Perfidy: False Guarantees of Safety

Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes about the surrender of Alibek-Haji and his naibs (naib - a district governor appointed by the authorities) in November 1877: "The head of the Terek oblast, General Prince Loris-Melikov, deceived them, giving his word of honor that all who turned themselves in would be pardoned"^[1]. Alibek-Haji's secretary Goytukin Rasu, an eyewitness, recorded the mechanism of the deception: Alibek was told "that if he came to the authorities in peace, he would keep his freedom. Trusting their words... he presented himself to the commandant of the Vedeno fortress. The commandant at once ordered him seized and, having shackled his legs and arms in irons, sent him to the town jail"^[1]. Those who surrendered were tried by a field court-martial and executed.

The USSR fought the auls that revolted in December 1929 not only with troops but with false promises; the Chechen historian A. G. Avtorkhanov, who worked in Chechnya in those years and wrote in emigration, described this mechanism. For the "peaceful liquidation" of the uprising a government delegation arrived from Moscow - it included Nikolayeva, member of the Central Committee of the union party (the "TsK VKP(b)"), and Ryskulov, deputy head of the government of the RSFSR, - and the "peace commission" of religious authorities it created declared to the insurgents in Shali: "responsibility for the events that have occurred lies exclusively with the local functionaries, who acted contrary to the directives of the party and the government", and in the name of the government delegation an address to the Chechen people was read out: "the internal Chechen affairs will henceforth be decided by the Chechen people itself"^[2]. The insurgents, Avtorkhanov writes, "found these explanations satisfactory and agreed to return to their homes"; the GPU detachment (the political police, a predecessor of today's FSB) that arrived next spent three days arresting local Soviet functionaries - just as had been promised; Avtorkhanov continues: "and toward one o'clock in the morning of the fourth day they surrounded the house of the former leader of the insurgents, Shita Istamulov"^[2]. The seizure failed - the Chechens fought Shita Istamulov free; Avtorkhanov writes: "To the ultimatum to surrender without a fight, however, Shita and his brother Hasan replied with fire. Part of Shita's house was engulfed in flames and Hasan gravely wounded when, toward dawn, help arrived: about a hundred armed Chechen horsemen surrounded the very part of the GPU troops that had invested Shita's house. After perhaps an hour of hand-to-hand fighting the GPU detachment, numbering up to 150 men, was almost entirely destroyed"^[2]. Avtorkhanov continues: "Freed by his friends, Shita Istamulov called all Chechens to a 'holy war' for the restoration of the 'Imamate of Shamil' and the expulsion of the 'infidels' from the Caucasus. Following this call, Shali, Goity and Benoy rose again"^[2]. The second deception was the amnesty; Avtorkhanov writes: "To all participants of the uprising, including the leaders of the uprising, an amnesty was declared in the name of the central government" - Shita Istamulov returned to Shali and "on instructions from above" was even appointed chairman of the Shali rural consumers' society (a cooperative for manufactured goods)^[2]. Avtorkhanov describes the denouement thus: in the autumn of 1931 Shita Istamulov "was summoned to Baklanov, head of the district GPU, to be handed the official act of amnesty from Moscow. Handing him the act with one hand, Baklanov with the other, from under the counter, emptied an entire Mauser clip into him. The gravely wounded Istamulov managed to stab the treacherous Baklanov to death with his dagger. The outside guard finished Istamulov off"^[2].

The USSR lured out by deception the Chechens who were hiding in the mountains from the occupation regime, promising freedom - in the NKVD's (predecessor of today's FSB) papers this was called "legalization." Those who believed the promises were arrested or deported together with their compatriots to Kazakhstan and Kirghizia (today's Kyrgyzstan) in the course of the genocidal Operation "Chechevitsa." The report of Dementiev, head of the Grozny Oblast internal affairs directorate (1956), states: in September-October 1943 alone "30 bands were legalized, comprising 183 men, plus 60 lone bandits"^[3]. Historian P. M. Polian writes: the NKVD files "listed 1,300 so-called legalized bandits, that is, men who had come forward, by mutual agreement, with a confession and been released from repression for it. All or nearly all of them were arrested shortly before the deportation or in its course"^[3]. In the days of the deportation the troops announced clemency for those who had gone into the mountains - and deported those who came out. A Russian student eyewitness from Grozny, whose testimony was printed in the émigré journal Prometheus in 1949 and is cited by the Chechen historian A. G. Avtorkhanov, writes: "At the same time an amnesty [a promise not to punish] was announced for those who had gone into the mountains, if they came forward voluntarily. Some of them did in fact come forward, but were deported all the same…"^[2]. In the summer of 1944 the colonizer repeated the deception: historian P. M. Polian writes that in June "tried and tested" religious authorities, deported in February, were brought from Kazakhstan to Grozny, and they induced hundreds of Chechens in hiding "toward legalization and, hence, deportation"^[3].

In the autumn of 1994, Russia attacked the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria under the name of a puppet opposition, and on 11 December 1994 the Russian army openly invaded the republic. The occupiers promised the villages of Ichkeria not to touch the Chechens if a village handed over its weapons, sent away the Armed Forces of Ichkeria or let Russian troops in, and then looted, bombed and stormed the villages that had believed them.

Russian generals and officers gave their promises to village heads and elders at their posts, by word of mouth or in the form of a written treaty^[4].

In mid-January 1995, the elders of Assinovskaya, a stanitsa in the west of Ichkeria, let in Russian troops, who promised through loudspeakers and leaflets not to touch anyone. The occupiers looted houses and abused Chechens, and by 16 February every Chechen family had left the stanitsa (see: "Pillage")^[5].

On 21 February 1995, the head of Samashki, a village in the west of Ichkeria, and the elders asked Kosolapov, a general of the occupation forces, at the Russian post near the village what they should do so that there would be no war in the village. The report of the Observer Mission of Russian human rights defenders gives the general's answer: "You have to hand over the heavy weapons, set up a militia team of 40-45 men to guard the village, draw up a protocol of accord with the seals of the imam and the chairman [of the village administration], explain it to the people — that is all that is required of you". On 6-7 March, fighters of the army of Ichkeria from other villages were forced to leave at the demand of the Chechens of Samashki. On 8 March, the head of the village, the imam and five elders signed a treaty with the Russian troops. The village undertook to hand over its heavy weapons and send away the army of Ichkeria, and in exchange the elders asked the Russian troops not to enter Samashki and not to use force against Chechen civilians. General Kosolapov signed the treaty and gave a copy to the head of the village^[4].

Eighteen days after the treaty, on 26 March 1995, Russian pilots in six helicopters fired rockets at Samashki and seriously wounded four Chechens. On 28 March, the colonel who commanded the Russian post near the village demanded that small arms be handed over, although the treaty said nothing of this. The head of Samashki collected six assault rifles in the village and handed them to the occupiers. On 6 April, Romanov, deputy commander of the occupation forces, demanded that the village let in the Internal Troops of Russia's Ministry of Internal Affairs (predecessors of today's Rosgvardia) and hand over 264 assault rifles by seven in the morning of 7 April (see: "Collective Punishment"). The elders replied that there were not that many weapons in the village, and the head of Samashki asked for three days to collect about fifty assault rifles. Romanov refused. On 7 April, the occupiers shelled Samashki with mortars and stormed the village. On 7 and 8 April, the Russian military killed 103 Chechen civilians in the village, whom human rights defenders recorded by name (see: "Mass Killings of Civilians")^[4]. On 11 April, five elders of Samashki handed human rights defenders at the Russian post a written statement: "We believed the MVD of Russia… we forced all the militiamen to leave our village of Samashki. We believed the military that in this case they would not touch the civilian population. And once again a lie. On 7 April the special forces of Russia's MVD began to enter the village"^[4][6].

Around 20 April 1995, the elders of Ishkhoy-Yurt, a village in the east of Ichkeria, let in Russian servicemen who promised only to pass through the village^[7]. The occupiers fired their assault rifles at the houses and killed a woman who was carrying a child, and the child survived^[8].

In the spring of 1996, Russian troops surrounded the villages of Ichkeria and shelled them (see: "Collective Punishment")^[9]. Then the occupiers and the puppet government in Grozny signed a "Protocol on Peace and Accord" with the village. The village undertook not to let in fighters of the army of Ichkeria, and in return Russia promised that it would be spared any fighting^[10]. On 14 March, Artemov, commander of the occupation forces in the south-west of Ichkeria, gave Russian deputies his word of honor that he would not storm Samashki, because the village was handing over its weapons^[9]. On 15 March, the occupiers stormed the village and killed at least 35 Chechen civilians (see: "Indiscriminate Attacks")^[7].

On 31 March 1996, Russian president Yeltsin, by decree No. 435, named "the signing of protocols on peace and accord" one of the main directions of his program for the Chechen Republic^[11]. According to the French agency AFP, even before the decree, by 28 March, more than 120 villages of Ichkeria had signed protocols with the occupation forces^[12]. On 2 April, Russia and the puppet government signed a "Protocol on Peace and Accord" with Shalazhi, a village south-west of Grozny^[7]. On the night of 3 April and on 4 April, Russian pilots bombed the village, destroyed dozens of houses, killed three Chechens and wounded more than three hundred (see: "Indiscriminate Attacks")^[7][9]. By 20 April, according to Zavgaev, head of the puppet government, only 15 villages and towns of Ichkeria had not signed the protocol^[7]. On 25 April, Russian pilots bombed Chishki, a village south of Grozny, which had signed a "Protocol on Peace and Accord" shortly before. The pilots killed one Chechen woman and wounded two more Chechens^[7].

Human rights defenders of Memorial write: "At times neither a truce, nor the signing of a 'protocol on peace and accord' by a settlement, nor even the occupation of a village or town by the federal [Russian] troops saved it from indiscriminate attacks, air strikes and artillery shelling"^[7]. Tim Guldimann, head of the mission of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe in Grozny from January 1996, wrote in 1998 that the commander of the occupation forces and Zavgaev, head of the puppet government, in part forced these protocols upon the villages^[10].

In August 1996, the Armed Forces of Ichkeria liberated Grozny from the occupiers, forcing Russia to the negotiating table^[13]. On 31 August 1996, peace agreements were signed in Khasavyurt (see: "Sham Treaties")^[14]. On 31 December 1996, the last Russian troops left the republic^[7].