Aggressors may forcibly conscript members of the Indigenous people into their own armed forces to take part in combat operations (including against their own compatriots). This technique is used to extract benefits by exploiting the local population as a free human resource. At the same time, it serves the purposes of neutralizing defenses: by sending men to distant fronts, the colonizer deliberately depletes the region's demographic and military potential, depriving the society of its capacity for self-defense.
The occupation administration obliged the subordinated Nokhchi societies to take part in military campaigns: historian E. N. Kusheva points to documents «on the possibility of the participation of Murza Shikh... in a campaign of Russian men-at-arms»[1].
The occupation administration forcibly sent subordinated Nokhchi to fight against their own compatriots: historian E. N. Kusheva indicates in the heading of a primary document that there took place a «campaign of Terek men-at-arms and Terek Okochans... against the Endirey ruler Saltan-Magmut and the people of the Okotsk and Michkiz kabaks who had joined him»[1].
The occupation administration of Tersky Town mobilized the metropole's subordinate allies: in a petition to Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich, the Kabardian prince Sholokh reported that «the voivode Mikita Dmitreevich Velyaminov sent me... with my father on your sovereign's service... against your sovereign's disobedient ones — the Michkiz people, against their kabaks»[1].
The occupation administration compelled the subordinate Nokhchi to take part in armed conflicts: in their petition to Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich, the Okotsky murza Kokhostrov Biytemirov and the serving Okochans of Tersky Town reported that «we, your sovereign's kholops (bonded servants), fight your sovereign's disobedient ones, not sparing our heads; for you, sovereign, we shed our blood and lay down our heads»[1].
The occupation administration and forces loyal to it sent the subordinate Nokhchi (Okochans) to take part in armed conflicts, including against their own compatriots: the historian I. Kh. Tkhamokova states that in 1626 the voivodes sent «252 Okochans»[2][3] on a campaign, and in 1628, during an armed incursion, the Kabardian murza Konshov-murza Bitemryukov «went against these "mountain people"... with the "Okochans"»[2].
The appointed controlled administration sent subordinated Nokhchi (Okochans) to take part in the metropole's Crimean campaigns: a dispatch from the Kabardian prince Kaspulat Mutsalovich Cherkassky to the Posolsky Prikaz in 1675 states that for the campaign against the Crimean ulusy he had at his disposal «190 Okochan men»[3]; the historian I. Kh. Tkhamokova adds that in 1675 detachments fought in Crimea alongside the prince «with uzdens, with the newly baptized, and with «Okochans»»[2].
The occupation administration sent subordinated Nokhchi (Okochans) to take part in armed conflicts (the Chyhyryn campaigns) on the territory of Ukraine: the historian I. Kh. Tkhamokova notes that in 1678 the Kabardian prince Kaspulat Mutsalovich Cherkassky (under whose authority the Okochans were) received a tsar's charter «for having taken part in the Crimean and Chyhyryn campaigns»[2]; the document registers for 1678 record a dispatch from the Chuhuiv voivode Ivan Rykhtarov to the Razryadny Prikaz «on the march of the regiment of Prince Kaspulat Mutsalovich Cherkassky to Chuhuiv»[3]; and in 1679 Tsar Fedor Alekseevich issued a decree to the Posolsky Prikaz «on his regiment performing guard duty in the vicinity of Chuhuiv and Kharkiv»[3].
The forced incorporation of the autochthonous armed forces into the imperial army: "The Sloboda Cossack regiments were abolished and in their place it was ordered to form 5 hussar regiments"[6].
The use of Ukrainian Cossack regiments in the imperial war against the Ottoman Empire. The merits of the Zaporozhians and their kish otaman Kalnyshevsky in this war "were recognized by the tsarist government and the empress, who awarded him a gold medal with diamonds"[7] – which saved neither him nor the Sich from reprisal right after the victory.
The use of Ukrainian Cossacks as a military resource for storming Turkish fortresses and consolidating imperial claims to Crimea: at Ochakiv "the 'loyal Cossacks' took part in the storming of the fortress"[8], and in the storming of Izmail "in total over 6 thousand Black Sea Cossacks took part in the battle"[9].
The use of Ukrainian Cossack formations in the imperial war: "The Russian troops, which included the Ust-Danube Budjak Cossack Host, captured Khotyn, Bendery… Akkerman"[10].
Mass conscription into the militia and the formation of Cossack regiments on the basis of false promises to restore Cossack liberties: "Ukraine was used for the recruitment, equipping, and movement of troops… including a 75-thousand-strong militia from the Kyiv, Podillia, Chernihiv, and Poltava governorates"[11].
The Regular Army of the Russian Empire compelled the Indigenous population to perform military service on the conqueror’s side, including against their own kin. Imperial general Yermolov testifies in his "Notes" that "instead of tribute it was ordained that men be sent out for service at the requisition of the commanders," and admits: "there has not yet been an instance of anyone being able to force the Chechens to use arms against their own countrymen, but the first step toward this has already been taken, and it has been impressed upon them that this will always be demanded of them"[12].
On the night of January 10, 1827, General Laptev, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, forced four hundred Chechens of subordinated communities to take part in a raid on the Nokhchi village of Uzeni-Yurt with a combat mission against their compatriots. The imperial historian Potto wrote: they "swam across the Argun and were to go by a roundabout road in order to cut off the inhabitants' retreat to the forest"[13]. In the summer of 1827, General Engelhardt, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, compelled to take part in the ambush on the inhabitants of Samashki, alongside a hundred Mozdok Cossacks, as Potto recorded, "as many peaceable Chechens"[13]. The subjugation of these communities was maintained by a system of hostages, as documented by Laptev's same practice with regard to Geldigen.
The mass enrollment of peasants into the militia: "The trigger was the publication, during the Crimean War of 1853–1856, of Emperor Nicholas I's manifesto providing for the creation of a mobile state militia"[7] - the manifesto and levy decrees of 29 January 1855 (Nos. 28.991–28.993); the Kyiv governorate was not on the list of governorates called up, and the peasants took the empire-wide summons as addressed to themselves[14].
The use of Ukrainians within the imperial army in large-scale wars of conquest in the Caucasus and Central Asia – recruit conscription had extended to the Ukrainian governorates since the liquidation of the autonomy[10].
The mobilization of the inhabitants of the colonized Ukrainian governorates into the imperial army for the war in the Balkans – under the universal military conscription in force in the Ukrainian lands since the liquidation of the autonomy[10].
The forced conscription of millions into the imperial army: "During the war years, 3.5 million Ukrainians were mobilized into the ranks of the Russian army (by other data – 4.5 million out of a total of 15.5 million)"[15].
In May 1916 the Russian Empire mobilized into the army the striking workers of the Grozny oil fields - those who held a deferral from military service and took part in the strike. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "an order was issued on the immediate mobilization of all Grozny workers holding a deferral from military service and taking part in the strike"[16]. The strike began with a wage dispute: on 12 May the workers handed the Council of the Congress of Terek Oil Industrialists written demands for a wage rise of 50% on average, on 21 May at two in the afternoon the oil fields stopped at the alarm whistles of the plants, and on 31 May, the same historians write, "the workers everywhere began to return to work"[16]. Those already recruited did not want to fight either: of the one and a half thousand men of the fourth draft of the "Savage Division" training in the reserve regiment, only 553 reached the combat units - the rest the military command returned to the Caucasus "in view of their 'unreliability'"[16].
On 29 June 1919 the central organ of the colonial administration of Ukraine (the VUTsIK) resolved "to carry out a general mobilization of workers and peasants of call-up age, beginning at 19, and in the front-line zone at 18," and to draft the entire "non-labouring element" from 18 to 45 into the rear militia - captured Ukraine was to fight for its captor - and by the same resolution it declared: "All who resist the carrying out of the mobilization are to be deemed enemies of the people"; it was signed for the chairman of the organ by Polozov and by secretary Lapchinsky[17]. On 26 July 1919 Skrypnyk, plenipotentiary of the same administration's Defence Council, reporting on the Trypillia district, where the army had just crushed the risen peasants, wrote: "there now remains the mobilization of the entire population of this district" - the men of villages that had just risen were taken into the very army that had crushed them[18].
In February 1919 the Volunteer Army announced at the congress in Aldy a mobilization of the highlanders - at the villages' own expense: "the villages were obliged to equip and maintain the mobilized at their own cost"[16]. General Aliev, the appointed ruler of Chechnya, carried out the mobilization: "The 200-300 horsemen assembled in this way (together with Kabardians and Ingush) took part in the suppression of peasant unrest in the Stavropol region"[16]. Historian E. F. Zhupikova conveys the conclusion of the researcher P. Aptekar on the causes of the Chechens' uprising against Denikin: "the forcible mobilizations and requisitions of provisions for Denikin's army"[19].
The mass conscription by field draft offices of the population of just-liberated territories: "'Chornosvytnyky' or 'black infantry' – such was the unofficial name given to men and youths mobilized by field military commissariats, and in fact by the commanders of formations, units, and detachments in 1943–1944 after the Red Army's liberation of enemy-occupied territories"[20].
In 1941 the USSR forcibly herded up to 13 thousand Chechens deemed unfit for military service into the "labor army" - construction battalions sent to build defensive lines: the people were carried toward the front without weapons and without soldier status. The mobilization, as the historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write, was carried out by the local military commissariats "by practically forcible methods"[16]; the historian M. K. Osmayev writes: "People were seized right on the streets without being served call-up papers and without preliminary explanation of the purpose of the mobilization," and among the mobilized "there were not a few old and sick men"[21]. The historians write about the position of the mobilized: they "were on the footing of servicemen but were not counted as Red Army soldiers"[16]. The historians describe the outcome: "The mobilized masses were loaded into trains and in September 1941 found themselves in the frontline zone, where no one needed their labor. The army was retreating in haste. Over 10 thousand unfortunate citizens of Checheno-Ingushetia died of cold, hunger and bombing, owing to the criminal negligence of the military officialdom"[16]. M. K. Osmayev cites another version of the fate of the mobilized: before even reaching their destination, "they were scattered by German aviation," and, by different sources, from 1,200 to 2 thousand people made it to Rostov-on-Don, whom a special commission of the colonial administration of Checheno-Ingushetia took back to Grozny[21]. The survivors the colonizer declared "deserters of the labor front"; the historians write: "They were barely saved from execution by a government commission from Checheno-Ingushetia that traveled to Rostov-on-Don in response to complaints"[16].