The aggressor covertly or overtly provides comprehensive support (financial, media, organizational, and political) to controlled political forces within the colonized society. The goal is to create a legal fifth column that will act in the interests of the metropole, disguising external interference as an internal political process.
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| C1150 | Deception and Forcible Detention of Beibulat Taimiev by Paskevich, Splitting Chechnya into Factions, and Coercion into an Oath of Allegiance (1828-1829) |
In the spring of 1829, Commander-in-Chief Paskevich built the governance of Chechnya through the deliberate maintenance of a split of the people into two rival parties — the Shamkhal party and the Beibulat party. In his instruction of May 16, 1829 to Emanuel, commander of the troops on the Caucasian Line, Paskevich wrote: "it is not without use for us to have two parties in Chechnya which, both remaining obedient to our government, will through internecine strife be restrained from hostile designs against the Russians"[1]. To this end he dispatched couriers (messengers with a special commission) to the elders of the Beibulat party, instructed Engelhardt, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, to "assist as far as possible" in summoning them, and by the regulation of August 2, 1829 placed the son of the Shamkhal of Tarki over the Chechens as commissar[1]. |
| S0009 | Diplomacy |
Use by the Council of People's Commissars of local Bolshevik cells as a legal political force that was to speak on behalf of the Ukrainian proletariat against the Central Rada[2]. |
| C0071 | Failure of the Political Seizure of the UNR in Kyiv (November – December 1917) |
Use by the Council of People's Commissars of local Bolshevik cells as a legal political force that was to speak on behalf of the Ukrainian proletariat against the Central Rada[2]. |
| S0010 | Regular Army |
In the spring of 1829, Commander-in-Chief Paskevich built the governance of Chechnya through the deliberate maintenance of a split of the people into two rival parties — the Shamkhal party and the Beibulat party. In his instruction of May 16, 1829 to Emanuel, commander of the troops on the Caucasian Line, Paskevich wrote: "it is not without use for us to have two parties in Chechnya which, both remaining obedient to our government, will through internecine strife be restrained from hostile designs against the Russians"[1]. To this end he dispatched couriers (messengers with a special commission) to the elders of the Beibulat party, instructed Engelhardt, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, to "assist as far as possible" in summoning them, and by the regulation of August 2, 1829 placed the son of the Shamkhal of Tarki over the Chechens as commissar[1]. |
| G0009 | Russian Empire |
In the spring of 1829, Commander-in-Chief Paskevich built the governance of Chechnya through the deliberate maintenance of a split of the people into two rival parties — the Shamkhal party and the Beibulat party. In his instruction of May 16, 1829 to Emanuel, commander of the troops on the Caucasian Line, Paskevich wrote: "it is not without use for us to have two parties in Chechnya which, both remaining obedient to our government, will through internecine strife be restrained from hostile designs against the Russians"[1]. To this end he dispatched couriers (messengers with a special commission) to the elders of the Beibulat party, instructed Engelhardt, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, to "assist as far as possible" in summoning them, and by the regulation of August 2, 1829 placed the son of the Shamkhal of Tarki over the Chechens as commissar[1]. |
| G0013 | Soviet Russia (RSFSR) |
Use by the Council of People's Commissars of local Bolshevik cells as a legal political force that was to speak on behalf of the Ukrainian proletariat against the Central Rada[2]. |