Regular Army

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Application of "scorched earth" tactics during the retreat in 1941: the deliberate blowing up of the Dnipro Hydroelectric Station, and the destruction of factories, warehouses, and communications^[38].

Forced incorporation of the autochthonous armed forces into the imperial army: "the transformation of the regiments into regular hussar ones"^[35].

Direct armed invasion by the Red Army of the territory of Poland on September 17, 1939, for the military occupation of western Ukrainian lands^[9].

The Regular Army of the Russian Empire dispatched armed contingents to preemptively suppress an anti-colonial uprising: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov cites a report by General Douglas, who ordered that the assembled rebel force must, «not being allowed to multiply, be averted and destroyed by the dispatched detachment»^[33], after which, as historian Sh. B. Akhmadov states, «on July 4, 1732, the tsarist authorities dispatched a military detachment to Chechnya, headed by General Douglas, who commanded the troops at the Holy Cross fortress»^[34].

On July 14, 1831, near the Tashkichu fortification, Beibulat Taimiev, leader of the Chechen resistance and head of the uprising of 1825–1826, was killed from ambush — eliminated after open repression had been deemed too dangerous by the command. The historian D. A. Khozhaev wrote: "The tsarist command intended several times to do away with Beibulat, but feared to repress him openly... Preparations for the murder of Beibulat began, and it was soon carried out"^[3]. The killer — Prince Sali, who was in imperial service — went unpunished, although other cases of blood vengeance were harshly prosecuted; commander-in-chief Paskevich wrote back that Beibulat "was a traitor to the end, and therefore the killer should not be punished"^[3].

The forced use of Cossacks to build imperial infrastructure under harsh conditions: "in the making of fortifications around the Kyiv-Pechersk Monastery"^[8][11].

As a guarantee of submission, the occupation administration detained representatives of the Nokhchi elite: historian E. N. Kusheva writes that «his nephew Batai was left as an amanat (hostage) in the Terek town»^[16].

Use of regular troops without insignia ("little green men") to establish military control over the territory and blockade Ukrainian garrisons^[9].

The Russian Empire sent troops into the lands of the Nokhchi in order to force its way deep into Greater Chechnya and break the resistance of its communities. The historian D. A. Khozhaev describes General Bulgakov's troops as having "come with fire and sword to the Chechen land," and the Khankala battle of 1807 as bloody^[3]. In February 1807, three detachments under the overall command of the commander of the Caucasus Line, General Bulgakov, crossed the Terek; on February 13, the troops broke through the Khankala Gorge by storm, which the inhabitants had fortified with barricades, ditches, and abatis. The commander of the Caucasus Line, General Bulgakov, reported that he had entered "for the exemplary punishment" of the Nokhchi communities, that the inhabitants, having gathered in number about 10,000, "resolved to perish rather than let the Russian troops pass through the gorge"; during the storming of the gorge, of the defending Chechens, according to his report, there were "about 1,000 killed on the spot"^[5]. The imperial historian Potto admits that after Bulgakov's storming of the Khankala Gorge, Russian attempts to penetrate deep into Chechnya "were never renewed"^[2].

From December 18, 1830 to January 26, 1831, General Velyaminov conducted a sweeping march through lowland Chechnya as punishment of the people for supporting the resistance, systematically devastating villages from the Sunzha River to the Kachkalyk Ridge. The imperial historian Potto wrote of the method: Velyaminov "would usually mark out a point toward which he advanced unswervingly with his entire detachment, and then, upon reaching it, immediately set up camp and established a fortified wagenburg (a camp enclosed by wagons), from which the troops were dispatched in turn in small columns to exterminate the neighboring auls"^[20]. Potto acknowledges the outcome of the campaign: "the whole of lowland Chechnya, traversed through and through as far as the Kochalyk Ridge, was put to fire and sword by Velyaminov"^[20].

The Russian Empire bought the loyalty of the Nokhchi elders in order to use them to incline the Chechens toward submission. To this end, the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Tormasov, through Esaul Chernov, ordered that the Chechen elders and clergy be given «250 rubles each, and others 150 silver rubles each, as a one-time payment, for which the required sum, 1,400 r. in total»^[51]. Historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov notes that the colonial authorities generally acted by relying on the social elite, «bribing them with all manner of rewards and privileges for their service to the benefit of Russia»^[34]. Historian D. A. Khozhaev cites the same formula with a direct indication of where the money came from: the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General Tormasov, agreed «to win over the principal Chechen elders and their clergy… to give 250, and others 150 silver rubles each, and to collect the said money from their own villages» — that is, the bribery of the elite was paid for by exactions from the Chechen villages themselves^[3].

Mass mobilization of Cossack regiments for hard construction labor in Ingria^[8].

The Regular Army of the Russian Empire founded a new military base for infrastructural entrenchment in the region: historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that in the autumn of 1722 Peter I "founded the fortress of the Holy Cross on the Sulak"^[33].

Open crossing of the state border by regular troops of the Russian Federation in the summer and fall of 2014 and in early 2015 to save the separatists from defeat, which led to massive losses of the Ukrainian army (Ilovaisk, Debaltseve)^[9][62].

In 1836, corps commander Baron Rosen sent covert topographers through Chechnya for the clandestine surveying of the unsubdued land. In a report to the emperor, Rosen acknowledges: "in 1836, to survey the direct route leading from Kakheti to Chechnya, a topographer was sent who, having crossed the snow ridge, came out onto the Caucasian Line at the fortress of Groznaya, and from there, through Chechnya and the lands of the Kistins and the Didois, returned to Kakheti"; at the same time "I sent from Vladikavkaz Ensign Prince Utsmiev of the Life Guards Grenadier Regiment with a topographer, through Chechnya, to Andia"^[6]. Rosen named the method outright: "covert surveys of the lands of the mountaineers hostile to us"^[6].

Direct deployment of Red troops under the command of V. Antonov-Ovseenko and M. Muravyov, heavy fighting for railway stations, and the storming of Kyiv, accompanied by the Battle of Kruty (January 1918)^[9].

The military forces of the Tsardom of Muscovy repeatedly rebuilt the fortified outpost on the lands of the Nokhchi: historian E. N. Kusheva writes that "in 1577 - 1578... the Russian town was reestablished on the Terek River at the mouth of the Sunzha"^[7], while the compiler of the collection of documents E. N. Kusheva indicates that the military forces of the Tsardom of Muscovy "rebuilt the ostrog in 1590 and 1635"^[16] and that "in 1651 a Russian ostrog was built anew on the left bank of the Sunzha"^[16].

In the spring of 1829, Commander-in-Chief Paskevich built the governance of Chechnya through the deliberate maintenance of a split of the people into two rival parties — the Shamkhal party and the Beibulat party. In his instruction of May 16, 1829 to Emanuel, commander of the troops on the Caucasian Line, Paskevich wrote: "it is not without use for us to have two parties in Chechnya which, both remaining obedient to our government, will through internecine strife be restrained from hostile designs against the Russians"^[10]. To this end he dispatched couriers (messengers with a special commission) to the elders of the Beibulat party, instructed Engelhardt, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, to "assist as far as possible" in summoning them, and by the regulation of August 2, 1829 placed the son of the Shamkhal of Tarki over the Chechens as commissar^[10].

The Russian Empire built a ring of fortresses around Chechnya in order to squeeze it and cut it off from its neighbors. Historian D. A. Khozhayev writes that following Groznaya, the fortress Vnezapnaya appeared in 1819, erected in order to "squeeze unsubdued Chechnya with new fortresses and fortifications"^[3]. Imperial historian Potto confirms its purpose and date: founded on the eighteenth of July 1819, it "separated the Chechens from the Kumyks" and "barred [the Chechens’] way across the Salatau mountains," and it was linked to Groznaya by a chain of fortifications^[2]. General Yermolov had planned this fortress as early as his most humble report of November 1817, proposing that "by extending the Line through the Aksai and Andreyevo villages to the Sulak River, Kizlyar will be covered"^[22].

The Regular Army of the Russian Empire moved troops onto the Nokhchi lands between the Terek and the Sunzha in order to forcibly shift the forward fortified line deep into Chechen territory and place the region under military control. Historian D. A. Khozhaev defines the meaning of moving the line as squeezing unsubdued Chechnya «with new fortresses and fortifications»^[3]. The imperial general Yermolov, in his «Notes», attests to the deployment of troops: «on May 24 the entire detachment crossed over… in a single march it moved from the Terek to the Sunzha River»^[1].

On the night of January 10, 1827, General Laptev, commander of the left flank of the Caucasus Line, led a detachment of 350 Line Cossacks with two horse guns and four hundred Chechens of subjugated communities compelled to take part against the village of Uzeni-Yurt - a refuge for the inhabitants of villages ravaged by troops in Yermolov's punitive campaign of 1826 - in order to destroy it as punishment for raids on the Line and in the absence of the Karabulak leader Astemir. The imperial historian Potto wrote: «Laptev decided to take advantage of that moment to strike a blow in Astemir's absence... and, quickly assembling a detachment, on the night of the tenth of January led it against Uzdeni-Yurt. By dawn the troops already stood before the aul»^[20].

The Russian Empire sent troops to lay waste to Nokhchi villages and drive their inhabitants off the land. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that under Yermolov "cruel punitive raids on peaceful Caucasian auls, disgracing Russian arms, with the destruction of the population, houses, crops, orchards, and forests, the driving off of livestock, and the plundering of property, became the rule"^[3]. General Yermolov writes in his "Notes" that on September 30, 1819, he "went in person with 6 battalions and 16 artillery pieces toward the Kachkalyk villages" and on October 2 attacked "the village of Goryachevskaya, the strongest of them," while Major General Sysoyev simultaneously invaded from the direction of Groznaya through Khan-Kale, drawing the Chechens’ forces away from the Kachkalyk plain^[1]. The imperial historian Potto confirms that the Apsheron men "burst into the aul and consigned it to the flames"^[2].

The Russian Empire sent troops to ravage the lowland villages of the Nokhchi, choosing the moment most vulnerable for the inhabitants to strike. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that «in January 1826, having waited for a period inconvenient for the inhabitants of Chechnya, when the frosts made it difficult to shelter families, Yermolov launches a large punitive campaign into Chechnya», occupying the aul of Bolshaya Ataga on January 26^[3]. General Yermolov himself, in a report to Emperor Nicholas I dated May 28, 1826, reported that the troops were methodically cutting roads and occupying villages: on April 12 «the village of Kurchali was occupied without a shot», on the 16th «the troops moved to the village of Gekhi», and on the 24th he «moved to the village of Malaya Roshni, which was found empty»^[22].

The military forces of the Tsardom of Muscovy erected a fortified outpost on the lands of the Nokhchi: historian E. N. Kusheva states that in 1567 "the Russian town... was erected in that same year"^[7].

Solzha (Sunzhenskaya), one of the wealthiest villages, the Russian Empire kept as a source of supply for the fortress of Groznaya, and having seized the village by force, it spent several days carting away its stores. Historian D. A. Khozhayev records the ravaging of Solzha (Sunzhenskaya), as a consequence of which "most of the peaceful neighboring auls fled into the mountains, and the flourishing banks were left deserted for a long time thereafter"^[3]. Imperial general Yermolov testifies in his "Notes" that he had earlier ordered the troops to spare the village so that the fortress "could obtain from it all necessary supplies," and when the troops seized the village, "grain, forage, and timber fit for building were carted away for several days"^[1].

From August 22 to the end of September 1832, corps commander Baron Rosen conducted a campaign through Chechnya and Ichkeria (the mountainous southeastern part of the Chechen land) in retribution against the people for the uprising, applying a uniform scheme: a village that failed to meet the conditions was exterminated. Rosen acknowledged the scheme in a report to Minister of War Chernyshev: the villages, "being unable to agree among themselves on the release of our prisoners, have been punished by the destruction of dwellings and plowed fields"^[6]. Historian D. A. Khozhaev wrote: "In the summer and autumn of 1832, the troops of General Rosen swept through Chechnya, leaving death and destruction in their wake"^[3].

Use of Ukrainians within the imperial army as cannon fodder for waging large-scale wars of conquest and subjugating peoples in the Caucasus and Central Asia^[9].

The military forces of the Tsardom of Muscovy erected a new fortified base: historian E. N. Kusheva writes that they «were building it in 1588-1589... Mikhailo Burtsev and Kelar Protasyev... the main force of its garrison consisted of streltsy armed with «fire weaponry», with pishchal arquebuses»^[7], while historians A. S. Kulikov and V. A. Runov add that in the early 17th century «the Terek fort had turned into a rather powerful fortress. Its artillery numbered 40 large guns»^[29].

Invasion by the regular army of the Russian Federation and massive missile and air strikes on Kyiv, Dnipro, Kharkiv, and other Ukrainian cities in the early morning of February 24, 2022^[9].

The tragedy near Bazar in November 1921: the execution by the Bolsheviks of 359 captured UNR soldiers who refused to defect to the Reds, as a symbol of the end of organized resistance^[55].

In 1830, during an ongoing earthquake, General Rozen 4th, who commanded the troops on the left flank of the Caucasus Line (the eastern section of the empire's fortified border along the Terek and Sunzha rivers), on the orders of commander-in-chief Paskevich sent proclamations out to the auls, instilling in the people an artificial picture of the world: the natural disaster was declared God's punishment for resisting the empire. The historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov wrote about how this lie sounded among the Nokhchi: "supporters of the Russian orientation claimed that the earthquake was caused by the wrath of Allah over the attempt at an armed uprising"^[18]. The imperial historian Volkonsky acknowledges the source of the suggestion: the commander-in-chief "ordered General Rozen 4th to spread entirely opposite rumors among the people, namely, that the earthquake had been sent down by God upon the Mountain Peoples for their ill-intentioned acts against the Russian government"^[19]. The imperial historian Potto recorded the act: Rozen "resorted to proclamations in which he sought to assure the people that the earthquake had been sent down upon them as punishment for their treason and their ill-intentioned acts against the Russian government"^[20].

The dispatch of Cossack regiments to distant theaters of war (the Baltic countries, Poland), which led to their exhaustion. The troops were "wearied by year-round military service, worn down, left without horses, and destitute"^[8][11][15].

Mass transfer of peasants and Cossacks to the status of rightless military settlers (the Arakcheyevshchina). The brutal exploitation of their labor provoked the revolt of the Buh Cossacks in 1817^[42].

To ensure constant armed oversight of the autonomy's top leadership and to prevent uprisings, the Tsardom of Muscovy stationed its regular troops directly in the hetman's capital: "with the hetman in Baturyn, for his protection and safety, there shall be a Muscovite streltsy regiment..."^[8].

The march of Colonel Yakovlev's and Halahan's troops to physically destroy the Lower Cossack Host and the base of the Sich^[23][8].

The Russian Empire exterminated people for show in order to terrorize the highlanders. Historian D. A. Khozhaev writes that at the Gerzel-aul fortification «the tsarist generals decided to stage a demonstrative execution to intimidate the highlanders», for which they summoned «318 respected men from the Aksai (Kumyk and Chechen) villages», whom General Lisanevich, «calling out those assembled one by one… threatened and subjected to insults»^[3].

The thrust of the regular army to physically destroy the defiant capital of the Hetmanate. "The strongest and most effective step... was Menshikov's attack... After that, all houses, churches, and monasteries were looted and, in accordance with the tsar's decree, burned"^[11][8][12].

Use of Ukrainian peasants and Black Sea Cossacks as a military resource for storming Turkish fortresses (Ochakiv, Khotyn, Izmail) and consolidating imperial claims to Crimea^[38].

The treacherous encirclement and forcible seizure of the Cossack stronghold by imperial troops under General Tekeli immediately after the Cossacks had helped the empire win the war. This event went down in history as the liquidation of the Zaporozhian Sich^[37].

When covert methods of destabilization proved insufficient, the Tsardom moved to open military invasion. The regular Muscovite army attempted to force the Hetmanate into submission, which ended for it in catastrophe at Konotop: "The flower of the Muscovite cavalry, which had made the fortunate campaigns of '54 and '55, perished in a single day..."^[21].

The Russian Empire sent troops on a punitive campaign to ravage Nokhchi villages and cut military roads through their lands. The imperial historian Potto writes that in the spring of 1820 Grekov, commander of the left flank, moved on the aul of Germenchuk "with a musket in one hand and an axe in the other," and on the night of March 6, 1820, covertly moved a detachment across the Sunzha, falling suddenly upon the aul of Topli^[2]. General Yermolov himself, in an order to Grekov of March 15, 1820, sanctioned the design: "only the squeezing of the Chechens in their essential needs can make plain to them the advantage of submission, and I have long since authorized you to employ every possible means to that end"^[22].

After forcibly coercing the signing of the new treaty, Moscow proceeded to the direct occupation of the autonomy's living space. Muscovite garrisons headed by voivodes were installed not only in Kyiv but also in other strategically important cities, ensuring physical control over the territory from within: "The Articles... substantially narrowed the autonomy of Cossack Ukraine within the Muscovite state"^[17].

The Russian Empire carried out punitive raids beyond the Terek in order to force the Nokhchi into submission. The imperial historian Potto writes that Colonel Eristov «crossed the Terek a second time and, after a stubborn battle, destroyed several villages along the Sunzha»^[52]. The punitive, rather than defensive, character of these raids was acknowledged by the imperial leadership itself. Commander-in-chief General Rtishchev condemned «such expeditions» and demanded that the mountaineers be won over «not by arms, but by kind treatment»^[52]. Emperor Alexander I, upon learning «of yet another raid on peaceful Chechnya by Colonel Eristov», ordered by a special rescript «to establish tranquility on the Caucasian Line through friendliness and gentle indulgence»^[3].

The regular army of the Tsardom of Muscovy carried out armed raids on the territories of Nokhchi societies: the historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that in 1691–1700 «punitive expeditions were carried out by the tsarist authorities in retaliation against the rebel Cossacks and their Highlander allies»^[33] and records «retaliatory punitive raids by tsarist forces»^[33].

Advance of regular Muscovite troops under the command of Golitsyn to suppress the liberation movement: "the Muscovite army was advancing... Orlyk was forced to retreat"^[28].

Use of the inhabitants of the colonized Ukrainian governorates as cannon fodder in yet another bloody war in the Balkans^[9][49].

Use of Ukrainian resources and Cossack regiments in yet another Russo-Turkish war for imperial geopolitical expansion^[39].

Use of Ukrainian Cossack regiments for the grueling war against the Ottoman Empire: mobilization of the indigenous people's resources for imperial expansion^[36].

Seizure and incorporation into the empire of Right-Bank Ukraine, Volhynia, and Podolia as a result of the partitions of the neighboring state^[4].

A full-scale offensive by the Ukrainian Front of the Red Army in early 1919 to recapture Ukrainian cities after the withdrawal of Austro-German troops^[56]. The Red Army's counteroffensive in the fall and winter of 1919 against Denikin's forces, as a result of which the Bolsheviks recaptured Kyiv on December 16 and occupied most of Ukraine^[56].

Use of regular troops and tanks to suppress large-scale revolts of Ukrainian political prisoners in the concentration camp system (in particular, in Kengir)^[57].

A years-long military campaign by the Russian Empire against a large-scale uprising of disenfranchised Ukrainian peasants led by Ustym Karmaliuk in Podillia^[38].

Use of the regular army for the forcible suppression of the January Uprising. The Russian government decides to use force to "eradicate any preconditions for independence"^[9][48].

The Russian Empire sent troops on punitive campaigns to punish the Nokhchi for resistance and drive them off the plain. Historian D. A. Khozhaev cites the report of Grekov, commander of the left flank of the Caucasian Line, who stated the campaigns’ purpose plainly: to drive the Chechens into the forests, where "only snow and cold weather were lacking for the Chechen people… to feel the necessity of submitting," and notes that Grekov’s expedition "destroyed… two auls — Shali and Malaya Ataga, whose inhabitants had taken a more active part in the unrest"^[3]. The imperial historian Potto confirms: on March 1, 1821, the troops "surrounded the village of Oisungur… and, to punish the inhabitants who had fled before their arrival, destroyed it completely," and in February 1822 Grekov "burned the villages of Shali and Malye Atagi"^[2].

Deployment of troops to forcibly suppress the liberation movement of Poles and Ukrainians during the November Uprising^[45].

Use of the regular army to forcibly suppress a mass anti-serfdom uprising of peasants in Slobozhanshchyna, known as the Shebelynka uprising^[44].

The government of the Tsardom of Muscovy organized military operations against Nokhchi societies: the historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov states that «the measures taken by Peter I to combat the Bulavin «rebeliya» and other uprisings, including on the Terek against Chechnya, were in essence punitive»^[33].

The Regular Army of the Russian Empire deployed armed contingents to suppress resistance in the region: historian Sh. B. Akhmadov records that "on July 23, 1722, a tsarist detachment headed by General Veterani... approached the village of Enderi"^[34].

Introduction of the "blackboard" regime — a total economic blockade of settlements, with a ban on cooperative and collective-farm trade and the removal of all goods from stores^[9].

Physical destruction of the armed forces of the supporters of independence in a general battle in order to eliminate the military potential of the resistance^[8].

Mass conscription of peasants as recruits and militia for participation in the Crimean War, which was arduous for the empire^[46].

Deployment of Muscovite garrisons headed by tsarist voivodes into the key centers of the autonomy (Kyiv, Pereiaslav, Nizhyn, Chernihiv, and others) to physically hold the territories under occupation^[27].

In the winter of 1831–1832, General Velyaminov, from his camp near the Groznaya fortress, dispatched troops against Chechen settlements in revenge for their support of the uprising: on December 23, 1831, Lieutenant Colonel Zass, commander of the Mozdok Cossack Regiment, devastated the hamlets on the right side of the Sunzha opposite the village of Chertugai, and in February 1832 Velyaminov "undertook an expedition to punish the Chechen villages lying up the Sunzha from the Groznaya fortress" — this is acknowledged by the imperial survey of military operations^[6]. The imperial historian Volkonsky wrote of the purpose of the raids: "to harass the enemy and divert his attention from our borders"^[19]. The historian Ya. Z. Akhmadov recorded: "Another large expedition was directed against the Chechen auls situated along the banks of the Sunzha"^[18].

Mass conscription into the militia and formation of Cossack regiments for the war against France (the formation of 22 regiments and 75,000 militiamen) on the basis of the authorities' false promises to restore Cossack liberties^[41].

Forced conscription of millions of Ukrainians into the Russian imperial army to take part in World War I for the alien geopolitical interests of empires^[50].