Aggressors may deliberately recruit, bribe, or ideologically motivate ordinary members of the local population, marginalized groups, and criminal elements to create a covert network of loyal operatives in the target territory. Forming a controlled agent network, including provocateurs, street militants, informers, and saboteurs, allows the colonizer to organize artificial mass riots, exert physical pressure on civilian activists, gather intelligence, and destabilize the socio-political situation within the colonized society before the start of an open intervention.
In 1836, the command of the Russian Caucasus Corps sent the hired preacher Taj ad-Din Mustafin, paid by the treasury, to the Groznaya fortress to undermine the influence of Tashu-Hadji (sheikh, imam of Chechnya in 1834-1836, spiritual and military leader of the Chechen resistance) - a spiritual track running parallel to the punitive military actions against the villages that had harbored Tashu-Hadji (campaign C1158). The goal was stated in the source: "with the aim of undermining the spiritual influence" of Tashu-Hadji "and reducing the effectiveness of the preaching of ghazawat" (ghazawat - the highlanders' war for independence from the Russian conquest)[1]. The agent "had managed to make a trip to the lowland societies of Dagestan" when Tashu-Hadji, by letter, "under threat of death forbade him to appear on Chechen territory"[1]; the response is cited by the historian Pokrovsky: "I instruct you that you shall not travel about in these lands without our permission, and if you are not foolish, you should withdraw before harm is done to you"[2].
The empire kept secret agents inside the administration of the Imamate of Shamil (the imam, leader of the resistance of the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest). Historian N. I. Pokrovsky writes from imperial military materials: "Akhverdy-Magoma replaced the chief of the guard posts between the Argun and the Sunzha, Mulla-Gazi, who had been a secret agent of the tsarist government" (Akhverdy-Magoma - the deputy of the imam in Lesser Chechnya; the Argun and the Sunzha - rivers in Chechnya)[2]. The second agent was an elder of the trans-Argun communities: general Zavadovsky, temporarily commanding the troops of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), in a report to general Neidhardt, head of the empire's troops in the Caucasus, of 24 February 1845, forwarded a dispatch from the left flank about information received "through a messenger who came to him from the trans-Argun elder, a man of weight among the people who is in secret communication with lt.-gen. Gaksfort": the agent reported that Shamil was convening a council of naibs (the imam's deputies) in Dargo, the imam's residence[2]. Defectors the empire formalised into agents and guides on the terms of a bargain. General Labyntsev, commander of the Sunzha Line, in a report to Vorontsov, viceroy in the Caucasus, in summer 1846 described the terms of the Chechen Topi: "Having promised, should this be carried into effect, not only to be a scout in the mountains and a guide for our troops, but, acting in our favour by his example and persuasion, to incline others to the offering of submission... I permitted the families of Topi... to settle among the resettlers located by the fortification"[3]. The agent was paid not in money but with his family's right to live by the fortification - under the control of the same empire.
The bought-over naibs conducted reconnaissance for the empire and took part in planning the marches. Imperial historian Volkonsky writes of Bata Shamurzayev, a naib of Shamil (deputy of the Imam, leader of the highlanders' resistance of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest) who had gone over to the empire: Bata "had his agents everywhere, informing him of all Shamil's movements," and the winter expedition of 1852 "was undertaken and conducted by Prince Baryatinsky" on Bata's directions; "The chief of the detachment did not conceal that for the successful taking of the auls he owed much to Bata as well"[4]. Baryatinsky, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), in a letter to Vorontsov, viceroy in the Caucasus, of 4 June 1852 confirmed: "Bata has passed on to me much of interest concerning Shamil's secret intrigues among the Ossetians"[2]. In July 1856 Yusuf-Hadji Safarov, a former counselor of the Imamate, defected to the empire and offered his knowledge to Baryatinsky in writing: "I know much about Shamil and his troops... I hope to be useful to the Russian government and I guarantee to destroy everything I made at Shamil's, because the master of the house knows best what goes on in it"[1].
Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "On 3 October there came to General Smekalov... a certain inhabitant of Benoy named Biy-Sultan. In exchange for a full pardon and permission to gather the remains of his property, Biy-Sultan volunteered to serve as a guide to Alibek-Haji's last fortified point. Thanks to this unexpected help the Simsir hamlets were quickly captured"[1].
The use of brute force by party activists against Rukh activists: when Rukh members attempted to install a cross on the grave of those executed near Bazar, "the activists were not allowed into the village" "with the help of KGB men and provocations about the Rukh members' 'Banderite' intentions"; some participants "were dragged out of the car, beaten, and the flags were torn to shreds," while the role of "protesting peasants" was played by men in disguise: "in reality these were communist party activists from nearby districts"[5]. The political prisoner Vasyl Ovsienko ended up in the hospital: "the communists thrashed me near Bazar on November 17"[6].