Russian Empire

The Russian Empire led the Nokhchi who survived the destruction of an aul away as captives into its own territory. General Yermolov himself writes in his "Notes" that women and children "were taken prisoner numbering up to one hundred and forty"^[19], and the imperial historian Potto confirms this^[10]. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that during the crossing of the captives over the Terek, 46 captured girls, "not wishing to endure abuse in captivity," perished, "dragging their guards with them into the turbulent river"^[7].

Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that by May 18, 1826, «women and children had been taken captive» from the Nokhchi^[7]. General Yermolov himself, in a report to Emperor Nicholas I dated May 28, 1826, specified the number: in the surprise attack on the village of Stavna-kul on May 2, «16 souls of both sexes were taken captive», and in the attack on Malaya Ataga on May 16 he «captured 15 souls of both sexes»^[18]. The imperial historian Volkonsky confirms the seizure at Stavnokol: the sudden movement «brought us sixteen captives»^[26].

During the destruction of Uzeni-Yurt on January 10, 1827, Cossacks of the detachment of General Laptev, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, took captive three women from among the fleeing inhabitants. The imperial historian Potto recorded: the Cossacks "seized... three women"^[11]. In the summer of 1827, having encircled the population of the aul of Samashki in an ambush during the harvest, the Cossacks of General Engelhardt, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, took captive the families of resistance leaders: the leader Tara-Adzuev and the family of Bakar-Bulatov; Bulatov himself managed to break through the cordon. Potto wrote: "Tara-Adzuev and Bulatov's family they carried off with them"^[11].

At dawn on December 19, 1830, during the seizure of the village of Dzulgai-Yurt, Cossacks of General Velyaminov's detachment captured the family of a resistance leader — the Karabulak chieftain Astemir, who himself managed to escape into the forest. The imperial historian Potto wrote: "his family — a young son, a daughter, a grandson, and a cousin — fell into the hands of the Cossacks. Besides them, thirty-nine people were taken prisoner"^[11].

On December 23, 1831, during the devastation of the hamlets near the village of Chertugai, Cossacks of the detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Zass, commander of the Mozdok Cossack Regiment, took three women captive. The imperial historian Volkonsky wrote: Zass "delivered three captive women to the camp"^[26].

On September 9, 1832, during the seizure of the village of Tsentoroy in Ichkeria, the column of General Volkhovsky from the detachment of corps commander Baron Rosen took captive a woman from among the residents who had not managed to flee. The imperial historian Volkonsky wrote: "one woman was taken prisoner"^[26]. On September 15, near the village of Dungen-yurt, the cavalry of Major Boreysha took captive residents caught while attempting to leave their homes. Rosen reported to Minister of War Chernyshev: the cavalry "managed to take prisoner 4 persons and 1 woman"^[14].

On August 23, 1836, during the sudden seizure of the aul of Zandak, the detachment of Colonel Pullo, chief of the Sunzha fortified line, took captive residents who had not managed to escape through the ravines and the forest. Corps commander Baron Rosen reported to the Minister of War: the infantry drove out the defenders, "having taken prisoner 31 souls of male and female sex"^[14].

Liquidation of Cossack administrative units and imposition of the imperial division: "By the Manifesto of 1765, Catherine II abolished the Cossack order... and created the Sloboda Ukraine Governorate"^[2].

The final liquidation of the Hetmanate's autonomy, including the abolition of the Cossack regimental system and the partition of the Left Bank into three ordinary imperial viceroyalties (Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Novhorod-Siverskyi)^[3].

Erasure of the historical boundaries of the seized territories and their unification through the imposition of an imperial system of control over the Left Bank by establishing the Little Russian Governorate-General^[15].

The occupation administration of the Russian Empire stripped the Indigenous population of the status of a legitimate adversary by applying an inversion of meanings: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that lawful defense was labeled with criminal terms, and «The anti-colonial and anti-feudal uprisings of the population of Chechnya, referred to in official documents as 'mischief', 'robberies', and 'murders', were perceived by the Russian autocracy as a challenge and an insult»^[5], which served as a formal pretext for punitive actions.

The Russian Empire shifted the blame for the devastation it had wrought onto the victimized people itself. In a proclamation to the inhabitants of the Chechen land, the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Tormasov, presented the pogrom of 1807 as a consequence of the inhabitants' own actions: «the raids and depredations that you carried out within the borders of Russia brought upon you righteous wrath… you yourselves were the cause of the misfortune that befell you three years ago» — and threatened a new invasion, «to bring sword and flame upon the guilty», offering «mercy» in exchange for submission^[12].

Seizure and incorporation into the empire of Right-Bank Ukraine, Volhynia, and Podolia as a result of the partitions of the neighboring state^[33].

Severing of Bessarabia from the Ottoman Empire and its official annexation by the Russian Empire under the Treaty of Bucharest of 1812^[43].

The Russian Empire condemned the Nokhchi inhabitants to famine by ravaging their villages, crops, and stores. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that after Yermolov's campaign, deprived of shelter and food, «people were dying of hunger, cold, and disease»^[7].

On January 10, 1827, during the razing of the village of Uzeni-Yurt, the troops of General Laptev, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, destroyed the inhabitants' livestock — the basis of a peasant household's sustenance. The imperial historian Potto recorded: the village, "with all its property and even its livestock, was destroyed to the ground"^[11]. In the summer of 1827, the Cossacks of General Engelhardt, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, after seizing the population of Samashki, destroyed the standing crops of the Galgai who lived near the aul at mills and farmsteads. Potto wrote: "beforehand they ordered that they be shown the fields belonging to those Galgai who lived at the mills, and burned their grain where it stood"^[11]. The destruction of livestock in winter and of ripened grain at harvest time deprived people of sustenance for a year ahead.

In December 1830 – January 1831, General Velyaminov's troops deliberately destroyed the winter stores of food and fodder of the villages being devastated. The imperial historian Potto wrote: during the burning of Edin-Yurt and Daut-Yurt, the troops "destroyed enormous stores of harvested hay"^[11]; on January 17, 1831, Geldigen was put to the torch "with all its stores"^[11]. The destruction of hay and grain stores in the depths of winter condemned the inhabitants, who had fled to the mountains and forests, to famine.

In August–September 1832, the troops of corps commander Baron Rosen destroyed the crops and plowed fields of the villages being ravaged — the people’s food base on the eve of winter. Rosen acknowledged this in a report to Minister of War Chernyshev: the unsubmitted villages were "punished by the destruction of dwellings and plowed fields"^[14]. The imperial historian Volkonsky wrote: on September 1, the residents of Avtury, for refusing to hand over prisoners, were "punished by the destruction of crops and dwellings"; on September 3, near Geldigen, the detachment "exterminated their plowed fields and houses"^[26].

Assimilation at the highest level: a decree that included "a ban on... baptism with Ukrainian names"^[1].

Luring the kish otaman Osyp Hladky over to the side of the Russian Empire in 1828, during the Russo-Turkish war^[44].

The occupation administration of the Russian Empire bought the loyalty of the local nobility with state payments: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that, according to General-in-Chief V. Ya. Levashov, the senior Chechen prince Aidemir «was accepted into Russian subjecthood and was assigned a permanent tsarist stipend»^[5], and in general «The princes and their uzdens even began to receive monetary allowances from the Russian government»^[5].

The occupation administration of the Russian Empire bought the loyalty of members of the local nobility with state payments: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov records «the granting of Russian stipends to 4 Chechen princes and their uzdens»^[5].

The Russian Empire, through the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Gudovich, addressed the elders of the Nokhchi with a proclamation offering economic benefits in exchange for accepting subjecthood and ceasing armed resistance. For submission, the elders were promised access to salt: they would be "permitted to take salt from the local salt lakes by tickets, irrevocably, paying a very small fixed price," as well as the right "to drive livestock to this side of the Terek and freely use the vacant pasture lands." The proclamation was conveyed to Chechen society and its elders (Kusu Al-Temir, Masarai, Idut), but subjecthood was not accepted; at the beginning of the following year the empire proceeded to armed invasion.^[9]. The same offer is independently recorded by the imperial historian Dubrovin: the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Gudovich, "promised… to release salt in unlimited quantity, for the most trifling payment; to permit the driving of livestock for pasture in wintertime to the left bank of the Terek River… and, finally, to make them equal to Russian subjects"^[21].

The Russian Empire bought the loyalty of Nokhchi elders in order to use them to bring recalcitrant villages into subjecthood. The commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Gudovich, instructed the Andreyevo elder Hadji-Redjeb to incline the villages "into submission and subjecthood," and assigned a salary to the Chechen uzden Bik-Bulat — "I persuaded the Chechen uzden Bik-Bulat… to whom I said… a salary of 300 r. in silver per year"; for winning over the remaining villages, "about 3,000 r. in silver for bringing them into loyal subjecthood" was allocated^[9]. The same bribery, from the Nokhchi side, is recorded by the historian D. A. Khozhaev: through the intermediary Hadji-Redjeb, in the name of the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Gudovich, the very head of the Chechen resistance, Beibulat Taimiev, was won over and took "an oath of fidelity of subjecthood to Russia," while Hadji-Redjeb asked the generals for another 3000 rubles in silver "for bringing the remaining unpacified Chechen villages into loyal subjecthood"^[7].

The Russian Empire bought the loyalty of the Nokhchi elders in order to use them to incline the Chechens toward submission. To this end, the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Tormasov, through Esaul Chernov, ordered that the Chechen elders and clergy be given «250 rubles each, and others 150 silver rubles each, as a one-time payment, for which the required sum, 1,400 r. in total»^[12]. Historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov notes that the colonial authorities generally acted by relying on the social elite, «bribing them with all manner of rewards and privileges for their service to the benefit of Russia»^[6]. Historian D. A. Khozhaev cites the same formula with a direct indication of where the money came from: the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Tormasov, agreed «to win over the principal Chechen elders and their clergy… to give 250, and others 150 silver rubles each, and to collect the said money from their own villages» — that is, the bribery of the elite was paid for by exactions from the Chechen villages themselves^[7].

Mass confiscation of national educational and religious literature: the "Decree of the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church on the confiscation of Ukrainian primers and church books from the population"^[1].

Closure of the national press: "The publication of the Ukrainian literary and scholarly-political journal ‘Osnova’ ceased"^[1].

The censorship's refusal to consider national manuscripts: "The censor returned the manuscript of a grammar of the Ukrainian language without reading it"^[1].

Restriction on the translation of literature: "The Russian government orders censors to watch strictly that no Ukrainian literary translations from the Russian language are permitted"^[1]. Restriction of access to literature: "A ban on the import of Ukrainian books from abroad"^[1].

Purging of the information space: «Nicholas II's decree abolishing the Ukrainian press»^[1].

Signing of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca. Diplomatic severing of Crimea from the Ottoman Empire through recognition of its formal "independence" in preparation for the subsequent annexation^[22].

Diplomatic collusion with Prussia and Austria, leading to the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the liquidation of Polish statehood^[33].

The diplomatic apparatus of the Russian Empire enlisted loyal forces of neighboring peoples for joint armed actions against the Nokhchi societies: historian Sh. B. Akhmadov states that the 1722 military expedition included "an armed detachment of Kalmyks, sent by Ayuka Khan at the tsar's request, numbering 3,730 men"^[6].

The government of the Russian Empire dispatched specialists to collect data on the lands and population of the Nokhchi: historian Sh. B. Akhmadov points out that in 1728 the officer I. G. Gerber "on the government's assignment... compiled a description of the localities and population... as well as a map of this area"^[6].

In 1836, corps commander Baron Rosen sent covert topographers through Chechnya for the clandestine surveying of the unsubdued land. In a report to the emperor, Rosen acknowledges: "in 1836, to survey the direct route leading from Kakheti to Chechnya, a topographer was sent who, having crossed the snow ridge, came out onto the Caucasian Line at the fortress of Groznaya, and from there, through Chechnya and the lands of the Kistins and the Didois, returned to Kakheti"; at the same time "I sent from Vladikavkaz Ensign Prince Utsmiev of the Life Guards Grenadier Regiment with a topographer, through Chechnya, to Andia"^[14]. Rosen named the method outright: "covert surveys of the lands of the mountaineers hostile to us"^[14].

The Regular Army of the Russian Empire founded a new military base for infrastructural entrenchment in the region: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that in the autumn of 1722 Peter I "founded the fortress of the Holy Cross on the Sulak"^[5].

The Government of the Russian Empire built up a military line through the engineering construction of fortified militarized outposts to isolate the Indigenous population: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that in 1736 «three new Cossack stanitsas: Borozdinskaya, Kargalinskaya, Dubovskaya»^[5] were established, which, as historian I. Kh. Tkhamokova records, served as fortifications, since each such stanitsa «was in effect a small fortress serving for protection against enemy raids»^[13].

The Regular Army of the Russian Empire built a fortress on the occupied territory as a stronghold, in order to keep the approaches to the Chechen lands under fire and cut the inhabitants off from their lands. Historian D. A. Khozhaev records that the fortress was built «on Chechen land»^[7]. The imperial general Yermolov attests in his «Notes» that the fortress, «constraining the inhabitants in their possession of the best lands… not far from the entrance through the Khan-Kale gorge, was named Groznaya», and that the earthworks were completed by mid-October 1818^[19]. The imperial historian Potto confirms the founding on June 10, 1818: «to the thunder of cannon, a strong fortress of six bastions was laid, which Yermolov named Groznaya»^[10]. As early as his most humble report of November 1817, Yermolov directly named the purpose of the Sunzha fortresses: «We must occupy the Sunzha River and build fortresses along its course: then the Chechens will be confined in their mountains, deprived of land suitable for cultivation and of the pasture grounds where throughout the winter they shelter their herds from the harsh mountain climate»^[18].

The Russian Empire built a ring of fortresses around Chechnya in order to squeeze it and cut it off from its neighbors. Historian D. A. Khozhayev writes that following Groznaya, the fortress Vnezapnaya appeared in 1819, erected in order to "squeeze unsubdued Chechnya with new fortresses and fortifications"^[7]. Imperial historian Potto confirms its purpose and date: founded on the eighteenth of July 1819, it "separated the Chechens from the Kumyks" and "barred [the Chechens’] way across the Salatau mountains," and it was linked to Groznaya by a chain of fortifications^[10]. General Yermolov had planned this fortress as early as his most humble report of November 1817, proposing that "by extending the Line through the Aksai and Andreyevo villages to the Sulak River, Kizlyar will be covered"^[18].

The Russian Empire placed a chain of fortifications on the land taken from the Nokhchi to consolidate the seizure and hold the population in submission. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that Yermolov, moving the Caucasian Line to the Sunzha, was "squeezing unsubdued Chechnya with new fortresses and fortifications," and that "on the occupied territory fortifications were built… Neotstupny Stan, Zlobny Okop, Vnezapnaya (1819), and others"^[7]. The imperial historian Potto confirms that in the summer of 1820, having barely finished the Germenchuk clearing, Grekov "set about felling the forest along the Sunzha and building on the cleared glades two new fortifications: the Ust-Martan redoubt and Zlobny Okop," and on the site of the demolished Kachkalyk village of Isti-Su he placed "Neotstupny Stan"^[10].

Economic strangulation and squeezing out of landless Ukrainian peasants, which forced them to resettle to the outskirts of the empire^[34].

Systematic imposition of the logic of the metropole's superiority: the publicist Mikhail Katkov formulates the ideologeme that subjugated peoples "will have to submit to the state nation," that is, the Russian people^[22].

The propaganda apparatus of the Russian Empire used poetry to broadcast the logic of domination into society: the imperial historian and participant in the events V. A. Potto records that the poet A. S. Pushkin proclaimed in verse the inevitability of subjugation: «Submit, Caucasus - Yermolov is coming!»^[10], while the poet V. A. Zhukovsky extolled the destruction of infrastructure by military commanders: «Scarcely at the villages - the villages blaze»^[30].

A secret instruction from the monarch on the complete cultural digestion of the local population: "so that they become Russified and stop looking to the forest like wolves"^[3].

A ban on attending cultural events: «The trustee of the Kyiv educational district issued an instruction forbidding pupils and students from attending Ukrainian theater performances»^[1].

The government of the Russian Empire deliberately constructed an image of the Indigenous population as criminal savages: historian Michael Khodarkovsky records that in administration documents the highlanders were labeled as "inconstant and treacherous," while their actions were explained by references to their "predatory craft, to which they are predisposed by their very nature and upbringing"^[45].

The apparatus of the Russian Empire constructed an image of the Indigenous population as savages: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov points out that pre-revolutionary historiography described the highlanders' struggle as «the actions of barbarians devoid of 'civilized' notions of independence and freedom»^[6], while the imperial historian and participant in the events V. A. Potto cites the words of General A. P. Yermolov, who declared that «the cruelty of the local mores cannot be tamed by mercy»^[10]. In his «Notes», General Yermolov characterized the Nokhchi as a born breed of brigands: «the Chechens, the most vicious of the brigands, attacking the line», their land a refuge where «the villains of all other peoples, abandoning their own land on account of some crimes, were received amicably», while Chechnya itself «may justly be called the nest of all brigands», «were less filled than others with brigands who had previously taken part in all the raids of the Chechens on the line. In them predators gathered and took cover…»^[19].

Official refusal to recognize the language and identity: "There was no Ukrainian language, there is none, and there cannot be one, and whoever does not understand this is an enemy of Russia"^[1].

Ideological justification of the censor's refusal: "writing back to the author that there was no need to permit for printing a grammar of a language doomed to nonexistence"^[1].

Official recording of Ukrainians exclusively as "Little Russians" (a subgroup of the Great Russian tribe) during the first general census, aimed at the bureaucratic destruction of the notion of a separate people^[4].

Mass expulsion of millions of Ukrainian peasants from their native lands to Siberia and the Far East during the implementation of the Stolypin agrarian reform^[34].

Mass deportations of the Ukrainian population during the occupation: more than 12 thousand people were forcibly expelled from Galicia on charges of political unreliability^[42].

The occupation administration of the Russian Empire forcibly resettled the subjugated Indigenous population: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov records that "by 1724 the Terek town had been razed, and all of its population, including the Okotsk sloboda, populated by natives of Chechnya... was transferred to the new fortress"^[5].

The Regular Army of the Russian Empire drove the population of the destroyed villages off their lands, which passed into the conqueror’s possession. Historian D. A. Khozhayev records that the inhabitants of the eight villages near Groznaya were "driven off the lands"^[7]. Imperial general Yermolov wrote to Emperor Alexander I that if the population refused to submit, they would be offered "to withdraw and join the other brigands," and then "all the lands will remain at our disposal"^[7].

Rejection of the treaty format: "The Decisive Points were issued in the form of a decree of the tsarist government to the hetman... indicated the transformation of the Hetmanate into an ordinary province of the Russian Empire"^[39].

The final destruction of the office of the autonomy's leader. "On November 10, 1764, Catherine II abolished the hetman's rule"^[3].

Use of the population census as an instrument for depriving the Ukrainian nation of the right to independent historical and political existence^[1].

Issuance of Catherine II's August manifesto, officially banning the very name of the Zaporozhian Sich and erasing its memory^[22].

Confiscation of historical documents: "Thousands of archival materials weighing poods were taken to Moscow after the judicial reform... many documents of liquidated institutions ended up there"^[1].

Erasure of the memory of national heroes: «The ban on marking the 100th anniversary of Taras Shevchenko»^[1].

Distortion of historical memory through monumental art intended to replace the history of the independent Hetmanate with an imperial myth^[22].

Destruction of the foundation for teaching children in their native language: "A ban on the Ukrainian primer and Ukrainian books for children"^[1].

The Russian Empire cut down the forests of the Nokhchi to strip their villages of natural protection and open a path for the troops. The imperial historian Potto writes that the "dense forest" stretching from the Argun to the Dzhalka, which served as "an obstacle to the destruction of the Germenchug fields and pastures," was cut through in three days by a wide clearing "opening onto a large glade on which stood Germenchug and a multitude of auls"^[10].

The Russian Empire cleared the forests of the Nokhchi to deprive their villages of natural protection. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that under Yermolov, punitive raids proceeded «with the destruction of the population, houses, crops, orchards, and forests»^[7]. The imperial historian Potto confirms that on March 1, 1821, the forest was cut down «in one direction as far as Isti-Su, in the other — as far as the Michik», and in February 1822 «wide clearings were cut through the Gekhi, Goity, Shali, and Germenchug forests all the way to Mayurtup»^[10].

Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that by May 18, 1826, the Nokhchi's «splendid fruit orchards had been cut down, fields burned»^[7]. General Yermolov himself, in a report to Emperor Nicholas I dated May 28, 1826, admitted that at Urus-Martan «its splendid orchards were cut down», and for the village of Shali he gave the order «to cut down the orchards»^[18].

In January 1831, General Velyaminov's troops cut a clearing and cleared a road through the forest between the settlement of Aldy and the Groznaya fortress, depriving the inhabitants of forest cover for the sake of a military passage to the south. The imperial historian Potto wrote: Velyaminov "set about cutting a clearing and clearing a road between Aldy and Groznaya in order to prepare for himself a secure gateway to the south"^[11]. On January 21, 1831, Mairtup was exterminated "with its luxuriant gardens and plantations" — orchards of many years' standing, the foundation of the village's way of life, were destroyed^[11].

Transfer of the Left Bank's economy under the direct administration of St. Petersburg. "Taxes were to flow into the imperial treasury" under the control of Russian officials^[39].

The Russian Empire funneled the Nokhchi's supply of grain and salt through trading points under its control, making vitally important goods dependent on its administration. The sale of grain and salt to the Chechens was permitted only through barter yards under quarantine, established «for the peaceful Chechens in Naur… for the mountain Chechens in Lashchurin», with a duty paid to the treasury and disputes adjudicated through an imperial pristav (overseer)^[12][6].

By the regulation of August 2, 1829, Commander-in-Chief Paskevich locked the Chechens' access to trade onto a commissar appointed by the empire: travel to imperial territory was permitted only with tickets (written passes) — "To him is also granted the right to issue tickets to the said Chechens for travel into our domains on trade business"^[17]. In practice, the pass system was supplemented by arbitrariness: Chechen society wrote to Paskevich on November 21, 1829 that Engelhardt and Khasai-Musa "order their subordinates to place under arrest all those Chechens who come to them with tickets from Shahbaz," while those obedient to Khasai-Musa act so "that we may thereby be deprived of the means of sustenance"^[17].

Erasure of the historical names of the southern Cossack territories, which had been used as a staging ground for the annexation of Crimea, and their renaming by Catherine II into the colonial construct "Novorossiya"^[22].

Secularization and confiscation into the imperial treasury of the lands of Ukrainian Orthodox monasteries (1786), depriving the local church of its economic base^[46].

Solzha (Sunzhenskaya), one of the wealthiest villages, the Russian Empire kept as a source of supply for the fortress of Groznaya, and having seized the village by force, it spent several days carting away its stores. Historian D. A. Khozhayev records the ravaging of Solzha (Sunzhenskaya), as a consequence of which "most of the peaceful neighboring auls fled into the mountains, and the flourishing banks were left deserted for a long time thereafter"^[7]. Imperial general Yermolov testifies in his "Notes" that he had earlier ordered the troops to spare the village so that the fortress "could obtain from it all necessary supplies," and when the troops seized the village, "grain, forage, and timber fit for building were carted away for several days"^[19].

When laying waste to a Nokhchi aul, the Russian Empire handed its property over to the soldiers as spoils. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that the punitive raids under Yermolov proceeded "with the destruction of the population, houses, crops, orchards, and forests, the driving off of livestock, and the plundering of property," while Russian commanders invaded peaceful lands "to distinguish themselves or to seize booty"^[7]. General Yermolov himself admits this in his "Notes": after the destruction of Dadi-Yurt, "the soldiers came away with rather rich spoils"^[19].

The Russian Empire drove off livestock and plundered the ravaged villages of the Nokhchi. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that by May 18, 1826, «livestock had been driven off», and after the troops returned, Yermolov «sent a detachment of 500 Cossacks against Daut-Martan», and «the village was ravaged and plundered»^[7].

In the autumn of 1830, General Velyaminov introduced collective property levies on Chechen villages that bore no responsibility for the actions of others: for the driving off by Chechens of ten head of cattle from the stanitsa of Chervlennaya, he "immediately ordered that ten head of cattle likewise be taken from the inhabitants of the two villages of Braguny and Novy-Yurt, past which the party had traveled, and returned to the Cossacks"; for the driving off of a herd of horses in the Nogai steppe, "Braguny once again paid with exactly the same number of head"; and Shakh-Girei, the owner of Novy-Yurt, was confined to a casemate — a prison cell of the Groznaya fortress — for the inaction of the village watch. This was recorded by the imperial historian Potto^[11]. In December 1830, during the encirclement of the village of Daut-Martan, "the inhabitants managed to flee, but all their property became the booty of the detachment"^[11].

On December 23, 1831, the detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Zass, commander of the Mozdok Cossack Regiment, dispatched by General Velyaminov, drove off the livestock of the inhabitants of the devastated hamlets near the village of Chertugai. The imperial historian Volkonsky wrote: Zass "delivered to the camp... up to 250 head of cattle"^[26]. Driving off 250 head of livestock in the middle of winter deprived the inhabitants of the devastated hamlets of their basic means of subsistence.

In August–September 1832, the troops of corps commander Baron Rosen appropriated the property and livestock of the residents and exacted monetary fines. The imperial historian Volkonsky wrote: the property of 50 families who had taken refuge in the forest near Mairtup "fell as booty to the detachment"; near Tsentoroy "6 horses and 50 head of cattle were seized"^[26]. Rosen reported to Minister of War Chernyshev: on September 15, near the village of Dungen-yurt, the cavalry "seized 140 sheep and 9 head of cattle," and in total over the campaign "tribute and fines in money and livestock have been paid... about 5 th. r. s. [five thousand rubles in silver]"^[14].

On August 23, 1836, during the destruction of the aul of Zandak, the detachment of Colonel Pullo, commander of the Sunzha fortified line, appropriated the property and livestock of the inhabitants. Corps commander Baron Rosen reported to the Minister of War: "our troops received as booty the property of the inhabitants and 384 head of cattle"^[14].

Introduction of bonus payments to officials for the policy of denationalization: "By law, officials of all departments were granted a substantial bonus for Russification"^[1].

Forced incorporation of the autochthonous armed forces into the imperial army: "the transformation of the regiments into regular hussar ones"^[2].

Use of Ukrainian Cossack regiments for the grueling war against the Ottoman Empire: mobilization of the indigenous people's resources for imperial expansion^[32].

Use of Ukrainian peasants and Black Sea Cossacks as a military resource for storming Turkish fortresses (Ochakiv, Khotyn, Izmail) and consolidating imperial claims to Crimea^[28].

Use of Ukrainian resources and Cossack regiments in yet another Russo-Turkish war for imperial geopolitical expansion^[31].

Mass conscription into the militia and formation of Cossack regiments for the war against France (the formation of 22 regiments and 75,000 militiamen) on the basis of the authorities' false promises to restore Cossack liberties^[41].

Mass conscription of peasants as recruits and militia for participation in the Crimean War, which was arduous for the empire^[38].

Use of Ukrainians within the imperial army as cannon fodder for waging large-scale wars of conquest and subjugating peoples in the Caucasus and Central Asia^[22].

Use of the inhabitants of the colonized Ukrainian governorates as cannon fodder in yet another bloody war in the Balkans^[22][47].

Forced conscription of millions of Ukrainians into the Russian imperial army to take part in World War I for the alien geopolitical interests of empires^[42].

The Regular Army of the Russian Empire compelled the Indigenous population to perform military service on the conqueror’s side, including against their own kin. Imperial general Yermolov testifies in his "Notes" that "instead of tribute it was ordained that men be sent out for service at the requisition of the commanders," and admits: "there has not yet been an instance of anyone being able to force the Chechens to use arms against their own countrymen, but the first step toward this has already been taken, and it has been impressed upon them that this will always be demanded of them"^[19].

On the night of January 10, 1827, General Laptev, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, forced four hundred Chechens of subjugated communities to take part in a raid on the Nokhchi village of Uzeni-Yurt with a combat mission against their compatriots. The imperial historian Potto wrote: they "swam across the Argun and were to go by a roundabout road in order to cut off the inhabitants' retreat to the forest"^[11]. In the summer of 1827, General Engelhardt, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, compelled to take part in the ambush on the inhabitants of Samashki, alongside a hundred Mozdok Cossacks, as Potto recorded, "as many peaceable Chechens"^[11]. The subjugation of these communities was maintained by a system of hostages, as documented by Laptev's same practice with regard to Geldigen.

The diplomatic apparatus of the Russian Empire expanded the legal subjugation of the Nokhchi territories under threat of military annihilation: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that having suffered defeat in 1722, the local princes took an oath of allegiance, "'including in it for the first time also their Chechens'"^[5].

The occupation administration of the Russian Empire imposed on the Indigenous population the legal codification of subordinate status, exploiting their economic need and presenting the oath as a rigid ultimatum: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that in 1747, in response to the highlanders' requests for resettlement, «official consent of the imperial court was given («to admit and assign») on the condition that the highlanders take an oath of Russian subjecthood»^[5], while to those absent «officers were sent «to administer the oath»»^[5]; similarly in 1748, when the mountain communities petitioned for subjecthood so that «traveling with merchandise to the town of Kizlyar... under protection would be free»^[5], the administration «agreed to this proposal on the condition of the mandatory resettlement of the «Chebutlins» from the mountains to the lower reaches of the Sunzha»^[5].

The Russian Empire compelled the Nokhchi communities by force of arms to swear an oath of subjecthood. After the devastation of the villages, the commander of the Caucasus Line, General Bulgakov, presented the Chechen people with a resolution by which the elders declared: "we submit ourselves with the whole Chechen people… into eternal loyal subjecthood… in witness whereof we give an oath according to our custom on the Holy Quran," and for any violation the people subjected itself "to the strictest punishment and to the devastation of our dwellings without resistance"; the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Gudovich, reported that the Chechens had been "completely subdued by force of arms and brought to an oath of eternal fidelity of subjecthood"^[9].

The Regular Army of the Russian Empire, having moved troops onto the Sunzha and occupied Chechen land, demanded that the elders of Chechen villages renew their oath of submission under threat of reprisal as against "open enemies." Imperial general Yermolov testifies in his "Notes" that in May 1818 "the elders of almost all the principal Chechen villages were summoned to me," to the military camp, and he demanded "that henceforth such [depredations] no longer be committed, and in confirmation they must renew their old oath of submission and return the captives held by them"^[19]. The demand went unfulfilled: the elders "promised nothing"^[19].

On March 6, 1829, in Tarki, Beibulat Taimiev and 120 elders of Chechnya were forced to take an oath of allegiance through the Shamkhal of Tarki. The historian D. A. Khozhaev recorded the coerced nature of this step: the elders "tried to avoid subordination to the tsarist superintendents, to avert from Chechnya the threat of constant raids"^[7]. The Chechens themselves, in a petition to Paskevich in April 1829, documented the backdrop against which the submission was being signed: the imperial command "arrested, took captive, hanged and exiled to Siberia and to other places many of those who, being obedient, served the great Sovereign"^[17]. Emanuel, commander of the troops on the Caucasian Line, in a report to Paskevich of May 15, 1829, made the recognition of submission conditional: it "will be recognized as well-intentioned only when they unconditionally take the oath and hand over amanats"^[17]. Holding Beibulat in Tiflis, Paskevich sealed the subjecthood with the "Regulation on the Submission of the Chechens to Russia" and the statute of August 2, 1829^[7][17].

The occupation administration of the Russian Empire institutionalized a system of holding relatives of the local elite: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov records that «In 1735, two amanats from the Chechen domain were already being held in Kizlyar: from Aidemir - Bardykhan, and from the Chechen lord Alisultan Kazbulatov - Bamat»^[5].

The occupation administration of the Russian Empire continued to physically hold relatives of the Nokhchi elite: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov records the existence of a document from 1738 identified as a «Letter from the Chechen lord A. Bartykhanov to Lieutenant Colonel Bunin regarding his loyal service to Russia and requesting the release of his sister from Kizlyar»^[5].

The occupation administration of the Russian Empire expanded the system of holding relatives of the nobility: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that, to control the territories, «amanats are handed over as a pledge of fidelity to the oath to the Russian authorities»^[5].

The Russian Empire held hostages from among the Nokhchi inhabitants as a guarantee of submission. Under the resolution presented by the commander of the Caucasus Line, General Bulgakov, the Chechen elders undertook: "we give the foremost among us as amanats, at the choice of the Russian commander in this region"; the villages of Bolshaya Ataga, Malaya Ataga, and Gekhi "gave 3 amanats from the best families," whom the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Gudovich, ordered "to send to Kizlyar… to keep watch over them and to issue for their maintenance 10 r. per month each"^[9].

The Russian Empire used the devastation of villages to force the Nokhchi to hand over hostages. The imperial historian Potto writes that after Colonel Eristov had laid waste to the villages along the Sunzha, the Nokhchi «gave amanats (hostages), promising to trouble the Russian borders no more»^[30].

The Regular Army of the Russian Empire held representatives of the villages along the Sunzha as a pledge of submission. Imperial general Yermolov testifies in his "Notes" that when the troops advanced to the Sunzha, "amanats (hostages) from their villages were taken into the camp"^[19]. Imperial historian Potto confirms that Yermolov "took amanats from all the auls sitting along the Sunzha"^[10].

The Russian Empire held hostages from among the Nokhchi and used them to compel submission. Historian D. A. Khozhaev cites Yermolov's «Address» to the Chechens containing a direct threat: at the slightest disobedience, «the amanats are hanged, villages are exterminated by fire, wives and children are slaughtered»^[7]. The imperial historian Potto confirms that Grekov, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line, compelled submission precisely through hostages: any attack on a detachment «will inevitably entail the death penalty or exile to Siberia for the amanats», and therefore «the Chechens willy-nilly reconciled themselves to the fact that the forests — their age-old protection — were falling and disappearing»^[10].

In the winter of 1826–1827, General Laptev, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, extorted amanats (hostages) from the village of Geldigen, using a captured young man of Geldigen as leverage. The young man agreed to a staged "captivity" in order to avert the strike being prepared against the village: the occupation left the village no other way to buy safety than by handing over hostages. The imperial historian Potto admits: Laptev, having got the man into his hands, "rejected all offers and demanded one thing only — amanats. Willy-nilly this condition had to be accepted, and the people of Geldigen, who had always stood at the head of bloody movements, left in our hands the hostages of their tranquility"^[11].

From spring until the end of summer 1829, Commander-in-Chief Paskevich forcibly kept with the field army the Chechen elders who had been summoned for negotiations, directly calling them hostages. In his instruction to Emanuel of May 16, 1829, he wrote: "The mere absence of these people, who will be with us in the manner of amanats, will restrain the unpacified Chechens from any hostile attempts"^[17]. He summed up the result on August 2, 1829: "The Chechen elders, having been graciously received by me, remained with the detachment and were with me in military operations against the Turks. Having kept them in this way for a whole summer, I secured tranquility for the Line on their part"^[17]. By the same document, hostage-taking was entrenched as a system of governing Chechnya: "As a pledge of the submission of the said Chechens, the amanats presented by each eldership are to be kept in the fortress of Grozny; and if from any one an amanat has not yet been delivered, then the elder, until the amanat is delivered, is obliged... to remain himself as a pledge in the fortress of Grozny"^[17].

In August–September 1832, corps commander Baron Rosen coerced the villages of Chechnya and Ichkeria into handing over amanats (hostages) under direct threat of extermination. Rosen reported to Minister of War Chernyshev regarding the village of Miskit: "when it was announced to them that in the event of the slightest resistance the entire village, the grain and the hay would be exterminated, they immediately presented amanats"^[14]. Rosen summed up the result in the same report: subjugation through hostage-taking covered "more than 80 Chechen and Ichkerian villages"^[14].

Militarized Settlers of the Russian Empire were used for the mass settlement of new frontiers: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov points out that at the new fortress "1 thousand families of Cossacks from the Don are being settled"^[5].

The Government of the Russian Empire physically enlarged the buffer zone around the territories of the Nokhchi through the mass relocation of militarized settlers: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that «1736 - from the Greben stanitsas down the Terek to Kizlyar, three new Cossack stanitsas are established: Borozdinskaya, Kargalinskaya, Dubovskaya, and from Kizlyar to the sea another 430 Cossack families are settled»^[5].

The government of the Russian Empire justified expansion with ideas of enlightening undeveloped societies: historian Michael Khodarkovsky states the ambition of the metropole's officials "to bring both Christianity and civilization to the 'wild and uncivilized' peoples along its borders"^[23].

In 1830, during an ongoing earthquake, General Rozen 4th, who commanded the troops on the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the eastern section of the empire's fortified border along the Terek and Sunzha rivers), on the orders of commander-in-chief Paskevich sent proclamations out to the auls, instilling in the people an artificial picture of the world: the natural disaster was declared God's punishment for resisting the empire. The historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov wrote about how this lie sounded among the Nokhchi: "supporters of the Russian orientation claimed that the earthquake was caused by the wrath of Allah over the attempt at an armed uprising"^[25]. The imperial historian Volkonsky acknowledges the source of the suggestion: the commander-in-chief "ordered General Rozen 4th to spread entirely opposite rumors among the people, namely, that the earthquake had been sent down by God upon the Mountain Peoples for their ill-intentioned acts against the Russian government"^[26]. The imperial historian Potto recorded the act: Rozen "resorted to proclamations in which he sought to assure the people that the earthquake had been sent down upon them as punishment for their treason and their ill-intentioned acts against the Russian government"^[11].

Introduction of the collegium as a parallel organ of power to intercept judicial and fiscal functions from the hetman's administration^[28].

Blocking the election of a new leader and creating a hybrid administration for direct manual control. The body "consisted of 3 Russian and 3 Ukrainian officials... headed by the Russian prince Shakhovskoy"^[40].

Establishment of a direct imperial body (the Second Little Russian Collegium headed by P. Rumyantsev), which "was to finally liquidate the autonomy of Ukraine"^[46].

Abolition of traditional local self-government: "The abolition of Magdeburg rights in the cities"^[1].

Ideological justification of the aggressive Russo-Turkish War through religion and Pan-Slavism. Russia's historical mission to "protect the Slavs from the Turks" and to conquer Slavic lands "for their own good" is postulated^[22].

The occupation administration of the Russian Empire used religious pretexts for expansion: historian Michael Khodarkovsky cites a memorandum by Governor-General P. S. Potemkin, who in 1784 declared that under the pretext of returning the highlanders to the faith and sending priests to them, the empire would be able to shed "the light of divine bliss among all the peoples scattered in the mountains"^[45].

Mass transfer of peasants and Cossacks to the status of rightless military settlers (the Arakcheyevshchina). The brutal exploitation of their labor provoked the revolt of the Buh Cossacks in 1817^[27].

Use of the local population's cheap labor in mines and metallurgical plants under conditions of extreme exploitation^[24].

The Regular Army of the Russian Empire forced Chechen villages to make deliveries and perform labor for the construction of the fortress. Imperial general Yermolov testifies in his "Notes": "the villages from which we held amanats were ordered to deliver timber for the construction"; the nearest villages "dared not show disobedience"^[19].

The Russian Empire forcibly compelled the Nokhchi to work for the conqueror — to cut clearings through their own forests. The imperial historian Potto writes that Grekov, commander of the left flank, "gathered the elders of the surrounding villages and ordered them to send out workers with axes for the felling at once," and under threat of reprisal "compelled the Chechens to obey," after which the conscripted inhabitants cut a clearing through their own forest^[10].

The Russian Empire compelled the Nokhchi themselves to cut military clearings through their own forests. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that in imposing the line, the conquerors "compelled the subjugated Highlanders to heavy labor building roads and bridges," while those who evaded it were "fined mercilessly, with their livestock and property confiscated"^[7]. The imperial historian Potto confirms that the clearings from Amir-Adzhi-Yurt to Oisungur, Isti-Su, and Gerzel-Aul "through the narrow forested strip… were worked by the natives themselves, under the supervision of the Aksai princes"^[10].

The final legal enserfment of Ukrainian peasants (the decree of 1783), depriving them of the right to free movement and cementing their social marginalization^[3].

Introduction of harsh territorial discrimination. The decree restricted the zone of residence and economic activity of the Jewish population, drawing the Pale of Settlement predominantly through colonized Ukrainian territories^[20].

Official reduction of rights and designation of the Indigenous population as aliens in their own country: «Stolypin's decree classifying Ukrainians as inorodtsy ('aliens')»^[1].

Direct prohibition and closure of legal educational societies: "The closure of ‘Prosvita’ in Odesa and Mykolaiv"^[1].

A complete legislative ban on self-organization: Stolypin's decree «on the prohibition of any Ukrainian organizations»^[1].

Destruction of the first political organization of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, known as the Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius, following a denunciation by the student Aleksei Petrov to the secret police^[16].

Purge of civil communities: a ban on the activities of Ukrainian enlightenment hromadas on the Right Bank after the suppression of the uprising^[28].

Total purge of Ukrainian institutions in the occupied territories of Galicia: closure of newspapers, persecution of figures of the movement, arrest and exile of Mykhailo Hrushevsky^[28][42].

Use of the Black Hundreds to organize mass and bloody pogroms against Jews and reprisals against the opposition with the connivance or direct support of the police^[8].

During the storming of a Nokhchi aul, the Russian Empire exterminated its inhabitants without distinction of sex or age. Historian D. A. Khozhayev writes that "the brutalized punitive forces spared neither women nor children," and, breaking into the houses, "slaughtered everyone without mercy"^[7]. The organizer himself, general Yermolov, admits the toll in his "Notes": "all who bore arms were exterminated, and their number could not have been fewer than four hundred," while "a far greater number were slaughtered or perished in the houses from the effect of artillery and fire"^[19]. Imperial historian Potto confirms that the aul was taken only when "every one of its defenders had been exterminated to a man," and those slaughtered or killed in the fire numbered twice as many as the one hundred forty who survived^[10].

The imperial historian Potto describes how, on the night of March 6, 1820, the Greben Cossack regiment "burst without resistance into the aul [Topli], still sunk in deep sleep," the Cossacks "rushed through the saklias with daggers," and "part of the inhabitants were slaughtered before they could rise from their beds"^[10].

The Russian Empire exterminated unarmed people whom it had itself convened under the pretext of an inquiry. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that after General Grekov attempted «to inflict a physical insult» on the Chechen mullah Uchar-Hadji from the village of Mayrtup and was killed by him, «after Lisanevich's command „Stab them! the mass extermination by the soldiers of all the unarmed highlanders present in the fortification began»^[7]. The imperial historian Potto confirms that both generals «fell at the hand of a fanatic»^[10]."

At dawn on January 10, 1827, the Cossacks of the detachment of General Laptev, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line, having burst into the village of Uzeni-Yurt, cut down unarmed inhabitants fleeing across the Argun. The imperial historian Potto recorded: the Cossacks, «having barely managed to overtake the tail of the fleeing, seized only three women and killed and wounded some fifteen people»^[11]. The killed and wounded were unarmed people overtaken in flight. Armed resistance, as the same Potto wrote, was mounted later only by those inhabitants who had managed to take refuge in the forest.

At dawn on December 19, 1830, Cossacks of General Velyaminov's detachment, having burst into the sleeping village of Dzulgai-Yurt, cut down the inhabitants caught unawares. The imperial historian Potto recorded: "thirty-nine people were taken prisoner, and about twelve were cut down. The rest, having taken cover in the forest, opened an exchange of fire"^[11]. Those cut down were inhabitants overtaken during the sudden nighttime seizure of the village; armed resistance was mounted later only by those who managed to reach the forest.

Deployment of troops to forcibly suppress the liberation movement of Poles and Ukrainians during the November Uprising^[36].

The Regular Army of the Russian Empire deployed armed contingents to suppress resistance in the region: historian Sh. B. Akhmadov records that "on July 23, 1722, a tsarist detachment headed by General Veterani... approached the village of Enderi"^[6].

The Regular Army of the Russian Empire dispatched armed contingents to preemptively suppress an anti-colonial uprising: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov cites a report by General Douglas, who ordered that the assembled rebel force must, «not being allowed to multiply, be averted and destroyed by the dispatched detachment»^[5], after which, as historian Sh. B. Akhmadov states, «on July 4, 1732, the tsarist authorities dispatched a military detachment to Chechnya, headed by General Douglas, who commanded the troops at the Holy Cross fortress»^[6].

The Russian Empire sent troops into the lands of the Nokhchi in order to force its way deep into Greater Chechnya and break the resistance of its communities. The historian D. A. Khozhaev describes General Bulgakov's troops as having "come with fire and sword to the Chechen land," and the Khankala battle of 1807 as bloody^[7]. In February 1807, three detachments under the overall command of the commander of the Caucasus Line, General Bulgakov, crossed the Terek; on February 13, the troops broke through the Khankala Gorge by storm, which the inhabitants had fortified with barricades, ditches, and abatis. The commander of the Caucasus Line, General Bulgakov, reported that he had entered "for the exemplary punishment" of the Nokhchi communities, that the inhabitants, having gathered in number about 10,000, "resolved to perish rather than let the Russian troops pass through the gorge"; during the storming of the gorge, of the defending Chechens, according to his report, there were "about 1,000 killed on the spot"^[9]. The imperial historian Potto admits that after Bulgakov's storming of the Khankala Gorge, Russian attempts to penetrate deep into Chechnya "were never renewed"^[10].

The Regular Army of the Russian Empire moved troops onto the Nokhchi lands between the Terek and the Sunzha in order to forcibly shift the forward fortified line deep into Chechen territory and place the region under military control. Historian D. A. Khozhaev defines the meaning of moving the line as squeezing unsubdued Chechnya «with new fortresses and fortifications»^[7]. The imperial general Yermolov, in his «Notes», attests to the deployment of troops: «on May 24 the entire detachment crossed over… in a single march it moved from the Terek to the Sunzha River»^[19].

Arrest of the acting hetman and the starshyna in St. Petersburg for attempting to defend autonomous rights through petitions. The physical elimination of the leader through his death in the Peter and Paul Fortress became an instrument for the final suppression of elite resistance^[48].

Arrest and lifelong exile of the Sich's top leadership. The last kish otaman, Petro Kalnyshevsky, was sent to solitary confinement in the Solovetsky Monastery^[29].

The betrayal and defection of otaman Hladky provoked the Turkish sultan into reprisals against the remaining Cossacks, which led to the final liquidation of the last free Cossack community — the Danubian Sich^[44].

Arrest, interrogations, and trial of the intelligentsia's leaders, including Mykola Hulak, who was placed in a solitary cell of the Alekseevsky Ravelin^[16]. Neutralization of Taras Shevchenko through forced exile as a soldier, with a personal ban on writing and painting^[22].

Harsh forcible suppression of any protests and peasant unrest, mass executions of those deemed undesirable^[34].

The Russian Empire eliminated the leadership stratum of the resistance by luring it in under the pretext of an inquiry. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that under the guise of a «demonstrative execution», «318 respected men from the Aksai (Kumyk and Chechen) villages» — elders and revered men of the communities — were summoned to the Gerzel-aul fortification; General Lisanevich, «calling out those assembled one by one», after the killing of the generals ordered their extermination: «after Lisanevich's command „Stab them!" the mass extermination by the soldiers of all the unarmed highlanders present in the fortification began»^[7].

In the spring of 1829, Commander-in-Chief Paskevich neutralized the leading stratum of the Chechen resistance by luring Beibulat Taimiev and 60 elders of his party to Tiflis under the pretext of negotiations and holding them there by force. The historian D. A. Khozhaev wrote: "On arriving in Tiflis, Beibulat learns that Paskevich is with the army in the field. Realizing that he has been deceived, he tries to return to Chechnya immediately, but he is forcibly detained in Tiflis"^[7]. Paskevich admitted the deception in his own hand in his instruction to Emanuel of August 2, 1829: "I at once resolved to summon to myself, under the guise of explanations, their elders and the elder Bei-Bulat known to you, so that, having drawn them away here, I might deprive this tribe of the possibility, in case of discontent, of undertaking anything hostile"^[17].

On July 14, 1831, near the Tashkichu fortification, Beibulat Taimiev, leader of the Chechen resistance and head of the uprising of 1825–1826, was killed from ambush — eliminated after open repression had been deemed too dangerous by the command. The historian D. A. Khozhaev wrote: "The tsarist command intended several times to do away with Beibulat, but feared to repress him openly... Preparations for the murder of Beibulat began, and it was soon carried out"^[7]. The killer — Prince Sali, who was in imperial service — went unpunished, although other cases of blood vengeance were harshly prosecuted; commander-in-chief Paskevich wrote back that Beibulat "was a traitor to the end, and therefore the killer should not be punished"^[7].

The Russian Empire set neighboring Indigenous peoples against one another so that their mutual enmity would weaken the resistance of each and prevent them from uniting. For the 1807 campaign against the Chechens, the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Gudovich, coerced Kabardians into marching against the Nokhchi: for failure to appear, those "designated from the ranks of uzdens and begauls" faced a fine "of 50 r. in silver and 2 oxen." General Delpozzo reported that he had "inclined the Kabardians to set out on the campaign and to assist together with our troops in punishing the Chechens," and although "it was very difficult to persuade them," he gathered over 3,500 men who "crossed the Terek River and arrived… at the Sunzha River" against the Chechen and Karabulak villages; at the same time, the Kabardians themselves refused to go directly "against the Chechens," as their co-religionists, agreeing to act only "against the Karabulaks alone." General Gudovich stated the aim of this incitement outright — "to set these two peoples at odds with each other and bring them into enmity against one another, and thereby weaken them over time"^[9].

The Russian Empire set neighboring Indigenous peoples against the Nokhchi in order to weaken Chechen resistance through their enmity. In July 1810, while pursuing a retreating Chechen party, the commanding general Ivelich, according to the imperial historian Potto, «talked the nearest Ingush auls, in view of the prospect of great gain, into cutting off its retreat»; the incited Ingush attacked the Chechens, and the latter «suffered such a loss that they abandoned even the body of their leader on the battlefield»^[30]. The commander of the Caucasian Line, General Delpozzo, reported that the peaceful elders who had pledged to act against the Chechens were «promised rewards according to their merits»^[12].

The Russian Empire set neighboring peoples against the Nokhchi in order to weaken the Chechens through their enmity. In 1816, the Nokhchi led by Beibulat Taimiev took Major Shvetsov prisoner^[7]. In response, the commander on the Terek, General Delpozzo, in a letter to the Kumyk lords of Endirey, Aksai, and Kostek, pressed them to go to war against the Chechens: «I ask you, I advise you, I order you to form among yourselves one council, one will, to return immediately by force of arms the captive Major Shvetsov, to put an end to the brigand people… to adopt such a resolution as would reduce the Chechens to weakness, to obedience to us, to complete slavery before you»^[49]. The Kumyk lords signed «Obligations» in which they pledged «to cease all mutual enmities… and to form a brotherhood», «to receive none of the Chechens… but wherever any of them is encountered, to kill him or deliver him alive to the nearest Russian authorities», and to let no goods pass through to them^[49].

The Russian Empire set a neighboring people against the Nokhchi in order to weaken their resistance. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that Yermolov, «attempting to provoke a clash between the Chechens and the Ingush… forcibly conscripted the Ingush into a militia and sent them together with tsarist detachments against Chechen auls», although the Ingush «refused to go against their kin… deserting from the militia»^[7].

The treacherous encirclement and forcible seizure of the Cossack stronghold by imperial troops under General Tekeli immediately after the Cossacks had helped the empire win the war. This event went down in history as the liquidation of the Zaporozhian Sich^[29].

Use of regular imperial troops to brutally suppress the revolts of the deceived population, which after the end of the war refused to return to the status of ordinary recruits^[41].

Use of the regular army to forcibly suppress a mass anti-serfdom uprising of peasants in Slobozhanshchyna, known as the Shebelynka uprising^[37].

Reprisals against the insurgents to preserve imperial control over Right-Bank Ukraine^[36].

A years-long military campaign by the Russian Empire against a large-scale uprising of disenfranchised Ukrainian peasants led by Ustym Karmaliuk in Podillia^[28].

Use of the army for the harsh armed suppression of the anti-serfdom peasant movement that went down in history as the Kyiv Cossack Movement^[50].

Use of the regular army for the forcible suppression of the January Uprising. The Russian government decides to use force to "eradicate any preconditions for independence"^[22][35].

The government of the Russian Empire purposefully organized military actions to punish the defiant Indigenous population: historian Sh. B. Akhmadov points out that on August 4, 1722, by decree of Peter I, "a punitive expedition was carried out for a second time against the rebellious Chechens and Andreevtsy"^[6].

The Government of the Russian Empire organized an armed raid to physically punish the insurgent Indigenous population: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov points out that General Douglas «halted the movement of the main forces and sent toward Chechen-Aul a detachment of dragoons under Colonel Koch, totaling 300 soldiers and 200 Cossacks»^[5].

The Russian Empire dispatched troops to the lands of the Nokhchi to compel submission. The plan of the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Gudovich, was to strike the unprotected: to catch the inhabitants before "their livestock and families… are sheltered in the mountains," for "then… their punishment and complete success in the matter would be surer and more convenient." When the commander of the Caucasus Line, General Bulgakov, delayed by an expedition in Dagestan, gave the inhabitants time to fortify the Khankala Gorge and took it by a bloody storm, General Gudovich, in a directive of March 20, 1807, refused to take this "on his own account" and stressed that he had not sent him to wage war: "you were sent not to wage war with the Chechen peoples, but to punish them and bring them into complete submission." The commander of the Caucasus Line, General Bulgakov, considered the outcome of the campaign to be that the Chechens had by force of arms been "brought to such a state that they will long feel the blow dealt to them and, certainly, will not soon regain strength"^[9].

The Russian Empire carried out punitive raids beyond the Terek in order to force the Nokhchi into submission. The imperial historian Potto writes that Colonel Eristov «crossed the Terek a second time and, after a stubborn battle, destroyed several villages along the Sunzha»^[30]. The punitive, rather than defensive, character of these raids was acknowledged by the imperial leadership itself. Commander-in-chief General Rtishchev condemned «such expeditions» and demanded that the mountaineers be won over «not by arms, but by kind treatment»^[30]. Emperor Alexander I, upon learning «of yet another raid on peaceful Chechnya by Colonel Eristov», ordered by a special rescript «to establish tranquility on the Caucasian Line through friendliness and gentle indulgence»^[7].

Solzha (Sunzhenskaya) the Russian Empire took by storm and ravaged as punishment for the village’s refusal to hand over a fellow villager who had shot at a soldier who was taking his ox. Historian D. A. Khozhayev records the ravaging of Solzha (Sunzhenskaya)^[7]. Imperial general Yermolov testifies in his "Notes" that a villager shot at a soldier "when they would not give him back an ox from a state wagon, which he called his own," and the attempt to seize the shooter failed — the officer whose "horse was seized by the bridle" was nearly killed, and the detachment retreated; to the demand to hand over the shooter the villagers replied "that they would not surrender the man who shot at the soldier and would defend themselves if the troops came," after which the chief of the corps staff "went himself with several companies… but was met with gunfire," while "the wives and children and the best property had already been sent away; only men remained to defend the houses"; during the storming the troops were ordered to cut off the withdrawal — "to intercept the retreat in the forest" — but the defenders had withdrawn earlier^[19].

The Russian Empire sent troops to ravage Nokhchi villages as punishment for insubordination. Historian D. A. Khozhayev writes that general Yermolov ordered Major General Sysoyev and Colonel Bekovich-Cherkassky to "surround the peaceful village of Dadi-Yurt" and to "punish it by force of arms, giving quarter to no one"^[7]. Yermolov confirms his order in his "Notes": to surround the aul, offer the inhabitants the chance to leave, "and should they resist, to punish them by force of arms, giving quarter to no one"^[19]. On the fifteenth of September 1819 the aul was surrounded by six Kabardian companies and seven sotnias of Cossacks and taken by storm^[10].

The Russian Empire sent troops to lay waste to Nokhchi villages and drive their inhabitants off the land. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that under Yermolov "cruel punitive raids on peaceful Caucasian auls, disgracing Russian arms, with the destruction of the population, houses, crops, orchards, and forests, the driving off of livestock, and the plundering of property, became the rule"^[7]. General Yermolov writes in his "Notes" that on September 30, 1819, he "went in person with 6 battalions and 16 artillery pieces toward the Kachkalyk villages" and on October 2 attacked "the village of Goryachevskaya, the strongest of them," while Major General Sysoyev simultaneously invaded from the direction of Groznaya through Khan-Kale, drawing the Chechens’ forces away from the Kachkalyk plain^[19]. The imperial historian Potto confirms that the Apsheron men "burst into the aul and consigned it to the flames"^[10].

The Russian Empire sent troops on a punitive campaign to ravage Nokhchi villages and cut military roads through their lands. The imperial historian Potto writes that in the spring of 1820 Grekov, commander of the left flank, moved on the aul of Germenchuk "with a musket in one hand and an axe in the other," and on the night of March 6, 1820, covertly moved a detachment across the Sunzha, falling suddenly upon the aul of Topli^[10]. General Yermolov himself, in an order to Grekov of March 15, 1820, sanctioned the design: "only the squeezing of the Chechens in their essential needs can make plain to them the advantage of submission, and I have long since authorized you to employ every possible means to that end"^[18].

The Russian Empire sent troops on punitive campaigns to punish the Nokhchi for resistance and drive them off the plain. Historian D. A. Khozhaev cites the report of Grekov, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, who stated the campaigns’ purpose plainly: to drive the Chechens into the forests, where "only snow and cold weather were lacking for the Chechen people… to feel the necessity of submitting," and notes that Grekov’s expedition "destroyed… two auls — Shali and Malaya Ataga, whose inhabitants had taken a more active part in the unrest"^[7]. The imperial historian Potto confirms: on March 1, 1821, the troops "surrounded the village of Oisungur… and, to punish the inhabitants who had fled before their arrival, destroyed it completely," and in February 1822 Grekov "burned the villages of Shali and Malye Atagi"^[10].

The Russian Empire sent troops to ravage the lowland villages of the Nokhchi, choosing the moment most vulnerable for the inhabitants to strike. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that «in January 1826, having waited for a period inconvenient for the inhabitants of Chechnya, when the frosts made it difficult to shelter families, Yermolov launches a large punitive campaign into Chechnya», occupying the aul of Bolshaya Ataga on January 26^[7]. General Yermolov himself, in a report to Emperor Nicholas I dated May 28, 1826, reported that the troops were methodically cutting roads and occupying villages: on April 12 «the village of Kurchali was occupied without a shot», on the 16th «the troops moved to the village of Gekhi», and on the 24th he «moved to the village of Malaya Roshni, which was found empty»^[18].

On the night of January 10, 1827, General Laptev, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line, led a detachment of 350 Line Cossacks with two horse guns and four hundred Chechens of subjugated communities compelled to take part against the village of Uzeni-Yurt - a refuge for the inhabitants of villages ravaged by troops in Yermolov's punitive campaign of 1826 - in order to destroy it as punishment for raids on the Line and in the absence of the Karabulak leader Astemir. The imperial historian Potto wrote: «Laptev decided to take advantage of that moment to strike a blow in Astemir's absence... and, quickly assembling a detachment, on the night of the tenth of January led it against Uzdeni-Yurt. By dawn the troops already stood before the aul»^[11].

From December 18, 1830 to January 26, 1831, General Velyaminov conducted a sweeping march through lowland Chechnya as punishment of the people for supporting the resistance, systematically devastating villages from the Sunzha River to the Kachkalyk Ridge. The imperial historian Potto wrote of the method: Velyaminov "would usually mark out a point toward which he advanced unswervingly with his entire detachment, and then, upon reaching it, immediately set up camp and established a fortified wagenburg (a camp enclosed by wagons), from which the troops were dispatched in turn in small columns to exterminate the neighboring auls"^[11]. Potto acknowledges the outcome of the campaign: "the whole of lowland Chechnya, traversed through and through as far as the Kochalyk Ridge, was put to fire and sword by Velyaminov"^[11].

In the winter of 1831–1832, General Velyaminov, from his camp near the Groznaya fortress, dispatched troops against Chechen settlements in revenge for their support of the uprising: on December 23, 1831, Lieutenant Colonel Zass, commander of the Mozdok Cossack Regiment, devastated the hamlets on the right side of the Sunzha opposite the village of Chertugai, and in February 1832 Velyaminov "undertook an expedition to punish the Chechen villages lying up the Sunzha from the Groznaya fortress" — this is acknowledged by the imperial survey of military operations^[14]. The imperial historian Volkonsky wrote of the purpose of the raids: "to harass the enemy and divert his attention from our borders"^[26]. The historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov recorded: "Another large expedition was directed against the Chechen auls situated along the banks of the Sunzha"^[25].

From August 22 to the end of September 1832, corps commander Baron Rosen conducted a campaign through Chechnya and Ichkeria (the mountainous southeastern part of the Chechen land) in retribution against the people for the uprising, applying a uniform scheme: a village that failed to meet the conditions was exterminated. Rosen acknowledged the scheme in a report to Minister of War Chernyshev: the villages, "being unable to agree among themselves on the release of our prisoners, have been punished by the destruction of dwellings and plowed fields"^[14]. Historian D. A. Khozhaev wrote: "In the summer and autumn of 1832, the troops of General Rosen swept through Chechnya, leaving death and destruction in their wake"^[7].

In 1835–1836, Colonel Pullo, chief of the Sunzha fortified line, conducted systematic expeditions against Chechen villages that supported Imam Tashu-Hajji. The imperial review of military operations acknowledges: Tashu-Hajji’s attempts "were preempted in good time by the expeditions of the chief of the Sunzha line, Col. Pullo, which inflicted utter ruin on the residents"^[14]. On August 23, 1836, Pullo led a detachment by a covert night march to the aul of Zandak on the Yaman-su River. Corps commander Baron Rosen reported to the Minister of War on the objective: "in order to shake the influence of Tashev-Hajji and to quell the unrest among the Chechens and instill fear in them, I resolved to undertake movements to punish the residents of the village of Zandak"^[14].

Large-scale extraction of coal, metals, and other resources from the southern and eastern Ukrainian regions for the industrialization and enrichment of the imperial center^[24].

The Regular Army of the Russian Empire shifted the cost of the imposed military service onto the Indigenous population itself. Imperial general Yermolov testifies in his "Notes" that the men levied by requisition were sent out "with their own arms and at their own expense"^[19].

The Russian Empire drove the Nokhchi from the lowland to clear it for itself and for loyal neighbors, and blocked their return with fortresses. Historian D. A. Khozhaev cites the admission of General Orbeliani that this expulsion was a system applied everywhere: "in all of Chechnya there remained not a single aul, not a single household, that had not been resettled from one place to another several times over"^[7]. General Yermolov himself, in a report to the emperor, admits this with regard to the Kachkalyk Nokhchi: to clear the Aksai riverside he drove them out of it and placed the fortresses of Amir-Adzhi-Yurt and Vnezapnaya in their place, for the sake of "freeing it [the Aksai] from the Kachkalyks, whom I immediately ordered to be driven out of it; I established the fortress of Vnezapnaya"^[18].

Complete diplomatic isolation of the autonomy. The decree categorically "prohibited the hetman from conducting diplomatic relations with foreign states"^[39].

Imposition of the "Lubny Treaty" on the Zaporozhian Sich, legally codifying the transfer of the Cossacks "under the rule of Russia" with an obligation of military service to the empire^[51].

The government of the Russian Empire fabricated historical accounts to provide legal justification for invasion: historian Michael Khodarkovsky points out that in 1748 and in the 1770s officials deliberately constructed fictitious claims that the Indigenous peoples of the Caucasus had allegedly been Christians in the past, in order to contest the claims of other empires and "legitimize their efforts at their 're-Christianization'"^[45].

Institutional seizure and liquidation of an independent spiritual structure on the Right Bank: «In 1839, the tsarist authorities liquidated the Greek Catholic Church»^[28].

Covert support and sponsorship by the empire of reactionary organizations, such as the Union of the Russian People, which propagated extreme Russian chauvinism and aggression^[8].

In the spring of 1829, Commander-in-Chief Paskevich built the governance of Chechnya through the deliberate maintenance of a split of the people into two rival parties — the Shamkhal party and the Beibulat party. In his instruction of May 16, 1829 to Emanuel, commander of the troops on the Caucasian Line, Paskevich wrote: "it is not without use for us to have two parties in Chechnya which, both remaining obedient to our government, will through internecine strife be restrained from hostile designs against the Russians"^[17]. To this end he dispatched couriers (messengers with a special commission) to the elders of the Beibulat party, instructed Engelhardt, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, to "assist as far as possible" in summoning them, and by the regulation of August 2, 1829 placed the son of the Shamkhal of Tarki over the Chechens as commissar^[17].

Lowering the social status of the indigenous population for the purpose of economic plunder: "the Cossacks were turned into military commoners and subjected to taxation"^[2].

The occupation administration of the Russian Empire levied discriminatory duties on the movement of goods of the Indigenous population: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov quotes the customs books, stating that in 1726 "on the travel document of the Terek resident, the Okochanin Kurman Bogomatov... duties of 24 altyns in money were collected by decree"^[5].

In September 1832, corps commander Baron Rosen imposed on the villages of Chechnya and Ichkeria an annual tribute from each household as a condition of being spared. The imperial historian Volkonsky wrote: "from the village of Metso-erzo-yurt, amanats (hostages) were taken along with a tribute of one ruble per hearth"; the villages of Eshta-kale and Eyni-kale undertook "to pay henceforth a tribute of 1 ruble per hearth"^[26]. Rosen reported to Minister of War Chernyshev: the village of Gurdali "handed over an amanat and undertook to pay tribute"^[14]. The tribute was exacted from a people whose villages and crops were in those very days being exterminated by the troops.

Intimidation of the population and suppression of the liberation movement in Ukraine by radical monarchist gangs during the revolution^[8].

The Regular Army of the Russian Empire instilled submission through fear of the demonstrative destruction of families. Imperial general Yermolov, in his "Address" to the Chechens, declared: "The slightest disobedience… and your auls will be destroyed, your families sold off into the mountains, the amanats hanged, villages exterminated by fire, women and children slaughtered"^[7][10].

The Russian Empire destroyed a single village demonstratively, in order to terrorize the rest of the Nokhchi into abandoning their lands. Imperial historian Potto writes that general Yermolov decided to clear the Kumyk plain, "forcing the Chechens to withdraw… beyond the Kachkalyk mountain ridge," and they could be compelled to do so "only by an example of terror," and the aul of Dadi-Yurt "was chosen as the expiatory sacrifice"^[10]. Yermolov himself admits this calculation in his "Notes": "only an example of terror can compel them to remove their wives," and after the destruction of the aul "the example of Dadan-Yurt spread terror everywhere"^[19].

The Russian Empire exterminated people for show in order to terrorize the highlanders. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that at the Gerzel-aul fortification «the tsarist generals decided to stage a demonstrative execution to intimidate the highlanders», for which they summoned «318 respected men from the Aksai (Kumyk and Chechen) villages», whom General Lisanevich, «calling out those assembled one by one… threatened and subjected to insults»^[7].

On August 23, 1832, during the storming of Germenchuk, the troops of corps commander Baron Rosen burned alive about 60 encircled defenders of the village, led by Mullah Abdurakhman, who had refused to surrender. Rosen reported to Minister of War Chernyshev: a group "numbering about 60 men ... led by ... Mullah Abdur-Rakhman, was cut off and surrounded by us in one large house"^[14]. The imperial historian Volkonsky, writing on the basis of Rosen’s dispatches, acknowledges the method of the massacre: "Major General Volkhovsky ordered burning firewood and hay to be thrown into the chimneys. This had its effect... while the greater part, together with Mullah Abdurakhman, perished in the flames, continuing to chant verses of the Quran"^[26]. The demonstrative burning of people alive served to terrorize all of Chechnya; Volkonsky acknowledges the calculation: the destruction of Germenchuk "was bound to have the most crushing effect on the Chechens"^[26].

The Regular Army of the Russian Empire destroyed the settlements and the food supply base of the highlanders: historian Sh. B. Akhmadov states that a tsarist detachment "came to Enderi and completely devastated and burned it, leaving nothing but ashes behind"^[6], while during the August 1722 raid "3 thousand houses were destroyed and the grain in the fields was burned"^[6].

The Regular Army of the Russian Empire physically eliminated a highlander settlement: historian Sh. B. Akhmadov states that the detachment under the command of Colonel Koch «entered the village of Chechen on July 7, burned it down completely, and began hastily withdrawing»^[6].

The Russian Empire burned the villages of the Nokhchi, depriving the inhabitants of shelter and means of subsistence. General Ivelich reported that the village of Bolshaya Chechenskaya Ataga was "consigned to fire" by the detachment of the commander of the Caucasus Line, General Bulgakov, while the remaining inhabitants, "whose villages were destroyed by fire," agreed to subjecthood^[9].

The Russian Empire razed and burned Nokhchi villages. The imperial historian Potto writes that Colonel Eristov, having crossed the Terek, after a stubborn battle burned and razed «several villages along the Sunzha»^[30].

The Regular Army of the Russian Empire demolished Chechen villages to clear ground for a fortress. Historian D. A. Khozhayev records the destruction of eight villages: to make way for Groznaya, "eight flourishing Chechen villages (Bugun-Yurt, Amirkhan-Kichu, Kuli-Yurt, Sorochan-Yurt, Sunzha, N. Chechen, Topli, Alkhanchu) were destroyed"^[7].

The Russian Empire wiped Nokhchi villages off the face of the earth. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that following Dadi-Yurt, the Kachkalyk villages of Isti-Su, Noiberdy, Alleroy, and others were "taken by storm and destroyed"^[7]. General Yermolov writes in his "Notes" that Noyen-Berdy and Allayar-Aul were "utterly devastated"^[19]. The imperial historian Potto confirms that "both villages were completely devastated"^[10].

The imperial historian Potto writes that after the night attack the aul of Topli was left as "smoldering ruins," and at the close of the campaign the troops "advanced forward, burned Germenchug, and drew back to Groznaya," even though the aul stood empty^[10].

Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that the expedition of Grekov, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, "destroyed… two auls — Shali and Malaya Ataga"^[7]. The imperial historian Potto confirms: on March 1, 1821, the troops "destroyed completely" the village of Oisungur, and in February 1822 Grekov "burned the villages of Shali and Malye Atagi"^[10].

Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that after February 17, 1826, Yermolov's troops «ravaged and destroyed the auls of Lesser Chechnya - Urus-Martan, Roshni, Gekhi, Belakai, Daut-Martan, and Shelchikhi», and by the end of the campaign «flourishing villages had been destroyed»^[7]. General Yermolov himself, in a report to Emperor Nicholas I dated May 28, 1826, confirmed: during the storming of Urus-Martan «the village was burned», Bolshaya Roshni was «put to the torch», and the village of Shali, whose inhabitants «give an amanat, asked for time, and deceived», he «ordered to be destroyed»^[18]. The imperial historian Volkonsky specifies that Shali stood empty by the time the troops arrived: Yermolov «did not find a single inhabitant there: all had scattered through the forests», after which he «burned their dwellings»^[26].

On January 10, 1827, the troops of General Laptev, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line, razed the village of Uzeni-Yurt on the bank of the Argun, whose inhabitants had fled across the river. The imperial historian Potto acknowledges: «the village of Uzeni-Yurt, with all its property... was destroyed to its foundations»^[11]. The village had served as home to people whose former auls had been exterminated by troops in Yermolov's punitive campaign of 1826 and who had refused to resettle under the conqueror's control.

In December 1830 – January 1831, General Velyaminov's troops razed and burned the villages of lowland Chechnya: Kiter-Yurt, Pkhan-Kichu, Edin-Yurt, Daut-Yurt, Engeli, Uzeken-Yurt, Besenber with its hamlets, Avtury, Geldigen, and Mairtup with the surrounding auls. The imperial historian Potto wrote: Kiter-Yurt "was immediately given over to the flames," "over the following two days the Butyrsky and Tarutinsky regiments burned the village of Pkhan-Kichu," "along the way they burned two more unsubmissive villages: Edin-Yurt and Daut-Yurt," the troops "managed to exterminate one more aul, Engeli," the regiments "burned the unsubmissive village of Uzeken-Yurt," "exterminated in the vicinity the aul of Besenber, with all the hamlets adjoining it," and on January 21, 1831, "the same fate befell Maiortup itself"^[11]. The submission offered by the villages of Avtury, Geldigen, and Mairtup, together with the handing over of hostages, Velyaminov rejected, demanding the impossible — the surrender of all Russian captives and fugitives — in order to preserve a pretext for exterminating the villages: submission, as Potto admits, "was not at all part of Velyaminov's designs, as he understood the necessity of punishing these auls cruelly"^[11].

From August 22 to September 23, 1832, the troops of corps commander Baron Rosen razed dozens of villages of Chechnya and Ichkeria: Belgatoy and Dzhan-yurt, the houses of the six-hundred-household Germenchuk, Shali (except for 11 households), Alkhan-yurt, Sala-yurt, Katar-yurt, Lyalsin-yurt, Nazari-yurt, Uzden-yurt, Uruzbey-yurt, Khyzin-Erzo-yurt, Anzeli-yurt, Chingaroy-yurt, Said-yurt, Anto-yurt, Askhor-yurt, Taba-yurt, Kudish-yurt, Mairtup, Shoni, Tsentoroy, the hamlet of Khamer, Ali-yurt, Bey-Bulat-yurt, Bachin-yurt, Khelboyn-yurt, Benoy, and others. Rosen reported to Minister of War Chernyshev on the dispatch of Colonel Shumsky, by whom "Alkhan-yurt, Sala-yurt, Katar-yurt, Lyalsin-yurt, Nazari-yurt, Uzden-yurt, Uruzbey-yurt and Khyzin-Erzo-yurt have been exterminated"^[14], and summed up the result himself: "Of unsubmitted villages, 61 have been exterminated"^[14]. Historian D. A. Khozhaev wrote: "The general’s troops burned Benoy and other Chechen villages"^[7].

On August 23, 1836, the detachment of Colonel Pullo, chief of the Sunzha fortified line, ravaged the aul of Zandak on the Yaman-su River. Corps commander Baron Rosen reported to the Minister of War on the destruction in the aul of the houses of murids and of "other principal adherents of Tashev-Hajji"^[14]. The Chechen writer Abuzar Aydamirov, in his "Chronology of the History of Checheno-Ingushetia," recorded: "Punitive expedition of Colonel Pullo to the auls on the Yaman-Su River. Destruction of the aul of Zandak"^[52].