chechen elders. Vorontsov, viceroy and commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, wrote in a report of summer 1846 about the elder of the aul of Natkhoy-Kezhu: "I turned my particular attention to attracting Aldumov to our side. For the losses borne by him and his 4 comrades... I would consider it just to assign a reward"[39].
At the beginning of 1844, after the defeats of the imperial army in 1843, general Neidhardt, head of the empire's troops in the Caucasus, issued a proclamation to the highlanders that inverted the picture of the war: the invader in it is not the imperial general who brought the troops, but Shamil (the imam, leader of the resistance of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest). The proclamation paints Shamil as a man "who preaches equality and the extermination of all hereditary authorities with the sole aim of seizing the inheritances of the khans and beks" and who "has filled your auls with hated murtazigats... has burdened you with heavy taxes..." (murtazigats - mounted warriors of the Imamate's standing army)[40]. The result of the proclamation historian N. I. Pokrovsky described briefly: "But the wails did not help" - by wails he means these imperial exhortations themselves[40].
Against the religious authority of the Imamate (the state of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya headed by imam Shamil, leader of the resistance to the Russian conquest) the empire fielded Islamic clerics loyal to itself. On 13 March 1845 Vorontsov, viceroy and commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, in a memorandum to emperor Nicholas I reported the dispatch of a Crimean Muslim judge (qadi) to Chechnya: "Qadi Esker Seid Halil Efendi came to me and declared his intention and wish personally to assist our righteous cause in the Caucasus mountains by admonishing the tribes in the name of the Mohammedan faith itself... I gave him for expenses... 400 rubles in silver in all and post-horses for four horses to the Groznaya fortress, charging this expense to the extraordinary sum"[39]. The empire paid for the service with a decoration as well: historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write - "In 1845 the Crimean Tatar qadi Qadiasker Seid-Halil Efendi was sent to the Groznaya fortress; his efforts were soon marked by a high decoration - the Order of St Anna, third class"[36].
Three times in 1842-1845 the empire threw large armies at Chechnya. On 30 May 1842 general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), led a ten-thousand-strong detachment from the Gerzel fortress into Ichkeria (mountainous south-eastern Chechnya) - towards Dargo, the residence of Shamil (the imam, leader of the resistance of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest); historian N. I. Pokrovsky: "In a six-day battle in the dense Ichkerian forests Grabbe suffered a decisive defeat"[40]; the historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov count: "The total losses in killed, wounded and missing came to 66 officers and over 1700 lower ranks"[36]. On 14 November 1843 emperor Nicholas I personally assigned new forces: "I am sending you for one year 2 divisions of 24 battalions... I give you such forces as the Caucasus has not seen even in a dream... You must penetrate into the mountains, rout Shamil wherever he stands against you, annihilate everything that resists you, but spare everything that submits without a fight" - and added, on bribery: "Scatter money, trying to attract to our side people who have influence over the tribes"[39]. In summer 1845 Vorontsov, viceroy and commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, on the direct order of Nicholas I led an army against Dargo: Pokrovsky counts the detachment at 9500 men, historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov - "an army of 21 thousand soldiers and officers with 42 artillery pieces"[40][36]. The march ended in catastrophe: "Of the 9500 men who made up Vorontsov's detachment, 3510 men were put out of action, among them 3 generals, 28 staff officers and 158 line officers"[40]. The fate of Dargo itself the sources convey differently: according to Pokrovsky, the troops found the aul "cleared and set alight by the murids themselves"; by the record of Gadzhi-Ali, Shamil's companion and chronicler, the Russians "after an insignificant skirmish took possession" of Dargo, and burned about 700 of their own tents as they left; historian D. A. Khozhayev writes that the village was burned by the tsarist troops themselves[40][48][23].
In 1841-1846 punitive marches of imperial troops against Chechnya went on yearly. In June 1841 general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), entered Aukh (the Chechen region in the north-east): historian N. I. Pokrovsky writes - "on 6 June he occupied Yaryksu, on the 7th - Kishen, which was being devastated for three days"[40]. At the end of September 1841 the detachments of Grabbe and lieutenant colonel Nesterov passed through the upper reaches of the Assa river - a march which, according to Pokrovsky, "was accompanied by annihilations of auls"[40]; from 15 to 30 October Grabbe's expedition passed through Greater and Lesser Chechnya (the lowland eastern and western parts of Chechnya). Pokrovsky states the goal of these marches: "to intimidate the Chechens by expeditions"[40]. In spring 1844 raids were ordered by general Neidhardt, head of the empire's troops in the Caucasus: to gather troops in the Groznaya fortress "for the conduct of brief and sudden raids into the nearest auls of Greater Chechnya" and to act "not only for menacing, but also for the punishment of unsubmissive auls" (instruction to the commander of the Nazran detachment of 5 April 1844)[39]. The sweeping of Lesser Chechnya (the lowland-piedmont western part of Chechnya) in December 1846 was carried out by a specially assigned column. The imperial officer Poltoratsky, a participant of the expedition, recorded the order of 14 December 1846: "for tomorrow... a column of three battalions [of the Jaeger Prince Vorontsov regiment], eight guns and a cavalry regiment under the command of colonel Meller-Zakomelsky was assigned to go and burn the enemy auls"[49]. The task "to go and burn" auls was set by order as a routine assignment for the next day.
General Neidhardt, head of the imperial troops in the Caucasus, in an instruction to the commander of the Nazran detachment of 5 April 1844 prescribed fear as the goal of the troops' actions: "by the simultaneous appearance and actions of detachments from different sides, along the whole extent of the theatres of revolt, to spread fear over the entire population, and, keeping the Chechens in their homes, to prevent them from giving help to the Lezgin tribes" (Lezgin tribes - in the imperial lexicon, the highlanders of Dagestan)[39]. The population's fear here is not a side effect of military operations but their declared goal, set for the troops by written order.
In the October 1841 expedition through Chechnya the troops of general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), tortured a captive to death. Historian N. I. Pokrovsky cites the episode from the manuscript of an eyewitness - officer Chaikovsky, "The Caucasus in 1841": a disarmed Chechen captive who refused to walk "was dragged for a whole march on a rope tied to a cannon. Mangled by being dragged along the stony road, he died the next day"; a second captive was bayoneted[40].
In 1841-1846 expeditions wiped out Chechen settlements by the dozen. The Aukh village of Kishen the troops of general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), destroyed over three days: the imperial historian Yurov recorded - "by evening the village and its orchards existed no more; out of the heap of charred ruins rose only two mosques and two saklias... spared at the request of Dukai-qadi" (saklia - a highlander's house; qadi - a Muslim judge)[41]. In the march to the Assa river at the end of September 1841 the detachment, according to Yurov, "took by fighting and destroyed 8 auls" - among them Gapurgoy-Yurt, Adilgeri-Yurt, Sha-Yurt - and "the stores of maize and hay were burned"[41]. In the October expedition of 15-30 October 1841 Phan-Kichu, Shalazhi, Magoma-Irzau, Magoma-Yurt, Terga-Yurt, Shuaib-khutor and the auls near Goyta were burned; on 16 October Nurikoy-Yurt was destroyed - Yurov calls it "the most populous and richest Chechen aul"[41]. In December 1846 the troops burned out the Aldy hamlets and the auls of Lesser Chechnya (the lowland-piedmont western part of Chechnya). The imperial officer Poltoratsky, a participant of the expedition, recorded on 15 December 1846: "at the order of the column's commander all the saklias around us burst into flame" (saklia - a highlander's house)[49]. The result of the sweep he summed up thus: "The goal of the expedition in Lesser Chechnya was achieved in full... the plain of Lesser Chechnya in the triangle between the fortresses of Groznaya, Vozdvizhenskaya and Zakan-Yurt has been cleared completely of dwellings and forests"[49].
In the winter of 1845-1846 the empire moved from cutting individual clearings to the destruction of the Chechen forests - the living environment and protection of the Chechen communities. Historian N. I. Pokrovsky cites the imperial survey by captain Nikolai: "From the end of 1845 our winter marches in Lesser Chechnya began", - and describes the acts: "from 4 to 24 December 1845 the expeditionary detachment of general R. K. Freitag cut a great clearing through the Goyta forest, one of the densest in Lesser Chechnya. The clearing connected the river Goyta with Urus-Martan"; "In January 1846, from the 18th to the 29th, the joined detachments of R. K. Freitag and P. P. Nesterov were already cutting. This time the object of annihilation was the Gekhi forest, and the clearing established communication between the rivers Gekhinka and Valerik"[40]. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov record the escalation: "from the beginning of 1846 the troops passed from the cutting of individual clearings to the literal annihilation of the dense Chechen forests"[36]. The goal was formulated by Vorontsov, viceroy in the Caucasus: to destroy the influence of Shamil (the imam, leader of the resistance of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest) and to "tear the Chechens away from him", without whom he would mean nothing[40].
In 1841-1846 the empire built up the Chechen plains with a chain of fortifications. Historian N. I. Pokrovsky writes of 1841: "in summer and autumn the Russian command feverishly strengthens the Sunzha Line: in July - August they build the fortification of Zakan Yurt, and in August - October - the fortification of Kazakh Kichu"[40]; historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov record the function: "The construction of the two new fortifications - Kazakhkichu and Zakan-Yurt - made it possible to exclude entirely the movement of large Chechen detachments beyond the Sunzha and still further isolated the Terek country from the rest of Chechnya"[36]. In 1844 - "the construction of the Vozdvizhenskoye fortification in autumn 1844 on the site of the destroyed aul of Chakhkeri (Chakhkar-Atagi), at the mouth of the Argun gorge"[36]; Pokrovsky names its purpose: "Vozdvizhenskoye was now to become the base for frequent raids on Chechen auls, for winter fellings of the forest in lowland Chechnya"[40]. In 1846 the fort of Achkhoy was built on the Fortanga river. An imperial report named the function of Achkhoy: "The building of a fortification on the Fortanga, almost in the heart of Lesser Chechnya, amid its granary plains, cannot fail to have influence on its subjugation"[39]. The invasion of Aukh (the Chechen region in the north-east) in June 1841 the troops of general Grabbe, commander of the troops of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), secured with a fortification on the seized land: on 16-17 June a temporary fortification was built at Aktash-Aukh. The fortification stood for one summer: historian N. I. Pokrovsky writes - "on 21 September the fortification was razed, the detachment withdrew"[40]. At this fortification the empire gathered the "loyal" Aukh families before their resettlement under the rule of the Kumyk lords.
After the inhabitants of twelve Terek-side villages (Chechen settlements of the left bank of the Terek) fled to the insurgents in June 1840, the empire gave their property to the Cossacks. The "Report of the chancellery for the administration of peaceable highlanders", drawn up not earlier than July 1841, lists the villages - Stary Naur, Novy Naur, Emingulovskaya, Murdarova, Boyan-Yurt, Kacherman-Yurt, Nagai Mirza-Yurt, Mizhi-Yurt, Kozhakhi, Kalauzova, Mamakai-Yurt and Guneshki - and records the regime: "the grain left standing in their fields the line Cossacks were permitted... to gather for their own benefit, the houses remaining in the localities to be dismantled and carried off to the stanitsas" (line Cossacks - the Cossack troops of the empire's border line)[39]. The same report records the division of spoils: 800 rams seized by lieutenant-colonel Bekovich-Cherkassky (of a Kabardian ruling family, in Russian service) while pursuing the fleeing inhabitants of Mizhi-Yurt and Kozhakhi "were ordered to be distributed as a reward to those inhabitants of the said two villages who remained devoted to us"[39]. The land taken from the expelled the empire handed over to the Cossack host. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov record: "to the Cossacks were given in Lesser Chechnya the 'ancestral' lands of the inhabitants of Karabulak and Galashki" (Lesser Chechnya - the lowland-piedmont western part of Chechnya; Galashki - a Vainakh community in the valley of the Assa)[36]. The word "ancestral" comes from the imperial papers themselves: what was being given away was not wasteland but land on which people had lived for generations.
After the devastation of Aukh (the Chechen region in the north-east) in summer 1841 the empire resettled the Aukh families loyal to it away from their land. The imperial historian Yurov recorded: "By 21 June 180 families had gathered in the villages of Aktash and Yurt-Aukh; as a pledge of submission they delivered their most honoured men as amanats and sent their herds to pasture in Salatau" (amanat - a person whom the empire took from a community as a hostage)[41]. When the troops withdrew in September the families were led away from their native land: historian N. I. Pokrovsky - "the Aukhovites loyal to tsarism were settled in Kumyk auls, where they quickly fell under the heavy hand of the Kumyk princes"[40]. The pressure on the families was two-sided: according to Yurov, the Aukhovites who had gone over to the empire were threatened with reprisal by the Imamate, "one thing remained to them - to hold fast to the Russians"[41] - a choice between two threats that ended in the loss of their home and subjection to alien lords. The creation of the Sunzha Line went through the expulsion of the people living on it. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: after the decision to create the line of Cossack stanitsas "the systematic expulsion of the Chechens began. In the end the largest community of Lesser Chechnya - Karabulak - was deprived of its lands entirely" (the Karabulaks - a Vainakh community between Chechnya and Ingushetia)[36]. The sweep of December 1846 squeezed the inhabitants off the plain physically: the imperial officer Poltoratsky, a participant of the expedition, recorded - "the country around the Aldy hamlets kept emptying: the auls were burned, and their inhabitants were pushed further into the forests"[49].
The Terek-side Chechens (inhabitants of the left bank of the Terek) who had fled to the insurgents the empire deprived forever of the right to return home. The "Report of the chancellery for the administration of peaceable highlanders" (not earlier than July 1841) records the directive: "to announce to the fugitive Chechens that they have forever lost the right to settle in the places they occupied before their flight"[39]; lieutenant-colonel Bekovich-Cherkassky (of a Kabardian ruling family, in Russian service, set over the Terek-side auls) "was instructed not to receive Chechens returning from flight without permission"[39]. By that time the houses of the twelve villages had been dismantled and carried off to the Cossack stanitsas - there was nowhere to return to, and returning was forbidden. The programme for the conquest of Chechnya approved by emperor Nicholas I in 1843 prescribed where and how the Chechens were permitted to live. War minister Chernyshev, in a report to the emperor of 16 November 1843, recorded the will of Nicholas I: to permit the Chechens to resettle on the right bank of the Sunzha near the imperial fortifications "not otherwise than in large auls, to adapt them somewhat independently for defence and for the more convenient keeping of the inhabitants in obedience, bearing in mind also in course of time to turn them into the Cossack estate. The left bank of the Sunzha and the expanse up to the Terek are designated for the establishment of Cossack stanitsas and their supply with land"[39]. The norm fixed a double dispossession: the Chechens were allowed to live by their own rivers only in large auls under the guns of the fortifications, while the left bank of the Sunzha up to the Terek was signed over to the Cossacks. The surviving inhabitants of Lesser Chechnya the empire resettled onto the plain under the guns of the fortifications being built. Vorontsov, viceroy and commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, in a report of summer 1846 recorded the course and the hitch of the policy: "The resettlement of the inhabitants of Lesser Chechnya onto the plain near the fortification under construction does not yet have proper success"[39]. By August 1846 resettlers were already living by fort Achkhoy - it was among them that the families of the Chechen Topi, who had promised to serve the empire as a secret scout in the mountains and a guide for its troops, were permitted to settle[39]. The choice of where to live was replaced by assignment: to live by the fortification, in view of the garrison.
In the place of the expelled Chechens and Karabulaks (a Vainakh community between Chechnya and Ingushetia) the empire settled Cossacks - stanitsas on the sites of auls. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov list them one by one: "in 1845, on the site of the Chechen (Karabulak) aul of Obarg-Yurt, the stanitsa of Troitskaya was established; in the same year, on the site of the Chechen aul of Dibir-Yurt, appears the stanitsa of Sunzhenskaya (Sleptsovskaya)"; "On the site of the aul of Enakhishka (Karabulak community)... the stanitsa of Mikhailovskaya (present-day Sernovodskaya) was founded"[36]. They also record: "In 1845-46 the Sunzha military line was formed, and in the stanitsas built on Karabulak lands the Cossacks of the 1st Sunzha regiment were settled"[36]. The mechanics of the replacement were formulated in retrospect by colonel De-Sazhe (1854), quoted by the same historians: "Every step of the advance cut off from the highlanders irrevocably a piece of their native land. Thus were Lesser Chechnya and Galashki subjugated. On all these places Cossacks have been settled, fortifications built with the regiments' headquarters..."[36].
In Chechen villages the empire quartered its troops. The "Journal of military events on the left flank of the Caucasus Line" for 23 May - 6 June 1846 records: after most inhabitants of the aul of Akbulat-Yurt on the Terek had fled, ""for the protection of the remaining inhabitants of Akbulat-Yurt and in order to use the direct communication with the Kumyk plain through this aul, maj.-gen. Kozlovsky stationed there one company of infantry with one gun and set up there a post of 25 mounted Kumyks"" (the Kumyks - a neighbouring Turkic people from whom the empire recruited mounted guards)[39]. A garrison in the aul is surveillance from within: the village's life went on under the daily watch of a company with a gun.
From the cut clearings and the new fortifications imperial detachments swooped on the Chechen auls, plundering and burning them. Historian N. I. Pokrovsky describes the practice of 1846: "Russian troops systematically fell the forests to run wide strategic roads... and the tsarist detachments from time to time swoop on the auls, plunder and burn them"[40]. The plunder here is not an excess but the regular mode of operations of the troops from the line.
Against Chechnya the empire mobilised the other peoples of the Caucasus it had conquered. In the army of Vorontsov, viceroy in the Caucasus, in the Dargo march of 1845 historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov count "1 thousand men of the Georgian militia, 16 sotnias of Cossacks and highland militia (Kabardian and Ossetian)" (militia - armed detachments of highlanders and Georgians in the empire's service)[36]. The colonised peoples the empire put into the ranks against their neighbours - so that Caucasians would fight Caucasians for the imperial conquest.
The strikes on Lesser Chechnya (the lowland-piedmont western part of Chechnya) in 1847-1851 were accompanied by the annihilation of unarmed inhabitants, documented by the perpetrators themselves. On 6 March 1847 a detachment, led by a bribed guide, burst at dawn into the sleeping hamlet of naib Duba (a deputy of Imam Shamil, leader of the highlanders' resistance to the Russian conquest); imperial officer Poltoratsky, a participant in the assault, wrote: "the majority, caught by surprise half-naked, old and young, women, children and nursing infants, drowned in their own blood from the sharply honed bayonets that pardoned no one, spared no one"[49]. On 15 June 1851 in the gorge of the Gekhi river, according to historian N. I. Pokrovsky, the detachment of General Sleptsov "annihilated a series of hamlets and auls. The inhabitants who had not managed to flee were slaughtered"[40]; Sleptsov's own report of 20 June 1851 puts it more mildly - "those who resolved to defend themselves were killed, or a very few were spared and taken prisoner"[50]. On 15 September 1851, at a crossing of the Sunzha river, the slaughter of those surrendering was admitted by the commander himself. Baryatinsky, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), described in a report to General Zavadovsky of 18 September 1851 how Chechens who had recognized the empire's power ("pacified") and Cossacks cut down the fleeing: "The pacified Chechens and our Cossacks, pursuing them along narrow paths, slashed without mercy. No one thought of defending himself... I myself and my officers tried to restrain the killings, but it was almost impossible"; he counts the dead at "more than 200 bodies"[50]. On 16 November 1851 General Kozlovsky reported, in a report of 21 November 1851, on the annihilation of the aul Dakhin-Irzau: "I resolved to annihilate this aul, which I carried out at dawn on 16 November with complete success" - more than 40 killed, more than 100 wounded[50].
Massacre as a means of intimidation was a conscious practice of the period - and the empire gave awards for it. Historian N. I. Pokrovsky writes of the strike on the hamlet of naib Duba (a deputy of Imam Shamil, leader of the highlanders' resistance to the Russian conquest): "the Russian command did not renounce separate short strikes aimed at terrifying the Chechens. The object of one such strike was the hamlet of naib Duba... What took place was an outright massacre"[40]. For this massacre the empire handed out awards: imperial officer Poltoratsky, a participant in the massacre, cites the order - "for the excellent courage and bravery shown in the action at the annihilation of the aul of Duba, such-and-such are promoted, and from ensign to second lieutenant - Poltoratsky," while Vorontsov, the viceroy in the Caucasus, sent the detachment "128 badges of the military order" for the soldiers[49]. An award for "the action at the annihilation of an aul" is official recognition of massacre as exemplary service.
The empire cut and widened forest clearings (prosekas) in the woods of Lesser Chechnya (the lowland-piedmont western part of Chechnya). Historian N. I. Pokrovsky writes of 1848: "In January - February R. K. Freytag was clearing and widening the Goyta and Gekhi clearings"[40]. Vorontsov, viceroy and commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, reported the purpose of the clearings to Minister of War Chernyshev in an official letter (otnosheniye) of 25 October 1847: "These clearings, together with those cut in the winter of 1845-1846, make it possible to penetrate Chechnya from several directions and punish hostile auls; constrained in their means of life, seeing their constant failures, the Chechens waver, and a large number of families are already resettling into our bounds"[39]. Emperor Nicholas I placed the resolution "Agreed" on the dispatch (6 November 1847; with one organizational reservation - on the impossibility of forming new line battalions)[39].
In the winter of 1847-1848 the empire built fortresses that locked in Lesser Chechnya (the lowland-piedmont western part of Chechnya). Imperial officer Poltoratsky, a participant in the winter expedition of 1847-1848, wrote: "By the building of the forward Sunzha Line, from Groznaya to Vladikavkaz, we greatly constricted Lesser Chechnya, but by now constructing fortresses on the Martan, the Valerik and the Assa we were finally carrying out her death sentence"[49]. Historian N. I. Pokrovsky records the continuation in 1848: "at the beginning of August the fortification of Urus-Martan was founded"[40]. The stanitsas settled Cossacks on the sites of burned auls; the fortresses kept troops on that same land.
The empire destroyed the auls and hamlets of Lesser Chechnya (the lowland-piedmont western part of Chechnya) blow after blow. In November-December 1847 Golen-Goyta and the aul of naib Saib-dula (a deputy of Imam Shamil, leader of the highlanders' resistance to the Russian conquest) were destroyed: imperial officer Poltoratsky, a participant in the winter expedition of 1847-1848, wrote of the burned highlander houses (saklias) - "the charred skeletons of saklias and, on the ground, blackened thick pools of blood and human corpses scattered everywhere recalled the rich aul of Golen-Goyta that had existed so recently," and of the aul of Saib-dula: the column "took the aul by storm, annihilated everything in it and burned it to the ground"[49]. On the night of 17 February 1850, under an order of the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus conveyed by the journal of military events of General Ilyinsky - "to annihilate there the dwellings of the harmful population stubborn in its insubmission" - the detachment of Colonel Sleptsov burned the hamlets of Muzuroyev and Nekhloyev and the aul Yasan-yurt: "Few of the inhabitants managed to save themselves... Having finished the annihilation of the hamlets and the aul in two hours' time, Colonel Sleptsov began his withdrawal"[50]. On 15 June 1851 "a series of hamlets and auls" of the Gekhi gorge was annihilated[40], and on 16 November 1851 - the aul Dakhin-Irzau: General Kozlovsky's report notes "the turning to ashes of the aul Dakhin-Irzau with enormous stores of grain and hay"[50].
Short surprise strikes were the working mode of the troops in Lesser Chechnya (the lowland-piedmont western part of Chechnya) in 1847-1851. The detachment against the hamlet of naib Duba (a deputy of Imam Shamil, leader of the highlanders' resistance to the Russian conquest) set out "on 5 March, at 10 o'clock at night" and struck at dawn[49]; the raid of 17 February 1850 took "two hours' time"[50]; in June, September and November 1851 the auls were struck by the detachments of Generals Sleptsov, Baryatinsky and Kozlovsky[50][40]. The frame of the practice was given by historian N. I. Pokrovsky: "separate short strikes aimed at terrifying the Chechens"[40].
The empire drove the population of the mountain gorges of Lesser Chechnya (the lowland-piedmont western part of Chechnya) down to its fortifications. General Sleptsov reported to General Ilyinsky on 4 October 1850: "In two days, from 30 September to 2 October, the auls Galgayevsky, Eyshkaloysky, Nachkhoysky and Terloyev, scattered in hamlets, emptied. More than 150 families settled the space around Zakan-yurt and Kazakh-kichu" - next to the imperial fortifications[50]. The report frames the resettlement as a request of the elders; the mechanism of coercion is named plainly by the same report - constraint by the future imperial settlements in the valley and the example of compatriots already resettled.
The squeezing of the Chechens out of the mountains was built on depriving them of the means of life - and the empire wrote about this openly. Vorontsov, viceroy and commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, reported to Minister of War Chernyshev in an official letter (otnosheniye) of 25 October 1847: "constrained in their means of life, seeing their constant failures, the Chechens waver, and a large number of families are already resettling into our bounds"[39]. General Sleptsov, in a report of 4 October 1850, built on this a calculation for the future: the mountain communities, "constrained by our future settlements in the valley, ... will inevitably follow the example of their compatriots" - that is, they too would come down to the fortifications[50].
The land of the evicted communities of Lesser Chechnya (the lowland-piedmont western part of Chechnya) passed to the empire. General Sleptsov, in a report to General Ilyinsky of 4 October 1850, summed up the displacement of the mountain auls: "the rich lands between the Sunzha and the Russian road have passed into the unaccountable possession of the government, so that the entire plain of Lesser Chechnya is now completely cleared of the hostile population"[50]. "Unaccountable possession" is the report's own formula: the land was taken without any registration of the former owners' rights.
The colonization of the Sunzha Line (the chain of Cossack stanitsas along the Sunzha river) left the Chechen people a small part of its own land. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov sum up: "after the creation of the Sunzha Cossack line and other numerous military fortifications, the greater part of the country's population found itself herded onto a space roughly 70 versts from west to east and 40 versts from south to north" (a verst is slightly more than a kilometer); per person there was less than 2 desiatinas of land (a desiatina is slightly more than a hectare) against a survival norm of 5[36]. Still earlier the empire took on the very order of settlement: "as early as the 1840s the Russian authorities strove to liquidate the numerous hamlets on the territory of lowland Chechnya, forcing their inhabitants to resettle into large villages with the aim of easing the collection of taxes and tributes and ensuring proper police control over the population"[36].
In 1847-1851 Cossack stanitsas rose, name by name, on the sites of the auls of Chechens and Karabulaks (a Vainakh community between Chechnya and Ingushetia). Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov give the series: "In 1847 on the site of the aul Gazhariyn-Yurt the stanitsa Nesterovskaya was erected. In 1847 on the site of the aul Ekha-Borze the stanitsa Assinovskaya was raised... the village of Mokhmad-Yurt - the stanitsa Magomed-Yurtovskaya (1847), present-day Voznesenovskaya; the village of Eldarkhan-Yurt - the stanitsa Karabulakskaya (1851); the village of Semashki - the stanitsa Samashkinskaya (1851); the village of Zaki-Yurt - the stanitsa Zakan-Yurtovskaya, later Romanovskaya (1851); the village of Alkhan-Kala - the stanitsa Alkhan-Yurtovskaya, later Yermolovskaya (1851)"[36]; of burned Akh-Borze they write plainly: "the burned Karabulak village of Akh-Borze is replaced in 1847 by the stanitsa Assinovskaya"[36]. The empire planned the continuation of colonization in writing: Vorontsov, viceroy in the Caucasus, in an official letter (otnosheniye) to Minister of War Chernyshev of 25 October 1847, reckoned that after the felling of the forests and "the removal from there of the hostile Chechen auls," "in 1849 it will be possible to lay the beginning of the settlement of the 2nd Sunzha regiment"[39]. Who the replacements were is visible from the empire's resettlement files. In 1847 families from the Don Cossack Host were moved to the Sunzha - according to the lists of the resettlement file, the first echelon set out on 23 May 1847 to settle the just-built stanitsas Magomet-Yurtovskaya and Assinskaya; the totals of the lists - 219 souls male and 221 female[51]. In 1850 the empire planted in the stanitsas of the regiment, including Assinskaya and Magomet-Yurtovskaya, the families of married soldiers of the regular regiments, including those "belonging to landlord ownership" - former serfs[51]. The first settler families lived, according to an imperial sketch, "in shanties covered with straw, or in dugouts"[52].
Those resettled down to the fortifications were held by hostages. General Sleptsov, in a report of 4 October 1850, stated that he was holding in the Cossack stanitsa Sunzhenskaya, planted on the site of the Chechen aul Dibir-Yurt, hostages (amanats) - people the empire took from the families of the resettled in order to hold their communities in obedience under the threat of reprisal against those taken: "The amanats, taken by me in assurance of the unconditional submission of the resettled, I keep in the stanitsa Sunzhenskaya"[50]. A hostage also secured the massacre of the hamlet of naib Duba (a deputy of Imam Shamil, leader of the highlanders' resistance to the Russian conquest) on 6 March 1847: imperial officer Poltoratsky wrote of the naib's two bribed nephews - "while one of the two was, as an amanat (hostage), held under arrest in the guardhouse at Vozdvizhenskoye, the other... was leading the enemy detachment into his own native nest"[49].
The massacre of the hamlet of naib Duba (a deputy of Imam Shamil, leader of the highlanders' resistance to the Russian conquest) on 6 March 1847 was prepared by a targeted bribe inside the naib's family. Imperial officer Poltoratsky, a participant in the assault, wrote of the detachment's guide: "This was naib Duba's own nephew, bribed together with his brother for a good cut out of the pocket of Meller" - Meller-Zakomelsky, who commanded the detachment[49]. Both brothers were bought: one led the troops against his native hamlet, the other sat as a hostage in Vozdvizhenskoye - a guarantee that the guide would not change his mind.
Every strike on the auls of Lesser Chechnya (the lowland-piedmont western part of Chechnya) ended with people being carried off. From the massacre of the hamlet of naib Duba (a deputy of Imam Shamil, leader of the highlanders' resistance to the Russian conquest) on 6 March 1847 the detachment, by the record of imperial officer Poltoratsky, "dragged along behind it 9 captives: three toothless old men and six women"[49]. In the raid of 17 February 1850, "54 souls of both sexes" were taken captive[50]; at the crossing of the Sunzha river on 15 September 1851 - 38 captives[50]; at the annihilation of Dakhin-Irzau on 16 November 1851, "24 souls were taken captive"[50]. The count in "souls of both sexes" in the reports is a count of civilians carried off, not fighters.
The empire conducted trade with the Chechens through controlled channels. The number of state barter yards (points of exchange of goods under the supervision of officials) in the second half of the 1840s "was increased to 11"[36]. In 1850 the empire expanded trade - under the same control: historian N. I. Pokrovsky writes - "In 1850 the commander-in-chief, wishing to bring the unsubdued highlanders closer to the Russians, permitted the opening of a fair near the Groznaya fortress... After an exchange of amanats on 15 May an armistice of three days was concluded... On our side the sale of weapons and iron was not permitted" (an amanat is a hostage whom the empire took from a community as a guarantee of its submission)[40]; historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write of "the first Grozny trade fair," to which the highlanders brought "various goods on 500 arbas" (an arba is a two-wheeled cart)[36]. The fair opened with an exchange of hostages; the sale of weapons and iron the empire did not permit.
The period 1852-1856 passed in series of punitive sorties across Greater Chechnya (the lowland eastern part of Chechnya) and its fringes. On 4 January 1852 the detachment of Baryatinsky, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), assembled in the Vozdvizhenskaya fortress: imperial historian Volkonsky, a participant in the march, counts "over ten thousand bayonets, about one and a half thousand cavalry, 24 guns," and conveys the task thus - "to smash the enemy hordes, destroy all means of subsistence of the inhabitants and the enemy, and then act according to circumstances"[53]. Farther east the sorties continued until 1856: General Baklanov recorded in his memoirs a "hard fight at the annihilation of the auls Dengi-Yurt and Ali-Yurt" on 25 February 1853[54]. The award mechanics of the marches was exposed from inside by imperial officer Poltoratsky: the soldiers of the Kabardinsky regiment took the trenches abandoned by the Chechens on the Michik without losses, and they "were sent the same day to take the auls Gurdaloy and Asa-Yurt, where they managed to lose several killed and wounded, which was necessary, since the storming of the trenches had cost them not a single scratch"[49] - the auls were attacked for the sake of losses for an award recommendation.
In the pogrom of Chechnya of 1852 the victims among the inhabitants ran into the hundreds. On 18 January 1852 on the Goyta river operated the detachment of Baryatinsky, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi): imperial historian Volkonsky, a participant in the march, summed up the day - "on that day we... destroyed up to two thousand households"; the count in people he recorded thus: "Only ten prisoners were taken - and even those were barely torn by force from under the daggers of the Cossacks. Apart from the highlanders who fell in the battle proper, the number of victims who perished in the auls on the Goyta reaches two hundred people"[53]. On the raid against the aul Gurdali of 11 August 1852 the sources diverge: historian N. I. Pokrovsky conveys Baryatinsky's report of 21 August 1852 - he "slaughtered its entire population, except for 52 people taken prisoner"[40]; Volkonsky, who described the same day, asserts that the aul did not fall, the detachment withdrew with heavy losses, and regrets: "If we had really devastated and burned Gurdali, slaughtered its entire population... the affair would have come out both more substantial and more useful"[53] - Baryatinsky's report and Volkonsky's account describe one and the same day in mutually exclusive ways. The annihilation of people was also a declared plan: Vorontsov, viceroy and commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, in a letter to the Emperor of 1-20 March 1854, formulated the task of the past winter - "the final subjugation and annihilation of the remaining unpacified in the environs on the plain"[50] ("unpacified" in the imperial lexicon means those who had not submitted to the empire).
The auls of Greater Chechnya (the lowland eastern part of Chechnya) were burned out throughout the period. On 6 January 1852 Avtury was burned - imperial historian Volkonsky, a participant in the pogrom, wrote: "The aul Avtury had at that time up to nine hundred households and belonged to the number of the richest auls," and of the detachment's withdrawal: "all the auls and hamlets that lay on the path of our retreat blazed up like their metropole"[53]. On 27 March 1852, at the storming of the aul of naib Talgik (a naib is a deputy of Imam Shamil), "the aul itself was turned into a heap of ashes and ruins"[53]. In December 1852 the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus ordered Baryatinsky, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), to destroy Khan-Kala - Volkonsky conveys the order: "the commander-in-chief insistently ordered Prince Baryatinsky to take this aul and raze it from the face of the earth," and the execution: "The aul, numbering ninety-five houses, was given to the flames, and by the evening of that same day not one sound stone remained of it"[53]. The result of 1853 was summed up by Vorontsov, viceroy and commander-in-chief in the Caucasus: in a letter to the Emperor of 1-20 March 1854 he reported that Baryatinsky "took possession of the Michik, cut a clearing of enormous width through the Qachqalyq ridge down to the plains of Greater Chechnya and annihilated the greater part of the villages that still remained unsubdued along the Michik and other streams in the direction of Umakhan-yurt"[50]. In January 1854 the auls along the rivers Dzhalka and Khabi-Shovdan were devastated - the imperial chronicle of "outstanding events" counts the resettlement of "418 families of Chechens"[55].
Famine was the planned aim of the policy of 1852-1857 - the empire wrote about it in orders and reports. On 29 July 1852, near the aul Belgatoy, the column, by the record of imperial historian Volkonsky, "finding there the same stores of hay as the day before, annihilated them to the last stalk"[53]. Baryatinsky, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), in a letter to Vorontsov, viceroy in the Caucasus, of 16 August 1852, calculated the effect on the Dagestani cavalry of Imam Shamil, leader of the highlanders' resistance of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest: "in the coming winter expedition Shamil can have almost no Tavlin cavalry in Chechnya, because there will be nothing to feed it with"[40]. The doctrine was sealed by Vorontsov in an official letter (otnosheniye) to Minister of War Chernyshev of 28 August 1852: the Chechens, deprived of crops and hay, "must - either resettle into our bounds, or go into the very depth of the mountains"[50]. General Olshevsky summed up the practice in his notes: "The destruction of grain crops... compelled the Chechens to submit to us sooner than any other measures, resettling into our bounds"[40]. The result was recorded by historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov: "in 1856-1857 a famine set in in Chechnya such as the Chechens had almost never known"[36].
The famine strategy was supplemented by a trade blockade. Vorontsov, viceroy and commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, in a letter to Baryatinsky, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), of 21 March 1852, together with the threat "we will not allow them to sow or to mow," prescribed restricting the sale of salt to those who had not submitted to the empire; the letter is cited by historian N. I. Pokrovsky[40]. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov convey, after the chronicle of the Dagestani author Genichutlinsky, a blockade of salt, iron and coarse cotton cloth[36]. In the years of the Crimean War the empire did not loosen the blockade: the same historians write - "Up to 200 thousand soldiers and officers confidently blockade the areas of the highlanders' operations in the North Caucasus - even the heavy defeats in the Crimea did not make the Russian command loosen this blockade"[36].
The empire felled the Qachqalyq forest, the shield of eastern Chechnya, in a month and a half. General Baklanov, the executor, recorded in his memoirs: "On 5 January 1852 I concentrated... three battalions of infantry... set about felling the forest; within a month I reached the Michuk... having cleared by 16 February 1852 the forest 100 sazhens from the bank, and 300 sazhens along the river" (a sazhen is slightly more than two meters)[54]. The result was recorded by imperial historian Volkonsky: "the ancient, dense forest that had served the highlanders as their chief defense and protection fell forever, and the Qachqalyq ridge was laid bare"[53]. The calculation was set out in writing by Vorontsov, viceroy and commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, in a letter to the Emperor of 1-20 March 1854, as he was handing over affairs before his leave. The felling he described as a system of many years: "This important business, well begun by Gen. Freytag and then strongly advanced by the annual expeditions for the felling of forests by Generals Nesterov, Kozlovsky and Prince Baryatinsky"[50], and the result he reckoned thus: the Chechens, forced off the plain into the Black Mountains, would not be able to feed themselves there and "must in a short time come over to us, or declare submission where they are; then the weak population of the Ichkerians alone will not be able to hold out"[50].
Burning and famine drove Chechen families from their land under the empire's power - and the empire kept count of those carried off. On 23 March 1852 the column of General Baklanov carried off the inhabitants of two auls: imperial historian Volkonsky counts - "There were two hundred fifty-eight souls of both sexes and all ages: fifty-one families from Mazlagash and sixteen families from Gurdali"[53]; the mechanics of the choice he conveyed in the words of contemporaries about the naibs - deputies of Imam Shamil: "the naibs pluck them, we pluck them and will go on plucking... they resolved to choose the lesser of two evils, i.e. to resettle to us"[53]. After the destruction of Khan-Kala in December 1852, Baryatinsky, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), counted in a report of 10 February 1853: of roughly 500 inhabitants, 350 were brought to the Groznaya fortress, "the total loss of the inhabitants must be put at around 100 people" - the fate of that hundred, by the report's own admission, "is not known with exactness"[50]. In January 1854, after the devastation of the auls along the Dzhalka, "418 families of Chechens" were evicted[55], and the order of General Muravyov, commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, of 19 July 1855 counts the result: "more than 1 thousand Chechen families have resettled into our submissive auls"[55]. The plan for 1856 posed the choice bluntly: the Chechens were "to choose one of two things - to submit, or to move out farther into the interior of the Black Mountains"[55].
The empire starved the inhabitants of the Khankala gorge out by an openly formulated plan. Imperial historian Volkonsky recorded the design of the summer of 1852: Baryatinsky, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), "resolved... to smoke the inhabitants out of the gorge, precisely - to smoke them out, because it was necessary to annihilate with fire everything that gave them subsistence"; the calculation Volkonsky recorded thus - "And to seek food from us means to humble oneself, submit, and willy-nilly resettle"[53]. The same calculation stood behind the razing of Khan-Kala - the inhabitants were to be torn away from Imam Shamil, leader of the highlanders' resistance of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest: "the inhabitants, deprived of shelter and sustenance, instead of running over to Shamil, would seek refuge with us"[53]. During the siege of Khan-Kala the detachment cut the aul off from water as well: "the enemy was deprived of the possibility of covered access to the river, and he was left without water"[53].
The clearings took from the Chechens the land that fed them, and the empire entered this seizure on its books: the order of Vorontsov, viceroy in the Caucasus, for the Separate Caucasus Corps of 5 January 1853 counted the result of the Qachqalyq clearing: "The construction of this clearing took away from the unsubdued Chechens a significant quantity of land, which could feed up to 1,500 souls"[50].
The empire demonstratively rewarded defectors from the leadership of the resistance with ranks, money and land. Bata Shamurzayev, a naib of Shamil (deputy of the Imam, leader of the highlanders' resistance of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest), went over to the empire in the autumn of 1851 and received rewards. Baryatinsky, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), in a letter to Vorontsov, viceroy in the Caucasus, of 24 February 1852, requested - "what a great reward Bata deserves, and I ask you to pardon him, then for Avtur to return him his rank and a pension of 400 rubles a year; I also ask you for an officer's rank for his son... who has often served us as a guide"[40]. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "Bata Shamurzayev took an active part in the war against the Imam, was promoted to captain and awarded 500 desiatinas of land... as an example for other potential defectors"[36]. Through Bata, Vorontsov, viceroy in the Caucasus, conveyed ultimatums to the Chechens - in a letter to Baryatinsky of 21 March 1852: "I asked Bata to insistently repeat to the inhabitants of the northern part of Greater Chechnya that we will not allow them to sow or to mow, unless they declare submission"[40]. Imperial historian Volkonsky admitted the system of bribery plainly: the empire acted "through their own co-religionists and persons like Bati Shamurzov," and "not with words alone, but with something more enticing and substantial - especially in the times of Vorontsov and Baryatinsky"[53].
The bought-over naibs conducted reconnaissance for the empire and took part in planning the marches. Imperial historian Volkonsky writes of Bata Shamurzayev, a naib of Shamil (deputy of the Imam, leader of the highlanders' resistance of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest) who had gone over to the empire: Bata "had his agents everywhere, informing him of all Shamil's movements," and the winter expedition of 1852 "was undertaken and conducted by Prince Baryatinsky" on Bata's directions; "The chief of the detachment did not conceal that for the successful taking of the auls he owed much to Bata as well"[53]. Baryatinsky, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), in a letter to Vorontsov, viceroy in the Caucasus, of 4 June 1852 confirmed: "Bata has passed on to me much of interest concerning Shamil's secret intrigues among the Ossetians"[40]. In July 1856 Yusuf-Hadji Safarov, a former counselor of the Imamate, defected to the empire and offered his knowledge to Baryatinsky in writing: "I know much about Shamil and his troops... I hope to be useful to the Russian government and I guarantee to destroy everything I made at Shamil's, because the master of the house knows best what goes on in it"[36].
Even when receiving defectors from the top of the Imamate, the empire insured itself with hostages. When at the beginning of February 1854 Umayev, naib of Lesser Chechnya (a deputy of Imam Shamil, leader of the highlanders' resistance of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest), was coming over to the imperial side, the pristav (an imperial superintendent) demanded a guarantee - Lieutenant Colonel Predemirov, in a report to General Vrevsky of 6 February 1854: "fearing treason on his part and not wishing thereby to suffer a loss in men because of him, I demanded that he first give an amanat. On 3 February the son of Endirey was delivered as an amanat to the pristav" (an amanat is a person whom the empire took from a community as a hostage)[39]. The naib's child became the price of the father's right to surrender.
Over the captured part of Chechnya the empire built its own governing institutions. Historian N. I. Pokrovsky writes of the project of Baryatinsky, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi): "the statute on the governance of the Chechens worked out by Baryatinsky, partially reviving justice by the adats: tsarism feared the sharia court... This 'Statute' was confirmed by Nicholas I and put into effect" (adats are the customary law of the highlanders; sharia is the Islamic law on which the court of the Imamate was built)[40]. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov describe the implementation: "As early as 1852 in the Groznaya fortress the so-called 'Chechen People's Court' was instituted, headed by a Russian staff officer... as a counterweight to sharia, implanted in Chechnya by Imam Shamil, the Russian authorities strove to strengthen the influence of customary law - the adats"; the first chairman of the "Chechen" court was the Russian colonel Bartolomey, the interpreters - Bata Shamurzayev and Kasim Kurumov, and the execution of sentences was controlled by the "Administration of the Chechen People" with the right of coercion[36]. The court also worked out a written code of subordination - the "Rules for the Governance of Submissive Chechens": articles "providing punishment for disobedience to the authorities, for harboring abreks, for contact with 'unpacified' compatriots, the conditions of 'coming out with submission' from the territory of the Imamate" ("unpacified" in the imperial lexicon means those who had not submitted to the empire; abrek is the imperial label for a highlander outside the law); in 1854 the "Rules" were supplemented[36]. The result was recorded from inside by General Muravyov, commander-in-chief in the Caucasus - in February 1855 he wrote from the Groznaya fortress to General Yermolov, who had commanded in the Caucasus in the past: "Here five naibstvos have already been instituted, there is a pristav and a court established in imitation of your Kabardin court" (a naibstvo is an imperial administrative unit copied from the institution of the deputies of Imam Shamil, leader of the highlanders' resistance of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest; a pristav is an imperial superintendent)[55].
Cossack stanitsas continued to rise on the sites of Chechen auls: in 1856-1857 on the site of the village Churt-Togi the stanitsa Petropavlovskaya was planted - historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov give the pair in their general series: "the village of Churt-Togi - the stanitsa Petropavlovskaya (1856)"[36]. The method was confirmed in writing the same year by General Muravyov, commander-in-chief in the Caucasus: "to consolidate our dominion by stanitsas moved forward - is a method already tried with profit, and it should not be changed"[36].
At the destruction of the aul Khan-Kala, also known as Syurin-Kort, the troops of the march of Baryatinsky, who commanded on the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), entered the inhabitants and their cattle as their booty. Imperial historian Volkonsky drew up the account: "three hundred fifty Syurin-Kort people and more than three thousand head of horned cattle became our asset, our, so to speak, property"[53].
The mass enrollment of peasants into the militia: "The trigger was the publication, during the Crimean War of 1853–1856, of Emperor Nicholas I's manifesto providing for the creation of a mobile state militia"[21] - the manifesto and levy decrees of 29 January 1855 (Nos. 28.991–28.993); the Kyiv governorate was not on the list of governorates called up, and the peasants took the empire-wide summons as addressed to themselves[56].
The armed suppression of the peasants' anti-serfdom movement (the "Kyiv Cossack movement"): "To suppress the 'Cossack movement' the government threw in regular troops and police. Bloody clashes occurred in several villages and towns"[21].
The proseka - a wide swath cut through the forest to deprive the defenders of cover and send troops along it - was the load-bearing instrument of the conquest of 1857-1859: the forest that protected Chechen societies was felled systematically. The "Journal of Military Operations of the Chechen Detachment" from 15 January 1857 records the daily routine: "on the 21st all the troops... were engaged in the annihilation of auls, orchards and forest"; "on the 22nd the same occupations. The auls have been finally destroyed, the orchards felled, and the Geldygen clearing laid out 750 sazhens wide" - about one and a half kilometers (a sazhen is just over two meters)[57]. The purpose of the clearings was reported by General Yevdokimov, who commanded the Chechen Detachment, to Minister of War Sukhozanet in a report of 25 March 1857: the clearing "took away from the unsubmissive their broad fields, the places of their crops", and confronted the population with a choice - "to seek salvation either by flight into the mountains or by coming out to us onto the glades"[57]. On 19 March 1857 General Nikolai seized the Goytemir Gates - the passage into Aukh and Ichkeria (Chechen regions in the northeast and southeast): the report explains the task - "To destroy this nest of brigands and open the approaches into Aukh and Ichkeria, it was necessary to take possession of the Goytemir-Kapu tract and build a clearing there"[57]; historian D. A. Khozhayev confirms from the regimental history: "on 19 March 1857 these fortifications were captured by the tsarist troops and destroyed"[23]. In February 1859 the forest was already being felled at the walls of Vedeno - the capital of the Imamate, Shamil's state: "on 8 February 1859, despite the resistance of the Chechens and Dagestanis, the numerous tsarist troops, having cleared of forest the whole space between the villages of Tevzan and Elistanzhi, came out to the fortification of Vedeno"[23].
General Yevdokimov, who commanded the troops of the left wing of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on Nokhchi land), recorded in the journal of military operations of the winter of 1857 that he sent General Mishchenko down the Khizy-Shavdon, "instructing him... to annihilate auls, so as to take away from the Chechens the very thought of the possibility of remaining at the site of their former dwelling"[57]. The execution is recorded there as well: "Major-general Mishchenko burned all the auls and hamlets in the area assigned to him; a multitude of those who had submitted came out to him... up to 400 households, under the cover of part of the troops... sent to Umakhan-yurt"[57]. To the report on this campaign Emperor Alexander II replied with approval "for the completely successful conclusion of the 1st period of the winter campaign"[57]. In November 1857 the same journal summed up the expedition against Salatavia, bordering on Chechnya: "Salatavia has been devastated and burned, so that its inhabitants will now have to settle at the sites of the former Salatavian auls along the Sulak"[57]. Having taken Vedeno, the capital of the Imamate - Shamil's state - the empire destroyed the fortress: "Occupied on 1 April 1859 by the tsarist troops, the Vedeno fortress was completely destroyed within five days"[23].
Historian N. I. Pokrovsky writes of Lesser Chechnya (the lowland-piedmont western part of Chechnya): its inhabitants "as early as the beginning of the fifties had been driven by Russian troops into the mountain wilds and doomed to starvation" (campaign C1166)[40]. The clearings continued the same work: "The clearing of the Gekhi proseka gives Yevdokimov the opportunity to lay waste the fields of those of the Lesser Chechnya people who had not yet brought submission, hiding in the mountains"[40]. The choice the policy left open is formulated in the report of General Yevdokimov, who commanded the Chechen Detachment, of 25 March 1857: flight into the mountains - or coming out "to us onto the glades"[57]; famine in the mountains made the first path lethal.
Historian N. I. Pokrovsky writes: "Throughout January 1857 the Chechen and Kumyk detachments are cutting clearings", and "On 10 November a new expedition into Aukh began. The Aukhovites could not hold out and surrendered, 'brought submission'"[40]. In 1858 General Yevdokimov's troops entered the Argun gorge: "The tsarist troops are advancing along the Argun valley. In January the Chechen detachment occupied the exit from the Argun gorge onto the plain... only in July 1858 did Yevdokimov move further... on 4 July he crossed Mesken-Duk and penetrated into the Shatoy society"[40]. The course of the summer expedition can be seen from the journal of General Yevdokimov himself, submitted to Minister of War Sukhozanet with a report of 11 August 1858, No. 237: on 4 August imam Shamil approached the Argun "with all his cavalry from the Nazran expedition" and took position with two guns beyond the Verdy-akhk ravine; "having satisfied himself of our intention to remain on the right bank of the Chanty-Argun, he ordered the camp to be struck", after which the imperial "2 light guns and 2 half-pud mortars opened, at my order, fire on the highlanders". That same day Yevdokimov "inspected the site on which the main fortification was to be erected, and at once ordered that its laying-out begin"[57]. In February 1859 the troops approached Vedeno, the capital of the Imamate and residence of imam Shamil (leader of the resistance of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest) - the fortress fell on 1 April 1859[40].
On 7 December 1857, according to the journal of General Yevdokimov, who commanded the Chechen Detachment, "deputies appeared from the entire population of the Khulkhulau valley with an offer to bring submission and to resettle within our bounds" - the entry is cited by historian N. I. Pokrovsky[40]. "In April 1858 the Goyta people surrender, followed by the Gekhi people. By mid-April the Russian command can definitively declare the conquest of Lesser Chechnya completed"[40]. "In August 1858 the Shatoy people laid down their arms"[23] - the same journal of Yevdokimov dates this to 7 August and explains the cause: "As soon as the Shatoy people saw that the Tavlintsy were abandoning them and that we intended to entrench ourselves firmly in the territory we had occupied, they at once sent deputies to me with an offer of submission and a request for permission to settle at the sites of their former auls"[57]; "on 5 April the Cheberloy people expelled the naib and submitted", while "on 12 April the Aukh Chechens acknowledged their powerlessness before the Russian army"[23]. Capitulation was also formalized by paper bearing promises: in January 1859, during the advance on Vedeno, a proclamation by commander-in-chief Baryatinsky to the Chechen people was circulated - the full text is given by historian D. A. Khozhayev: "the Russian government grants you complete freedom to practice forever the faith of your fathers", "you will never be called up as soldiers and will not be turned into Cossacks", "you are granted an exemption for three years... upon expiry of this term you will have to contribute three rubles per household for the upkeep of your popular administrations", "the governors set over you will rule according to sharia and adat" (sharia - Islamic law; adat - customary law of the highlanders)[23].
Historian D. A. Khozhayev writes of the springs of 1859: "All the subdued highlanders were immediately, under convoy of the tsarist troops, resettled onto the plain for surveillance"[23]. To the plain, that is down to the lowland under surveillance, people were driven at once: in December 1857 up to 400 households that had come out of the auls being annihilated were sent under troop cover to Umakhan-yurt[57]. After the taking of Vedeno General Yevdokimov ordered his subordinate Nostitz "to proceed with the resettlement of the Chechens living between the Khulkhulau and the Gudermes": on 8 April 1859 "up to 300 families who lived in the nearest hamlets on the right bank of the Khulkhulau at once appeared in the camp with their belongings and livestock"[57]. Resistance to the resettlement is recorded by the imperial documents themselves: naib (district governor under the imam) Osman "several times attempted to pass by the detachment onto the plain and tried to obstruct the resettlement of the Chechens"[57]; separately, according to the journal of military operations of no later than 9 April 1859, "the Ichkerians, Aukhovites and Salatavians, having gathered in great numbers, wanted to obstruct the resettlement" of the inhabitants from the Aksai[39]. For the auls of the upper Fortanga and Assa, forced into capitulation in November 1858, the eviction was set with a deferral: "to remain in the places they occupy for another three months; with early spring they will move out onto the plain of Lesser Chechnya into the Galash society"[57]. Benoy held out longest: historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write that Yevdokimov "in the autumn of 1859 and at the beginning of 1860 set about the inhabitants of the mountain society of Benoy", part of whom "were dispersed among the surrounding auls and hamlets"[36].
General Yevdokimov recorded in the journal of military operations up to 22 June 1859 (report to Minister of War Sukhozanet, No. 544): for the refusal to hand over captives "I declared the Benoy people and their neighbors unsubmissive, deprived of the protection of Russian laws, and ordered the surrounding population to seize them as captives and to take away their livestock"[57]. Historian D. A. Khozhayev relays the same policy: "The temporary administration of the surrounding villages was directly instructed to cease all contacts with Benoy, to take the Benoy people captive and to destroy them"[23].
In November 1858 General Yevdokimov, by his own journal, "found it more advantageous to put the peaceful native population to use": naib (district governor under the imam) Saib-Dulla with more than two thousand armed Chechens forced into surrender the auls of the upper Fortanga and Assa, which "handed over to Saib-Dulla 27 Russian captives and amanats from the best families" (an amanat - a person the empire took from a community as a hostage)[57]. Former naibs of the Imamate the authorities preserved for future service: Colonel Belik, according to Yevdokimov's report of 8 September 1858 cited by historian N. I. Pokrovsky, "was instilling order and establishing the first principles of administration in the newly submitting societies; victims persecuted by the people sought refuge with him"[40]. On 4 July 1859, according to historian D. A. Khozhayev, Chechen elders came to Baryatinsky, commander-in-chief of the Caucasus Army: "a Chechen deputation of honored men, among whom were the former naibs Talkhig, Eski, Edil, Duba, Umalat, appeared at the Groznaya fortress before Prince Baryatinsky" - that is Talkhig Shalinsky, naib of Greater Chechnya and chief of the Imamate's artillery, and Duba Vashendaroyevsky, naib of Lesser Chechnya; the naibs who went over "received tsarist ranks, awards, and were appointed naibs of the same districts where they had once served Shamil"[23]. On 19 August 1859 commander-in-chief Baryatinsky gave "preliminary consent to the allotment of lands in Chechnya and on the Kumyk plain" to Sub-lieutenant Askhanov, Lieutenant colonel Chermoyev and Penzulayev[39]. Historian N. I. Pokrovsky summed up the outcome: "the heads of the tsarist administration in Chechnya and Dagestan after 1859 are persons well known to us as Shamil's naibs"[40].
At the start of the twentieth century the Terek authorities began to bring in military detachments and Cossack units for mass searches of highland auls - formally to confiscate weapons and to "detain fugitives"[36]. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write what this turned into: sweeping searches of mountain villages "were as a rule accompanied by looting and other unlawful acts by soldiers and Cossacks, which was encouraged in every way by the Terek authorities, who constantly sought a pretext for applying harsher measures against the highlanders"[36]. How literally this encouragement worked is visible in November 1902: during a search staged by Cossacks at the bazaar of the village of Shaami-Yurt mass disturbances broke out, the ataman of the Samashkinskaya stanitsa, Gridnev, forbade his men to use firearms, and the clash ended without bloodshed - after which the head of the Terek oblast removed Gridnev from his post and expressed displeasure to the Cossacks who had taken part in the disturbances for their "passivity"[36]. The sanction came from the very top: when the head of the Terek oblast reported that the clashes between Chechens and Cossacks were bringing material damage and human casualties and that these groups of the population should be kept apart, Nicholas II replied that "it is precisely this neighbourhood that keeps up in the Cossacks their old ancestral daring, and therefore there is no need whatever to take measures to soften the situation"[58]. Bloodshed in Chechen villages was for the authorities not an incidental cost but the working condition of the land.
The military teams and Cossack units brought in at the beginning of the 20th century for sweeping searches of the mountain auls robbed the residents with the authorities' encouragement: historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write that the searches "were as a rule accompanied by robberies and other unlawful actions of soldiers and Cossacks, which was encouraged in every way by the Terek command"[36].
In early June 1860, troops, Cossacks, and militia were sent into Benoy, where the deported families had returned without permission, led by Baysangur of Benoy, head of that society under Imam Shamil (the leader of the highlanders’ resistance to the Russian conquest)[36]. On 28 September 1860 the troops took Benoy by storm: the historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write - "the desperate resistance... was quickly suppressed by artillery fire"; the historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova dates the taking of the aul to 26 September and adds: "The retaliatory repressions were directed at the entire population of the insurgent districts"[36][58]. In December 1860 - January 1861 General Kundukhov's operation swept through Ichkeria - ten infantry battalions, four hundred Cossacks, and seven hundred Chechen militia: "'flying' detachments were widely used to pursue the insurgents, while the main mass of the troops was engaged in 'combing' the terrain"[36]. From spring until late autumn 1861, according to the historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova, "on the territory of Chechnya, from the Assa river to the aul of Gekhi, a military-punitive expedition operated... evicting the Chechens by force of arms into the foothills and onto the plain"[58]. In autumn 1861 three detachments forced the last leaders of the uprising to surrender - an imperial report of 22 December 1861 sums it up: "The persistent actions of our troops in the severe winter of last year... compelled the Ichkerians to declare unconditional submission"[57].
In June 1860 the troops devastated the aul of Dzhumsoy, abandoned by its inhabitants: according to a July 1860 report from the commander of the troops of the Terek oblast to the Viceroy, it was "devastated to the ground, and part of the crops annihilated"[57]. The outcome of Kundukhov's operation in the winter of 1860-1861 is summed up in his own report, quoted by the historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova: "All the buildings, in the auls as well as in the khutors, have been burned to the ground... the hay not only in the auls but even on the very summits of the mountains has been annihilated by fire, at which the inhabitants themselves marveled, seeing that in inaccessible thickets and on the heights the hay was burning"; General Bazhenov reported on 29 November 1860: "Today I have finished with the Termoy people. All the auls are destroyed. In Ezi you cannot even recognize the place, so thoroughly has it been taken apart"[58]. In all, according to the historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov, "15 villages and a multitude of mountain khutors were left destroyed"[36]; the historian D. A. Khozhayev writes: "about 15 auls implicated in it [the uprising] were destroyed... Benoy was burned once again"[23].
The historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov reckon: "more than 1200 inhabitants of Benoy, Engenoy, Dattykh, Gendargen and other villages of Ichkeria were forcibly resettled"[36]; the historian D. A. Khozhayev details the mechanism of dispersal: the inhabitants of Benoy "on 29 January 1861, numbering 1218 people, were deported and dispersed, 5—10 households at a time, among the lowland villages of Chechnya assigned to them"[23]. Deportations went on in winter as well: the historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova writes - "Especially hard for the Chechens was the resettlement undertaken in December 1860, during severe frosts. 120 highlander families, having no way to shelter in the forest in winter, were resettled onto the plain within 2 days, their dwellings devastated by the troops. Over the winter of 1861, 1500 mountain Chechens were deported to the Chechen plain"[58]. The Akki mountain society was deported in its entirety in July 1860: according to an imperial report, "The mutinous Akkins were dispersed among the Galash people and other neighboring tribes; their dwellings were destroyed"[57].
A report of 6 August 1860 from the commander of the Caucasus Army to the Minister of War records, concerning the deported Akkins: "the land they occupied has been declared state property, and thus the matter of the Akkins has been settled conclusively"[57]. The historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov confirm: the inhabitants of the Akki society "were dispersed over the course of July among the Galash and other neighboring societies. The land of the Akki society was thereby declared 'state property'"[36].
Baysangur of Benoy was taken prisoner by the troops on 17 February 1861: General Kempfert reported to the Minister of War on 28 February - "...Despite desperate resistance, [we] took prisoner Baysungur and four of his companions... the families of Baysungur and Sultan-Murad were also seized — 14 people in all"[23]. In March 1861 a field court-martial in Khasav-Yurt sentenced him to hanging; the historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova relays the Chechen oral tradition about the execution: none of those standing by the gallows agreed to act as executioner, and "only after the officers in charge of the execution offered a monetary reward to a volunteer executioner did one of the Dagestanis standing in the crowd take this role upon himself"[58]; Baysangur's family and sons were exiled to Siberia[23]. The leaders of the uprising who surrendered - Atabi-Mullah Atayev, naib of Lesser Chechnya, whom the imperial papers call Atabai (14 November 1861), and Uma Duyev (14 December 1861) - Emperor Alexander II ordered exiled to the inner provinces - separately: "Uma... is to be sent to reside in provinces distant from the Caucasus... but on the condition that he not be in the same town as Atabai"[57]. Sheikh Kunta-Haji, a Muslim preacher who taught that God should be remembered aloud, in chorus, with singing and circling in a ring (such remembrance is called zikr - hence the imperial nickname of his followers, the zikrists), who had been under permanent police surveillance since the beginning of 1862, was arrested on 3 January 1864 in Serzhen-Yurt by order of the Viceroy. His followers had a single demand: "The main demand of the zikrists, as before, was the immediate release of those arrested and an end to new arrests. In that case the Kunta-Haji followers promised to obey the authorities once more"[36]. The head of the Chechen district, General Tumanov, rejected the demands and pressed for the surrender of those who had escaped arrest; on 18 January 1864, near Shali, the matter ended in a shooting. Those who came had left their firearms behind deliberately - the decision to go with blades alone is attributed to Machik-Mullah, who announced that Kunta-Haji, having appeared to him, would fill the soldiers' rifles with water[36]. The historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "the Kunta-Haji followers advanced on the dense squares of regular troops with nothing but shashkas and daggers in their hands. Tumanov allowed them to attack, and then gave the order to open rifle and artillery fire"; they put the dead at "over 150"[36]. The historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova gives the count at the site of the slaughter: "164 dead remained at the site of the clash. Among those bayoneted there proved to be 5 women's bodies"; the detachment's losses - 8 dead and 33 wounded[58]. Eighteen people were exiled in this case - the sheikh himself, indefinitely, to Ustyuzhna in Novgorod province; his brother Movsar - to the Vyborg fortress; the vekils, the sheikh's trusted men, - to Smolensk province; nine rank-and-file zikrists - to fortress labor with subsequent settlement in Siberia[36][58]. In the archival register of persons under surveillance in Novgorod province for 1865 the sheikh is entered in a single line: "Chechen Shikh-Kunty. Age 35. Exiled for spreading the fantastical teaching of 'zikr'... Receives 1 rub. 80 kop. a month"[58]. Having lived in exile a little over two years, Kunta-Haji died of starvation[36].
In devastated Dzhumsoy in June 1860 the troops spared those who handed over hostages: "left untouched were those houses and plowlands whose owners appeared at their places and handed over amanats" (an amanat is a person whom the empire took from a community as a hostage, to keep it in obedience by the threat of reprisal against the one taken)[57]. After the Shali shooting, according to the historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova, "The families of the zikrists who had not been caught were taken into custody and deported to Yekaterinograd. Because of this, one zikrist gave himself up so that his family would be released" - Yekaterinograd here is not the Kuban Yekaterinodar but the stanitsa of Yekaterinogradskaya on the Terek, now in Kabardino-Balkaria; the auls of Chechnya "were bound by mutual responsibility", with lists of those answerable to the government[58].
The use of the regular army to suppress the January Uprising: Muravyov and Berg, appointed by the emperor, "resorted to brutal repressions and terror with the aim of suppressing the uprising"; "hundreds of Poles were executed, thousands exiled to Siberia or given over to the army"[6].
The use of Ukrainians within the imperial army in large-scale wars of conquest in the Caucasus and Central Asia – recruit conscription had extended to the Ukrainian governorates since the liquidation of the autonomy[12].
The mobilization of the inhabitants of the colonized Ukrainian governorates into the imperial army for the war in the Balkans – under the universal military conscription in force in the Ukrainian lands since the liquidation of the autonomy[12].
In May 1877 the detachment of Colonel Batyanov suppressed the uprising in borderland Salatavia: historian A. I. Ismailova writes - "The suppression of the uprising, which went on through the entire second half of May, was carried out with extreme cruelty. The auls of Almak, Dylym and Burtunay with their hamlets were destroyed"[59]. On 12 July 1877, "significant detachments of troops were moved against the Bass auls. But the inhabitants, with their families and all their movable property, hid in the forests. The punitive expedition destroyed the auls, and the crops it ravaged and trampled down"[59]. On 16 July Colonel Nakashidze entered Cheberloy in two columns: historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write - he "destroyed 5 villages, including the auls of Makazhoy and Sadoy, arrested up to a thousand people and seized a large number of livestock"[36]. On 14 August the troops took the aul of Dyshni-Vedeno at the walls of the Vedeno fortress - the insurgents, according to historian A. I. Ismailova, defended every saklia (a highlander's house) "despite the murderous artillery fire"[59].
In the instructions of Svistunov, head of the Terek oblast, to General Smekalov one demand was invariably repeated: "advance at least little by little, mercilessly destroying everything and everyone before you... Our forces will keep arriving; just mow down everything without pity, beat and hang without mercy" - the instructions are quoted by historian A. I. Ismailova from the imperial publication "Materials for the Description of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78"[59]. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov record: at the final stage the punitive forces "acted in full accordance" with this order[36].
The order of Colonel Lokhvitsky of 17 July 1877 for the Cheberloy uchastok (administrative section) prescribed: "to raze to the ground the villages of Nizheloy, Rigakhoy and Nuy-Khoy"[59]; historian A. I. Ismailova sums up: "The auls and crops of the Cheberloy uchastok were destroyed wholesale; the same fate befell many auls of the Shatoy and Evdokimovsky uchastoks. The inhabitants hid in the forests"[59]. In October 1877, on the way back from the Simsir hamlets, historian D. A. Khozhaev records: "the Russians burned and destroyed Zandak and, for the second time, the village of Benoy - everything, down to the last house, including the mosques, they leveled to the ground"[23].
Svistunov, head of the Terek oblast, wrote to Smekalov on 18 August 1877: "As for Benoy and Zandak, they must be deported to Siberia to a man, or, if these scoundrels refuse, all of them must be killed off in winter like cockroaches and destroyed by famine"[59]; the same directive of Svistunov is quoted by historian D. A. Khozhaev[23]. In the imperial publication of the correspondence (letter to Smekalov of 18 August 1877, No. 226) the formula reads: "to freeze them all out in winter, like cockroaches, and destroy them by famine"[60]. The food base was being destroyed from the very first days: on 13 April 1877, merely for letting the detachment of Alibek-Haji, leader of the uprising, pass through the village, "the hayfields and maize fields of the inhabitants [of Benoy] were completely burned by the tsarist troops"[58]. Colonel Batyanov, according to historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova, "widely applied the destruction of stores of grain and hay," believing that this made many "come to their senses"[58]. In Cheberloy the troops stood for about 20 days - "All this time they were ruining the fields of the Cheberloy villages. Their inhabitants meanwhile were in such a state as if the greatest of floods had struck them"[36].
Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write about the teams of "hunters": "the militiamen had orders to kill not only abreks in hiding, but any inhabitant heading from his village into the forest. As a reward for every person killed or caught in the forest the authorities paid 25 rubles" (abrek - the empire's label for a highlander it had outlawed)[36]; separate sums were set for the leaders - "for Alibek-Haji - several thousand rubles"[36]. Captives were to be killed if an attempt was made to free them - and this was carried out: "during an attack by the insurgents on the detachment escorting 135 arrested inhabitants of the village of Mekhkety to the Vedeno fortress, the soldiers killed up to 20 Mekhkety villagers"[36].
Svistunov, head of the Terek oblast, ordered the head of the Argun okrug on 20 August 1877: "In the event not only of any aul receiving the mutineers, but of the slightest disorder in it or disobedience to the authorities, you will send the amanats of that aul to Grozny, and I will have them shot" (amanat - a person the empire took from a community as a hostage)[59]. Colonel Batyanov, according to historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova, declared that he considered it "a useful measure to shoot five of the amanats of every aul that had broken away"[58].
Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes about the surrender of Alibek-Haji and his naibs (naib - a district governor appointed by the authorities) in November 1877: "The head of the Terek oblast, General Prince Loris-Melikov, deceived them, giving his word of honor that all who turned themselves in would be pardoned"[23]. Alibek-Haji's secretary Goytukin Rasu, an eyewitness, recorded the mechanism of the deception: Alibek was told "that if he came to the authorities in peace, he would keep his freedom. Trusting their words... he presented himself to the commandant of the Vedeno fortress. The commandant at once ordered him seized and, having shackled his legs and arms in irons, sent him to the town jail"[23]. Those who surrendered were tried by a field court-martial and executed.
The field court-martial sat in Grozny on 4-6 March 1878: "Of the 17 persons tried, 11 were sentenced to death, among them Alibek-Haji, Uma Duev, one of his sons, and Dada Zalmaev"[36]; historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova counts 18 tried and 13 sentenced to death, the rest - to 20 years of katorga (penal labor)[58]. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes: "On 9 March 1878, at 6 o'clock in the morning, in the town of Grozny, on the fairground square, they were hanged and buried in a common pit" - and gives the list of the eleven by name[23]; Akhmadov and Khasmagomadov add: the execution took place "amid dead silence and the evident sympathy of the assembled townspeople for those being executed"[36]. A participant in the suppression who was present at the execution admitted: "I was struck by the calm with which these people died"[58]. The bodies, buried by the authorities in a common pit, were secretly reburied by Chechens at night according to Muslim rites - historian D. A. Khozhaev relays the tradition of a cemetery near Samashki, historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova - of the Tyrtov grove near Grozny[23][58].
"Already in August 1877 the first 150 inhabitants of the villages of Zandak and Dattykh were deported; small parties of exiles were being sent off throughout the autumn"[36]. "In the spring of the following year, 1878, another 110 families were deported from the Terek oblast, and 660 families from Dagestan. Most of the deportees died within the first months of exile. It is also known that over 500 Chechens were sentenced to lifelong katorga labor"[36]. Historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova gives the count for a single governorate: "of the 1625 highlanders deported in 1878 to the Novgorod governorate, 429 died within the first months (118 of them men, the rest - women) and 74 were declared hopelessly ill"[58]. The conditions were described by journalist Yu. Poluyansky, who visited the exiles: "In Cherepovets the highlanders are housed in a half-ruined, long-uninhabited hovel... Of the fifty people, up to thirty have already died, mostly children, of consumption and typhoid fever... For subsistence the adults are allotted 6 kopecks a day, the children 3 kopecks"[58]. Within Chechnya, mountain villages were being driven down onto the plain: "From the locality indicated, the villages of Mekhkety, Khatuni and Tauzen have been deported almost to a man"[36]; the plan for the wholesale deportation of the Salatavians, "up to 3000 souls," to the northern governorates was cut down to 200 people only for lack of escort troops[59].
The order of Colonel Lokhvitsky of 17 July 1877 for the Cheberloy uchastok obliged the punished themselves to cut a road for the troops into their own mountains: "the entire uchastok is to be obliged right now, within the very shortest time, to make a wide forest clearing (proseka) from the Bosoevskaya mountain to the Sharo-Argun river over a stretch of upwards of 6 versts" (a verst is slightly over a kilometer)[59].
Following the suppression of the 1877 uprising the empire took away the land of the mountain communities: historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova records - "Thousands of inhabitants of mountain villages were resettled onto the plain; their lands were confiscated"[58].
Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "On 3 October there came to General Smekalov... a certain inhabitant of Benoy named Biy-Sultan. In exchange for a full pardon and permission to gather the remains of his property, Biy-Sultan volunteered to serve as a guide to Alibek-Haji's last fortified point. Thanks to this unexpected help the Simsir hamlets were quickly captured"[36].
The viceroy in the Caucasus, Mikhail Romanov, expressed the wish to bring the Dagestani militia (militia - armed detachments of highlanders in the empire's service) into the military operations in Chechnya, and on the Dagestan side, near the village of Botlikh, a detachment of regular infantry and 12 sotnias of mounted and foot Dagestani militia was concentrated[36]. At the beginning of May a detachment under Colonel Nakashidze was assembled in neighboring Dagestan - two battalions of the Apsheronsky and Samursky regiments, 6 druzhinas and 3 sotnias of militia with guns[36]. The rout was completed in the same manner: the village of Sogratl in Dagestan, where the leaders of the uprising had taken refuge, was surrounded by Russian troops and the Dagestani militia[23]. Part of the suppression the empire shifted onto the colonized themselves, keeping for itself the role of arbiter and entrenching enmity between neighbors.
The troops that occupied Chechen territories during the suppression of the 1877 uprising plundered the population. During the destruction of the five villages of Cheberloy the detachment of Nakashidze "arrested up to a thousand people and seized a large number of livestock"[36], and historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova records the practice beyond the orders: "the soldiers looted with impunity in the occupied territories, and also ravaged crops, took horses away from the population, slaughtered livestock even without any need for it"[58].
On 10 October 1905, at the Grozny market, the troops of the Russian Empire fired not at the pogromists but at the Chechens whom armed reservists were attacking: historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write that the soldiers of the Shirvansky regiment, led by Colonel Popov, used their weapons, "...shooting the hiding Chechens, hunting them down in attics and cellars, while the reservists and hooligans smashed and looted shops before the eyes of the authorities"; by the historians' count, 27 Chechens were harmed in the pogrom, of whom 17 were killed[36].
A military directive of the Russian Empire of late 1907 prescribed to the commander of the brigade stationed in the Grozny and Vedeno okrugs, in the event of an uprising, "...to act with full energy, scattering the bands to the point of total annihilation, and likewise wiping off the face of the earth the villages that sheltered them, bearing in mind that such a method will be not only more effective but also more humane"[36]. The prescription was carried out. In August 1908 the village of Tsatsan-Yurt was subjected to an "execution" with mass searches, and its residents had a "contribution" for undelivered weapons exacted from them - 7 thousand rubles[36]. In 1911, in the Vedeno and Grozny okrugs, all hamlets built "without permission" were demolished, and 100 thousand rubles were exacted from the Chechen population of both okrugs in favor of those who had suffered "...during the attack of Zelimkhan's band"[36]. People from the abrek's circle were killed and hanged: Salambek Gorovodzhiev was hanged; in March 1911 Ayub Tomayev was killed in Starye Atagi[36]. Speech was persecuted in the same manner: "Any propaganda undermining the authority of the government and the local authorities was prohibited in the strictest way", and the offender faced up to three years of prison or a fine of up to 3 thousand rubles[36].
At the end of 1906 a punitive detachment of the Russian Empire, with artillery and Cossacks, was restoring imperial power in the Vedeno okrug: "the villages of Nizhaloy, Nokhch-Keloy, Khoy and Makazhoy, whose residents stubbornly refused to submit, were subjected to artillery bombardment"; it was noted that as a result of the punitive expedition "...the greater part of the population of the Vedeno okrug, seized by panic, fled to the mountains, where it suffers hunger and cold"; several hundred people were arrested, most of them convicted and exiled[36]. In August 1908 the village of Tsatsan-Yurt was subjected to an "execution" with mass searches[36].
The forced conscription of millions into the imperial army: "During the war years, 3.5 million Ukrainians were mobilized into the ranks of the Russian army (by other data – 4.5 million out of a total of 15.5 million)"[6].
With the start of the world war in 1914 the Russian Empire carried off to the front from Chechnya those it considered dangerous. The Chechen writer Kh. D. Oshaev, a native of the Vozdvizhenskaya settlement and a witness of the events, wrote: "As after 1905, the viceroyalty in the Caucasus decided, during the war, to remove from Chechnya all the unreliable element that had no employment for its hands and that could bring the tsarist administration much trouble 'in life's hard minute'. Those hiding from the authorities who expressed the wish to go to war were amnestied"[61]. For this the empire in 1914 created the Caucasus Native Cavalry Division, nicknamed the "Savage Division", - six national regiments of highlanders, four mounted sotnias each: the Chechen, Dagestani, Ingush, Kabardian, Tatar and Circassian[36]. The same goal was later named by General Denikin, who in the Civil War headed the Volunteer Army that occupied Chechnya in 1919 (campaign C1174): "It was all but the striving to remove the most restless elements from the territory of the Caucasus that was the sole reason for this formation"[36]. Those who remained the empire kept under reinforced garrisons - Kh. D. Oshaev wrote: "During the war the garrisons of the fortifications of Vedeno, Shatoy and Vozdvizhenskaya were enlarged; hundreds of cartloads of provisions, weapons and munitions filled the depots of these fortifications in the very first days of the war"[61]. In August 1916 the soldiers of the Ossetian foot divizion (a battalion-sized unit) training at the Vozdvizhenskaya fortress refused to carry out orders and dragged out their dispatch to the front; the military command transferred an infantry battalion from Grozny, and on 26 August it fired on the protest - historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "16 were killed and over 30 soldiers of the divizion wounded"; some of those who fled took shelter in Chechen auls and homes[36][38]. For instigation the imperial administration arrested two residents of Starye Atagi - Murda Khamidov and Dzhabrail Tolgaev; the same historians write: "Both were sentenced to death and escaped it only thanks to the February Revolution of 1917"[36].
The direct deployment of Red troops, heavy fighting for the stations, and the storming of Kyiv. The march on Kyiv was led by Muravyov: he "headed the march of Soviet troops on Kyiv in January 1918"[7]. Overall command was exercised by Antonov-Ovseenko: "in December 1917 - March 1918 - commissar for combating counter-revolution in the South, he led the Soviet troops in the struggle against otaman A. Kaledin and the Ukrainian Central Rada"[28].
The Muravyov massacre of February 1918 after the capture of Kyiv by the Red troops: the EIU characterizes Muravyov as "the initiator of mass executions in the city," and later he was himself arrested on the charge of "'condoning mass executions and lootings that led to the fall of Soviet power in Ukraine'"[7]. Hrushevsky on the campaign's commander: "the chief commandant, the former gendarme Muravyov, who in February had boasted of executions of Ukrainians and the ruin of their property"[15].
In January 1918 the troops of Bolshevik Russia were advancing on Kyiv. At Kruty station the Ukrainian defense barred their way. From late December 1917 the yunkers - cadets of the 1st Kyiv Youth Military School named after Bohdan Khmelnytsky, four companies of 150 cadets each with 20 officers and 18 machine guns - under the command of Sotnyk Averkii Honcharenko held Bakhmach, a railway junction on the border of the UNR and the RSFSR[62]. On January 27 the first company of the student volunteer battalion under Sotnyk Omelchenko arrived from Kyiv to join them - 115-130 volunteers: students and senior-grade gymnasium pupils, teenagers, many of them 17 years old[62][63]. Together with the company the Ukrainian command also sent out a demolition team; the volunteers dug in on both sides of the railway line between the stations of Kruty and Plisky[64]. The battle began on the morning of January 29, 1918. Historians of the Institute of History of Ukraine of the National Academy of Sciences write: it took place "during the offensive on the city of Kyiv by the troops of Bolshevik Russia", with the positions attacked by the forces of "a 6-thousand-strong Bolshevik detachment of Petrograd and Moscow Red Guards" led by Yegorov[62]. The fighting lasted until evening, the defenders repelled several attacks; historians put the defenders' losses at "up to 300 killed, wounded, captured"[62]. Toward evening Sotnyk Averkii Honcharenko ordered a withdrawal to their echelon - the detachment's train waiting two kilometers away; during the retreat part of the student company was encircled, and one platoon lost its bearings at dusk and came out at the station already held by the Red Guards - 27 captured teenagers and students were shot[62]. The defenders delayed the Red Guards' advance on Kyiv: explaining the heavy losses and the delay, Muravyov claimed in his report that the Ukrainian forces had been commanded by "S. Petliura himself" - as the compilers of the collection of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory note[64].
The Red Guards shot the prisoners taken at Kruty (a station in the Chernihiv region) with the authorization of Yegorov, commander of the First Revolutionary Army. Lapidus, commissar of the 1st Moscow Red Guard detachment, who was with the prisoners at the station and the day before, together with Zombart, commander of the armored train, had talked the Red Guards out of an immediate reprisal, recounted in his testimony to the investigation in the case of commander-in-chief Muravyov: "The next day, as we were pulling out of Kruty station, the train stopped on the way at Yegorov's order; all the detainees were led out of the carriage, and 300 paces from the train they were shot with explosive bullets. I went up to the dead, then went up to Yegorov and asked why they had been shot. Yegorov, puffing on a cigarette and smiling, replied that he had given the Red Guards permission because they insisted on it"[63]. Moiseyev, a member of the committee of the First Revolutionary Army, described in his testimony who was shot: "At Kruty station about 20 haidamakas were taken prisoner, among them many gymnasium pupils of about 17. They were taken beyond the station and shot in the most shameless manner. There was an outrageous case when one youth ran away from that place, but he was chased down, brought back to the same spot wearing only his underwear and shot" - and specified: "this was done from the train commanded by Yegorov"[63]. Babenko, commander of the Moscow detachment, captured the prisoners, and Muravyov had appointed Yegorov commander of the First Army - both links are recorded in the investigation materials[63]. The investigation clarified the number of those shot: Tsvanger, secretary of the army committee, corrected her testimony, naming 24 people instead of the earlier 150, and a member of the investigative commission certified the correction[64]. The sources differ in describing the manner of the killing: Sotnyk Averkii Honcharenko, who commanded the Ukrainian detachment at Kruty, wrote in his memoirs that the prisoners were not shot but bayoneted, whereas the documents of the Soviet investigation record shooting with explosive bullets[64].
A full-scale offensive by the Ukrainian Front of the Red Army in early 1919 to recapture Ukrainian cities after the withdrawal of Austro-German troops[65].⏎In the summer of 1919 Ukraine was also under attack by the White army - the Armed Forces of South Russia led by General Denikin[66]. The advance of Denikin's White army on Kyiv ran under the slogan of restoring a "united and indivisible Russia"[65]. On August 30, 1919, Kyiv, abandoned by the Reds almost without a fight, was taken by the combined Ukrainian forces - the 1st and 3rd corps of the Ukrainian Galician Army (UHA) and the Zaporizhzhia Group of the army of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) under the overall command of the Galician general Kravs; for 4 p.m. the next day, Sunday, August 31, Kravs scheduled a ceremonial parade of the Ukrainian troops on Khreshchatyk with the participation of Symon Petliura, head of the UNR Directory[67]. The day after the Ukrainian armies entered the capital, Kyiv was also occupied by Denikin's troops under General Bredov, who forced the Ukrainian units out[67]. The events of August 31, 1919 became known as the "Kyiv catastrophe"[67][65]. A catastrophe this day was for the Ukrainian armies and for the statehood of the UNR: they lost the capital, taken the day before, within a single day; the armed clash on Duma Square left dead and wounded, and several hundred men were taken prisoner[67]. Historians of the Institute of History of Ukraine of the National Academy of Sciences conclude: "the initially successful operation of the Ukrainian forces turned into a painful defeat". Of the consequences they write: the catastrophe "had a demoralizing effect on the Ukrainian army and deepened the divergence in the strategic aims" of the two Ukrainian political leaderships - that of Dnieper Ukraine and that of Galicia[67].⏎The course of the day is known from the diary of the Supreme Command - the staff of the Ukrainian Galician Army. The staff described the morning of August 31 thus: at 8 o'clock Denikin's units entered the city, "it seems - across the middle unoccupied bridge and also across the railway bridge, over which several armored trains crossed", and positioned themselves in the southeastern suburbs[68]. The senior Galician commander, Otaman Vimetal, agreed with Denikin's commanders on a provisional demarcation line, but between 4 and 5 p.m. Denikin's general Stackelberg, with a delegation of officers and a detachment of 100-200 men, approached the City Duma, already held by the Galicians; Kravs demanded that they be withdrawn behind the agreed line[68]. The staff recorded the denouement thus: the assembled crowd, "knowing of the presence of Denikin's troops in Kyiv, demanded that the Russian flag be hung on the Duma in addition to the Ukrainian one we had already planted there", and Kravs, "in order to calm the crowd, in which there were many former Russian officers", permitted it with the justification "as a banner of the common struggle of both armies against the Bolsheviks"[68]. Units of the Zaporizhzhia Group passing by the Duma "tore down the Russian flag"; shooting broke out - Denikin's detachments attacked the Galician units scattered across the city, and of the fire from roofs and balconies the diary entry reads: "the civilian population also fired at our units"[68]. The day's toll in the diary: "10 Cossacks killed", the disarmed staff of the III Galician Corps and eleven of its companies, the guns of the Zaporizhzhia Group abandoned in the city; Kravs estimated Denikin's forces at "at least two divisions"[68]. There was no battle for the city: after the shooting at the Duma "great panic" set in - several units were disarmed, the rest fought their way out of the city; the staff summed up: "a unified resistance was impossible because of the panic mentioned"[68]. Kravs set out to negotiate with Bredov and already on his way met "strong columns of volunteers [soldiers of Denikin's Volunteer Army]" marching on the city[68].⏎Kyiv remained with Denikin's forces. On the night of September 1 Kravs signed with Bredov an agreement on the withdrawal of the Galician units; by September 2 the group's troops were already assembling on the Ihnativka - Vasylkiv line[68]. The withdrawal was the command's decision: the riflemen of the group, according to the entry for September 1, "deeply dispirited by the recent events, demand a new offensive on Kyiv"[68].⏎In the fall of 1919 the Red Army went over to a counteroffensive, now against Denikin's forces[65].
Mezhlauk, deputy war minister of the Soviet colonial administration of Ukraine (the UkrSSR), telegraphed Lenin on 5 April 1919: Ukraine must not be looked upon "as a promised land" of inexhaustible reserves - its resources had to be counted among the all-Russian ones as soon as possible and used under a single plan[69]. In the second half of April 1919 Lenin, head of the RSFSR government, proposed that the Petrograd organizations ship workers to Ukraine to replenish stocks of food and fuel: "Continue the mobilization of workers in Piter, extending it to Ukraine and the Don... I advise sending these workers en masse to Ukraine, the Don, the East for 3 months. It is foolish to starve and perish in Piter when bread and coal can be won back"[70]. By a decree of 12 April 1919 this administration obliged every village to hand over to the state the amount of grain assigned to it[12]. The grain was taken from Ukrainians by the administration's food ministry: it sent armed workers' detachments into the villages, and alongside them the grain was seized by detachments of the Bolsheviks' secret police - the extraordinary commissions (Cheka) - and by units of the Russian army[12]. These detachments confiscated peasants' property and implements, took hostages, and made a whole village answer for a single inhabitant. Detachments of the same ministry and of the Cheka intercepted, on roads and at railway stations, Ukrainians carrying grain for barter or sale outside the state monopoly: the food was seized, and carrying grain was punished up to and including execution[12]. Refusing to hand over property cost lives: in June 1919 agents of the Kherson district extraordinary commission detained Nykyfor Potachenko, a 24-year-old peasant of the village of Roksandrivka in Kherson district, "for unwillingness to provide horses"; by the commission's resolution he was shot on the night of 15 June (a local history publication gives 15 July) in the basement of the Tyulpanov house - twice he climbed out of the filled-in grave alive, and only the third execution killed him[71].
On 14 June 1919 Lenin telegraphed Kyiv at three addresses at once - Rakovsky, head of the colonial administration, Shlikhter, its food minister, and Podvoisky, its war minister - shifting the supply of the Russian fronts onto Ukrainian grain: "In view of the utter impossibility of provisioning the Western and Northern fronts from the exhausted stocks of the Centre, the whole weight of this state task naturally passes to the delegation of Tsekomprodarm, led by Orlov and working under Trotsky's order for the entire Russian army as a whole"; in the same telegram he demanded that the administration's war ministry assist this delegation "so that it can immediately move food freight to the armies of the West and North"[72]. A week later, on 21 June, Lenin sent Rakovsky a telegram marked "out of all turn" and "with verification of the exact time of delivery," setting a deadline: "The Western army absolutely needs three trainloads of bread within the coming days. I urgently request the most energetic measures to meet this need. The extremity is utmost"[73].
Units of the Volunteer Army (the "Whites") captured the town of Fastiv in Kyiv province on 25 August 1919 (7 September by the modern calendar) - and on the same day began robbing the inhabitants of the town's Jewish quarters. Pakhomov, the Whites' temporary commandant, having received 25,000 roubles from a Jewish delegation, promised to take measures but refused to stop the violence at once, explaining why: "since the troops are greatly embittered against the Jews." The Whites' garrison was commanded by Belogortsev. The Whites killed on a schedule: "Towards evening all the Cossacks, regulars and partisans separately, were usually assembled for roll-call. After roll-call and prayer they scattered in groups across the town 'to work.'" Those fleeing were caught on the railway: "Many were taken off trains along the way and led into the forest to be shot"[74].
When a Russian delegation came to the commandant asking him to stop the pogrom, because the Russian population had begun to suffer from it too, he asked: "And who is doing the robbing?" - and, on hearing that the Russian population was also taking part, replied: "And later they will say it was the Cossacks who robbed"[74]. On 23 September 1919 Kundo, the Whites' commandant in Fastiv, issued order No. 2 declaring everything settled: "I add that measures for the protection of order in the townlet were taken long ago, all apprehensions are entirely groundless. Of all cases of robbery, violence and requisitions I request immediate notification to the commandant's office"[75].
Rabinovich, a commissioner of the Russian Red Cross, described the result of the three days thus: "The pogrom, like a tornado, destroyed, burned and scattered the greater half of the town... From the smouldering ruins of the fires bodies of those burned in the houses were still being recovered"[76]. By 30 September 1919, 600 killed, 100 burned and 315 wounded had been counted in Fastiv - out of eight thousand Jewish inhabitants of the town, and the figure was incomplete: "there are far more killed, since to this day bodies are being found in the woods"[74].
The resistance of the villages of captured Ukraine tied down troops for the whole of 1919. On 18 April 1919 Antonov-Ovseenko, commander of the RSFSR's Ukrainian Front, reported to Vatsetis, commander-in-chief of the RSFSR armed forces, that he would give no troops for the Southern Front: "Right now there is hard fighting at Shepetivka and Tiraspol and a hard struggle with kulak uprisings everywhere." Vatsetis wrote on the report: "Carry out the order and report back"[77]. Two weeks later, on 3 May 1919, Antonov-Ovseenko repeated his refusal and named the scale: "30 versts from Kyiv there is a kulak uprising, up to three thousand well-armed men with 8 guns." Vatsetis answered as before: "I repeat that the order must be carried out"[78].
For the command, the Ukrainian peasants who had risen against the seizures were not an adversary but a hindrance to supplying the front: it regarded the Ukrainian village as a rear area to be kept in order while the main forces carried out Moscow's tasks.
Naval artillery was turned on the risen villages too: on 2-5 May 1919 the armed steamers of the Dnipro river flotilla shelled Chornobyl, Pliuty and Trypillia, held by the insurgents - the vessels "Arnold," "Verny" and "Admiral" are named in the operational summary one by one[79].
On 25 May 1919, summing up for the armies of the front the fighting against the Ukrainian units of commander Hryhoriv, who had risen against the Soviet authority, Antonov-Ovseenko laid down the order of the mopping-up: those who surrendered were to be handed to the military tribunals of the Soviet authority, "ringleaders and chiefs" singled out separately, and the villages in the armies' areas of operation disarmed with the taking of hostages; the order was signed with him by commissar Savitsky and chief of staff Babin[80].
Don Cossacks of the White army of General Denikin killed Ukrainian Galician riflemen taken prisoner - the command of the Galician Army lodged a formal protest with the Whites' command, and the Galician Army's own military court confirmed that the killings of prisoners were fact. On 25 October 1919 the Supreme Command - the staff of the Galician Army (UHA) - sent, as recorded in its war diary, a mission to the Whites' command - otaman Lysniak, sotnyks Levytsky and Kurytsia - "who were to lodge a formal protest against the killings of our prisoners by the Don Cossacks"[68]. In the delegation's written commission the task was recorded thus: "first, to protest against the killing of our prisoners by Denikin's troops, as took place in Haisyn, and second, to discuss the matter of an exchange of prisoners." Otaman Lysniak testified in court: "In Vinnytsia I received the commission to go to the Staff of the Volunteer Army [Denikin's, the 'Whites'], hand over the said protest and negotiate an exchange of prisoners"; the delegation was received by general Slashchov, who promised "to telephone Denikin"[68]. In November 1919, at the military trial of UHA commander general Tarnavsky, sotnyk Kurdiak asked "whether the killings by the Don Cossacks were fact or fiction"; Tarnavsky replied: "It is fact. Witness - otaman Bukshovany, and indeed the 5th Brigade"[68].
On 29 June 1919 the central organ of the colonial administration of Ukraine (the VUTsIK) resolved: "To take the most energetic measures to suppress kulak uprisings and the actions of bands, applying the imposition of contributions on rebellious localities and the taking of hostages"; the resolution was signed for the chairman of that organ by Polozov and by its secretary Lapchinsky[81]. Under this resolution it was not the one who rose who had to answer - in money and in hostages - but the whole locality at once.
By the end of the year Moscow fixed the practice for the entire army: on 11 December 1919 Trotsky, war minister of the RSFSR, and Kamenev, commander-in-chief of the RSFSR armed forces, signed secret order No. 579 - every army "undertakes, in its area of operations, to disarm the population with the help of all means at its disposal (agitation, agent intelligence, payment for surrendered weapons in money and in kind, house-to-house searches, fines in money and in kind, collective responsibility, the hostage system, the shooting of culprits, etc., etc.)," and the order, as stated in it, applies "first of all to the armies entering Ukraine"[82].
On 26 July 1919 Skrypnyk, plenipotentiary of the same administration's Defence Council, telegraphed from the area of Zeleny's uprising - in the same words as the orders: "The uprising of the peasants of the Trypillia district has been suppressed... there now remains... the exaction from it of all the expenses borne by the workers' and peasants' state for the suppression," specifying: "It is necessary to carry out the exaction in produce, the exaction from the peasants of the expenses caused by the uprising"[83]. In Mohyliv-Podilskyi, which Soviet troops captured on 5 April 1919 without a fight, the town was at once subjected to a forced payment - a telegram to the Bureau of the Ukrainian Press over the signature of Ivanitsky reported: "there is exemplary order in the town, with which even the bourgeoisie is content, despite the imposed contribution of one and a half million"[84]. The reports of the Special Investigative Commission attached to the Whites' command (the AFSR) record of Odesa: "400 people have been sent to forced labour for non-payment of contributions," and of Izium in Kharkiv province: "eyewitnesses told of the wholesale robbery of families whose relatives had gone over to the 'Kadets'"[71].
In Fastiv in Kyiv province the forced payment imposed on the town under the Soviet authority was paid by the Jewish community - Kh. Hofman, an officer of the Editorial Board, the body collecting testimony on the pogroms, recorded: "The entire imposed contribution was paid almost wholly by the Jews, notwithstanding that they are poorer and considerably fewer than the Christians. Many Jews were taken hostage, sat long in prison, many had to leave Fastiv altogether"[74].
On 26 May 1919, at the height of the uprising of Ukrainian peasants under Hryhoriv against the Soviet authority, Lenin, head of the RSFSR government, telegraphed to Kyiv to Rakovsky, head of the colonial administration of Ukraine (the UkrSSR), and to Kharkiv to Mezhlauk, its deputy war minister: "Decree and carry into effect the complete disarming of the population, shoot on the spot mercilessly for any concealed rifle. The whole crux of the moment: a quick victory in the Donbas, the collection of all rifles from the villages, the creation of a solid army"; he ordered the telegram read "to all prominent Bolsheviks"[85]. A day earlier Antonov-Ovseenko, commander of the RSFSR's Ukrainian Front, had ordered the armies "to disarm the local population" in their areas of operation[80].
In secret order No. 579 of 11 December 1919 Trotsky, war minister of the RSFSR, named the goal in a single clause - "the unconditional and universal disarming of the village population" of Ukraine was declared "the basic condition of success"[82].
On 26 July 1919 Skrypnyk, plenipotentiary of the same administration's Defence Council, telegraphed on the course of the disarmament from the Trypillia district: "The disarming of the population is carried out by searches; all those guilty of concealing weapons and war materiel are handed over to the field revtribunal [the Bolsheviks' military court]"[83].
In the village of Tiutkovychi in Rivne district on 6 July 1919 an assembly of village representatives, in the presence of Soviet military commissar Senichkin, resolved to surrender "rifles, machine guns, cartridges" and asked "to leave the population 15 rifles and cartridges for the defence of the population against bandits"; in the same protocol the assembly complained that Soviet soldiers were taking property arbitrarily, without a warrant[86].
At the end of February 1919 four regiments of the Volunteer Army - the division of General Shatilov - attacked the village of Goity with artillery, for its refusal to hand over the Red Army men sheltering there; detachments from the surrounding villages came to its aid, and the Denikinites retreated toward Grozny[36]. On 23 March the army struck from Grozny at Gudermes[36]. From 27 to 30 March battles raged for Alkhan-Yurt: "The shelling of the village was conducted by 24 guns and an armored train that had taken position near the Ermolovskaya stanitsa... the village was captured"; more than 400 of its defenders died[36]. For failure to fulfill the demand to return captured Cossacks the army stormed Tsatsan-Yurt - historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "On 9 April 1919 the White troops attacked and by nightfall captured the village of Tsatsan-Yurt. In the course of the fierce battle more than 500 people died on the Chechen side, including over 400 Tsatsan-Yurt villagers proper"[36]. In October the command threw against Chechnya a force of 15 thousand soldiers and officers taken off the advance on Moscow: "On 5 October stubborn three-day battles began for Chechen-Aul, after which the villages situated near the railway were subjected to a new devastation"[36].
In its March offensive along the railway the Volunteer Army destroyed villages to the ground: "for several days stubborn battles went on, in the course of which the villages of Berdykel and Ustar-Gordoy ended up completely destroyed, and a number of other villages were captured"[36]. The year's count is kept by the Soviet survey cited by historian E. F. Zhupikova: 21 destroyed auls (27 in another publication of the same source) with 15 thousand dead[87]. The Chechen historian A. G. Avtorkhanov, who wrote of these events in emigration, gives both the motive and a list by name: the highlanders' desire "to arrange their state life at their own discretion" Denikin construed as "national Bolshevism", "hence the policy of burning auls and the extermination of the unsubmissive highlanders", and "to break the resistance of the Chechens and the Ingush, Denikin burned to the ground dozens of the largest centers of Chechnya-Ingushetia - Ekazhevo, Dolakovo, Alkhan-Yurt, Chechen-Aul, Ustar-Gardoy, Gudermes, Gerzel-Aul, Stary-Yurt and others" (Ekazhevo and Dolakovo are Ingush villages)[88].
After capturing Alkhan-Yurt at the end of March 1919 the Volunteer Army for a month did not let the residents bury their dead - historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "As a punishment for the stubborn resistance, the White command for the course of a month did not permit the bodies of the village's fallen defenders to be committed to the earth"[36].
The Volunteer Army answered the uprising in Grozny in December 1919 with mass executions: after the suppression of the rising on the night of 23 December the insurgent leader Gikalo reported: "Right now there are nightmarish reprisals in Grozny: 79 people have been hanged and a mass of people shot"[36].
On 19 February 1919 General Lyakhov, at a congress of Chechnya's representatives in Aldy, announced the demands of the Volunteer Army, including mobilization: "These demands were put forward in the form of an ultimatum and were not subject to discussion," write historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov, and the congress left the ultimatum without an answer[36]. In April 1919 the command put forward a new ultimatum: "the complete submission of the Chechens to the appointed ruler of Chechnya, the handing over of all Red Army men, Bolsheviks and abreks, as well as of all the valuables carried off into Chechnya by the Red Army... the return of the pilfered materials from the railway and the organization of deliveries of provisions and fodder for the army"; for failure to fulfill a separate demand - to immediately return a group of Cossacks captured in the vicinity of the village - the army took Tsatsan-Yurt by storm[36].
In February 1919 the Volunteer Army demanded, through the Mountain government, the handing over of all Red Army men sheltering in Chechnya: "About 700 people were indeed prepared for handover, but this action met the resolute resistance of the Goity Soviet and the open discontent of the people," write historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov (the Goity Soviet - the soviet of the village of Goity); General Shatilov reported: "...unrest is taking place among the Chechens, as part of them do not want the Bolsheviks handed over"[36]. The demand to hand over "all Red Army men, Bolsheviks and abreks" entered the April ultimatum as well[36].
In February 1919 the Volunteer Army announced at the congress in Aldy a mobilization of the highlanders - at the villages' own expense: "the villages were obliged to equip and maintain the mobilized at their own cost"[36]. General Aliev, the appointed ruler of Chechnya, carried out the mobilization: "The 200-300 horsemen assembled in this way (together with Kabardians and Ingush) took part in the suppression of peasant unrest in the Stavropol region"[36]. Historian E. F. Zhupikova conveys the conclusion of the researcher P. Aptekar on the causes of the Chechens' uprising against Denikin: "the forcible mobilizations and requisitions of provisions for Denikin's army"[87].
In 1919 General Denikin refused to recognize the Mountain government and dissolved it[87]; General Lyakhov, appointed ruler of the Terek oblast, agreed to regard the republic's parliament as no more than "a consultative organ attached to his person"[36]. As ruler of Chechnya the Volunteer Army appointed a general from among the Chechens - historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "As Ruler of Chechnya on behalf of the Volunteer Army was appointed a well-known military man - General Eriskhan (Iriskhan) Aliev, a Chechen by origin"[36]. On 29 March 1919 Denikin convened a conference in Grozny - as the same historians write, one "called upon to put an end to the bloodshed and to confirm E. Aliev as ruler of Chechnya" - attended by representatives of 42 villages, mostly supporters of the Atagi Soviet (the Chechen National Council, which sat in Starye Atagi), entrepreneurs and part of the clergy[36].
On December 12, 1919, the command of the Soviet Southern Front issued secret directive No. 188. The document was signed by front commander Yegorov, the future head of the USSR Stalin, and chief of staff Petin. The directive gave the invaders' army its task: «to capture the city of Kyiv in the shortest possible time»[89]. On December 16, 1919, the army of Soviet Russia (RSFSR) took Kyiv for the third time since the start of the communist revolution[89][65].
The Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) is the Ukrainian state proclaimed in 1917. By December 1919 its army - eight to ten thousand soldiers, many of them sick with typhus - was pinned near Starokostiantyniv in Volhynia: the Volunteer Army of Denikin to the south and east, the Polish army to the west, the troops of Soviet Russia to the north. Contemporaries called this position the «triangle of death»[6]. At a meeting in Nova Chortoryia on December 4-6, 1919, the head of the UNR Directory Symon Petliura and the army command decided to dissolve the regular front. The UNR Army under the command of Mykhailo Omelianovych-Pavlenko set out on a raid through the rear of the Soviet and White forces: in 180 days, from December 6, 1919 to May 6, 1920, some ten thousand soldiers marched two and a half thousand kilometres across Ukraine. This raid is known as the First Winter Campaign[6].
That same winter Soviet troops occupied most of Ukraine. The dates of the cities' capture, according to the front reports: December 11, 1919 - Poltava and Kharkiv, December 16 - Kupiansk, December 24 - Luhansk, January 5, 1920 - Mariupol, February 7 - Odesa[89]. On the Right Bank the Russian occupier reached the Polish front line: Kamianets-Podilskyi, Proskuriv and Starokostiantyniv were held by the Poles[6].
The UNR leadership signed an alliance with Poland and secured the support of its army in the fight against the Russian occupiers. In the spring of 1920 the armies of Poland and the UNR moved to liberate Kyiv. On May 6, 1920, Yegorov, commander of the Southwestern Front of the Soviet army, telegraphed in secret order No. 304: «Kyiv must fall to the enemy only at the cost of the heaviest losses on his part»[90]. The armies of the UNR and Poland retook Kyiv: on May 7 Polish reconnaissance units rode to the centre of the city by tram, and on May 8 ten regiments of the 3rd Polish Army entered the capital[91].
The occupier gathered its forces and on June 6 broke through the Polish front south of Kyiv, at Samhorodok. On June 10 the Polish troops, having blown up the Chain and Rusanivskyi bridges, withdrew from Kyiv[91]. On June 12, 1920, Yegorov reported: «Units of the 58th Division have taken Pechersk and are entering Kyiv». The orders to cut the Kyiv - Korosten railway, issued the day before, were signed by Yegorov and Stalin[90].
On October 18, 1920, an armistice took effect on the Polish-Soviet front, and the UNR Army was left to face the invader alone[91]. By November 10 it held the front with 8,968 bayonets and 3,250 sabres, with 95 guns and 687 machine guns. Against it the Soviet command moved the 12th and 14th armies, the Bashkir cavalry brigade and Kotovsky's cavalry brigade: 24,000 bayonets, 4,000 sabres, 120 guns and five armoured trains[92]. The occupation troops attacked first and thwarted the offensive being prepared in Podillia, in today's Vinnytsia and Khmelnytskyi oblasts. In eleven days of fighting the UNR Army lost about 13 thousand soldiers, almost all of its artillery and four armoured trains[91].
On November 21, 1920, about 12 thousand UNR soldiers, together with the staff of Symon Petliura and the ministries, crossed the Zbruch River, along which ran the border with the lands ceded to Poland under the Treaty of Warsaw[91]. Mykhailo Andrusiak, a participant in the retreat, recalled: «Sadly, with bowed heads, the Cossacks laid down their arms after crossing the bridge and marched on to the West»[93].
In the autumn of 1921 the soldiers of the UNR army made a last attempt to raise a general uprising against the Soviet occupiers. This raid is known as the Second Winter Campaign, and its course is known from the report of the chief of the Field Insurgent Staff, Colonel Yurii Otmarshtein, submitted to Symon Petliura. At 2 a.m. on November 4, 1921, the detachment crossed the Polish-Ukrainian border near the village of Borove: 155 officers and officials, 645 Cossacks, 32 horses, with about 56 percent of the men armed with rifles[94]. On November 7 the detachment under the overall command of Yurii Tiutiunnyk liberated the Korosten railway junction in battle and freed 600 political prisoners from the jail, but withdrew that same morning: an armoured train of the Soviet occupiers was approaching the town with guns the detachment had nothing to counter, and ammunition had to be spared. Seven officers and twelve Cossacks died in the battle[94].
The detachment could go no further. Half of the infantry marched without boots and with frostbitten feet, the wagon train carried up to 80 wounded, and ammunition was replenished only with what was taken from killed and captured Russians. The staff decided to turn back, towards Poland[94]. The troops of the Russian invader blockaded the area of the UNR raid and on November 17 encircled the detachment near the village of Mali Mynky in the north of Zhytomyr Oblast. Over 400 soldiers died in the battle, 537 were taken prisoner, and more than a hundred broke out of the encirclement and crossed the Polish border on November 20[28][16]. The prisoners were taken to the village of Bazar, where 359 of them were shot[95]. The armed struggle of the regular UNR Army ended there[67].
In the autumn of 1921 the soldiers of the Army of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR), who had retreated across the Zbruch River in November 1920, formed detachments and returned to Ukraine to raise an uprising against Soviet rule. This raid is known as the Second Winter Campaign[16]. On November 17, 1921, occupation troops under the command of Kotovsky encircled the UNR detachment near the village of Mali Mynky in the north of Zhytomyr Oblast[16].
The captured Ukrainians were taken to the neighbouring village of Bazar and locked in the church. A visiting commission of the Cheka - the secret police of Soviet Russia, predecessor of today's FSB - arrived from Kyiv to judge them; the Communists called it the «Extraordinary Five». Its resolution, signed in Bazar on November 22, 1921, was entered into the collection of orders to the troops of the Kyiv Military District as No. 2578 of November 26, 1921[95].
The Russian commission described the battle as follows: «Over 400 men were cut down in the battle and 537 captured, including the wounded… In all, 443 men appeared before the extraordinary commission (the Five); the rest died of their wounds before the commission arrived or were in grave condition and left until recovery»[95].
The commission recorded the motive for the execution in the same document: «Guided by the dictates of revolutionary conscience… and in order to prevent similar crimes… and to show the entire capitalist world and its hirelings that the power of the Soviets mercilessly punishes anyone who attempts to disrupt its peaceful work, the Extraordinary Five resolves: 1. The persons listed in the annex hereto, numbering 359, as malicious, active bandits - TO BE SHOT»[95].
The fate of the remaining Ukrainian prisoners the commission set out in the same document: forty-one men of the senior command and civil administration it ordered sent for further interrogation by the investigative organs, and forty-two former Red Army soldiers, captured a year earlier, to the special department of the Kyiv Military District for screening[95].
The resolution was signed by commission chairman Garkavy, members Livshits, Ivanov, Kotovsky and Frinovsky, and secretary Litvinov. Kotovsky, who put his signature under the death sentence, commanded the very troops that had encircled the detachment at Mali Mynky. The order for the district was signed by district commander Yakir, member of the district Revolutionary Military Council Zatonsky, and district chief of staff Pauka[95].
The Soviet command offered the prisoners a transfer into the Red Army; not one agreed[67][28]. The colonizers carried out the execution in front of people herded to watch: the day before, they forced local peasants to dig a long ditch in a ravine near Bazar, and brought in the residents of the surrounding villages to the execution site[95]. Before the ditch one of the commissars asked once more who wished to join the Red Army. From the ranks came the answer: «We will not serve you!.. Shoot!.. The people will not forgive you for this!»[95]. The condemned embraced and sang «Shche ne vmerla Ukraina» - the song that seventy years later, after Ukraine declared independence in 1991, became the national anthem of Ukraine and remains so to this day[96]. To the sound of the anthem, Soviet troops shot all 359 Ukrainian prisoners near the village of Bazar[95][67]. The testimonies were gathered by a courier of the Ukrainian underground who visited Mali Mynky and Bazar immediately after the execution[95].
The exact day of the execution differs between sources, ranging from November 21 to 23[95][28][16].
The list of all 359 executed men, name by name, was published by Sotnyk O. Shpilinskyi in Kalisz in 1932; the list was later reprinted together with the text of the resolution[95].
Historian Larysa Yakubova writes: «This execution became a tragic symbol of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917—1921. The armed struggle of the regular UNR Army came to an end»[67].
In November 1921 Russian occupation troops under the command of Kotovsky encircled, near the village of Mali Mynky in the north of Zhytomyr Oblast, a detachment of soldiers of the army of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) who had returned from across the Zbruch to raise an uprising against Soviet rule - this raid is known as the Second Winter Campaign[16]. The captured Ukrainians were taken to the neighbouring village of Bazar, and a visiting Russian commission (the «Extraordinary Five») sentenced 359 men to death[95].
The colonizers staged a public execution for intimidation. The day before the shooting they forced the peasants of the village of Bazar to dig a long ditch in a ravine, and brought the residents of the surrounding villages to the execution site[95]. The purpose is recorded in the testimonies gathered by a courier of the Ukrainian underground who visited the site immediately after the execution: the people were herded there «to deter the population from attempts to resist Soviet rule»[95]. A detachment of the invader's army surrounded the 359 captured Ukrainians in a tight ring and shot them before the eyes of their assembled compatriots[95].
The calculation of intimidation is recorded in the sentence itself: the commission resolved to shoot the prisoners in order «to show the entire capitalist world and its hirelings that the power of the Soviets mercilessly punishes anyone who attempts to disrupt its peaceful work»[95].
Soviet Russia disarmed Chechen villages by military operations through all five years of the campaign. Historian E. F. Zhupikova writes: the Caucasus Labor Army "conducted" disarmament operations "...in 1920; in March-August 1921 the Chechen auls of Gordali, Tsentoroy, Belgatoy, Dargo, Benoy, Vedeno, Groznensky and Shali, which had taken part in the mutiny of N. Gotsinsky, were disarmed"[87]. In May 1922 the troops sent into Chechnya were headed by Gikalo - secretary of the Mountain oblast committee (obkom) of the party[97], who in the war with Denikin had commanded insurgent detachments in the mountains of Chechnya[87]: "The villages of Makhkety, Goity and Katyr-Yurt were subjected to disarmament, with combat aviation used against the latter. Besides the seizure of a significant quantity of weapons, up to 30 'bandits' were captured and shot, and their property was confiscated by the authorities"[36]. The year 1924 "ended in the Chechen Autonomous Oblast with a large military operation to seize weapons, in the course of which almost 3 thousand rifles and about 400 revolvers and pistols were collected"[36].
In 1920 the Red Army looted the Chechen villages where it was stationed: the units quartered in Chechnya, historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write, "received almost no property or food allowance", which pushed them into "self-supply" - "...the Red Army not only ran riot, but took away grain, cattle and so forth, terrorizing the population with senseless killings"[36]. In the summer of 1920, in Tsentoroy, the Chechens routed a unit of the Caucasus Labor Army "engaged in outright plunder"[36]. The property of the killed was taken too: during the disarmament of May 1922 "up to 30 'bandits' were captured and shot, and their property was confiscated by the authorities"[36].
On 31 July 1925 the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR explained the operation being prepared by the properties of an entire people - the order says: "The Chechen oblast is a hotbed of criminal banditry spreading to the districts neighboring Chechnya... In their mass the Chechens are inclined to banditry as the main source of easy gain, which is furthered by the presence of a large quantity of weapons. Mountain Chechnya is a refuge for the most hardened enemies of Soviet power"[98]. The label from the order passed into the operation's working nomenclature: the instruction of 4 August 1925, approved by Uborevich, commander of the North Caucasus Military District, Volodin, member of the district's Revolutionary Military Council, and Yevdokimov, plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU (the political police, a predecessor of today's FSB) for the krai, puts people in one row with rifles and "removes" them with a single verb - point 8 of the instruction reads: "If the conditions of the surrender of weapons are fulfilled, no house-to-house search is conducted, and only the bandit and vicious element is removed"[99]. Thus criminality was declared a property of the people, and its men - an "element" subject to removal.
On 31 July 1925 the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, in the order justifying the operation to disarm Chechnya, declared the Chechens incapable of proper farming: "The rich lands granted to the Chechens on the plain after the revolution are not used by them in full; they run their agriculture in backward forms, are not industrious"[98]. The accusation stands in a military order as one of the grounds for sending in troops: the lands were "granted" to the people by the authorities themselves, their way of farming was declared backward by the same authorities, and the conclusion drawn from this assessment was a military operation. Historian T. U. Elbuzdukayeva, who publishes the order, also cites its continuation: "political indications" had ripened - the population's weariness of war and the demand to fight "banditry"[98] - that is, even by the document's own logic the war was to be waged not on economic backwardness, yet it is backwardness that is set down as a justification.
On 25 August 1925 the USSR sent troops into the Chechen Autonomous Oblast to take away the weapons of its inhabitants; the operation was conducted by the army and the OGPU (the political police, a predecessor of today's FSB) under the overall command of Uborevich, commander of the North Caucasus Military District, and Yevdokimov, plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU for the krai[98]. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write of the forces gathered against the Chechen villages: "In all, about seven thousand Red Army men with 240 machine guns and 24 [artillery] guns were brought in to take part in it. In addition, two aviation detachments and an armored train were at the disposal of the operation's commander. Tactically the troops, as well as the operational groups of the GPU, were divided into seven groupings"[36]. Historian T. U. Elbuzdukayeva gives, from the military documents, a different count: 6183 Red Army men with 137 heavy and 102 light machine guns, 14 mountain and 10 light [artillery] guns, and beyond that 341 OGPU officers assembled from across the whole North Caucasus[98]. Mikoyan, secretary of the North Caucasus krai committee of the party and one of the operation's organizers, recalled that "It was agreed to send two divisions into Chechnya 'for exercises'. The exercises were to include contact with the population, amateur performance evenings, concerts, closeness with the local youth, which was to strengthen still further the trust in Soviet power"[100]; the same legend was scattered from the air - the account of a surviving companion of imam Nazhmuddin Gotsinsky, printed in 1936 in the Warsaw journal Severny Kavkaz, says: "To calm the population, proclamations were scattered from aeroplanes, in which it was written that ordinary maneuvers were taking place and the inhabitants were asked not to worry and to stay in their homes"[101]. The head of Chechnya itself - Eldarkhanov, chairman of the Chechen TsIK (the highest organ of power of the autonomous oblast) - was not informed of the preparations: "The center and the organs of the OGPU did not consider it necessary to inform even the chairman of the Chechen TsIK, T. Eldarkhanov, of the action being prepared. The concentration of troops in Grozny was explained by forthcoming maneuvers"[98]. At the same time the disarmament instruction of 4 August 1925 wrote the Chechen TsIK into every step of the execution: its representatives enter the surrounded aul together with the command and convene the assembly, sit on the weapons-reception commissions, are obliged to provide profiles of the districts, and after "all the enumerated measures of influence" receive the authority to dissolve village executive committees and install revkoms[99]. Even before the troops went in, the OGPU had described every village: historian E. F. Zhupikova relates - "The organs of the OGPU gathered information about the most influential mullahs and sheikhs, about the honored elders, about the guides without whom it was impossible to penetrate into the mountains"[102]; for every settlement a questionnaire was drawn up with the number of inhabitants and households, the composition of the population by taips (clans) and the quantity of weapons planned for removal[99].
Over the three weeks of the operation, from 25 August to 12 September 1925, the troops of the USSR took from the inhabitants of Chechnya 25299 rifles, 4319 revolvers and pistols, a machine gun and about 80 thousand cartridges[36]; the OGPU (the political police, a predecessor of today's FSB) reported to Stalin in rounded numbers: "In Chechnya during the operation 24000 rifles, 4000 revolvers, about 70000 cartridges, 2 machine guns were removed"[103], while Mikoyan, secretary of the North Caucasus krai committee of the party and one of the operation's organizers, counted in his memoirs "more than 30 thousand rifles, more than 10 machine guns"[100]. By the assessment of historian E. F. Zhupikova, what was removed amounted to "approximately 75% of what the population had before the start of the operation and approximately half of the weapons removed in all the highland oblasts"[102]. Under the disarmament instruction of 4 August 1925 the inhabitants were announced "the exact figure of the firearms and ammunition subject to removal", taken from the OGPU questionnaires, and given no more than two hours to surrender them[99]; Mikoyan describes the same quota with the words "they would present each village with the demand to surrender all weapons in the quantity known from agent intelligence"[100]. The taking of weapons began even before the troops went in, with the inhabitants divided up by lists: from those entered in the lists of the "vicious element" and their relatives "the local revkoms took the weapons away, while registering those of the remaining inhabitants"[102]. The inhabitants themselves asked to give up their weapons without shelling: in early September 1925 the delegates of the Goity society Eski Karlagov, Khatu Dobriyev and Dzhabi Otgayev appealed to the district's Revolutionary Military Council with a request: "Now, at the disarmament, which we consider right, we ask that this be taken into account and petition that an exception be made by allowing the voluntary surrender of weapons without the taking of repressive measures"; the answer came by telegram, "most urgent", over the signatures of Uborevich, commander of the North Caucasus Military District, Volodin, member of the district's Revolutionary Military Council, and Yevdokimov, plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU for the krai: "The Red Army knows well the revolutionary services of the village of Goity. The surrender of weapons must be carried out voluntarily on 9 September with delivery of the weapons to Grozny. The weapons necessary for self-defense will be left to the aul of Goity"[104].
The targets of the artillery and aviation were often not military objectives but inhabited settlements as such: the instruction of 4 August 1925, approved by Uborevich, commander of the North Caucasus Military District, Volodin, member of the district's Revolutionary Military Council, and Yevdokimov, plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU (the political police, a predecessor of today's FSB) for the krai, prescribed - "If the population of the aul does not fulfil the demand to surrender weapons in the established time in full, or fulfils it partially, the detachment command, by way of threat, opens artillery fire (or, in the absence of artillery, machine-gun fire) for 10 minutes with high bursts and half-strikes", and added: "depending on the situation the warning fire, as a measure of influence, may be opened several times as well"[99]; the document names no military objective and no target inside the village at all. Of the 242 disarmed settlements 101 came under rifle, machine-gun and artillery fire, 16 under strikes from the air[36]; by the count of historian E. F. Zhupikova, "104 one-pud bombs [about 1.7 tonnes] were dropped on the 16 auls where the leaders of the insurgents were hiding"[102]. A one-pud aerial bomb is about 16 kilograms, the weight of a round of a modern 120 mm mortar; on average six to seven such bombs fell per aul. The aviation was directed by Petrozhitsky, chief of the district's air force, and historian T. U. Elbuzdukayeva lists the targets by name: "In the course of the operation the aircraft of the 3rd, and from 6 September also of the 5th aviation detachments delivered air strikes on the auls of Zumsoy, Dai, Tagir Khoy, Akki Bougi, Oshni, Khimoy, Nizheloy, Ragekhoy, Urus-Martan and Nozhay-Yurt"[98]. What the "warning fire" looked like in a single aul can be seen from the dispatch on Achkhoy-Martan of 25 August 1925: "15 shrapnel rounds were fired at the aul, first four with a high burst, then to strike. After two Chechen women had been wounded, the inhabitants began to hand over their weapons"[105]. Historian A. Yu. Lashkov writes of the strike on the aul of Dai: "Initially, because of heavy fog, the neighboring settlement of Chubakhkimeroy was mistakenly subjected to the air strike"[106].
Through the resisting villages the troops moved in raids with house-to-house searches and arrests. The instruction on mass searches, issued for the operation by the staff of the OGPU (the political police, a predecessor of today's FSB), ordered houses to be cordoned off and everyone found in them to be detained and searched, and speaks of arrests in points 7 and 8: "All who counteract in one measure or another the successful conduct of the mass operation are brought to account and arrested", "Malicious concealers of weapons are arrested"; of what was taken during a search the same document says: "During searches and arrests only all correspondence is taken, including correspondence in the Arabic language, as well as all weapons found during the search"[99]. The information department of the OGPU, in its "Survey of the Political Condition of the USSR for September 1925" stamped "Top Secret", summed up the operation with the words "On our side losses are 20 men"[103], and reported nothing about the killed and wounded in the shelled and bombed auls. The count of losses for the operation as a whole is given by historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov from a journal publication of 1995: six killed civilians, 30 wounded, a further 12 killed assigned to the "bandits", with the troops' own losses at five killed and nine wounded[36].
Disarming Chechnya, the troops of the USSR destroyed the villages that had not met the ultimatum, up to complete demolition: the aul of Khakmedy - more than 300 households - was destroyed entirely, in the aul of Dai 20 houses were destroyed, Urus-Martan stood for three days under artillery fire and air strikes. A surviving companion of imam Nazhmuddin Gotsinsky - the spiritual head of the resistance in Dagestan and Chechnya, whom the troops pursued into the mountains - related in 1936 in the Warsaw journal Severny Kavkaz: "Then the fire was transferred to the nearest auls, of which the aul of Khakmedy (more than 300 households) was completely destroyed"[101]. The aul of Dai, the center of resistance of the fifth combat sector, historian A. Yu. Lashkov describes from the documents of the military archive: "From the shelling and bombings the aul of Dai suffered substantially: 20 houses turned out destroyed, there were a small number of human casualties"[106]. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "...the aul of Urus-Martan was subjected to artillery shelling and air strikes for three days, the aul of Dai was bombed three times, for two days artillery shelled the auls of the Zumsoy society"[36].
Even before the operation the village assemblies together with the revkoms (unelected committees installed in place of elected Soviets - campaign C1176) drew up lists of the "vicious element" - inhabitants noted in robberies; historian E. F. Zhupikova writes: "They and their relatives bore material responsibility for all cases of theft on the territory of Chechnya"[102] - the relatives paid for others' thefts by the fact of kinship and an entry in the list. One could leave the list only by an oath with an obligation to inform: "If the 'vicious element' took an oath that for a year he would not rob and would inform on thieves, he was struck from the list"[102]. When the troops reached the mountains, the destroyed was counted by the same category: as the result of the bombing of 16 auls "119 houses of the 'vicious element' were blown up"[102]; historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov confirm the number - "119 houses were blown up"[36]: a house was blown up because its owner was entered in the list.
On 8 September 1925 Soviet aviation dropped eight one-pud bombs - 16 kilograms each, like a round of a modern 120 mm mortar - on Nozhay-Yurt, to force the village to hand over Gibertiev, the former head of the district militia[107]. Urus-Martan was coerced in the same way: historian A. Yu. Lashkov writes that after artillery fire and bomb strikes "the leadership of Urus-Martan yielded and handed over the bandits on 9 September"[106]. Of the representatives of the local authorities the instruction on mass searches, issued for the operation by the staff of the OGPU (the political police, a predecessor of today's FSB), says: they are brought into the removal as those "obliged to point out the dwellings of persons subject to removal, as well as those persons (relatives and others) with whom the person subject to removal may be hiding"[99] - the community itself was made the executor of the removal. The price of this demand is named by historian E. F. Zhupikova: "By force of the highland custom of hospitality, the population of Chechnya, even if it was hostile to the leaders of the insurgents and the chiefs of the bandits, could not hand them over to the authorities. Breaking the custom would have disgraced the highlander for many generations and would have threatened his clan with blood vengeance from the man he had handed over"[102].
The Nokhchi rose in arms three times against the forced merging of households into kolkhozes ("collectivization"), and all three times the USSR sent troops against the auls. In December 1929 Shali, Goity and Benoy revolted. The Chechen historian A. G. Avtorkhanov, who worked in Chechnya in those years and later wrote about it in emigration, names the leaders of the uprising: in Shali it was headed by Shita Istamulov, in Goity - by Akhmat-Mullah and Kuriev, in Benoy - by Yaroch and Khodzhas. Shita Istamulov explained why he was taking up arms: "we cannot look on while the Chechens' grain is taken away, while they are ruined and their last property is taken. Fines, searches - if the authorities keep all this up, they will force me to come out with weapon in hand... If we keep looking on at this, they will take everything, down to your last trousers, and kill you naked. Better to die, at least you will know you will be buried in trousers"[108]. Avtorkhanov writes of the first days of the uprising: "The insurgents occupied all the village and district institutions, burned the state archives, arrested the district authorities, including the chiefs of the GPU [the political police, a predecessor of today's FSB], in Benoy they also seized the oil fields, and established a provisional people's power"[88]. The insurgents sent their demands to Moscow. As the first point they demanded "Stop the unlawful confiscation of peasant property", as the second - "End the trial-less arrests of peasants", as the third - "Recall the heads of the GPU from Chechnya, replacing them with a civil administration"; by two more points - to abolish the "people's" courts introduced by the Soviet power, with the return of sharia justice, and to restore the powers of the Chechen Congress. They agreed to lay down arms if these conditions were met[108]. The first attempts of the Soviet troops to seize the auls failed - Shali and Goity fought them off; the staff of the North Caucasus Military District admitted in its memorandum on the first operation of 30 March 1930 that "the successful armed resistance to the local authorities in the auls of Shali and Goity during the seizure of inventoried property served as the final push" toward calling in field units[109]. The OGPU recorded in its survey of the political condition of the USSR for December 1929: on 7 December "two teips [clans] of the aul of Goity, led by the son of Sheikh Khadzhiev, shut themselves in their quarters, posting an armed guard", and "on 8 December in the village of Shali, over the inventorying of the property of kulaks [peasants declared well-off], the militia was disarmed"; the OGPU calls Shita Istamulov "the former Minister of War of the government of Uzun-Haji" [the North Caucasus emirate of 1919-1920]; the arrest count in the same survey: "220 people arrested in Shali and 144 in Goity. The leaders of the Shali and Goity outbreaks Istamulov, Khadzhiev and Kuriev have gone into hiding"[110]. The Russian command moved against the peasants, disarmed four years earlier, a detachment formed in Grozny. At its head stood Burichenko, former head of the Vladikavkaz infantry school. After the first failures the command reinforced the detachment with battalions, an artillery divizion and a "detachment of airplanes". On 11 December the troops seized Shali, on the morning of 12 December - Goity, and from 20 to 27 December they attacked the mountain auls of Benoy, Tsentoroy and Zandak. The staff memorandum states: "in the operation as a whole there took part, together with the units of the VOGPU [OGPU troops], 1,904 fighters with 75 heavy and light machine guns"; artillery pieces and seven airplanes are named there as well; the outcome, in the same document: "Over the operation 450 bandits were seized. Up to 60 people killed and wounded"; the troops' losses - 43 men, of them 21 killed or dead of wounds[109]. On the end of the uprising the sources diverge: in the staff memorandum the seizure of Shali and Goity is dated 11 and 12 December 1929, while the historians place the fall of both centers in mid-January 1930; of the leaders' fate some sources write that they escaped, others - that the insurgent staff in Goity perished[88]. In the spring of 1930 the mountain okrugs rose again, and the Soviet troops again marched on the auls, now in greater force. The occupation command of the district admitted the scale of the outbreak in its report to the krai committee of the party (the "kraikom VKP(b)"): "In Chechnya, as in Karachay, we had not isolated bandit counter-revolutionary outbreaks, but a direct uprising of entire districts (Galanchozh), in which almost the whole population took part in the armed action"[109]. By the district staff's memorandum on the second operation in Chechnya, by 14 March rifle battalions with batteries, cavalry divizions and an aviation flight had been massed into Chechnya: "in all, 3,920 fighters with 16 [artillery] pieces were drawn into the operation"[109]. By the final report of Belov, commander of the occupation troops of the district, to the krai committee of the party, 1,500 units of weapons were seized across Chechnya, 122 people arrested, 19 insurgents killed[109]. Avtorkhanov describes the end of the march on Benoy: "At the end of March 1930 Belov, having received fresh units from Transcaucasia, unfolded a large mountain offensive with the task of taking the insurgents' last point - Benoy. After two months of heavy fighting and great losses, in April 1930, Belov entered Benoy, but found not a single inhabitant in the aul: all of them, including women and children, had evacuated further into the mountain wilds. The victor Belov sent envoys to the insurgents with an offer of honorable peace: to all who voluntarily returned to the aul with the surrender of weapons, an amnesty was declared. The insurgents replied that they would return to their auls only when Belov left with his troops"[88]. In March 1932 the Nozhay-Yurt district revolted; the uprising was led by Mutsu Shamilev (the Nokhchi know him as Motsu of Shuani), Ibragim Ninakhadzhiev, Usman Ushkhaev, Khusein Istamulov and Dada Kebetov; on 20 March, 300-400 insurgents attacked the oil extraction site on Mount Sterch-Kertch, another 700-800 dug in on the mountain ridge, covering the uprising's district from the direction of Khasav-Yurt, a town in neighboring Dagestan[36]. Kashirin, commander of the occupation troops of the district, in a memorandum of 31 March 1932 reported to the Minister of War of the USSR Voroshilov: "The band is headed by a certain 'imam' Mutsu from the aul of Shuani"[109]. For nine days the district remained in the insurgents' hands. Units of the 28th Mountain Rifle Division and the national cavalry regiment approached the district on 26-27 March, fighting began at midday on 28 March, and by 29 March the Soviet troops had seized the district. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "the number of killed reached 333, of wounded - 150. The units of the Red Army and the operational groups of the GPU lost in all 27 men killed and 30 wounded"[36].
Hostages figured as a separate accounting line in the final report on the punitive operation of 1930: Belov, commander of the occupation troops of the North Caucasus Military District, reported to the krai committee of the party (the "kraikom VKP(b)") verbatim: "Seized across Chechnya: of active counter-revolutionary and bandit element, 122 people, of them ringleaders - leaders of the movement - 9; ringleaders who appeared voluntarily - 7; hostages - 35. Rank-and-file participants who appeared voluntarily are not counted, they number hundreds"[109]. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov quote this line of the report: among those arrested in the course of the operation - "leaders of the insurgent movement - 9, hostages - 35"[36]. The Chechen historian A. G. Avtorkhanov, who worked in Chechnya in those years and later wrote about it in emigration, described why the Chekists took hostages and what awaited them: "To the old tsarist system of taking 'amanats' (hostages) to force 'bandits' to surrender the Chekists resorted constantly, and on a wider scale", but "in the history of Soviet Checheno-Ingushetia there was not a single case of the 'amanats' being released when the 'bandit' appeared"; of the fate of both Avtorkhanov writes: the man who appeared voluntarily, "contrary to the solemn promise to spare his life, - was shot, while the 'amanats' were exiled to Siberia, including women and children"[88].
The introduction of the "blackboard" regime - a total economic blockade of settlements. The resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR and the CC of the CP(b)U of December 6, 1932, signed by Chubar and Kosior, prescribed "the immediate cessation of the delivery of goods, the complete cessation of cooperative and state trade on site, and the removal of all available goods from the respective cooperative and state shops," as well as "a complete ban on kolkhoz trade both for kolkhozes and kolkhoz members and for individual farmers"[111].
The direct armed invasion of Polish territory by the Red Army on September 17, 1939 for the military occupation of the western Ukrainian lands; the seizure was consolidated by "the treaty of the USSR with Germany (September 28, 1939)," which "confirmed the incorporation of the western Ukrainian lands into the USSR"[11].
The 1941 scorched-earth tactic under the directive of the USSR Sovnarkom and the Central Committee of 29 June 1941: "In the forced withdrawal of Red Army units, drive off the rolling railway stock, leave the enemy not a single locomotive, not a single railcar"[112]; the Dnipro hydroelectric station was "destroyed at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War… (see the Directive of the USSR Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the VKP(b) of June 29, 1941)"[16].
The mass conscription by field draft offices of the population of just-liberated territories: "'Chornosvytnyky' or 'black infantry' – such was the unofficial name given to men and youths mobilized by field military commissariats, and in fact by the commanders of formations, units, and detachments in 1943–1944 after the Red Army's liberation of enemy-occupied territories"[113].
The use of untrained conscripts as expendable material: they were "thrown into combat often at once, without undergoing military training in reserve units, sometimes unarmed, not even changed into military uniform (hence the name)"[113]. The scale is visible from a single episode: "after the Red Army first took Kharkiv in the spring of 1943, about 15 thousand people aged 15 to 45 were mobilized into it and sent to the front without training," with "1 rifle per 5-10 men"[113].
In early November 1941, waging a military operation against the "uprising" it had itself declared, the USSR bombed with combat aircraft mountain auls of Chechnya in which there was neither this invented "uprising" nor the real protest. The historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: for the suppression of the protest, "besides the operational groups and internal troops, three flights of combat aircraft were brought in," and "the operation proved poorly prepared in the military respect and was accompanied by heavy losses among the peaceful population. Bombs rained down on auls whose population did not even suspect any 'uprising'"[36]. The historian S. P. Arenin, who wrote from the documents of the NKVD Department for the Struggle against "Banditry" (a predecessor of today's FSB), writes of the operations of 28 October - 3 November 1941: they were carried out by "chekist-military groups, to which three flights of aircraft were attached"[114]. In the spring of 1942, according to memoirs, Soviet aircraft repeated the strikes on a larger scale - the Chechen historian A. G. Avtorkhanov, who wrote about these events in emigration, testifies: "in the spring of 1942 Soviet aviation twice subjected all of mountain Checheno-Ingushetia to bombing," and "in the auls of Shatoy, Itum-Kale and Galanchozh the inhabitants killed by aerial bombing and by the Bolsheviks' artillery shelling outnumbered those left alive"[88]. Avtorkhanov adds: "In those days, when Stalin was arranging this hell over his own people, not a single German had yet set foot in the Caucasus"[88]. The report of the 141st Regiment on the military operation of 30 October - 15 November 1941 counts only its own men and "bandits" - "killed: bandits — 36... Regiment losses: killed — 6, wounded — 7"[109]; there is not a line in it about killed or wounded villagers. On the Galanchozh district the testimonies and the documents diverge: the historians cite data gathered from those who were in the mountains - that "absolute calm was observed" there, "and the bombing of peaceful auls by Soviet aviation came as a shock even to the district leadership"[36], while Khalukhaev's report names the Galanchozh district among those engulfed by the uprising[109].
In 1941 the USSR forcibly herded up to 13 thousand Chechens deemed unfit for military service into the "labor army" - construction battalions sent to build defensive lines: the people were carried toward the front without weapons and without soldier status. The mobilization, as the historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write, was carried out by the local military commissariats "by practically forcible methods"[36]; the historian M. K. Osmayev writes: "People were seized right on the streets without being served call-up papers and without preliminary explanation of the purpose of the mobilization," and among the mobilized "there were not a few old and sick men"[115]. The historians write about the position of the mobilized: they "were on the footing of servicemen but were not counted as Red Army soldiers"[36]. The historians describe the outcome: "The mobilized masses were loaded into trains and in September 1941 found themselves in the frontline zone, where no one needed their labor. The army was retreating in haste. Over 10 thousand unfortunate citizens of Checheno-Ingushetia died of cold, hunger and bombing, owing to the criminal negligence of the military officialdom"[36]. M. K. Osmayev cites another version of the fate of the mobilized: before even reaching their destination, "they were scattered by German aviation," and, by different sources, from 1,200 to 2 thousand people made it to Rostov-on-Don, whom a special commission of the colonial administration of Checheno-Ingushetia took back to Grozny[115]. The survivors the colonizer declared "deserters of the labor front"; the historians write: "They were barely saved from execution by a government commission from Checheno-Ingushetia that traveled to Rostov-on-Don in response to complaints"[36].
The USSR put Chechen-Ingush volunteers into the line, but denied them weapons, supply and an army number - and on 3-4 August 1942 threw them, with sabers and miscellaneous rifles, against German tanks at Kotelnikovo. Chechens and Ingush went to fight without any imperial coercion: already in the first year of the war over 18 thousand were at the front, by the third year - 32 thousand, by other accounts up to 50 thousand[36]. After the USSR cancelled the call-up of Chechens and Ingush, Chechen-Ingush officers of the Soviet army obtained permission to recruit volunteers; their requests to arm the recruits properly, army-style, went unanswered. The Chechen historian A. G. Avtorkhanov, who wrote about these events in emigration, names them one by one: "On the initiative of the Chechen Soviet general Supyan Mollaev, the Ingush colonel Abadiev, Major Visantov, Captain Akhtaev and others, the Soviet government permitted the Chechen-Ingush republic to recruit volunteers"[88]. Two divisions gathered, an active one and a reserve one; after the evacuation of Kerch the active division went to the Southern Front. In Krasnodar the commander of the Southern Front, Marshal Budyonny, drew it up facing the division that had retreated from Kerch and addressed the retreaters, as Avtorkhanov renders it, with these words: "Look at them, the highlanders: their fathers and grandfathers, under the leadership of the great Shamil, fought bravely for 25 years and defended their independence against the whole of tsarist Russia. Take them as your example of how to defend the Motherland!"[88]. Neither of the two divisions was taken onto the supply rolls of the Soviet army or received an army number. Avtorkhanov writes: "They were uniformed by the Chechen-Ingush republic itself, and from there they received their provisions as well"[88]. Of the fighters' weapons and footwear he writes: "the entire armament of these divisions consisted of sabers alone and of chance rifles of the most varied systems"[88]; "Many of the fighters were barefoot, as their homemade highland chuviaki had long worn out"[88]. The officers asked Budyonny to take the divisions into the army and arm them army-style. Avtorkhanov continues: "Budyonny promised to think it over. While Budyonny was thinking, the Germans crossed the Don, and the Chechen-Ingush division, in the same condition, without any support, was thrown literally under the hurricane fire of German tanks racing toward Stalingrad. At Kotelnikovo, on 4 August 1942, German tanks rolled over the corpses of many fighters of this division. A small part was taken prisoner; another, led by the staff, managed to break out of the encirclement and retreated. But the rout of this division, together with the rout of whole corps and armies of the Southern Front, served as a bad attestation for the entire Chechen-Ingush people"[88]. The historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov describe the events differently: a single 114th Chechen-Ingush Cavalry Division was being recruited - volunteers came a thousand over the establishment of 4.5 thousand - Moscow disbanded it, and the 255th Chechen-Ingush Cavalry Regiment of Major Movlid Visaitov, created on its base, was thrown by the USSR toward Stalingrad[36].
On 29 January 1944 People's Commissar (Minister) of Internal Affairs Beria approved the principal document of Operation "Chechevitsa" - the "Instruction on the Procedure for the Deportation of the Chechens and Ingush"[109]; on 31 January the State Defense Committee of the USSR issued two resolutions on the deportation and the destinations[36]. The first laid out the reception of the deported at the places of exile: the Soviet NKVD (predecessor of today's FSB) was instructed to send "in February-March of this year, for resettlement, up to 400 thousand people to the Kazakh SSR and up to 90 thousand people to the Kirghiz SSR," and in every destination district it was prescribed "to organize troikas consisting of the chairman of the district executive committee, the secretary of the district party committee and the head of the district branch [RO] of the NKVD"[116]. The second resolution prescribed that people be transported "at the tariff for the transportation of prisoners"[117]. On 7 February, at a meeting with Beria, "concrete tasks were set for organizing the deportation of 459,486 Chechens and Ingush - 97,635 families," and the date was fixed: 22-23 February[118]. The colonizer massed in the republic, write historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov, "up to 19 thousand officers of the NKVD and NKGB and 100 thousand combat-ready soldiers of the internal troops... over 15 thousand railway wagons and hundreds of locomotives, 6 thousand trucks"[36] - under a cover story: "rumors were spread about large-scale tactical exercises in the mountains of Chechnya and Ingushetia"[118]. On 23 February, the Soviet military holiday ("Red Army Day"), NKVD troops rounded up the men - historian Z. S. Isakieva writes: "Instead of the clubs, the men were driven (and marched) to assembly points under reinforced armed guard"[118]. The Chechen historian A. G. Avtorkhanov cites the testimony of a Russian student eyewitness, printed in the émigré journal Prometheus in 1949, about the evening of 23 February in the auls: "That evening the Red Army men lit fires on the aul squares and began singing and dancing. The aul residents, suspecting nothing, gathered at this festivity as spectators. When in this way most of the residents had assembled on the square, all the men were arrested. Some Chechens had weapons, and shooting broke out in many places... The men arrested on the squares were locked in barns, and a hunt began for those who had not been on the square. The whole action was carried out in two or three hours"[88]. "By 11 o'clock of the first day of the deportation more than 94 thousand people had been taken out of various settlements"[36], and by the morning of 24 February - more than 333 thousand. The NKVD hauled the people in 180 trains: following a "rationalization" proposal the agency packed the loading tighter - "densification of the loading of the special contingent" in its papers - from 24 to 45 people per wagon; historians write: "In reality up to 80 people were crammed into the freight 'teplushka' wagons"[36]. En route, according to the official figures of the Soviet NKVD, 1,361 people died[36]; the eyewitness Ametistov, later a judge of the Constitutional Court of Russia, recalled: "I saw them [the Chechens] brought in in wagons - and half were unloaded already as corpses. The living were thrown out into 40-degree frost"[36]. "The last train with deported Chechens and Ingush pulled up for unloading in the Kazakh steppe on 20 March 1944"[36]. A. G. Avtorkhanov recorded how it looked to the people: "On 23 February 1944... within literally 24 hours the entire population of the Checheno-Ingush Republic was placed under arrest, and its loading into prisoner trains began, for dispatch to an unknown destination," while the decree liquidating the republic "was published backdated" - two years and four months later[88].
During the deportation the punitive forces of the Soviet NKVD (predecessor of today's FSB) killed on the spot those Chechens who could not be brought to the trains - the gravely ill, the old, women with children: in the agency's papers they were listed as "untransportable." On 27 February 1944 in the aul of Khaibakh, Galanchozh district, the punitive forces, according to historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov, killed "over 700 people": Colonel Gvishiani, as the historians write, "ordered the 'untransportable' residents of Khaibakh and the surrounding hamlets locked... in the stable of the local collective farm named after L. P. Beria, after which the stable itself was piled round with hay and set on fire"[36]. An eyewitness - Dziyaudin Malsagov, Deputy People's Commissar (Minister) of Justice of the republic - testified: "When the stable was engulfed in flames, the huge, heavily reinforced gates collapsed under the press of people, and through the fire a crowd of maddened people surged out. Gvishiani commanded: 'Fire!' Automatic and machine-gun bursts rang out from dozens of barrels... No one broke through the fire and the gun cordon. No one was saved"[36]; Gvishiani received from People's Commissar (Minister) of Internal Affairs Beria, the historians write, "a personal commendation, a recommendation for a decoration and a promotion in rank"[36]. The punitive forces killed the "untransportable" throughout the mountain districts: "47 gravely ill people were put to death and buried in a single pit on the grounds of the Urus-Martan district hospital... several dozen old people, women and children were burned in Tsori, Targim and Guli. Many of those who fled that day from the villages into the mountains or forest were shot on the spot without warning"[36]; "in the Itum-Kale district... houses were packed with the sick and pelted with grenades and bottles of incendiary mixture"[36]. Historian Z. S. Isakieva writes: at the end of March 1944 NKVD troops "shot" the residents of mountainous Malkhista, whom they had failed to reach in February because of snowfall[118]. The Chekists recorded the shootings of the sick in their own correspondence: on 28 May 1944 the head of the Galanchozh operational sector Gransky reported to Deputy People's Commissar (Minister) of State Security Kobulov about the "unauthorized shootings of the elderly Chechen women, the sick and the crippled who remained after the resettlement" - in the Nachkhoevsky village soviet alone the "sick and crippled" shot numbered "up to 60 people"[119].
Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write about the days of the deportation of the Chechens: "over the two or three days that the deportation lasted, killing one or two people here and there, the punitive forces destroyed in total no less than a thousand people. And it was announced loudly and distinctly, in Russian: for attempted escape - execution, for failure to obey an order - execution, for expressing protest - execution"[36]. The Chechen historian Dalkhan Khozhaev writes that the threats "were announced in Russian, though many did not understand the language," and the toll of reprisals began within the first hours: "On the Chechen plain hundreds of people (men, women, children and the old) were shot within a few hours"; in the mountains, where people were driven to the roads on foot, "more often than on the plain, they shot down stragglers, the enfeebled, those who misunderstood an order, or simply - 'attempting to escape'"[120]. Historian Z. S. Isakieva writes about the columns from the mountain villages: "Those who could not walk were led out of the column and shot, without even permission to bury them"[118].
During the deportation - Operation "Chechevitsa" - the troops of the Soviet NKVD (predecessors of today's Rosgvardia) burned the mountain auls of the Chechens as soon as they had driven the residents under convoy to the trains bound for Kazakhstan and Kirghizia (today's Kyrgyzstan) and had driven off their livestock. The Chechen historian A. G. Avtorkhanov cites the testimony of a Russian student of the Grozny Petroleum Institute who was sent to one of the auls on the day of the deportation: "In the mountain auls this action was carried out differently. All the livestock was evacuated from there, and then the auls were burned, to deprive the 'bandits' of a base for existence. For days on end one could watch auls burning in the mountains"[88].
Deporting the Chechen people in February 1944, the colonizer looted its emptied homes. The Chechen historian Dalkhan Khozhaev writes: "In the days of the deportation, parallel to the human stream, columns of military trucks moved toward Grozny in an unbroken flow, loaded with the valuables looted from the emptied homes of the Chechens and Ingush. The items the guards deemed most valuable - carpets, burkas, Caucasian mounted belts, weapons ornamented with gold and silver (daggers, shashkas, flintlock rifles made by Chechen masters of the last century), jewels - were carried in canvas-covered vans"[120]. Drozdov, head of a brigade of the People's Commissariat (Ministry) of State Control of the RSFSR, who inspected the districts handed to Dagestan in August 1944 on the instructions of the government of the RSFSR, reported "unrestrained theft and squandering of the property of the special settlers," begun "soon after the deportation": Yusupov, acting chairman of a district soviet, "fully outfitted himself at the expense of the property of the special settlers" - he was short four hand-operated and four treadle sewing machines, 26 rugs, 30 carpets and 6 bicycles; Khashaev, prosecutor of Dagestan, received a house, an orchard, a vegetable garden and an "ownerless" cow; people's judge Suleimanov formalized his haul with a receipt: "Goods received, money not paid, to which I hereby subscribe"[120]. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov sum up: "Implicated in the unrestrained theft of other people's goods was the entire party-economic and militia top brass of Grozny Oblast, Dagestan, Stavropol, North Ossetia and Georgia"; those caught were dismissed and tried, but "in the end the arrests had to be abandoned, since no one would have been left at liberty to govern"[36].
Use of regular troops and tanks to suppress revolts of Ukrainian political prisoners in the concentration camp system. In Kengir, tanks crushed the unarmed: "About 200 Ukrainian women joined hands and marched against the tanks. But the tanks did not stop and one by one overcame the living phalanx. And the MVD men rushed to the barracks, shooting everyone they encountered"[121].
The use of regular troops without insignia to establish control over the peninsula. A year later V. Putin admitted it on his call-in show of 17 April 2014: "behind the backs of Crimea's self-defense forces, our servicemen, of course, stood. They acted very correctly, but… decisively and professionally"[123]. Ukrainian garrisons on the peninsula were blockaded and disarmed, as Putin himself admitted: "and the way the Ukrainian units were disarmed - all of this was done so swiftly that it seemed it had been prepared for an incredibly long time"[123].
The overt crossing of the state border by regular Russian troops in the summer and autumn of 2014 to save the separatists from defeat: the "DNR" commander admitted that the decisive role was played by Russian servicemen who came "on leave" - "it was mostly 'vacationers' who advanced on Mariupol. When they left, both the front line and the opportunities became precarious"[124]. The offensive resulted in heavy losses for the Ukrainian army near Ilovaisk and Debaltseve. The presence of regular troops continued into 2015: the GRU men captured near Shchastia were "soldiers of the 3rd Separate Guards Special Purpose Brigade of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, who arrived on the territory of Ukraine on March 26 and were quartered in Luhansk"[125].
The invasion by the regular Russian army and massive missile and air strikes on Ukrainian cities: "On 24 February 2022, the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, announced his decision to conduct a 'special military operation' in Ukraine to seek its 'demilitarization and denazification'. On the same day, Russian troops crossed various border points into Ukraine, including through Belarus, and launched attacks by land, air and sea"[126]. The UN Commission investigated the events of February-March 2022 in Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv and Sumy Provinces[126].
Deliberate mass killings of people without regard to their ethnic origin, solely on the basis of their Ukrainian citizenship and affiliation with the Ukrainian state[127].
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