Diplomacy

The occupation administration imposed vassalage under the guise of an equal alliance: historian Murat Yasar notes that the rulers «regarded the shert rather as a military alliance»^[1], whereas historian Michael Khodarkovsky points out that «in Moscow's eyes, the shert now signified an oath of allegiance by the tsar's new and loyal subjects»^[2].

To secure the political subordination of the Nokhchi elite, the administration used financial incentives: historian Murat Yasar points out that «the signing of the shert went hand in hand with monetary allowances and gifts that the tsar gave to local rulers»^[1].

The Tsardom of Muscovy exploited the critical position of the Hetmanate to impose a format of subordination, refusing from the outset to take on symmetrical obligations. To the Cossacks' demand for a mutual oath the tsar's envoy answered with a refusal - by the embassy's own report, swearing on behalf of the sovereign was "a thing that has never happened and never will, and it is unbecoming for the hetman even to say such things, for every subject must swear to his sovereign"^[3]; Khmelnytsky had to convene the council three times in a single day, 18 (8) January 1654, yet Buturlin, citing the autocratic character of the Russian monarch's power, refused a second time^[4]. The "treaty" itself was not a bilateral act: "The originals of the treaty documents have not survived. Only their copies and drafts are known"; the Ukrainian side submitted its terms "in the form of petitions to the tsar," while "the acts of the tsarist government took the form of 'grants' from the tsar"^[5] - the written terms were drawn up only in Moscow in March 1654.

From the very beginning, Moscow laid an asymmetric foundation for the relationship, harshly cutting off the autonomy's international agency. Tsar Aleksei's charter (27 March 1654) directly restricted the hetman's foreign relations: "And with the Turkish sultan and the Polish king, without our tsarist majesty's decree, no relations are to be maintained"^[6].

As soon as political interests changed, Moscow went for a separate peace with its recent enemy – Poland – negotiating behind its Ukrainian ally's back: "The priorities at the negotiations were territorial and financial questions, as well as the terms of the election of the Russian tsar to the Polish throne"^[5] – the fate of the Cossack lands became a bargaining chip in this deal. The negotiations were held at Niemieza near Vilna from August 1656; the armistice was signed on October 24^[5].

The Tsardom of Muscovy physically and legally isolated the autonomy from participation in international politics, deciding the fate of the Cossack lands without regard for their national interests: "The plenipotentiary representatives of the Ukrainian Cossack state, headed by R. Haponenko, were not admitted to the negotiating table"^[5]. The hetman's request to grant the envoys mandates as full participants was "let pass unheeded" by the tsar's government: the delegates "sat idle beside the commissioners, not admitted to the official sessions"^[3].

Taking advantage of the political crisis and having surrounded the autonomy's leaders with its troops, the tsardom forced them to sign a new, utterly enslaving treaty. The articles turned the confederative bond with Moscow into a federative one: "the Pereiaslav Articles converted Ukraine's confederative ties with Russia into the form of a federation. The Ukrainian state lost its independence and acquired the status of a political autonomy within the Russian state"^[4]. The very basis of the treaty was forged: "Prince Trubetskoy took advantage of his military superiority over Yu. Khmelnytsky, rejected the Zherdiv Articles and forced the Ukrainian side to accept 14 points of the so-called old articles of 1654 (which in reality constituted a falsification of the 1654 treaty)"^[4]. The 14 imposed points themselves are published in the "Collection of State Charters and Treaties"^[7].

Depriving the autonomy of control over its own administrative and economic life: "direct control over the military-administrative and financial-economic life of Ukraine passed into the hands of the tsarist voivodes"^[8] – the sovereign functions of the hetman's authority passed to representatives of the metropole.

The official partition of Ukrainian lands between two neighboring states. The treaty was signed exclusively by representatives of Moscow and Warsaw: "Concluded on January 30 (February 9) in the village of Andrusovo, near Smolensk, for 13.5 years. The Russian delegation was headed by okolnichy A. L. Ordin-Nashchokin, the Polish one by commissioner Yu. Hlebowicz"^[9]. The opinion of the autonomy itself was completely ignored: "The interests of the hetmans and of Ukraine were, of course, not taken into account"^[10]. A separate knot of the collusion was Kyiv: article 7 of the Andrusovo treaty (30 January 1667) stipulated that "the very city of Kyiv… is to be handed over and vacated… that is, within two years, counting from the present treaty… in the coming year 1669, on the 15th day of April"^[11]; "Muscovy then did not give it back"^[12] - and in 1686 it legalized what it had withheld, "paying for Kyiv once more" (see the "Eternal Peace" campaign). The "territory for money" scheme was laid down in the same document: article 34 records Tsar Aleksei's consent to grant "a worthy treasury for the satisfaction of the szlachta exiles… from the part of Ukraine ceded to His Tsarist Majesty's side"^[11] - with the sum deferred to future embassies.

In the legal partition of Ukrainian lands, the opinion of the people themselves or of their leaders was demonstratively ignored. The Hetmanate was treated exclusively as an object: "The interests of the hetmans and of Ukraine were, of course, not taken into account"^[10].

Interference in internal governance: "the hetman was deprived of the right to arbitrarily (without a hearing before the military court) issue orders for the execution or dismissal of his subordinates"^[13] – personnel and judicial decisions were removed from the hetman's sole authority. The norm itself is older than this treaty: it was first fixed by the Konotop Articles of 1672 ("executed and removed from office… by the judgment and proof of the Host's court")^[7].

A wager on the estate interests of the officer class: "The Konotop Articles limited both the hetman's power and, accordingly, the autonomy of the Hetmanate, while significantly expanding the rights of the Cossack officers"^[13] – by expanding the rights of the officer oligarchy at the hetman's expense, Moscow gained levers of influence over the autonomy through the hands of its own elite.

To gain control over the church, Moscow applied corruption at the international level: the Kyiv metropolitanate was seized "through bribery, manipulation, and blackmail"^[14]. The payment was recorded by Patriarch Dionysius of Constantinople himself in a letter to the tsars: "We have received the alms of your holy tsardom from your envoy, lord Nikita Alekseevich – three forties of sables and two hundred gold pieces"^[15].

The division of spheres of influence behind the Ukrainian ally's back, accompanied by a financial deal for territory: under the 1686 treaty Moscow undertook "to count out one hundred forty-six thousand Muscovite rubles and hand them over to the Commonwealth"^[16][10][17]. Ukrainian historiography recorded the deal as an ordinary purchase - Hrushevsky: Muscovy "concluded an eternal accord with Poland (paying, in addition, another 146 thousand rubles for Kyiv)"^[12].

The complete exclusion of the autonomy from participation in international negotiations on the status of its own territories. In the legal partition of Ukrainian lands the opinion of the people themselves was ignored – contemporary Ukrainian historiography assesses the Eternal Peace "as a national tragedy of Ukraine"^[10].

The diplomatic entrenchment of spiritual expansion: Moscow secured the inclusion in the treaty of an article on the position of the Orthodox in the Commonwealth – the 1686 treaty ordered the Polish side "to inflict no oppression and no coercion toward the Roman faith or the Union"^[16] – and arrogated to itself the role of protector of Orthodoxy on Polish lands, relying on the Kyiv metropolitanate already subordinated to Moscow. The treaty also secured an ecclesiastical lever: the Orthodox eparchies in the Commonwealth "according to their spiritual rank and custom, are to receive blessing and ordination from the Metropolitan of Kyiv; and this shall harm none of them in the favor of His Royal Majesty"^[18] - while the Kyiv metropolitanate was already subordinated to Moscow.

The systematic dismantling of the autonomy's democratic institutions. Moscow categorically forbade the Cossacks to elect their leaders independently and to conduct an independent foreign policy: "and without a petition and without a decree of the great sovereigns... a hetman shall not be elected... nor shall they, on their own... write anything to anyone"^[17]. The abolition of the historical right to grant asylum: the autonomy was forced to perform the functions of the Muscovite punitive apparatus and to hand over fugitives: "and those fugitives and people of all ranks shall not be received, nor kept among them"^[17].

The introduction of strict political censorship. Under threat of punishment, the population was forbidden even to say aloud that their lands constituted a separate state entity: "and let no one utter such voices, that the Little Russian land is of the hetman's regiment"^[17].

The use of demographic engineering to accelerate assimilation. Moscow openly proclaimed a course toward erasing ethnic boundaries by encouraging marriages with Great Russians: "to unite the Little Russian people with the Great Russian people by all measures and means... through matrimony and other conduct..."^[17].

"In this provision of the articles, the tsarist government's aspiration to turn Ukraine into a region incorporated into the Russian state on ordinary terms was openly declared for the first time"^[10].

The Tsardom of Muscovy enshrined in state documents its course toward the complete absorption of the region: "Prince Vasily declared in the articles the beginning of the process of Russification"^[10].

To guarantee acceptance of the treaty's enslaving terms, the tsardom bribed the local starshyna with guarantees that they would keep their offices, placing the elite's personal ambitions above national ones: "the hetman shall not remove anyone of the general starshyna from office without the will and decree of their most serene tsarist majesty..."^[17].

The diplomatic apparatus of the Tsardom of Muscovy expanded the legal subordination of Nokhchi territories: the historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov records that in 1696 the metropole formalized «the expression of Russia's protection over the Braguny principality in Chechnya»^[19].

The distribution of the highest imperial awards to buy the hetman's loyalty against the backdrop of Ukraine's resource exhaustion: Peter I "deigned to name me a knight of the glorious order of the holy first-called apostle of Christ, Andrew"^[17][10].

The backroom partition of Ukraine along the Dnipro: by the "Eternal Peace" of 1686 Moscow officially ceded the Right Bank to Warsaw, without the participation or consent of Ukrainians themselves. The fate of the Right-Bank Cossacks was decided by foreign capitals: the ban of 1699 implemented this partition, against which Palii's Cossacks, "contrary to the terms of the 'Eternal Peace' of 1686," continued the struggle to unite both banks^[4].

The diplomatic apparatus of the Tsardom of Muscovy concluded an alliance agreement with Kalmyk forces for joint actions against the Indigenous population: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that on September 30, 1708, "at the negotiations between Peter's military commander P.M. Apraksin and the Kalmyk khan Ayuka, an agreement of eight articles was concluded, including 'on the pursuit of the Chechens and Nogais'"^[19].

The collapse of the anti-Moscow coalition from within: on the Right Bank, the Tatar allies betrayed the Cossacks and turned to seizing the civilian population – "the Tatars, disobeying Orlyk, scattered in raiding parties and began taking yasyr captives across Ukrainian villages"^[20]. Orlyk himself wrote to the Swedish king: "What atrocities unheard of under the moon did the wild Tatars then commit!"^[20].

The diplomatic apparatus of the Tsardom of Muscovy used loyal elites of neighboring peoples for joint armed actions against the Nokhchi societies: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that in 1718 an expedition into the lands of the Nokhchi was carried out by the forces of "Kabardian princes allied with Peter I"^[19].

The diplomatic apparatus of the Russian Empire enlisted loyal forces of neighboring peoples for joint armed actions against the Nokhchi societies: historian Sh. B. Akhmadov states that the 1722 military expedition included "an armed detachment of Kalmyks, sent by Ayuka Khan at the tsar's request, numbering 3,730 men"^[21].

The diplomatic apparatus of the Russian Empire expanded the legal subjugation of the Nokhchi territories under threat of military annihilation: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that having suffered defeat in 1722, the local princes took an oath of allegiance, "'including in it for the first time also their Chechens'"^[19].

The return of the Zaporozhian Sich under the empire's authority on the crown's terms: "For tactical reasons, in the course of preparations for the next Turkish war, Anna amnestied the Zaporozhians and allowed them to return to the old Sich grounds (1734) and found the New Sich"^[5] – the amnesty formalized the Cossacks' passage under Russian authority with an obligation of military service.

The signing of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca: the diplomatic severing of Crimea from the Ottoman Empire through fictitious "independence" – "neither the Russian court nor the Ottoman Porte shall interfere in the election and elevation of the said khan, nor in their domestic, political, civil, and internal affairs under any pretext"^[22] – in preparation for the subsequent annexation.

The diplomatic collusion of the great powers behind the backs of the peoples of the dismembered republic: "Russia carried out the second partition of Poland jointly with Prussia"^[4]; all three monarchies took part in the third – the fate of the Right Bank was decided in St. Petersburg, Berlin, and Vienna.

The severing of Bessarabia from the Ottoman Empire and its official annexation under the Peace of Bucharest: the treaty "confirmed the annexation of Bessarabia to Russia and the transfer of the border from the Dniester to the Prut down to its confluence with the Danube"^[23].

The Russian Empire, through the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Gudovich, addressed the elders of the Nokhchi with a proclamation offering economic benefits in exchange for accepting subjecthood and ceasing armed resistance. For submission, the elders were promised access to salt: they would be "permitted to take salt from the local salt lakes by tickets, irrevocably, paying a very small fixed price," as well as the right "to drive livestock to this side of the Terek and freely use the vacant pasture lands." The proclamation was conveyed to Chechen society and its elders (Kusu Al-Temir, Masarai, Idut), but subjecthood was not accepted; at the beginning of the following year the empire proceeded to armed invasion.^[24]. The same offer is independently recorded by the imperial historian Dubrovin: the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Gudovich, "promised… to release salt in unlimited quantity, for the most trifling payment; to permit the driving of livestock for pasture in wintertime to the left bank of the Terek River… and, finally, to make them equal to Russian subjects"^[25].

The otaman's defection left the Cossacks remaining beyond the Danube exposed to the Porte's retaliation and put an end to the last free Cossack host: the Danubian Sich "existed from the last quarter of the 18th century until 1828"^[26].

Use by the Council of People's Commissars of local Bolshevik cells as a legal political force that was to speak on behalf of the Ukrainian proletariat against the Central Rada^[27].

Political and military support for local radicals (the Artem group) in proclaiming a republic not subordinate to Kyiv^[28].

The refusal of the White commanders to recognize Ukrainian statehood. General Denikin, as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of South Russia, signed the programmatic address "To the Population of Little Russia" (August 1919), which declared the struggle for a Ukrainian state to be treason. Symon Petliura (head of the Directory of the Ukrainian People's Republic and chief otaman of its army) and his associates, the address ran, "having begun the dismemberment of Russia, continue even now their evil work of creating an independent 'Ukrainian State' and of fighting against the rebirth of a United Russia"^[29]. Denikin wrote in the first person: "declaring Russian the state language throughout the whole expanse of Russia, I consider entirely inadmissible and prohibit the persecution of the Little Russian folk language"^[29]. The promised "prohibition of persecution" did not recognize the language but assigned it the place of a vernacular. What remained for Ukrainian under the address were everyday life, private schools, and the first years of primary school - Denikin explained: "to ease the pupils' assimilation of the first rudiments of knowledge"; the "treasonous movement" for statehood he required to be "completely distinguished" from the permitted "love for the native region… and its local folk language"^[29]. Denikin allowed the people's existence and denied it political subjecthood: the striving for an independent Ukrainian state was declared treason, the language was left a vernacular. On the night of September 1, 1919, after four hours of negotiations, the Galician general Kravs and Denikin's general Bredov (according to the diary of the Supreme Command of the Ukrainian Galician Army - the commander of the Guards corps) agreed: the Galician units would withdraw from the city that same day "at least beyond the line of the Kyiv railway stations", then to the line Ihnativka - Vasylkiv - Hermanivka, while the Galician army guarantees that it "will make no moves against the army of the volunteers [Denikin's Volunteer Army]"^[30]. In the fourth point the Galician command renounced political subjecthood: "The commander of the Kyiv group of the Galician army declares that the Galician army operates independently of Petliura's army under separate Galician command, without any political aims, and solely with the purpose of fighting the Bolsheviks"^[30]. A day earlier, on August 30, at negotiations with the command of Denikin's 2nd brigade, its representatives demanded that the territory southeast and east of the Koziatyn - Fastiv - Kyiv railway be treated as "the operational zone of Denikin's troops", and that the strip between the line Fastiv - Volodarka - Saskiv - Buky and the line Bila Tserkva - Tarashcha - Lysivka - Zvenyhorodka be declared neutral; the diary records: "We did not agree to this demand"^[30].

Use of the "union treaty" format of June 1, 1919, and December 28, 1920, not to create an equal federation but as an instrument for legalizing direct, rigid rule from Moscow^[28].

Transfer of control over the military affairs, finances, communications, and transport routes of the Ukrainian republic into the hands of the central bodies of the RSFSR^[28].

De facto liquidation of the Ukrainian army (the disbandment of the Ukrainian Front) and the transformation of the government of the Ukrainian SSR into a nominal appendage of the Russian administrative machine^[28].

The signing of the Treaty of Riga in March 1921: a backroom division of spheres of influence and Ukrainian territories with Poland behind the back of the Ukrainian people, legalized through the formal participation of the puppet Ukrainian SSR^[27].

The partition of Eastern Europe behind the backs of its peoples: the secret protocol established that "in the event of a territorial-political rearrangement of the areas belonging to the Polish state, the boundary of the spheres of interest of Germany and the USSR shall run approximately along the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula, and San"^[31]. Half a century later the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR "recognizes the secret protocols as legally untenable and invalid from the moment of their signing"^[32]. The invasion was covered by Molotov's note to the Polish ambassador Grzybowski (17 September 1939): "the Polish state and its government have in fact ceased to exist"^[33].

The coordination of actions with the pro-Soviet government of Poland to destroy the Ukrainian underground: Operation "Vistula," "as a deportation action, was elaborated in detail and carried out by the Polish authorities," but its execution "was coordinated with the party-Soviet organs of power of the USSR" - the Soviet command transferred "from Lviv oblast one tank division and special NKVD units, and blocked the Ukrainian-Polish border with border troops"^[5].

The union center deployed an international platform against Ukrainian sovereignty: Bush publicly called the striving for independence a "suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred"^[34] – the speech went down in history as the "Chicken Kiev speech."

The instigation of the threat of splitting the country in response to the protests: at the congress in Sievierodonetsk on November 28, 2004, Regions faction leader R. Bohatyriova gave a direct promise of a separatist referendum - "we will not go to it with you, we will hold a referendum on the creation of a South-Eastern state (ovation, applause)"^[35]. The presence of Russian officials lent this Moscow's sanction: the mayor of Moscow Yu. Luzhkov reminded the hall from the rostrum that "our President of Russia Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin was the first to congratulate Viktor Fedorovych Yanukovych on his victory"^[35].

Direct energy blackmail and the cut-off of gas supplies at the height of winter: on January 1, 2006 - "at 10.00am Moscow time on January 1, 2006, Gazprom cut off gas supplies to Ukraine"^[36]; on January 1, 2009 - "Russian exports to Ukraine were cut off on 1 January," after which exports to the EU were "drastically reduced on 6 January and cut completely from 7 January," and in the worst-affected Balkan countries a humanitarian emergency ensued, with "parts of the populations unable to heat their homes"^[37].

An attempt to strike a deal with the US leader over Kyiv's head in order to block Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration under the threat of its dismemberment: Ukraine's accession to NATO would create "a field of conflict for you and us, long-term confrontation," while Moscow, relying on anti-NATO forces, "would be working on stripping NATO of the possibility of enlarging. Russia would be creating problems there all the time"^[38]. As retold by Kommersant's source from the summit itself: "You understand, George, that Ukraine is not even a state! What is Ukraine? Part of its territory is Eastern Europe, and part - a considerable part - was gifted by us!" - with a transparent hint "that Russia could begin the severance of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine"^[39].

The use of economic blackmail and promises of a loan together with a gas discount to coerce V. Yanukovych into derailing the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU: on December 17, 2013, a reduction of the gas price "to 268.5 dollars per thousand cubic meters" (instead of 410) was announced, along with the fact that "Ukraine, under the bilateral agreements, will receive 15 billion dollars from the Russian National Welfare Fund, selling Moscow its government securities for that amount." Putin stressed: "We consider this a temporary solution, bearing in mind that long-term, long-lasting agreements must and will be reached"^[40].

The publication of the manifesto "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians" (July 2021), constructing a pseudo-historical myth: "Russians and Ukrainians are one people, a single whole," while modern borders are declared the result of the fact that "the Bolsheviks' actions in severing from Russia its historical territories are not considered a criminal act"^[41]. The same article describes how Lenin personally "persuaded" the leaders of the Donetsk-Kryvyi Rih republic "to act within Soviet Ukraine," and how the Central Committee resolved "to create at the congress 'one government for all of Ukraine'"^[41]. On the eve of the invasion the thesis was taken to its limit: in his address of February 21, 2022 Putin declared that "modern Ukraine was entirely and wholly created by Russia, or, to be more precise, by Bolshevik, communist Russia," and called the country "Ukraine named after Vladimir Ilyich Lenin" - "He is its author and architect"^[42].

The official denial of the Ukrainian nation's right to independent statehood: the article by the head of the Russian state declares outright that "Ukraine's genuine sovereignty is possible precisely in partnership with Russia," while "the wall that has arisen in recent years between Russia and Ukraine" is declared a split of "between parts of what is essentially one historical and spiritual space"^[41].

An article by D. Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia's Security Council, in Kommersant (11 October 2021) marginalizing the Ukrainian leadership: "it is pointless for us to deal with vassals. One must do business with the suzerain"; "at the head of Ukraine stand weak people who strive only to line their own pockets," and negotiations with them are "absolutely pointless"^[43]. In the same text the Ukrainian president was likened to a hypothetical Jew serving in the SS^[43].