Deception and Forcible Detention of Beibulat Taimiev by Paskevich, Splitting Chechnya into Factions, and Coercion into an Oath of Allegiance (1828-1829)
After Yermolov's punitive campaign of 1826 and the ebbing of the uprising of 1825-1826, the empire, having failed to subdue Chechnya by force of arms, turned to deception, division, and hostage-taking. The historian D. A. Khozhaev wrote: "Paskevich, trying to lure the principal leader of the Chechen insurgents out of Chechnya, throughout the whole of 1828 offers Beibulat, through intermediaries, a return to 'Russian service.' He is promised the rank of captain, pardon, and honors"[1]. On March 6, 1829, Beibulat Taimiev and 120 elders of Chechnya were forced to accept nominal allegiance in Tarki through the Shamkhal of Tarki. D. A. Khozhaev recorded the motive: the elders "sought to avoid subordination to the tsarist pristavs (superintendents), to avert from Chechnya the threat of constant raids"[1]. Emanuel, commander of the troops on the Caucasus Line, set a condition in his report to Paskevich: "the submission of Bey-Bulat and the other unsubdued Chechens will be recognized as well-intentioned only when they unconditionally take the oath and hand over amanats (hostages)"[2]. In his instruction to Emanuel, Paskevich revealed the calculation of splitting the people: "it is not without use for us to have two factions in Chechnya, which, both remaining submissive to our government, will by internecine discord be restrained from hostile designs against the Russians"[2]. Having summoned Beibulat and the elders of his faction to Tiflis ostensibly for negotiations, Paskevich detained them with the army in the field for the entire Turkish campaign. D. A. Khozhaev wrote: "Realizing that he had been deceived, he tries to return to Chechnya immediately, but he is detained in Tiflis by force"[1]. Paskevich himself acknowledged the scheme in his instruction to Emanuel of August 2, 1829: "I at once resolved to summon to me, under the guise of explanations, their elders and the elder Bey-Bulat known to you, so that, having drawn them away here, I would deprive this tribe of the possibility... of undertaking anything hostile"; "Having kept them in this way for the whole summer, I secured tranquility for the Line on their part"[2]. The same instruction confirmed the regulation on Chechnya: amanats from every elder's district "as a pledge of submission" in the fortress of Groznaya, the son of the Shamkhal as commissar over the Chechens, and travel into imperial territory only with tickets (written passes) from the commissar[2]. The oath was signed by a people that had lived through a wave of arrests, executions, and exiles at the hands of the imperial command. The Chechens wrote to Paskevich in April 1829: they "arrested, took captive, hanged, and exiled to Siberia and other places many of those who, being submissive, served the great Sovereign"[2].
Actors
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| G0009 | Russian Empire |
In the spring of 1829, Commander-in-Chief Paskevich built the governance of Chechnya through the deliberate maintenance of a split of the people into two rival parties — the Shamkhal party and the Beibulat party. In his instruction of May 16, 1829 to Emanuel, commander of the troops on the Caucasian Line, Paskevich wrote: "it is not without use for us to have two parties in Chechnya which, both remaining obedient to our government, will through internecine strife be restrained from hostile designs against the Russians"[2]. To this end he dispatched couriers (messengers with a special commission) to the elders of the Beibulat party, instructed Engelhardt, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, to "assist as far as possible" in summoning them, and by the regulation of August 2, 1829 placed the son of the Shamkhal of Tarki over the Chechens as commissar[2]. |
Techniques Used
| ID | Name | Use | |
|---|---|---|---|
| T0038 | Economic Control |
By the regulation of August 2, 1829, Commander-in-Chief Paskevich locked the Chechens' access to trade onto a commissar appointed by the empire: travel to imperial territory was permitted only with tickets (written passes) — "To him is also granted the right to issue tickets to the said Chechens for travel into our domains on trade business"[2]. In practice, the pass system was supplemented by arbitrariness: Chechen society wrote to Paskevich on November 21, 1829 that Engelhardt and Khasai-Musa "order their subordinates to place under arrest all those Chechens who come to them with tickets from Shahbaz," while those obedient to Khasai-Musa act so "that we may thereby be deprived of the means of sustenance"[2]. |
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| T0147 | Forced Registration of Subjecthood |
On March 6, 1829, in Tarki, Beibulat Taimiev and 120 elders of Chechnya were forced to take an oath of allegiance through the Shamkhal of Tarki. The historian D. A. Khozhaev recorded the coerced nature of this step: the elders "tried to avoid subordination to the tsarist superintendents, to avert from Chechnya the threat of constant raids"[1]. The Chechens themselves, in a petition to Paskevich in April 1829, documented the backdrop against which the submission was being signed: the imperial command "arrested, took captive, hanged and exiled to Siberia and to other places many of those who, being obedient, served the great Sovereign"[2]. Emanuel, commander of the troops on the Caucasian Line, in a report to Paskevich of May 15, 1829, made the recognition of submission conditional: it "will be recognized as well-intentioned only when they unconditionally take the oath and hand over amanats"[2]. Holding Beibulat in Tiflis, Paskevich sealed the subjecthood with the "Regulation on the Submission of the Chechens to Russia" and the statute of August 2, 1829[1][2]. |
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| T0099 | Hostage-Taking |
From spring until the end of summer 1829, Commander-in-Chief Paskevich forcibly kept with the field army the Chechen elders who had been summoned for negotiations, directly calling them hostages. In his instruction to Emanuel of May 16, 1829, he wrote: "The mere absence of these people, who will be with us in the manner of amanats, will restrain the unpacified Chechens from any hostile attempts"[2]. He summed up the result on August 2, 1829: "The Chechen elders, having been graciously received by me, remained with the detachment and were with me in military operations against the Turks. Having kept them in this way for a whole summer, I secured tranquility for the Line on their part"[2]. By the same document, hostage-taking was entrenched as a system of governing Chechnya: "As a pledge of the submission of the said Chechens, the amanats presented by each eldership are to be kept in the fortress of Grozny; and if from any one an amanat has not yet been delivered, then the elder, until the amanat is delivered, is obliged... to remain himself as a pledge in the fortress of Grozny"[2]. |
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| T0021 | Neutralization of the Opposition |
In the spring of 1829, Commander-in-Chief Paskevich neutralized the leading stratum of the Chechen resistance by luring Beibulat Taimiev and 60 elders of his party to Tiflis under the pretext of negotiations and holding them there by force. The historian D. A. Khozhaev wrote: "On arriving in Tiflis, Beibulat learns that Paskevich is with the army in the field. Realizing that he has been deceived, he tries to return to Chechnya immediately, but he is forcibly detained in Tiflis"[1]. Paskevich admitted the deception in his own hand in his instruction to Emanuel of August 2, 1829: "I at once resolved to summon to myself, under the guise of explanations, their elders and the elder Bei-Bulat known to you, so that, having drawn them away here, I might deprive this tribe of the possibility, in case of discontent, of undertaking anything hostile"[2]. |
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| T0131 | Support for a Controlled Opposition |
In the spring of 1829, Commander-in-Chief Paskevich built the governance of Chechnya through the deliberate maintenance of a split of the people into two rival parties — the Shamkhal party and the Beibulat party. In his instruction of May 16, 1829 to Emanuel, commander of the troops on the Caucasian Line, Paskevich wrote: "it is not without use for us to have two parties in Chechnya which, both remaining obedient to our government, will through internecine strife be restrained from hostile designs against the Russians"[2]. To this end he dispatched couriers (messengers with a special commission) to the elders of the Beibulat party, instructed Engelhardt, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, to "assist as far as possible" in summoning them, and by the regulation of August 2, 1829 placed the son of the Shamkhal of Tarki over the Chechens as commissar[2]. |
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Instruments
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| S0010 | Regular Army |
In the spring of 1829, Commander-in-Chief Paskevich built the governance of Chechnya through the deliberate maintenance of a split of the people into two rival parties — the Shamkhal party and the Beibulat party. In his instruction of May 16, 1829 to Emanuel, commander of the troops on the Caucasian Line, Paskevich wrote: "it is not without use for us to have two parties in Chechnya which, both remaining obedient to our government, will through internecine strife be restrained from hostile designs against the Russians"[2]. To this end he dispatched couriers (messengers with a special commission) to the elders of the Beibulat party, instructed Engelhardt, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, to "assist as far as possible" in summoning them, and by the regulation of August 2, 1829 placed the son of the Shamkhal of Tarki over the Chechens as commissar[2]. |