"Neither plow nor sow": the pogrom of Chechnya, organized famine, the buying-up of elites and the institutions of subjugation (1852-1857)

The period 1852-1856 passed in series of punitive sorties across Greater Chechnya (the lowland eastern part of Chechnya) and its fringes. On 4 January 1852 the detachment of Baryatinsky, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), assembled in the Vozdvizhenskaya fortress: imperial historian Volkonsky, a participant in the march, counts "over ten thousand bayonets, about one and a half thousand cavalry, 24 guns," and conveys the task thus - "to smash the enemy hordes, destroy all means of subsistence of the inhabitants and the enemy, and then act according to circumstances"^[1]. Farther east the sorties continued until 1856: General Baklanov recorded in his memoirs a "hard fight at the annihilation of the auls Dengi-Yurt and Ali-Yurt" on 25 February 1853^[5]. The award mechanics of the marches was exposed from inside by imperial officer Poltoratsky: the soldiers of the Kabardinsky regiment took the trenches abandoned by the Chechens on the Michik without losses, and they "were sent the same day to take the auls Gurdaloy and Asa-Yurt, where they managed to lose several killed and wounded, which was necessary, since the storming of the trenches had cost them not a single scratch"^[6] - the auls were attacked for the sake of losses for an award recommendation.

In the pogrom of Chechnya of 1852 the victims among the inhabitants ran into the hundreds. On 18 January 1852 on the Goyta river operated the detachment of Baryatinsky, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi): imperial historian Volkonsky, a participant in the march, summed up the day - "on that day we... destroyed up to two thousand households"; the count in people he recorded thus: "Only ten prisoners were taken - and even those were barely torn by force from under the daggers of the Cossacks. Apart from the highlanders who fell in the battle proper, the number of victims who perished in the auls on the Goyta reaches two hundred people"^[1]. On the raid against the aul Gurdali of 11 August 1852 the sources diverge: historian N. I. Pokrovsky conveys Baryatinsky's report of 21 August 1852 - he "slaughtered its entire population, except for 52 people taken prisoner"^[3]; Volkonsky, who described the same day, asserts that the aul did not fall, the detachment withdrew with heavy losses, and regrets: "If we had really devastated and burned Gurdali, slaughtered its entire population... the affair would have come out both more substantial and more useful"^[1] - Baryatinsky's report and Volkonsky's account describe one and the same day in mutually exclusive ways. The annihilation of people was also a declared plan: Vorontsov, viceroy and commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, in a letter to the Emperor of 1-20 March 1854, formulated the task of the past winter - "the final subjugation and annihilation of the remaining unpacified in the environs on the plain"^[2] ("unpacified" in the imperial lexicon means those who had not submitted to the empire).

The auls of Greater Chechnya (the lowland eastern part of Chechnya) were burned out throughout the period. On 6 January 1852 Avtury was burned - imperial historian Volkonsky, a participant in the pogrom, wrote: "The aul Avtury had at that time up to nine hundred households and belonged to the number of the richest auls," and of the detachment's withdrawal: "all the auls and hamlets that lay on the path of our retreat blazed up like their metropole"^[1]. On 27 March 1852, at the storming of the aul of naib Talgik (a naib is a deputy of Imam Shamil), "the aul itself was turned into a heap of ashes and ruins"^[1]. In December 1852 the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus ordered Baryatinsky, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), to destroy Khan-Kala - Volkonsky conveys the order: "the commander-in-chief insistently ordered Prince Baryatinsky to take this aul and raze it from the face of the earth," and the execution: "The aul, numbering ninety-five houses, was given to the flames, and by the evening of that same day not one sound stone remained of it"^[1]. The result of 1853 was summed up by Vorontsov, viceroy and commander-in-chief in the Caucasus: in a letter to the Emperor of 1-20 March 1854 he reported that Baryatinsky "took possession of the Michik, cut a clearing of enormous width through the Qachqalyq ridge down to the plains of Greater Chechnya and annihilated the greater part of the villages that still remained unsubdued along the Michik and other streams in the direction of Umakhan-yurt"^[2]. In January 1854 the auls along the rivers Dzhalka and Khabi-Shovdan were devastated - the imperial chronicle of "outstanding events" counts the resettlement of "418 families of Chechens"^[7].

Famine was the planned aim of the policy of 1852-1857 - the empire wrote about it in orders and reports. On 29 July 1852, near the aul Belgatoy, the column, by the record of imperial historian Volkonsky, "finding there the same stores of hay as the day before, annihilated them to the last stalk"^[1]. Baryatinsky, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), in a letter to Vorontsov, viceroy in the Caucasus, of 16 August 1852, calculated the effect on the Dagestani cavalry of Imam Shamil, leader of the highlanders' resistance of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest: "in the coming winter expedition Shamil can have almost no Tavlin cavalry in Chechnya, because there will be nothing to feed it with"^[3]. The doctrine was sealed by Vorontsov in an official letter (otnosheniye) to Minister of War Chernyshev of 28 August 1852: the Chechens, deprived of crops and hay, "must - either resettle into our bounds, or go into the very depth of the mountains"^[2]. General Olshevsky summed up the practice in his notes: "The destruction of grain crops... compelled the Chechens to submit to us sooner than any other measures, resettling into our bounds"^[3]. The result was recorded by historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov: "in 1856-1857 a famine set in in Chechnya such as the Chechens had almost never known"^[4].

The famine strategy was supplemented by a trade blockade. Vorontsov, viceroy and commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, in a letter to Baryatinsky, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), of 21 March 1852, together with the threat "we will not allow them to sow or to mow," prescribed restricting the sale of salt to those who had not submitted to the empire; the letter is cited by historian N. I. Pokrovsky^[3]. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov convey, after the chronicle of the Dagestani author Genichutlinsky, a blockade of salt, iron and coarse cotton cloth^[4]. In the years of the Crimean War the empire did not loosen the blockade: the same historians write - "Up to 200 thousand soldiers and officers confidently blockade the areas of the highlanders' operations in the North Caucasus - even the heavy defeats in the Crimea did not make the Russian command loosen this blockade"^[4].

The empire felled the Qachqalyq forest, the shield of eastern Chechnya, in a month and a half. General Baklanov, the executor, recorded in his memoirs: "On 5 January 1852 I concentrated... three battalions of infantry... set about felling the forest; within a month I reached the Michuk... having cleared by 16 February 1852 the forest 100 sazhens from the bank, and 300 sazhens along the river" (a sazhen is slightly more than two meters)^[5]. The result was recorded by imperial historian Volkonsky: "the ancient, dense forest that had served the highlanders as their chief defense and protection fell forever, and the Qachqalyq ridge was laid bare"^[1]. The calculation was set out in writing by Vorontsov, viceroy and commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, in a letter to the Emperor of 1-20 March 1854, as he was handing over affairs before his leave. The felling he described as a system of many years: "This important business, well begun by Gen. Freytag and then strongly advanced by the annual expeditions for the felling of forests by Generals Nesterov, Kozlovsky and Prince Baryatinsky"^[2], and the result he reckoned thus: the Chechens, forced off the plain into the Black Mountains, would not be able to feed themselves there and "must in a short time come over to us, or declare submission where they are; then the weak population of the Ichkerians alone will not be able to hold out"^[2].

Burning and famine drove Chechen families from their land under the empire's power - and the empire kept count of those carried off. On 23 March 1852 the column of General Baklanov carried off the inhabitants of two auls: imperial historian Volkonsky counts - "There were two hundred fifty-eight souls of both sexes and all ages: fifty-one families from Mazlagash and sixteen families from Gurdali"^[1]; the mechanics of the choice he conveyed in the words of contemporaries about the naibs - deputies of Imam Shamil: "the naibs pluck them, we pluck them and will go on plucking... they resolved to choose the lesser of two evils, i.e. to resettle to us"^[1]. After the destruction of Khan-Kala in December 1852, Baryatinsky, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), counted in a report of 10 February 1853: of roughly 500 inhabitants, 350 were brought to the Groznaya fortress, "the total loss of the inhabitants must be put at around 100 people" - the fate of that hundred, by the report's own admission, "is not known with exactness"^[2]. In January 1854, after the devastation of the auls along the Dzhalka, "418 families of Chechens" were evicted^[7], and the order of General Muravyov, commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, of 19 July 1855 counts the result: "more than 1 thousand Chechen families have resettled into our submissive auls"^[7]. The plan for 1856 posed the choice bluntly: the Chechens were "to choose one of two things - to submit, or to move out farther into the interior of the Black Mountains"^[7].

The empire starved the inhabitants of the Khankala gorge out by an openly formulated plan. Imperial historian Volkonsky recorded the design of the summer of 1852: Baryatinsky, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), "resolved... to smoke the inhabitants out of the gorge, precisely - to smoke them out, because it was necessary to annihilate with fire everything that gave them subsistence"; the calculation Volkonsky recorded thus - "And to seek food from us means to humble oneself, submit, and willy-nilly resettle"^[1]. The same calculation stood behind the razing of Khan-Kala - the inhabitants were to be torn away from Imam Shamil, leader of the highlanders' resistance of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest: "the inhabitants, deprived of shelter and sustenance, instead of running over to Shamil, would seek refuge with us"^[1]. During the siege of Khan-Kala the detachment cut the aul off from water as well: "the enemy was deprived of the possibility of covered access to the river, and he was left without water"^[1].

The clearings took from the Chechens the land that fed them, and the empire entered this seizure on its books: the order of Vorontsov, viceroy in the Caucasus, for the Separate Caucasus Corps of 5 January 1853 counted the result of the Qachqalyq clearing: "The construction of this clearing took away from the unsubdued Chechens a significant quantity of land, which could feed up to 1,500 souls"^[2].

The empire demonstratively rewarded defectors from the leadership of the resistance with ranks, money and land. Bata Shamurzayev, a naib of Shamil (deputy of the Imam, leader of the highlanders' resistance of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest), went over to the empire in the autumn of 1851 and received rewards. Baryatinsky, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), in a letter to Vorontsov, viceroy in the Caucasus, of 24 February 1852, requested - "what a great reward Bata deserves, and I ask you to pardon him, then for Avtur to return him his rank and a pension of 400 rubles a year; I also ask you for an officer's rank for his son... who has often served us as a guide"^[3]. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov write: "Bata Shamurzayev took an active part in the war against the Imam, was promoted to captain and awarded 500 desiatinas of land... as an example for other potential defectors"^[4]. Through Bata, Vorontsov, viceroy in the Caucasus, conveyed ultimatums to the Chechens - in a letter to Baryatinsky of 21 March 1852: "I asked Bata to insistently repeat to the inhabitants of the northern part of Greater Chechnya that we will not allow them to sow or to mow, unless they declare submission"^[3]. Imperial historian Volkonsky admitted the system of bribery plainly: the empire acted "through their own co-religionists and persons like Bati Shamurzov," and "not with words alone, but with something more enticing and substantial - especially in the times of Vorontsov and Baryatinsky"^[1].

The bought-over naibs conducted reconnaissance for the empire and took part in planning the marches. Imperial historian Volkonsky writes of Bata Shamurzayev, a naib of Shamil (deputy of the Imam, leader of the highlanders' resistance of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest) who had gone over to the empire: Bata "had his agents everywhere, informing him of all Shamil's movements," and the winter expedition of 1852 "was undertaken and conducted by Prince Baryatinsky" on Bata's directions; "The chief of the detachment did not conceal that for the successful taking of the auls he owed much to Bata as well"^[1]. Baryatinsky, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), in a letter to Vorontsov, viceroy in the Caucasus, of 4 June 1852 confirmed: "Bata has passed on to me much of interest concerning Shamil's secret intrigues among the Ossetians"^[3]. In July 1856 Yusuf-Hadji Safarov, a former counselor of the Imamate, defected to the empire and offered his knowledge to Baryatinsky in writing: "I know much about Shamil and his troops... I hope to be useful to the Russian government and I guarantee to destroy everything I made at Shamil's, because the master of the house knows best what goes on in it"^[4].

Even when receiving defectors from the top of the Imamate, the empire insured itself with hostages. When at the beginning of February 1854 Umayev, naib of Lesser Chechnya (a deputy of Imam Shamil, leader of the highlanders' resistance of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest), was coming over to the imperial side, the pristav (an imperial superintendent) demanded a guarantee - Lieutenant Colonel Predemirov, in a report to General Vrevsky of 6 February 1854: "fearing treason on his part and not wishing thereby to suffer a loss in men because of him, I demanded that he first give an amanat. On 3 February the son of Endirey was delivered as an amanat to the pristav" (an amanat is a person whom the empire took from a community as a hostage)^[8]. The naib's child became the price of the father's right to surrender.

Over the captured part of Chechnya the empire built its own governing institutions. Historian N. I. Pokrovsky writes of the project of Baryatinsky, who commanded the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi): "the statute on the governance of the Chechens worked out by Baryatinsky, partially reviving justice by the adats: tsarism feared the sharia court... This 'Statute' was confirmed by Nicholas I and put into effect" (adats are the customary law of the highlanders; sharia is the Islamic law on which the court of the Imamate was built)^[3]. Historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov describe the implementation: "As early as 1852 in the Groznaya fortress the so-called 'Chechen People's Court' was instituted, headed by a Russian staff officer... as a counterweight to sharia, implanted in Chechnya by Imam Shamil, the Russian authorities strove to strengthen the influence of customary law - the adats"; the first chairman of the "Chechen" court was the Russian colonel Bartolomey, the interpreters - Bata Shamurzayev and Kasim Kurumov, and the execution of sentences was controlled by the "Administration of the Chechen People" with the right of coercion^[4]. The court also worked out a written code of subordination - the "Rules for the Governance of Submissive Chechens": articles "providing punishment for disobedience to the authorities, for harboring abreks, for contact with 'unpacified' compatriots, the conditions of 'coming out with submission' from the territory of the Imamate" ("unpacified" in the imperial lexicon means those who had not submitted to the empire; abrek is the imperial label for a highlander outside the law); in 1854 the "Rules" were supplemented^[4]. The result was recorded from inside by General Muravyov, commander-in-chief in the Caucasus - in February 1855 he wrote from the Groznaya fortress to General Yermolov, who had commanded in the Caucasus in the past: "Here five naibstvos have already been instituted, there is a pristav and a court established in imitation of your Kabardin court" (a naibstvo is an imperial administrative unit copied from the institution of the deputies of Imam Shamil, leader of the highlanders' resistance of Dagestan and Chechnya to the Russian conquest; a pristav is an imperial superintendent)^[7].

Cossack stanitsas continued to rise on the sites of Chechen auls: in 1856-1857 on the site of the village Churt-Togi the stanitsa Petropavlovskaya was planted - historians Ya. Z. Akhmadov and E. Kh. Khasmagomadov give the pair in their general series: "the village of Churt-Togi - the stanitsa Petropavlovskaya (1856)"^[4]. The method was confirmed in writing the same year by General Muravyov, commander-in-chief in the Caucasus: "to consolidate our dominion by stanitsas moved forward - is a method already tried with profit, and it should not be changed"^[4].

At the destruction of the aul Khan-Kala, also known as Syurin-Kort, the troops of the march of Baryatinsky, who commanded on the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the chain of imperial fortifications on the land of the Nokhchi), entered the inhabitants and their cattle as their booty. Imperial historian Volkonsky drew up the account: "three hundred fifty Syurin-Kort people and more than three thousand head of horned cattle became our asset, our, so to speak, property"^[1].