Tsardom of Muscovy

The government of the Tsardom of Muscovy used religious identity and the concept of protecting co-religionists as ideological cover for military expansion: historian Michael Khodarkovsky states that the diplomatic apparatus positioned the tsar as a "universal Christian ruler who 'upheld the true Christian faith'"^[1], while invasions were motivated by a "divine obligation to rescue Orthodox Christians from infidel captivity"^[1]; as a result, as historian Michael Khodarkovsky summarizes, in the advance into new territories "Moscow's military and political interests could no longer be separated from the ideological and theological rhetoric of expansion"^[1], because of which the North Caucasus "became a religious frontier"^[2].

The government of the Tsardom of Muscovy fabricated historical narratives to provide legal justification for the invasion of new territories: historian Michael Khodarkovsky points out that in diplomatic correspondence officials deliberately constructed fictitious claims that the Indigenous peoples of the Caucasus had allegedly, since ancient times, been Muscovite "subjects in the Riazan region, who then fled from Riazan and settled in the mountains"^[1].

The military forces of the Tsardom of Muscovy erected a fortified outpost on the lands of the Nokhchi: historian E. N. Kusheva states that in 1567 "the Russian town... was erected in that same year"^[3].

To construct the base on the lands of the Nokhchi, the administration brought in armed detachments: historian E. N. Kusheva writes that in the spring of 1567 the voivodes A. S. Babichev and P. Protasyev were dispatched from Moscow "with many men, as well as ordnance, cannons, and arquebuses"^[3], while historians A. S. Kulikov and V. A. Runov note that they were sent "with firepower and many men"^[4].

The military forces of the Tsardom of Muscovy repeatedly rebuilt the fortified outpost on the lands of the Nokhchi: historian E. N. Kusheva writes that "in 1577 - 1578... the Russian town was reestablished on the Terek River at the mouth of the Sunzha"^[3], while the compiler of the collection of documents E. N. Kusheva indicates that the military forces of the Tsardom of Muscovy "rebuilt the ostrog in 1590 and 1635"^[5] and that "in 1651 a Russian ostrog was built anew on the left bank of the Sunzha"^[5].

The occupation administration of the Tsardom of Muscovy systematically brought armed detachments into the lands of the Nokhchi to hold the bridgehead: the compiler of the collection of documents E. N. Kusheva indicates that at the site of the fortress, "by order of the Terek voivodes, a detachment of streltsy and Cossacks was permanently stationed"^[5], and during the siege of 1653 it held "Russian service men, Terek atamans, and Cossacks"^[5].

The military forces of the Tsardom of Muscovy erected a new fortified base: historian E. N. Kusheva writes that they «were building it in 1588-1589... Mikhailo Burtsev and Kelar Protasyev... the main force of its garrison consisted of streltsy armed with «fire weaponry», with pishchal arquebuses»^[3], while historians A. S. Kulikov and V. A. Runov add that in the early 17th century «the Terek fort had turned into a rather powerful fortress. Its artillery numbered 40 large guns»^[4].

A permanent military contingent maintained at state expense was stationed in the territory: historian I. Kh. Tkhamokova quotes a tsar's decree according to which «in 1623, «upon the petition of the Terek and Greben Cossacks», a tsar's decree was sent to the Terek ordering the payment of salaries to 30 atamans and 470 rank-and-file Cossacks»^[6]. New personnel were also sent in to hold the positions: historian I. Kh. Tkhamokova notes that «in 1589, soon after the town was built, 800 streltsy and Cossacks were to be sent there from Astrakhan, but the Astrakhan voivode sent only 600 men»^[6].

The occupation administration systematically brought in regular troops to maintain the garrison: historians A. S. Kulikov and V. A. Runov note that in the early 17th century «the garrison numbered more than a thousand streltsy and Cossacks»^[4].

The occupation administration imposed vassalage under the guise of an equal alliance: historian Murat Yasar notes that the rulers «regarded the shert rather as a military alliance»^[7], whereas historian Michael Khodarkovsky points out that «in Moscow's eyes, the shert now signified an oath of allegiance by the tsar's new and loyal subjects»^[1].

To secure the political subordination of the Nokhchi elite, the administration used financial incentives: historian Murat Yasar points out that «the signing of the shert went hand in hand with monetary allowances and gifts that the tsar gave to local rulers»^[7].

As a guarantee of submission, the occupation administration detained representatives of the Nokhchi elite: historian E. N. Kusheva writes that «his nephew Batai was left as an amanat (hostage) in the Terek town»^[5].

The occupation administration obliged the subordinated Nokhchi societies to take part in military campaigns: historian E. N. Kusheva points to documents «on the possibility of the participation of Murza Shikh... in a campaign of Russian men-at-arms»^[5].

The metropole's occupation administration abolished Nokhchi self-governance, forcibly subordinating them to an alien elite: historian E. N. Kusheva states that in 1614 Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich ordered the Kabardian prince Sunchaley Yanglychevich Cherkassky «to be prince over all the Okochans... to judge them and to have charge of them in military organization and in all matters»^[3].

The appointed administration forced the Indigenous population into unpaid labor: historian E. N. Kusheva points out that the Kabardian prince Sunchaley Yanglychevich Cherkassky compelled the service Okochans of the Terek town subordinate to him «to make all manner of wares for him, to plow the fields and to mow the hay»^[3]. The metropole itself went years without paying for the military service of the Indigenous population: a report from the Terek voivode Pyotr Petrovich Golovin to the Astrakhan voivode Ivan Nikitich Odoyevsky records that they «serve the sovereign tsar... in all manner of the sovereign's Terek... services... yet have not been granted the sovereign's monetary and grain salary for the tenth year now»^[8].

Representatives of the metropole's authorities openly seized property from the Nokhchi population, abusing their official position: in their petition to Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich, the service Okochans of the Terek town reported that the Kabardian prince Sunchaley Yanglychevich Cherkassky «having taken from us by force 8 good horses from the herd, sent them off to his kabaks (villages) in Kabarda»^[8][5].

The appointed occupation administration enslaved the Indigenous population: a petition submitted to Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich by the service Okochans of the Terek town stated that the Kabardian prince Sunchaley Yanglychevich Cherkassky «wrongfully sold 4 of our fellow Okochans»^[8][5] and «took a wife into bondage and sent her off to his kabaks in Kabarda»^[8][5].

The appointed occupation administration used corporal punishment and unlawful arrests: a petition submitted to Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich by the service Okochans of the Terek town stated that the Kabardian prince Sunchaley Yanglychevich Cherkassky «orders us to be thrown into prison and beaten with the knout without your sovereign knowledge and without guilt»^[8][5].

The appointed occupation administration used unlawful arrests to suppress the resisting Indigenous population: a petition submitted to Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich by the service Okochans of the Terek town stated that the Kabardian prince Sunchaley Yanglychevich Cherkassky «orders us to be thrown into prison and beaten with the knout without your sovereign knowledge and without guilt»^[8][5].

The occupation administration forcibly sent subordinated Nokhchi to fight against their own compatriots: historian E. N. Kusheva indicates in the heading of a primary document that there took place a «campaign of Terek men-at-arms and Terek Okochans... against the Endirey ruler Saltan-Magmut and the people of the Okotsk and Michkiz kabaks who had joined him»^[5].

The occupation administration imposed tribute on the highland Nokhchi societies: an extract from the book of the Terek town's Prikaz office records that the administration sent people «to the Michkizes for the sovereign's yasak»^[5].

The metropole deliberately ignored official complaints by the Indigenous population about the arbitrary conduct of the appointed rulers, depriving them of the right to protection: the compilers of academic document collections state that, as regards the petition submitted to Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich, «the petition of the «Okochans» was not granted»^[8].

The occupation administration of Tersky Town mobilized the metropole's subordinate allies: in a petition to Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich, the Kabardian prince Sholokh reported that «the voivode Mikita Dmitreevich Velyaminov sent me... with my father on your sovereign's service... against your sovereign's disobedient ones — the Michkiz people, against their kabaks»^[5].

The occupation administration of Tersky Town dispatched armed detachments which, as the Kabardian prince Sunchaley Yanglychevich Cherkassky and his son the Kabardian prince Sholokh reported to Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich, made their way «across the mountains and through mountain crevices, impassable places»^[5] in order to suppress the defiant communities.

The occupation administration of Tersky Town deliberately organized a campaign of violent punishment: in his petition to Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich, the Kabardian prince Sholokh reported that the Terek voivode sent the armed detachments precisely «against your sovereign's disobedient ones — the Michkiz people, against their kabaks»^[5].

During the punitive campaign, the military detachments burned entire auls to the ground: in a petition to Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich, the Kabardian prince Sunchaley Yanglychevich Cherkassky reported that they «burned down and utterly ruined many Shibut and Kalkan and Erokhan and Michkiz kabaks»^[5].

The punitive detachments plundered and enslaved the population: in a petition to Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich, the Kabardian prince Sunchaley Yanglychevich Cherkassky reported that they «utterly ruined» the auls «and took many captives»^[5].

The occupation administration of Tersky Town employed mass terrorizing violence: in a petition to Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich, the Kabardian prince Sunchaley Yanglychevich Cherkassky reported that the military detachments «burned down and utterly ruined many Shibut and Kalkan and Erokhan and Michkiz kabaks»^[5] and «slew many peo[ple]»^[5].

The punitive detachments physically exterminated the local population: in a petition to Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich, the Kabardian prince Sunchaley Yanglychevich Cherkassky reported that in the settlements they «slew many other peo[ple]»^[5].

Under direct military threat, the mountain communities were forced to capitulate: in a petition to Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich, the Kabardian prince Sunchaley Yanglychevich Cherkassky reported that the mountaineers «brought their guilt... petitioned humbly and gave... the shert (oath of allegiance)»^[5].

As a result of the devastation of their settlements, the subordinated communities handed people over to the occupation administration: in a petition to Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich, the Kabardian prince Sunchaley Yanglychevich Cherkassky records that they «gave amanats (hostages) to Tersky Town»^[5].

The metropole's administration did not pay for forced labor and withheld food provisions for five years: a memorandum from the Posolsky Prikaz (Ambassadorial Office) to the Prikaz of the Kazan Palace records a complaint that the subordinate Okochans of Tersky Town «were not given the sovereign's grain allowance for the past years — for the 125th, and the 126th, and the 127th, and the 128th, and the 129th year»^[5].

The occupation administration deliberately exhausted the Indigenous population materially, forcing them to perform compulsory service at their own expense: in a petition submitted to Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich, the Okotsky murza Kokhostrov Biytemirov and the serving Okochans of Tersky Town reported that, because their allowance went unpaid, they «were left without grain, have utterly perished from hunger and every hardship, have fallen, sovereign, into great debt, and are dying a death of starvation together with our wives and little children»^[5].

Representatives of the metropole confiscated the personal property of a deceased Nokhchi delegate into the state treasury: a memorandum from the Posolsky Prikaz to the Prikaz of the Kazan Palace prescribed an investigation into the death of the drowned Okotsky murza Kokhostrov Biytemirov, while of what was found they «took his clothing and all his goods into our treasury»^[5].

The occupation administration used the physical loss of documents to artificially lower the social status of local residents for the purpose of taxing them economically: an extract of the Posolsky Prikaz concerning a petition to Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich states that after «the sovereign's charter of grant was lost», the heirs of the deceased Nokhchi delegate were stripped of their privileges and «made equal in everything with the Okochans, with the plowing people, and carts and wagons are exacted from them», whereas previously «no taxes whatsoever had been taken» from them^[5].

The occupation administration compelled the subordinate Nokhchi to take part in armed conflicts: in their petition to Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich, the Okotsky murza Kokhostrov Biytemirov and the serving Okochans of Tersky Town reported that «we, your sovereign's kholops (bonded servants), fight your sovereign's disobedient ones, not sparing our heads; for you, sovereign, we shed our blood and lay down our heads»^[5].

The occupation administration and forces loyal to it sent the subordinate Nokhchi (Okochans) to take part in armed conflicts, including against their own compatriots: the historian I. Kh. Tkhamokova states that in 1626 the voivodes sent «252 Okochans»^[6][8] on a campaign, and in 1628, during an armed incursion, the Kabardian murza Konshov-murza Bitemryukov «went against these "mountain people"... with the "Okochans"»^[6].

Armed detachments loyal to the metropole carried out incursions into the territories of the Nokhchi mountain communities in order to suppress their resistance: the historian I. Kh. Tkhamokova notes that in 1628 the Kabardian murza Konshov-murza Bitemryukov «went against these "mountain people" together with the "free" atamans and Cossacks and with the "Okochans"»^[6].

The occupation administration demanded that the Nokhchi mountain communities (the Shibutians) legally formalize their subordinate status: a report from the Terek voivodes Ivan Andreyevich Dashkov and Bogdan Gerasimovich Priklonsky to the Posolsky Prikaz records information about «the oath given by the Shibutians Lavarsan Yazyev and Zatyshka Lavarsanov on behalf of 20 households in 1627»^[5], with a direct injunction that they «not fall away from the sovereign and remain under the sovereign's hand in outright bondage (kholopstvo)»^[5].

The occupation administration imposed an annual tribute in kind on the Nokhchi mountain communities (the Shibutians): a report from the Terek voivodes Ivan Andreyevich Dashkov and Bogdan Gerasimovich Priklonsky to the Posolsky Prikaz states that when subjecthood was formalized in 1627, the mountaineers were required «to give yasak at one kul (sack) of honey per year»^[5].

The metropole's occupation administration legally prohibited the free residence of the Indigenous population in Tersky Town, organizing the forced expulsion of unapproved persons and total demographic control: in 1631, Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich issued a decree to the Prikaz of the Kazan Palace ordering a census of the newly arrived Nokhchi (Michkizians and Okochans) and ruling that those of them «who cannot be trusted» must be «ordered to be expelled out of Tersky Town, and ordered to go back whence each had come»^[8]; to ensure surveillance, in the state register of serving people for the region of the Prikaz of the Kazan Palace for 1637, the central authorities recorded in detail the number of subordinate residents of Tersky Town, including 350 «Okotsky people» and 680 newly arrived «Okochans, and Tatars, and Michkizians, and Shibutians»^[5]; and in 1640, on the orders of the Terek voivode, the Terek syn boyarsky P. Lukin and the clerk F. Belkov compiled a name-by-name register of the population of the Terek slobodas, rigidly recording every household of the subordinate Nokhchi (Okochans)^[8][5].

The occupation administration handed out privileges and transferred to loyal Nokhchi leaders power over dependent people in order to win them over to its side: the register of cases of the Posolsky Prikaz for 1645 records a petition from the serving Okotsk murza Chepan Kokhostrov to Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich and a report extract by the central apparatus «on granting him an increase to his salary and possession of the uzdens and «people» of his brother, murza Albir Kokhostrov»^[5].

The occupation administration forced the mountain societies of the Nokhchi into legal subordination: in 1647, under pressure from the Terek voivodes, the Shibutians «placed themselves under thy sovereign high hand in direct servitude... and swore the shert oath on the Quran»^[5], while the Michkiz people «with all the Michkiz land placed themselves in servitude under thy sovereign high hand... and swore the shert on the Quran»^[5].

The occupation administration used the taking of hostages from among the Indigenous population to guarantee the loyalty of the mountain societies of the Nokhchi: a dispatch from the Terek voivode Prince Venedikt Andreevich Obolensky and his associates to the Posolsky Prikaz in 1647 officially records the fact of «the giving of an amanat to the Terek town»^[5]; the metropole instructed the voivodes «to order that amanats be taken from them — kinsmen of notable people»^[5], as a result of which the Highlanders «gave a good amanat to the Terek town, Kasa»^[5][3].

The Tsardom of Muscovy exploited the critical position of the Hetmanate to impose a format of subordination, refusing from the outset to take on symmetrical obligations. To the Cossacks' demand for a mutual oath the tsar's envoy answered with a refusal - by the embassy's own report, swearing on behalf of the sovereign was "a thing that has never happened and never will, and it is unbecoming for the hetman even to say such things, for every subject must swear to his sovereign"^[9]; Khmelnytsky had to convene the council three times in a single day, 18 (8) January 1654, yet Buturlin, citing the autocratic character of the Russian monarch's power, refused a second time^[10]. The "treaty" itself was not a bilateral act: "The originals of the treaty documents have not survived. Only their copies and drafts are known"; the Ukrainian side submitted its terms "in the form of petitions to the tsar," while "the acts of the tsarist government took the form of 'grants' from the tsar"^[11] - the written terms were drawn up only in Moscow in March 1654.

The seizure of a neighboring state's territories was presented to the population of the Tsardom of Muscovy not as an act of political or military expansion, but as a sacred mission of protecting brothers in faith. This myth outlived the centuries: as late as 1990 Solzhenitsyn reproduced it verbatim – "The return of these lands to Russia was then perceived by everyone as REUNIFICATION"^[12].

From the very beginning, Moscow laid an asymmetric foundation for the relationship, harshly cutting off the autonomy's international agency. Tsar Aleksei's charter (27 March 1654) directly restricted the hetman's foreign relations: "And with the Turkish sultan and the Polish king, without our tsarist majesty's decree, no relations are to be maintained"^[13].

As soon as political interests changed, Moscow went for a separate peace with its recent enemy – Poland – negotiating behind its Ukrainian ally's back: "The priorities at the negotiations were territorial and financial questions, as well as the terms of the election of the Russian tsar to the Polish throne"^[11] – the fate of the Cossack lands became a bargaining chip in this deal. The negotiations were held at Niemieza near Vilna from August 1656; the armistice was signed on October 24^[11].

The Tsardom of Muscovy physically and legally isolated the autonomy from participation in international politics, deciding the fate of the Cossack lands without regard for their national interests: "The plenipotentiary representatives of the Ukrainian Cossack state, headed by R. Haponenko, were not admitted to the negotiating table"^[11]. The hetman's request to grant the envoys mandates as full participants was "let pass unheeded" by the tsar's government: the delegates "sat idle beside the commissioners, not admitted to the official sessions"^[9].

The occupation administration dispatched emissaries to collect strategic, demographic, and economic data on the mountain societies of the Nokhchi: in 1658 the central apparatus of the Posolsky Prikaz instructed the Terek voivodes to find out «how many of them there are and what kind of people they are... and what fighting force they have... and what grows in their land, and what craftsmen there are»^[5], in execution of which in 1659 the Terek voivodes Melenty Kvashnin and his associates «sent a streltsy commander into the Shibut land and ordered him to inspect in the Shibut land... the towns and places»^[5], who, in an extract for the report of the Posolsky Prikaz to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich of 1660, reported that «[to]wns they have none, nor any fighting forces»^[5].

The occupation administration made attempts to force the independent societies of the Nokhchi (the Shibutians) into legal subordination: an extract for the report of the Posolsky Prikaz to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich of 1660 states that the Terek voivodes Melenty Kvashnin and his associates sent a military emissary to the Highlanders and ordered him «to bring them to the oath»^[5]; however, the attempt proved unsuccessful, and he «did not br[in]g the inhabitants of the Shibut land to the oath»^[5].

The occupation administration set itself the task of extracting hostages from the mountain societies of the Nokhchi (the Shibutians), but the attempt did not succeed: in 1658 the central apparatus of the Posolsky Prikaz directly instructed the Terek voivodes «to order that amanats be taken from them — kinsmen of notable people»^[5], after which the Terek voivodes Melenty Kvashnin and his associates ordered their military emissary «to take an amanat to the Terek»^[5]; however, the extract for the report of the Posolsky Prikaz to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich of 1660 records no handover of new hostages and merely states the old fact that «on the Terek [there is an amanat] of theirs»^[5].

Seeking to weaken the Hetmanate from within and prevent it from breaking vassalage, Moscow artificially fomented civil war, supporting and arming the internal opposition against the lawful hetman: "The proclamation of I. Vyhovsky as hetman was received negatively by the representatives of the forces opposed to him," led by Poltava colonel Pushkar and kish otaman Barabash^[14]. Their revolt opened the period of the bloody Ruin.

When covert methods of destabilization proved insufficient, the tsardom moved to open military invasion. The regular Muscovite army tried to subdue the Hetmanate by force, which ended in catastrophe at Konotop. The imperial historian Soloviev admitted: "The flower of the Muscovite cavalry, which had made the fortunate campaigns of '54 and '55, perished in a single day… Never again was the tsar of Muscovy able to field such a strong host"^[15].

Taking advantage of the political crisis and having surrounded the autonomy's leaders with its troops, the tsardom forced them to sign a new, utterly enslaving treaty. The articles turned the confederative bond with Moscow into a federative one: "the Pereiaslav Articles converted Ukraine's confederative ties with Russia into the form of a federation. The Ukrainian state lost its independence and acquired the status of a political autonomy within the Russian state"^[10]. The very basis of the treaty was forged: "Prince Trubetskoy took advantage of his military superiority over Yu. Khmelnytsky, rejected the Zherdiv Articles and forced the Ukrainian side to accept 14 points of the so-called old articles of 1654 (which in reality constituted a falsification of the 1654 treaty)"^[10]. The 14 imposed points themselves are published in the "Collection of State Charters and Treaties"^[16].

After forcing the signing of the treaty, Moscow moved to the direct occupation of the autonomy's living space. The articles codified the expansion of the military presence: "besides Kyiv, tsarist voivodes were introduced into Pereiaslav, Chernihiv, Nizhyn, Bratslav, and Uman"^[10] – garrisons headed by voivodes ensured physical control over the territory from within.

The occupation administration of the Tsardom of Muscovy maintained the regime depriving the subordinated societies of the Nokhchi (the Okochans) of autonomy, officially formalizing the transfer of power over them to a new feudal lord loyal to the metropole: in 1661 Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich issued a charter of grant to the Kabardian prince Kaspulat Mutsalovich Cherkassky, instructing him «to be prince over the Okochans and over the Cherkas who serve us, the great sovereign, on the Terek, and to administer and judge them in military organization and in all our affairs»^[5].

The central authorities of the Tsardom of Muscovy used an appointed ruler for the legal subordination of the region: in 1676 the Posolsky Prikaz sent an instruction to the Kabardian prince Kaspulat Mutsalovich Cherkassky on the necessity of arriving at the Terek town «to administer the oath of the population of the North Caucasus to Tsars Ivan and Peter Alekseevich»^[8].

The appointed controlled administration sent subordinated Nokhchi (Okochans) to take part in the metropole's Crimean campaigns: a dispatch from the Kabardian prince Kaspulat Mutsalovich Cherkassky to the Posolsky Prikaz in 1675 states that for the campaign against the Crimean ulusy he had at his disposal «190 Okochan men»^[8]; the historian I. Kh. Tkhamokova adds that in 1675 detachments fought in Crimea alongside the prince «with uzdens, with the newly baptized, and with «Okochans»»^[6].

The creation of a specialized agency to govern the autonomy: through the Little Russian Prikaz the tsarist government "exercised control over the political-administrative activity of the hetman's administration and the tsarist voivodes in Ukraine"^[17] – the governance of the Hetmanate was embedded into Moscow's prikaz vertical.

Expansion of the military occupation of the autonomy: in addition to reinforcing the garrisons of Kyiv, Chernihiv, Pereiaslav, and Nizhyn, "Russian military garrisons headed by voivodes were introduced into Poltava, Kremenchuk, Novhorod-Siverskyi, Oster, Kaniv, and other cities, as well as into Kodak in the Liberties of the Zaporozhian Host"^[18] – the upkeep of the troops was placed on Ukrainian taxpayers.

Direct extraction of the autonomy's economic resources: "The collection of taxes from the Ukrainian population (except for the Cossack estate) was entrusted to the tsarist administration. The collected funds were channeled into the tsar's treasury"^[18].

Depriving the autonomy of control over its own administrative and economic life: "direct control over the military-administrative and financial-economic life of Ukraine passed into the hands of the tsarist voivodes"^[18] – the sovereign functions of the hetman's authority passed to representatives of the metropole.

The official partition of Ukrainian lands between two neighboring states. The treaty was signed exclusively by representatives of Moscow and Warsaw: "Concluded on January 30 (February 9) in the village of Andrusovo, near Smolensk, for 13.5 years. The Russian delegation was headed by okolnichy A. L. Ordin-Nashchokin, the Polish one by commissioner Yu. Hlebowicz"^[19]. The opinion of the autonomy itself was completely ignored: "The interests of the hetmans and of Ukraine were, of course, not taken into account"^[20]. A separate knot of the collusion was Kyiv: article 7 of the Andrusovo treaty (30 January 1667) stipulated that "the very city of Kyiv… is to be handed over and vacated… that is, within two years, counting from the present treaty… in the coming year 1669, on the 15th day of April"^[21]; "Muscovy then did not give it back"^[22] - and in 1686 it legalized what it had withheld, "paying for Kyiv once more" (see the "Eternal Peace" campaign). The "territory for money" scheme was laid down in the same document: article 34 records Tsar Aleksei's consent to grant "a worthy treasury for the satisfaction of the szlachta exiles… from the part of Ukraine ceded to His Tsarist Majesty's side"^[21] - with the sum deferred to future embassies.

In the legal partition of Ukrainian lands, the opinion of the people themselves or of their leaders was demonstratively ignored. The Hetmanate was treated exclusively as an object: "The interests of the hetmans and of Ukraine were, of course, not taken into account"^[20].

The legal codification of the territory's division. Moscow deliberately fragmented a once unified country, turning such important regions as Zaporizhzhia into rightless buffer zones under joint administration: "...Zaporizhzhia (which under the treaty of 1667 was under the joint rule of Moscow and Warsaw)"^[23].

Having gained political power over the Left Bank, Moscow immediately attempted to seize the right to collect taxes in order to extract resources directly: "the attempts of Russian voivodes... to introduce their own taxation system in Ukraine led only to revolts (for example... the attempted census of 1666...)"^[23].

Interference in internal governance: "the hetman was deprived of the right to arbitrarily (without a hearing before the military court) issue orders for the execution or dismissal of his subordinates"^[24] – personnel and judicial decisions were removed from the hetman's sole authority. The norm itself is older than this treaty: it was first fixed by the Konotop Articles of 1672 ("executed and removed from office… by the judgment and proof of the Host's court")^[16].

A wager on the estate interests of the officer class: "The Konotop Articles limited both the hetman's power and, accordingly, the autonomy of the Hetmanate, while significantly expanding the rights of the Cossack officers"^[24] – by expanding the rights of the officer oligarchy at the hetman's expense, Moscow gained levers of influence over the autonomy through the hands of its own elite.

For the ideological justification of the seizure, the Muscovite authorities received a ready-made historical canon: "the 'SYNOPSIS,' 'Synopsis, or a Brief Collection from Various Chroniclers on the Origin of the Slaveno-Rossian People' – a historical work first published by the printing house of the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra (1674)"^[14] – the book constructed a shared "Slaveno-Rossian" past, legitimizing Moscow's rule over Kyiv retroactively.

The implantation of a narrative about the unbreakable bond between Kyiv and Moscow, serving the political aims of the metropole: the author sought "to give the Muscovite tsar the motivation to continue the struggle with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth" and "to ease the incorporation of the Hetmanate's elite into the Russian ruling estate"^[25].

The deliberate dissolution of a distinct Ukrainian identity in the construct of a "single Orthodox people": the "Synopsis" subordinated Kyiv's history to the idea of a common "Slaveno-Rossian people"^[14], and its political program presupposed a struggle for the "liberation… of the remaining part of the 'single Orthodox people'"^[25]. Hrushevsky points out what exactly was erased: the "Synopsis" is "a brief history of Rus composed at the Pechersk Lavra, done very lifelessly and incompletely (the history of the Cossacks, the struggle against Poland, and all of Ukraine's recent history are almost entirely omitted from it)"^[22].

The imperial historical myth was directly based on religious manipulation: expansion was justified by the concept of religious unity. The author constructed an ideologeme in order "to give the Muscovite tsar the motivation to continue the struggle with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth for the liberation from Catholic rule of the remaining part of the 'single Orthodox people'"^[25].

The occupation administration sent subordinated Nokhchi (Okochans) to take part in armed conflicts (the Chyhyryn campaigns) on the territory of Ukraine: the historian I. Kh. Tkhamokova notes that in 1678 the Kabardian prince Kaspulat Mutsalovich Cherkassky (under whose authority the Okochans were) received a tsar's charter «for having taken part in the Crimean and Chyhyryn campaigns»^[6]; the document registers for 1678 record a dispatch from the Chuhuiv voivode Ivan Rykhtarov to the Razryadny Prikaz «on the march of the regiment of Prince Kaspulat Mutsalovich Cherkassky to Chuhuiv»^[8]; and in 1679 Tsar Fedor Alekseevich issued a decree to the Posolsky Prikaz «on his regiment performing guard duty in the vicinity of Chuhuiv and Kharkiv»^[8].

To gain control over the church, Moscow applied corruption at the international level: the Kyiv metropolitanate was seized "through bribery, manipulation, and blackmail"^[26]. The payment was recorded by Patriarch Dionysius of Constantinople himself in a letter to the tsars: "We have received the alms of your holy tsardom from your envoy, lord Nikita Alekseevich – three forties of sables and two hundred gold pieces"^[27].

The liquidation of independent jurisdiction to turn the church into an instrument of assimilation – the annexation of the Ukrainian church to the Muscovite one in 1686^[28]. The Ecumenical Patriarchate later officially stated that these actions "were carried out entirely out of accord with the lawful canonical prescriptions"^[29].

The introduction of censorship control over Ukrainian book printing. Patriarch Joachim banned publications without his sanction and sent a reprimand for publishing books without prior permission^[20][23], and in 1690 "the Council of the Russian Orthodox Church condemned the 'new Kyivan books' of Petro Mohyla, Kyrylo Stavrovetsky, Ioanykii Galiatovsky, Sylvestr Kosov, Lazar Baranovych, and others, laying on them a curse and anathema"^[30].

The destruction of the Kyiv theological school and the declaration of its works as heresy: "All Ukrainian writings, beginning with the catechism of Petro Mohyla, were declared heretical... the council condemned virtually all the principal works of Kyivan theological scholarship"^[23][20].

The annexation of the metropolitanate was disguised as the protection of co-religionists: the reform was carried out "relying on the Orthodox movement against the Turkish conquerors"^[20], and "Golitsyn's main project concerning Ukraine… became the reform of the Ukrainian Orthodox church, or rather – the subordination of the Kyiv metropolitanate to the Moscow patriarch"^[20][23].

Immediately after the subordination began the imposition of Muscovite church standards and rites, marginalizing the local tradition. The Ecumenical Patriarchate recorded the canonical illegality of the act itself directly: "the alienation from our Throne of the Metropolitanate of Kyiv and of the Orthodox Churches of Lithuania and Poland dependent on it, as well as their attachment to the Holy Church of Moscow, were from the very beginning carried out entirely out of accord with the lawful canonical prescriptions"^[29].

Following the establishment of control over the metropolitanate came the gradual unification of liturgical printing and pronunciation along Muscovite models, culminating in Peter I's direct decree of 1720: church books could be printed only after being checked against Muscovite ones, "so that there be no discord or distinct dialect in them"^[31].

The division of spheres of influence behind the Ukrainian ally's back, accompanied by a financial deal for territory: under the 1686 treaty Moscow undertook "to count out one hundred forty-six thousand Muscovite rubles and hand them over to the Commonwealth"^[32][20][23]. Ukrainian historiography recorded the deal as an ordinary purchase - Hrushevsky: Muscovy "concluded an eternal accord with Poland (paying, in addition, another 146 thousand rubles for Kyiv)"^[22].

The legal codification of the country's split into two parts, with the Right Bank turned into a buffer zone: "Under the terms of the Eternal Peace, the Right Bank remained with Poland... it was agreed and resolved that those places are to remain deserted, as they now are"^[23][20].

The complete exclusion of the autonomy from participation in international negotiations on the status of its own territories. In the legal partition of Ukrainian lands the opinion of the people themselves was ignored – contemporary Ukrainian historiography assesses the Eternal Peace "as a national tragedy of Ukraine"^[20].

The diplomatic entrenchment of spiritual expansion: Moscow secured the inclusion in the treaty of an article on the position of the Orthodox in the Commonwealth – the 1686 treaty ordered the Polish side "to inflict no oppression and no coercion toward the Roman faith or the Union"^[32] – and arrogated to itself the role of protector of Orthodoxy on Polish lands, relying on the Kyiv metropolitanate already subordinated to Moscow. The treaty also secured an ecclesiastical lever: the Orthodox eparchies in the Commonwealth "according to their spiritual rank and custom, are to receive blessing and ordination from the Metropolitan of Kyiv; and this shall harm none of them in the favor of His Royal Majesty"^[33] - while the Kyiv metropolitanate was already subordinated to Moscow.

The systematic dismantling of the autonomy's democratic institutions. Moscow categorically forbade the Cossacks to elect their leaders independently and to conduct an independent foreign policy: "and without a petition and without a decree of the great sovereigns... a hetman shall not be elected... nor shall they, on their own... write anything to anyone"^[23]. The abolition of the historical right to grant asylum: the autonomy was forced to perform the functions of the Muscovite punitive apparatus and to hand over fugitives: "and those fugitives and people of all ranks shall not be received, nor kept among them"^[23].

To ensure constant armed oversight of the autonomy's top leadership and to prevent uprisings, the Tsardom of Muscovy stationed its regular troops directly in the hetman's capital: "with the hetman in Baturyn, for his protection and safety, there shall be a Muscovite streltsy regiment..."^[23].

The introduction of strict political censorship. Under threat of punishment, the population was forbidden even to say aloud that their lands constituted a separate state entity: "and let no one utter such voices, that the Little Russian land is of the hetman's regiment"^[23].

The use of demographic engineering to accelerate assimilation. Moscow openly proclaimed a course toward erasing ethnic boundaries by encouraging marriages with Great Russians: "to unite the Little Russian people with the Great Russian people by all measures and means... through matrimony and other conduct..."^[23].

"In this provision of the articles, the tsarist government's aspiration to turn Ukraine into a region incorporated into the Russian state on ordinary terms was openly declared for the first time"^[20].

The Tsardom of Muscovy enshrined in state documents its course toward the complete absorption of the region: "Prince Vasily declared in the articles the beginning of the process of Russification"^[20].

To guarantee acceptance of the treaty's enslaving terms, the tsardom bribed the local starshyna with guarantees that they would keep their offices, placing the elite's personal ambitions above national ones: "the hetman shall not remove anyone of the general starshyna from office without the will and decree of their most serene tsarist majesty..."^[23].

The regular army of the Tsardom of Muscovy carried out armed raids on the territories of Nokhchi societies: the historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that in 1691–1700 «punitive expeditions were carried out by the tsarist authorities in retaliation against the rebel Cossacks and their Highlander allies»^[34] and records «retaliatory punitive raids by tsarist forces»^[34].

The diplomatic apparatus of the Tsardom of Muscovy expanded the legal subordination of Nokhchi territories: the historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov records that in 1696 the metropole formalized «the expression of Russia's protection over the Braguny principality in Chechnya»^[34].

The occupation administration of the Tsardom of Muscovy imposed discriminatory levies on Nokhchi societies for the internal movement of goods: the historian Sh. B. Akhmadov emphasizes that «the Okochans (Akkin Chechens) living in the town of Terki were obliged without exception to pay duty on the various goods and wares they took out for sale to their compatriots in Chechnya and Ingushetia»^[35].

The occupation administration of the Tsardom of Muscovy engaged in systemic lawless arbitrariness against the Indigenous population: the historian Sh. B. Akhmadov states that «the venality and bribe-taking of the voivodes, who permitted themselves great abuses — all this was far from a new phenomenon»^[35].

Shifting the financial and logistical burden of imperial wars onto the autonomy's shoulders: "The commoners supplied provisions for the volunteer troops, and they also stocked hay for the winter for the host's artillery"^[23][20].

The forced use of Cossacks to build imperial infrastructure under harsh conditions: "in the making of fortifications around the Kyiv-Pechersk Monastery"^[23][20].

The distribution of the highest imperial awards to buy the hetman's loyalty against the backdrop of Ukraine's resource exhaustion: Peter I "deigned to name me a knight of the glorious order of the holy first-called apostle of Christ, Andrew"^[23][20].

The deployment of a network of military bases (Novobohorodytska, Kamianyi Zaton) near the Zaporozhian Sich. Under the pretext of protection, Moscow was establishing rigid military control: "The Zaporozhians... put forward the destruction of Kamianyi Zaton as a condition for any oath of allegiance"^[23][20].

The backroom partition of Ukraine along the Dnipro: by the "Eternal Peace" of 1686 Moscow officially ceded the Right Bank to Warsaw, without the participation or consent of Ukrainians themselves. The fate of the Right-Bank Cossacks was decided by foreign capitals: the ban of 1699 implemented this partition, against which Palii's Cossacks, "contrary to the terms of the 'Eternal Peace' of 1686," continued the struggle to unite both banks^[10].

The abolition of the regimental-sotnia administrative order to serve the imperial partition of the lands: the Sejm of 1699 adopted the decision "banning the Cossacks on the Right Bank"^[10].

The dispatch of Cossack regiments to distant theaters of war (the Baltic lands, Poland), which led to their exhaustion. The troops were "wearied by year-round military service, impoverished, dismounted, destitute"^[23][20].

The strangulation of the autonomy's economy through the system of billeting the regular army: "And when the kompaniytsi and serdiuks stand in winter quarters... 24 commoners feed a single kompaniyets without any excuses"^[23][20].

The mass conscription of the population for the construction of military installations in Moscow's interests. The tsar officially thanked the hetman and the starshyna for their "diligent zeal (and considerable labors borne) in the making of the Pechersk fortification" and promised for this "service and labors in the making of the said fortification" his "most exalted favor"^[23].

Preparation for dismantling the autonomy during the reforms of 1707: by Orlyk's account, the Cossack starshyna expected the empire to be preparing "to turn the Cossacks into a regular army… to break the rights and liberties of the Host"^[23][20].

Preparation for the liquidation of the Hetmanate through the gubernia reform, into which Cossack towns were artificially inscribed. Moscow planned "to take the Little Russian towns into its own domain"^[23][20].

A course toward the complete absorption and destruction of the very name of the Cossack state. In the Bendery Constitution of 1710, Orlyk recorded Moscow's intention "to eradicate the Zaporozhian Host of the Lower Dnipro and to efface its name forever"^[23]. Hrushevsky confirms the course was systemic: Mazepa's alliance with the Swedish king merely "gave the Muscovite government occasion… to take up more forcefully the abolition of Ukrainian autonomy. The Muscovite government had pursued this line from the very beginning"^[22]. What was at stake was the enslavement of the entire people: the Muscovite state, per the preamble of Orlyk's constitution, managed to "violate and utterly destroy" the rights and liberties "and to cast a slave's yoke upon the free Cossack people, never conquered by it"^[36].

The mass mobilization of Cossack regiments for penal construction labor: the digging of the Ladoga Canal "was carried out chiefly by the hands of Ukrainian Cossacks," and there "tens of thousands of people perished from back-breaking labor, hunger and the harsh climate"^[17]. In 1721 a "10,000-strong Cossack corps" headed by P. Polubotok was dispatched to the canal^[10]; the works continued through 1721–23^[14].

Shifting the upkeep of the mobilized onto the subjects themselves: Cossacks dispatched to the imperial construction sites were left without supply and "suffer great want from hunger, having neither food for themselves, nor winter quarters, nor fodder for the horses"^[23]. Workers for state construction the tsar simply ordered to be "taken from Ukraine, from those towns that are under your authority"^[23], while at the works themselves people perished "from back-breaking labor, hunger and the harsh climate"^[17].

Removing Cossack regiments from the Cossack hierarchy and placing them under the direct command of imperial officials: Peter I handed the direction of the Ladoga Canal works to B.-C. Münnich, who "took over from Prince A. Menshikov the direction of the construction (digging) of the Ladoga Canal"^[17]; Cossack corps were dispatched to these works "by order of Tsar Peter I"^[10].

The government of the Tsardom of Muscovy organized military operations against Nokhchi societies: the historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that «the measures taken by Peter I to combat the Bulavin «rebeliya» and other uprisings, including on the Terek against Chechnya, were in essence punitive»^[34].

The regular army of the Tsardom of Muscovy physically exterminated inhabitants who refused to submit to the occupation: the historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that in 1708 «military detachments were sent to the Terek that physically annihilated any population showing the slightest disobedience»^[34].

The diplomatic apparatus of the Tsardom of Muscovy concluded an alliance agreement with Kalmyk forces for joint actions against the Indigenous population: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that on September 30, 1708, "at the negotiations between Peter's military commander P.M. Apraksin and the Kalmyk khan Ayuka, an agreement of eight articles was concluded, including 'on the pursuit of the Chechens and Nogais'"^[34].

The government of the Tsardom of Muscovy captured and physically eliminated a resistance leader: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that the tsar "personally decided the fate of the insurgent leaders"^[34], as a result of which the leader Murat Kuchukov, "taken prisoner while wounded, was hanged"^[34].

The government of the Tsardom of Muscovy used demonstrative brutal executions to psychologically break the Indigenous population: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov records that the captured leader of the uprising was "hanged by a rib on a hook in accordance with Peter I's order to P.M. Apraksin ('carry out a cruel death penalty')"^[34].

The deployment of the regular army to physically destroy the Hetmanate's defiant capital: "On the morning of November 2, Russian troops burst into Baturyn. After a two-hour battle, the remnants of the garrison were slaughtered together with the entire civilian population"^[20][23]. The town was looted and burned on Peter's direct order - his letter to Menshikov of 5 November 1708: "and Baturyn, as a mark against the traitors (for they resisted), burn entire, as an example to others"^[37].

Total massacre of the civilian population: "Funck slaughtered more than a thousand people in the small town of Terey (Tereyska sloboda) and burned the town down, and also burned Dryhalov (Nedryhailiv)… and ordered everyone encountered to be killed, so as to instill horror in others"^[38]. "In total, about 15 thousand Ukrainians died in the Baturyn tragedy, including all the women and children"^[20][23].

The demonstrative destruction of the city as an act of intimidation for the rest of the country. Peter I personally gave the order: "and Baturyn, as a sign to the traitors (since they resisted), burn down entirely as an example to others"^[20][23]. Hrushevsky: the Muscovite army, having taken Baturyn "through the treachery of one man," "dealt terribly with the populace: the people were slaughtered, the town razed to the ground, the commanders given over to terrible tortures"^[22].

A campaign to erase the resistance leader's name (damnatio memoriae): "For two centuries the name and deeds of Mazepa were expunged… His coats of arms were knocked off the churches he had built, his name was painted over in books"^[20][23].

The anathema against Mazepa was proclaimed by the tsar's direct order - "be pleased to have him, for such a deed of his, publicly cursed in the cathedral church..."^[23]. Part of the Ukrainian clergy refused to accept the rite: a former Lokhvytsia archpriest said during the proclamation of the anathema, "Our Mazepa is holy and will be in heaven, and your sovereign will not"^[23]. The Ecumenical Patriarchate never recognized it: "the anathema was laid on Ivan Mazepa for political reasons and had no theological or canonical justification"^[39].

Large-scale looting of state arsenals and the treasury during the punitive raid on the autonomy's capital: "Menshikov managed to remove part of the artillery"^[20][23]; the remaining guns were blown up and the city burned.

Deliberate removal of intellectual and historical heritage. The imperial troops did not merely loot — they seized unique documents: "Menshikov managed to carry off... the hetman's archive and Mazepa's library"^[20][23].

The installation of a government fully controlled by Moscow after the destruction of the capital: the election of the new hetman took place in Peter's presence immediately after the execution of the Baturyn officers – "Under the circumstances, the officers simply confirmed Skoropadsky, presented by Peter"^[20]. Hrushevsky records the mechanics of dependence: "The hetman's residence was moved from Baturyn to Hlukhiv, right up against the Muscovite border, and two Muscovite regiments were garrisoned there so that the residents could arrest the hetman and the officers at once," and "everyone in Ukraine understood that power lay not with the hetman but with those residents"^[22].

The formalization of the occupation regime through sham procedures. The officers, terrorized by the massacre, were made to vote for the metropole's preferred candidate: "At the end of this spectacle came the execution of the officers captured in Baturyn, and then the formal election of a new hetman. Under the circumstances, the officers simply confirmed Skoropadsky, presented by Peter"^[20][23].

The destruction of the political leadership that supported the hetman: "the entire (!) general starshyna" followed Mazepa, and of the Left-Bank colonels only four remained loyal to the tsar^[23]. The investigation of the officers was directed from the tsar's headquarters, where "being at Lebedyn and Sumy, Peter and Menshikov in January 1709" oversaw the reprisals^[23]. The ecclesiastical punishment was arranged by the tsar's direct order - by a letter of 31 October 1708 (No. 2795) Peter I instructed metropolitan Stefan Yavorsky: "be pleased to have him, for such a deed of his, publicly cursed in the cathedral church..."^[23][37].

Intimidation of the population by an exemplary reprisal against an entire town: during the capture of Baturyn "in the bloody massacre and fire a multitude of the town's defenders and inhabitants perished"^[23], "the town was razed to the ground and its inhabitants annihilated," and the returning residents were charged a special tax "for treason"^[11]. The devastation of the hetman capital also destroyed the state archive of the Hetmanate, which suffered "during the storming of Baturyn castle by A. Menshikov in 1708"^[11].

A punitive expedition against the Sich to physically annihilate the Lower Dnipro Cossacks: "Three infantry regiments led by Colonel P. Yakovlev were sent there. Keleberda was the first to be taken and burned on April 16. A stubborn battle was fought for Perevolochna"^[20]. The assault on the Sich itself lasted four days. The punitive force was guided by mercenary colonel Hnat Galagan: in "1709 he took part in the destruction of the Zaporozhian Sich, for which he received four villages on the Right Bank"^[40].

Public executions of prisoners as intimidation: "Cossacks and officers were hanged, their heads were cut off, and the graves of old Zaporozhians were desecrated"^[20]. The head of the acting otaman was demonstratively sent to Zaporizhzhia^[20].

Total extermination of the defenders: when Perevolochna was taken, "All the Zaporozhians and inhabitants were killed (only 12 people were taken alive), and the neighboring kurins were also burned and slaughtered"^[20].

Destruction of the military-economic base of the Lower Dnipro Cossacks. The Sich "was a kind of military base housing the fleet, artillery, and arsenal"^[41] – all of this infrastructure was destroyed or seized during the assault.

Complete destruction of the Sich's buildings and neighboring fortifications: "the neighboring kurins were also burned and slaughtered"; "All the buildings were destroyed, as Menshikov wrote: 'To lay waste all their places, so that this treasonous nest be utterly uprooted'"^[20].

The issuing of an official manifesto banning the very name of the Sich in any documents^[23]. Physical destruction of memory: "the graves of old Zaporozhians were desecrated"^[20].

The use of the church as an instrument of punishment: the anathema was proclaimed by the tsar's direct order - "be pleased to have him, for such a deed of his, publicly cursed in the cathedral church..."^[23]. No theological grounding was supplied for it, and part of the Ukrainian clergy refused to accept the rite: a former Lokhvytsia archpriest said during the proclamation of the anathema, "Our Mazepa is holy and will be in heaven, and your sovereign will not"^[23].

Physical destruction of the armed forces of the supporters of independence in a general battle in order to eliminate the military potential of the resistance^[23].

Mass executions of captured Cossacks after the capitulation at Perevolochna and Poltava for the final intimidation of the supporters of autonomy^[23].

The liquidation of the autonomy's statehood and international agency as a result of the defeat of the Swedish-Ukrainian forces. The rout at Poltava set off an irreversible process of dismantlement: "In the hundred years after the famous Pereiaslav Council, Ukraine traveled the path from the 'Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky'… to the de facto liquidation of the autonomy and the hetmanate, to the country's transformation into an ordinary province of the Russian Empire"^[23].

Refusal to sign a treaty: the replacement of an equal agreement with the tsar's unilateral "resolutions." "The joint document, drawn up as a decree, was signed by state chancellor Count G. Golovkin"^[14][42] – the autonomy ceased to be a party to a treaty.

Entrenchment of tsarist control over the autonomy's foreign policy: the articles "fully preserved the previously established control of the tsarist regime over… foreign policy"^[14].

Preservation of tsarist representatives' oversight of the hetmanate's administrative apparatus: the articles "fully preserved the previously established control of the tsarist regime over local financing and the functioning of the administrative apparatus"^[14]. The institution of the tsar's resident was established alongside the hetman: "The first tsar's resident was stolnik A. Izmailov, who in his work was guided by official and secret tsarist articles"; the residents "were given the right to control the election and official appointments of representatives of the starshyna"^[14].

Preservation of the center's control over the region's finances: the articles "fully preserved the previously established control of the tsarist regime over local financing"^[14].

The collapse of the anti-Moscow coalition from within: on the Right Bank, the Tatar allies betrayed the Cossacks and turned to seizing the civilian population – "the Tatars, disobeying Orlyk, scattered in raiding parties and began taking yasyr captives across Ukrainian villages"^[43]. Orlyk himself wrote to the Swedish king: "What atrocities unheard of under the moon did the wild Tatars then commit!"^[43].

The empire's forcible retention of the Right Bank: the Bila Tserkva fortress with its Muscovite garrison held out, and the campaign collapsed after the Tatars' betrayal – "Orlyk retreated without taking Bila Tserkva"^[43], and his army disintegrated.

The government of the Tsardom of Muscovy consolidated militarized settlements on the border with the lands of the Nokhchi to strengthen control: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that in 1711–1712 "the small Greben Cossack towns along the Terek were merged, by order of Tsar Peter I, into 5 stanitsas - from Chervlyonnaya to Kurdyukovskaya"^[34].

The government of the Tsardom of Muscovy organized expeditions to study and inventory natural resources in the territories of the Indigenous population: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov records the 1717 "survey of mineral springs and other natural riches of the Terek River (including the Bragun warm springs) by Doctor Gottlieb Schober on the assignment of Peter I"^[34].

A covert operation by Muscovite emissaries disguised as monks to destroy ancient documents of the 11th–17th centuries: "The enormous archive and library burned down; the charters and grants… of princes, magnates, and hetmans perished"; "The fire destroyed the written memory of the Lavra's independent Ukrainian political and spiritual life"^[44].

The government of the Tsardom of Muscovy organized attacks on the territories of the Nokhchi for the mass capture of prisoners and booty: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that in 1718 there took place a "predatory expedition of detachments of Don Cossacks and Kabardian princes allied with Peter I into the 'Chechen uezd' along the Sunzha and the Argun"^[34], as a result of which "800 prisoners were captured, not counting 'belongings'"^[34], and in 1721 the Astrakhan governor A. P. Volynsky "invited the Don Cossacks and, together with the Terek Cossacks, organized raids to the Agrakhan and Aksai rivers against the Kumyks and Chechens"^[34].

The diplomatic apparatus of the Tsardom of Muscovy used loyal elites of neighboring peoples for joint armed actions against the Nokhchi societies: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that in 1718 an expedition into the lands of the Nokhchi was carried out by the forces of "Kabardian princes allied with Peter I"^[34].

The introduction of censorship over book printing by Peter I's decree of 5 October 1720: "no new books whatsoever are to be printed except previous church editions, and even those old church books… are to be corrected before printing"^[31].

The ruler's direct decree against the very language of the local population in print: the same decree of Peter I ordered books to be checked against Muscovite ones, "so that there be no discord or distinct dialect in them"^[31].