Aggressors may use systemic corruption and the distribution of privileges, titles, and large-scale financial resources to win over members of the target state's top leadership, intelligentsia, and military ranks. This technique permeates every stage of colonization: from preparation for seizure (recruiting agents of influence) to the seizure of governance (sabotage during defense) and institutional consolidation (buying the loyalty of a puppet government). By encouraging the personal ambitions of the elite at the expense of national interests, the colonizer destroys the local population's capacity for organized resistance.
To secure the political subordination of the Nokhchi elite, the administration used financial incentives: historian Murat Yasar points out that «the signing of the shert went hand in hand with monetary allowances and gifts that the tsar gave to local rulers»[1].
The occupation administration handed out privileges and transferred to loyal Nokhchi leaders power over dependent people in order to win them over to its side: the register of cases of the Posolsky Prikaz for 1645 records a petition from the serving Okotsk murza Chepan Kokhostrov to Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich and a report extract by the central apparatus «on granting him an increase to his salary and possession of the uzdens and «people» of his brother, murza Albir Kokhostrov»[2].
A wager on the estate interests of the officer class: "The Konotop Articles limited both the hetman's power and, accordingly, the autonomy of the Hetmanate, while significantly expanding the rights of the Cossack officers"[3] – by expanding the rights of the officer oligarchy at the hetman's expense, Moscow gained levers of influence over the autonomy through the hands of its own elite.
To gain control over the church, Moscow applied corruption at the international level: the Kyiv metropolitanate was seized "through bribery, manipulation, and blackmail"[4]. The payment was recorded by Patriarch Dionysius of Constantinople himself in a letter to the tsars: "We have received the alms of your holy tsardom from your envoy, lord Nikita Alekseevich – three forties of sables and two hundred gold pieces"[5].
To guarantee acceptance of the treaty's enslaving terms, the tsardom bribed the local starshyna with guarantees that they would keep their offices, placing the elite's personal ambitions above national ones: "the hetman shall not remove anyone of the general starshyna from office without the will and decree of their most serene tsarist majesty..."[6].
The occupation administration of the Russian Empire bought the loyalty of the local nobility with state payments: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that, according to General-in-Chief V. Ya. Levashov, the senior Chechen prince Aidemir «was accepted into Russian subjecthood and was assigned a permanent tsarist stipend»[8], and in general «The princes and their uzdens even began to receive monetary allowances from the Russian government»[8].
The occupation administration of the Russian Empire bought the loyalty of members of the local nobility with state payments: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov records «the granting of Russian stipends to 4 Chechen princes and their uzdens»[8].
The Russian Empire, through the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Gudovich, addressed the elders of the Nokhchi with a proclamation offering economic benefits in exchange for accepting subjecthood and ceasing armed resistance. For submission, the elders were promised access to salt: they would be "permitted to take salt from the local salt lakes by tickets, irrevocably, paying a very small fixed price," as well as the right "to drive livestock to this side of the Terek and freely use the vacant pasture lands." The proclamation was conveyed to Chechen society and its elders (Kusu Al-Temir, Masarai, Idut), but subjecthood was not accepted; at the beginning of the following year the empire proceeded to armed invasion.[9]. The same offer is independently recorded by the imperial historian Dubrovin: the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Gudovich, "promised… to release salt in unlimited quantity, for the most trifling payment; to permit the driving of livestock for pasture in wintertime to the left bank of the Terek River… and, finally, to make them equal to Russian subjects"[10].
The Russian Empire bought the loyalty of Nokhchi elders in order to use them to bring recalcitrant villages into subjecthood. The commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Gudovich, instructed the Andreyevo elder Hadji-Redjeb to incline the villages "into submission and subjecthood," and assigned a salary to the Chechen uzden Bik-Bulat — "I persuaded the Chechen uzden Bik-Bulat… to whom I said… a salary of 300 r. in silver per year"; for winning over the remaining villages, "about 3,000 r. in silver for bringing them into loyal subjecthood" was allocated[9]. The same bribery, from the Nokhchi side, is recorded by the historian D. A. Khozhaev: through the intermediary Hadji-Redjeb, in the name of the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Gudovich, the very head of the Chechen resistance, Beibulat Taimiev, was won over and took "an oath of fidelity of subjecthood to Russia," while Hadji-Redjeb asked the generals for another 3000 rubles in silver "for bringing the remaining unpacified Chechen villages into loyal subjecthood"[11].
The Russian Empire bought the loyalty of the Nokhchi elders in order to use them to incline the Chechens toward submission. To this end, the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Tormasov, through Esaul Chernov, ordered that the Chechen elders and clergy be given «250 rubles each, and others 150 silver rubles each, as a one-time payment, for which the required sum, 1,400 r. in total»[12]. Historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov notes that the colonial authorities generally acted by relying on the social elite, «bribing them with all manner of rewards and privileges for their service to the benefit of Russia»[13]. Historian D. A. Khozhaev cites the same formula with a direct indication of where the money came from: the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Tormasov, agreed «to win over the principal Chechen elders and their clergy… to give 250, and others 150 silver rubles each, and to collect the said money from their own villages» — that is, the bribery of the elite was paid for by exactions from the Chechen villages themselves[11].
The luring of kish otaman Hladky over to the empire's side in 1828: part of the Danubians "headed by kish otaman Y. Hladky, on May 30 (18), 1828, crossed the Kiliya mouth of the Danube, entered the port of Izmail, and joined the Russian army"[14].
In September 1837, preparing Nicholas I's visit to the Caucasus, the empire tried to recruit Shamil (Shamil - imam, leader of the resistance of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest), offering him power and honors in exchange for subordination to the empire. General Adlerberg conveyed the emperor's will to general Rozen in a letter of 10 August 1837: to give "Shamil and his chief accomplices Tashav-Hadji, Kibit-Magomet and the Qarakh qadi Abdurrahman suggestions... to beg the mercy of appearing before the face of the Monarch Himself" in Tiflis[15]; Tashu-Hadji (sheikh, in 1834-1836 the imam of Chechnya, spiritual and military leader of the Chechen resistance) is named first on the list. Carrying this out, general Klugenau obtained a personal meeting with Shamil on 18 September 1837 at a spring near the aul of Karanay; as recorded by Shamil's chronicler Muhammad Tahir al-Qarakhi, the general "began to speak, asking Shamil to come for a meeting with the Russian Nicholas. He asserted that the emperor would exalt him, Shamil, show him honor, and make him the administrator of the affairs of all Dagestani Muslims. From the emperor, he said, there would be no treachery"[16]. In parallel, general Feze instructed Akhmed Khan of Mekhtuli "to persuade Shamil to arrive in Tiflis by the time of His Majesty's arrival there", as general Rozen reported to Chernyshev on 25 September 1837[17], and colonel Pullo demanded of Shamil by letter that he send "to the Groznaya fortress two deputies to be presented to the Sovereign"[15]. The bribe was delivered to its addressee and rejected: on 28 September 1837 Shamil replied to Klugenau by letter - "I have resolved not to go to Tiflis even if I am cut to pieces, because I have many times seen treachery from you"[15]; neither Shamil nor Tashu-Hadji went to Tiflis. The offer to Shamil of the post of "administrator of the affairs of all Dagestani Muslims" repeated the same policy line by which the empire, in those same years, was creating loyal religious institutions (campaign C1159).
The bribery of the highland elite the empire put on a programmatic footing. War minister Chernyshev, in a secret letter to general Golovin, commander of the Separate Caucasus Corps (head of the empire's troops and administration in the Caucasus), of 19 July 1842, proposed adopting the experience of British India: "The English knew how to establish their dominion in India by political means... Should not we too try this system?"[18]. Golovin, in a reply of 28 August 1842, drew up a list of candidates for buying over from the circle of Shamil (the imam, leader of the resistance of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest) and requested a fund: "By inclining to our side some of the above-mentioned persons, one would greatly weaken the union of muridism... I consider it necessary for the chief authority here to have at its disposal up to 15 thousand chervonets in ready money" (chervonets - a gold coin of the empire; muridism - in the imperial lexicon, the highlanders' resistance movement)[18]. On 1 February 1844 emperor Nicholas I approved the fund above the request: by an official service letter of Chernyshev to general Neidhardt, who had replaced Golovin at the head of the empire's troops in the Caucasus, "concerning your designs for secret dealings with the highlanders" it was commanded "instead of the 10 thousand chervonets you requested for this purpose, to assign to your charge 15 thousand chervonets"[18]. For the Dargo expedition of 1845 (the imperial army's march on Shamil's residence, the aul of Dargo) historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov record a separate fund: "for the bribery of influential persons from among the highlanders, 45 thousand rubles in silver were allocated"[19]. On the Sunzha Line under construction (the chain of imperial Cossack stanitsas and fortifications on the Sunzha river) the empire bought the loyalty of individual Chechen elders. Vorontsov, viceroy and commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, wrote in a report of summer 1846 about the elder of the aul of Natkhoy-Kezhu: "I turned my particular attention to attracting Aldumov to our side. For the losses borne by him and his 4 comrades... I would consider it just to assign a reward"[18].
The massacre of the hamlet of naib Duba (a deputy of Imam Shamil, leader of the highlanders' resistance to the Russian conquest) on 6 March 1847 was prepared by a targeted bribe inside the naib's family. Imperial officer Poltoratsky, a participant in the assault, wrote of the detachment's guide: "This was naib Duba's own nephew, bribed together with his brother for a good cut out of the pocket of Meller" - Meller-Zakomelsky, who commanded the detachment[20]. Both brothers were bought: one led the troops against his native hamlet, the other sat as a hostage in Vozdvizhenskoye - a guarantee that the guide would not change his mind.
The empire demonstratively rewarded defectors from the leadership of the resistance with ranks, money and land. Bata Shamurzayev, a naib of Shamil (deputy of the Imam, leader of the highlanders' resistance of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest), went over to the empire in the autumn of 1851 and received rewards. Baryatinsky, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), in a letter to Vorontsov, viceroy in the Caucasus, of 24 February 1852, requested - "what a great reward Bata deserves, and I ask you to pardon him, then for Avtur to return him his rank and a pension of 400 rubles a year; I also ask you for an officer's rank for his son... who has often served us as a guide"[21]. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "Bata Shamurzayev took an active part in the war against the Imam, was promoted to captain and awarded 500 desiatinas of land... as an example for other potential defectors"[19]. Through Bata, Vorontsov, viceroy in the Caucasus, conveyed ultimatums to the Chechens - in a letter to Baryatinsky of 21 March 1852: "I asked Bata to insistently repeat to the inhabitants of the northern part of Greater Chechnya that we will not allow them to sow or to mow, unless they declare submission"[21]. Imperial historian Volkonsky admitted the system of bribery plainly: the empire acted "through their own co-religionists and persons like Bati Shamurzov," and "not with words alone, but with something more enticing and substantial - especially in the times of Vorontsov and Baryatinsky"[22].
General Kundukhov, until then himself head of the Chechen okrug, received from the Viceroy "a most delicate assignment – to conduct unofficial negotiations with the Turkish government on carrying out a mass resettlement of the Chechens" and a written instruction "to proceed to arouse among the Chechen population a striving to leave for Turkey"[19]. For the agitation he received 5 thousand rubles from the treasury[19]; the historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova writes of 10 thousand "for the 'discreet remuneration' of three or four persons most popular among the population, that is, for bribing influential figures"[23]; Kundukhov personally was paid 45 thousand rubles "ostensibly for property left behind in Russia," with the treasury's total expenses exceeding 130 thousand[19]. Kundukhov himself described in his memoirs the recruitment of the Chechen leadership in February 1865: having invited the naib (an administrator of a district installed by the authorities) of Lesser Chechnya Sadulla Osmanov (in other sources - Saadula Osmayev) and the elder of the Karabulak society Tsugov, he achieved that "They all agreed to resettle without the slightest objection... and swore to prepare for resettlement"[11]. Osmanov was no outside appointee: in the consolidated list of the Imamate's naibs he stands as "Saadulla Osmanov of Nikhaloy (naib of Lesser Chechnya)"[19] - a man who had fought alongside Shamil, and who for an imperial salary and land drove his own people to Turkey. The price of the purchase is visible on him too: he governed his naibstvo for eight years, received 550 desiatinas of land for his service, swore on the Quran to assist the resettlement "to the end" and undertook to lead the second wave of those departing - going ahead of the first was a condition of payment of the reward[23]. He worked in such a way that even the head of the Terek oblast, General Loris-Melikov, admitted the naib was "overdoing it," spreading distorted rumours, and wanted to rid himself as soon as possible of the too-hotheaded agitator[23].
"In 1867 alone, 8674 desiatinas (a desiatina is a little over a hectare) were transferred into private ownership across Chechnya for various kinds of 'services'" - according to historian Z. Kh. Ibragimova, 57 Chechens received it, and she names the viceroy in the Caucasus, Baryatinsky, as the initiator of the handouts[23]; the largest allotments went to the Chechen ruling families - the Taymazovs (6550 desiatinas), the Bekovich-Cherkasskys (over 6350), the Turlovs, the Eldarovs; land was also handed out to Russian officers - "Colonel Ippolitov received more than 1 thousand desiatinas of land in the Argun okrug"[19]. The hierarchy of the handouts followed estate lines: to the largest highland owners - "from 1 to 5 thousand desiatinas, depending 'on the degree of significance and the services rendered by each to the government'", to persons of the second category (the highland notability, the first being Russian nobles) - up to 1 thousand[23]. Land also paid the lower administration: "village elders received five shares each of arable and hay lands"[19], aul secretaries - up to 75 desiatinas[24].
The starshina (headman) of Shali, Borshchik Khambulatov, who organized the repulse of the insurgents in April 1877, "was granted the rank of ensign of the militia and an annual salary of 600 rubles, and received a lifelong pension - 100 rubles a year"[19]; historian A. I. Ismailova puts the pension at "about 400 r. a year"[25].
The imposition of corrupt gas-supply schemes through intermediary companies: Moscow "used a series of intermediary trading companies (Itera from 1998, Eural Trans Gas from 2003, Rosukrenergo (RUE) from 2005) to transport, and sometimes to supply, the gas to Ukraine," a practice that "was long criticized in European government circles and by corporate governance bodies (where there was concern about their opacity)"[26]. RUE's co-owner Dmytro Firtash told the US ambassador in December 2008 outright that "He acknowledged ties to Russian organized crime figure Seymon Mogilevich, stating he needed Mogilevich's approval to get into business in the first place"[27].
The use of economic blackmail and promises of a loan together with a gas discount to coerce V. Yanukovych into derailing the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU: on December 17, 2013, a reduction of the gas price "to 268.5 dollars per thousand cubic meters" (instead of 410) was announced, along with the fact that "Ukraine, under the bilateral agreements, will receive 15 billion dollars from the Russian National Welfare Fund, selling Moscow its government securities for that amount." Putin stressed: "We consider this a temporary solution, bearing in mind that long-term, long-lasting agreements must and will be reached"[28].